Full Judgment Text
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®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 9 DAY OF APRIL, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE N S SANJAY GOWDA
WRIT PETITION NO. 29559 OF 2018 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. RUDRAMMA.,
W/O LATE SIDDAPPA,
@ BADE SIDDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
2. SRI. MANJAPPA.,
S/O LATE SIDDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
3. SRI. REVANASIDDAPPA.,
S/O LATE SIDDAPPA.,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS.,
4. SMT. RATHNAMMA.,
D/O LATE SIDDAPPA.,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
ALL ARE AGRICULTURIST/COOLI
& R/O KENCHAMMANAHALLI VILLAGE,
DAVANAGERE TALUK AND DISTRICT.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. G.BALAKRISHNA SHASTRY., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA.,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY.,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
Digitally
signed by
KIRAN
KUMAR R
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
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M.S.BUILDING., BANGALORE-560 001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
DAVANAGERE DISTRICT.,
DAVANAGERE-577 001.
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
DAVANAGERE SUB-DIVISION.,
DAVANAGERE-577 001.
4. THE THASILDAR.,
DAVANAGERE,
DAVANAGERE-577001.
5. SRI. SHIVAPPA @ SHIVAKUMAR,
S/O MANGAMMA @ THUNGAMMA.,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
OCC:AGRICULTURE
R/AT KENCHAMMANAHALLI VILLAGE,
GUDAL POST.,
TQ & DATED DAVANAGERE-577 201.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA., AGA FOR R-1 TO R-4;
SRI. BHOJARAJA.S.V., ADVOCATE FOR C/R-5)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO
QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED:15.06.2018 PASSED BY
THE R-2 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C., ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 06.12.2024, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE N S SANJAY GOWDA
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CAV ORDER
1. On 31.11.1961, the land bearing R.Sy.No.29(37)
measuring 02 acres 20 guntas situated at
Kenchammanahalli village of Gudal post,
Davanagere District was granted by the Tahsildar to
one Siddappa son of Badesiddappa with a condition
that said land should not be alienated for a period of
fifteen years.
2. However, on 02.04.1970, Siddappa sold said land to
one G. Kotrappa son of Jimbagi Pachaksharappa
under a registered sale deed conveying the property
for a sale consideration of Rs.400/-.
3. Kotrappa, thereafter, proceeded to sell said land to
one K. G. Sharanappa son of Goudra Channappa
under the sale deed dated 28.02.1972 for a sale
consideration of Rs.1,000/-.
4. Ten years thereafter, on 19.07.1982, Siddappa—the
grantee approached the Assistant Commissioner by
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filing an application for resumption under the
provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) Act, 1978 (for short, “ the PTCL Act ”).
5. The Assistant Commissioner by an order dated
06.03.1984 directed resumption of the land in favour
of Siddappa and the same was also resumed in his
favour.
6. Siddappa, within a month of the above order being
passed, proceeded to alienate the land that was
resumed in his favour once again, by executing a
sale deed on 06.04.1985 in favour of Gowdra
Shivappa and Tungamma.
7. The Tahsildar submitted a report in the year 2002
informing the Assistant Commissioner about the
alienation, and the Assistant Commissioner
thereafter proceeded to initiate proceedings for a
second time under the PTCL Act for resumption.
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8. The Assistant Commissioner, ultimately, passed an
order on 20.02.2002 ordering resumption of the land
for the second time and held that the land was
vested in favour of the State Government.
9. Against this order of the Assistant Commissioner, an
appeal was preferred before the Deputy
Commissioner and the same was dismissed for non-
prosecution by the order dated 27.02.2006.
10. This order was challenged by Gowdra Shivappa—the
purchaser in Writ Petition No.11956 of 2006 and said
petition was allowed on 18.11.2008, remanding the
matter to the Assistant Commissioner to re-hear the
matter on merits.
11. On remand, the Assistant Commissioner proceeded to
come to the conclusion that the grantee had sold the
land on 06.04.1985 i.e., after the PTCL Act came
into force, without obtaining the permission under
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Section 4(2) of the Act and, consequently, ordered
for resumption of the subject land.
12. Aggrieved, Shivappa—the purchaser preferred an
appeal before the Deputy Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner by the impugned order dated
15.06.2018 has proceeded to allow the appeal,
principally, on the ground that there was an
inordinate delay in invoking the provisions of the
PTCL Act.
13. The Deputy Commissioner noticed that the alienation
was made in the year 1985 and proceedings for
resumption were initiated seventeen years thereafter
in the year 2002 and, in light of the order passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal
1
No.3131 of 2007 , came to the conclusion that the
proceedings had not been initiated within a
reasonable time and were consequently liable to be
set aside.
1
Ningappa v. Deputy Commissioner and Others, Civil Appeal No.3131/2007
disposed of on 14.07.2011
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14. Being aggrieved by this order of the Deputy
Commissioner refusing to resume the land, the
present petition is filed by the legal representatives
of Siddappa, the grantee.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. G.
Balakrishna Shastry, contended that the lands had
been sold after the PTCL Act had come into force on
06.04.1985 and was thus in clear violation of Section
4(2) of the Act. He submitted that once this clear
contravention was pointed out, the Deputy
Commissioner was bound to order for resumption.
He submitted that the question of delay would be
inconsequential, more so in light of the recent
amendment to the Act.
16. The learned counsel appearing for the purchaser, on
the other hand, contended that the order of the
Deputy Commissioner could not be found fault with,
in view of the inordinate delay of 20 years in
initiating the resumption proceedings.
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17. It was also contended that the proceedings for
resumption under the PTCL Act could not be invoked
more than once. It was contended that once an
application for resumption was filed and allowed,
restoring the lands to the grantee, the grantee could
not take advantage of the PTCL Act and once again
sell the land, seek cancellation of the sale deed and
then its resumption.
18. In light of the submission canvassed by the Learned
Counsel, the following questions would arise for
consideration in this petition.
i. Whether the order of the Deputy
Commissioner, refusing to resume
the land on the ground that
resumption proceedings had been
initiated belatedly, is correct; and
ii. When once the granted lands have
been resumed and restored to the
grantee under the provisions of the
PTCL Act, can the provisions of the
PTCL Act be invoked for a second
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time to annul a sale made after
restoration of the lands in favour of
the grantee?
19. The answer to the first question would have to be in
the affirmative , in light of the three Division Bench
rulings of this Hon’ble Court in the cases of
2 3 4
Gouramma , Akkayamma and Manjula which
have categorically held that invoking the provisions
of the PTCL Act belatedly—at any rate, after 12
5
years —would be illegal.
20. In the reported judgment rendered in Gouramma ’s
case, the Division Bench considered a decision of the
Apex Court rendered in the cases of Nekkanti
6 7
Rama Lakshmi and N. Murugesan to observe
and hold as follows:
2
Gouramma @Gangamma v. the Depuy Commissioner & Ors., 2024:KHC-
D:10666-DB .
3
Smt. Akkayamma v. the State of Karnataka & Ors., 2024:KHC:48227-DB.
4
Smt. M. Manjula & Ors. v. the Deputy Commissioner & Ors., 2024:KHC:
51015-DB .
5
Ibid.
6
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 14 SCC 232 .
7
Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 .
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“3(b) When above was the state of things as per
record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons
claiming under the original grantee could move
another application afresh on 27.08.2004...
Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty
two years spanning between alienation and the
filing of resumption application. There is
absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the
laches that militate on record and against justice.
Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court
decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of
Karnataka, that tardy and belated claims should
not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the
impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the
same cannot be faltered.
(c) x x x
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable
with retrospective effect is only a duplication of
the existing legal position. Such duplication
happened even in English legislative history,
hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of
delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is
silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced
to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any
change in the statutory scheme. At the most,
they are declaratory of what the statute has been
all through, so far as the limitation period is
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concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no
limitation period earlier and there is no limitation
period now too. Laches, which would involve a
host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation
period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse
of time between alienation of granted land and
the filing of claim for its resumption...
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates
might have taken place about the observations of
the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases
while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se
does not lend credence to the contention that the
said amendment intends to invalidate the law
declared by the highest court of the country
which it did after considering all aspects of the
matter including the sense of equity & justice. If
the Legislature intended to silence the voice of
Nekkanti, it would have employed a different
terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of limitation
prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided
keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are
replete in Law Reports relating to delay and
laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 &
227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to
illustrate.
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(g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay
& laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation &
delay’ that obtain in law. The following
observations of the Apex Court in Union of India
Vs. N.Murugesan make out this point...”
21. Furthermore, in Akkayamma ’s case as well,
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi was considered by
another Division Bench of this Court along with the
above-mentioned order passed in Gouramma ’s
case, thus affirming said position of law.
22. Even in the Manjula ’s case decided by a Division
Bench of this Court, the decision rendered in
Gouramma ’s case was considered along with
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi and N. Murugesan
(both supra ) to deny the relief of restoration of the
granted land since the applicants had approached
the relevant authorities or the Court with an
unreasonable delay. The relevant extracts of this
order are produced for ease of reference:
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“4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in
Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25],
the division bench highlighted the nice distinction
between ‘delay and *laches’, as against ‘limitation’.
It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription
of time for taking an action as contemplated by the
legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and
*laches’ has a different connotation to operate.
4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt.
Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above
reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined
without touching the aspects of validity of
amendment which is pending adjudication. It was
held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground
of *laches, the court would be justified in denying
the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring
the land to the applicant when he has approached
the court after unreasonable delay and his
approaching the court is marred by *laches.
5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that
the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of
the Court may not be provided to him on equitable
grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and
his action suffers from *laches,
5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the
delay and *laches has the facet in equity. Delay is
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the genus to which the *laches and acquiescence
are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay,
*laches and acquiescence have their own colour
and connotation and conceptually often different
from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in
the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant
in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any
proceedings. Laches concedes an element of
culpability in allowing time to pass by in
commencing the action in law.
6. In light of the above discussion and the position
of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case,
the restoration of the land cannot be permitted
after 12 years. The question of *laches would come
into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be
highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well
as against law to grant any relief to the original
grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting
restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of
the land taken place long back to be null and void.”
( emphasis supplied )
23. As could be seen from the above, various Division
Benches of this Court have noticed that even if the
recent amendment of 2023 to the PTCL Act is taken
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into consideration, the proceedings are,
nevertheless, required to be annulled if they are
vitiated due to delay and laches.
24. However, notwithstanding the answer to the first
question—which would result in the dismissal of the
writ petition—in my view, the second question would
also have to be considered in light of several cases
where the grantees, on getting their granted lands
resumed in their favour, have proceeded to once
again sell the land and are thereafter seeking
restoration of the lands for a second time.
25. In order to consider this question, the provisions of
the PTCL Act are required to be examined and
analysed. At the outset, it would be useful to
examine the Statement of Objects and Reasons in
the enactment, which read as follows:
“The non-alienation clause contained in
the existing Land Grant Rules and the
provision for cancellation of grants where
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the land is alienated in contravention of
the above said provision are found not
sufficient to help the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes grantees whose
ignorance and poverty have been
exploited by persons belonging to the
affluent and powerful sections to obtain
sales or mortgages either for a nominal
consideration or for no consideration at all
and they have become the victims of
circumstances. To fulfill the purposes of
the grant, the land even if it has been
alienated, should be restored to the
original grantee or his heirs .
The Government of India has also
been urging the State Government for
enacting a legislation to prevent alienation
of lands granted to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes by Government on the
lines of the model legislation prepared by
it and circulated to the State Government.
Hence the Bill.”
26. For interpreting the provisions of the PTCL Act,
though the Statement of Objects and Reasons would
not be conclusive for interpreting a statute,
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nevertheless, the same can be looked into to gather
the Intent of the Legislature in passing said
enactment.
27. As could be seen from the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, the PTCL Act was enacted after the
Legislature noticed two aspects which related to
grants made to persons belonging to the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (" SC/ST "). The first
aspect was that the non-alienation clause contained
in the existing land grant rules was inadequate, and
the second aspect was in relation to the provisions
covering the cancellation of grants— when the land
is alienated in contravention of the terms of the
grant—which were also felt as being insufficient to
help the SC/ST grantees whose ignorance and
poverty had been exploited by persons belonging to
the affluent and powerful sections of the society.
28. The Statement of Objects and Reasons also
categorically observe that in order to fulfil the
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purposes of the grant, the land, even if it has been
alienated, would have to be restored to the original
grantee or his heirs.
29. Basically, the Statement of Objects and Reasons
would indicate that the Legislature was concerned
mainly with alienations made prior to the PTCL Act
being enacted—in contravention of the terms of the
grant, the manner in which they were to be declared
as being void, and the manner in which they were
required to be restored to the grantee who had lost
the land.
30. This Act was also brought in to strengthen the
provisions which provided for cancellation of the
grants when they had been made in contravention of
the terms of the grant.
31. It must be noticed that in both the cases, where
alienations had been made prior to the Act and the
alienations that could be made after the Act came
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into force, the clear emphasis of the law was to
cover those granted lands which had been sold in
contravention of the terms of the grant .
32. It is obvious that the Legislature basically wanted to
remedy a situation where the SC/ST grantees were
exploited due to their ignorance and poverty and
were deprived of the lands which had been granted
to them by the State with the objective of uplifting
them, both in economic terms and in social terms.
In that sense, the PTCL Act can be considered as a
remedial statute designed to remedy a wrong done
in the past and a wrong which could be committed in
the future.
33. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act defines the expression
8
“ granted land ” and as per said definition, it would
8
3. Definitions.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) x x x
(b) “ granted land ” means any land granted by the
Government to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled
Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and includes land allotted or
granted to such person under the relevant law for the time
being in force relating to agrarian reforms or land ceilings or
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be a land which had been granted by the
Government to a person belonging to any of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and would
include land allotted to a grantee to such a person
under the relevant law for the time being in force
relating to agrarian reforms or land ceilings or
abolition of inams.
34. The word “ transfer ” has been defined under Section
9
3(1)(e) of the Act to mean sale, gift, exchange,
mortgage, lease or any other transaction not being a
partition among the members of a family and also
states that it includes any other transaction,
including the creation of a charge or an agreement
to sell, exchange, mortgage or lease.
abolition of inams, other than that relating to hereditary
offices or rights and the word “granted” shall be construed
accordingly;
9
3. Definitions.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) x x x
(e) “ transfer ” means a sale , gift, exchange, mortgage (with or
without possession), lease or any other transaction not being a
partition among members of a family or a testamentary disposition
and includes the creation of a charge or an agreement to sell,
exchange, mortgage or lease or enter into any other transaction.
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35. Thus, not only would a transfer effected in accordance
with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 , but even mere agreements to transfer the
granted lands would attract the provisions of the
Act.
36. Section 4 of the PTCL Act creates the statutory bar for
transfer of granted land, and the same reads as
follows:
“ 4. Prohibition of transfer of granted
lands.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any
law, agreement, contract or instrument, any
transfer of granted land made either before or
after the commencement of this Act, in
contravention of the terms of the grant of such
land or the law providing for such grant, or
sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no
right, title or interest in such land shall be
conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed
by such transfer.
(2) No person shall, after the
commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire
by transfer any granted land without the
previous permission of the Government.
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(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and
(2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in
execution of a decree or order of a civil court or
of any award or order of any other authority.”
37. As can be noticed from the above extraction of
Section 4, sub-section (1) declares that any transfer
of granted lands made either before or after the
commencement of the Act would be null and void, if
they were made in contravention of the terms of the
grant of such land or the law providing for such
grant and no right, title or interest in the granted
lands would stand conveyed to the purchaser.
38. Any alienation made in contravention of Section 4(2)
i.e., without obtaining the prior approval of the
Government, would also be null and void.
39. Section 4 basically deals with the act of alienation
which has been done prior to the Act and an
alienation which may be made after the
commencement of the act, both alienations having
been done in violation of the terms of the grant.
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Thus, on a plain reading, the provision will stand
attracted only when the granted lands have been
transferred for the first time in contravention of the
terms of the grant and it does not contemplate to
govern the transfer made after the lands have been
resumed and restored to the grantee under the Act.
40. Section 5 provides the manner in which a transfer
made in contravention of the terms of the grant is to
be resumed and restored to the original grantee or
his legal heirs, and if there are no legal heirs, then
to be granted to other persons belonging to SC/ST.
41. The intent of the law is thus manifestly clear, that it is
designed to undo a wrong by declaring the alienation
void and restore the land to the grantee so that he
can utilize the land for the purpose that it is granted,
which was to uplift them from their social and
financial backwardness.
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42. The question that however arises now is whether
these provisions could be invoked for a second time,
after the lands have been resumed and restored to
the grantee.
43. As already noticed above, a grantee who had
alienated the land in contravention of the terms of
the grant is enabled by the provisions of the PTCL
Act to get the land back, notwithstanding that he
had lost it by his own act. Such a grantee is
conscious and aware of the fact that there is an
enactment which seeks to protect him and his
granted land. He is, as a consequence, also aware
that he could not have sold the land. He would also
therefore be aware of the fact that he cannot sell the
land which has been restored to him by virtue of
Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. In short, the grantee,
by invoking the provisions of the Act and getting
back his land, is also clearly aware of the fact that
the PTCL Act prohibits himself from alienating said
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land without securing the prior permission of the
Government.
44. The question as to whether the transfer sought to be
made by the grantee for a second time is in
accordance with the terms of the grant or the law
relating to the grant, is not being considered in this
case, and for the purpose of considering the effect of
the alienation after such land is resumed, it is
assumed that prior permission of the Government
was necessary.
45. While dealing with a challenge to the validity of the
PTCL Act and considering a case where the
alienation was made in contravention of the terms of
the grant prior to the commencement of the PTCL
Act, specifically considering the contention of the
transferee’s right, the Apex Court in the case of
10
Manchegowda has held as follows:
10
Manchegowda & Ors. v. the State of Karnataka & Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 301.
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“15. Any person who acquires such granted
land by transfer from the original grantee in
breach of the condition relating to prohibition
on such transfer must necessarily be presumed
to be aware of the prohibition imposed on the
transfer of such granted land. Anybody who
acquires such granted land in contravention of
the prohibition relating to transfer of such
granted land cannot be considered to be a bona
fide purchaser for value; and every such
transferee acquires to his knowledge only a
voidable title to the granted land. The title
acquired by such transfer is defeasible and is
liable to be defeated by an appropriate action
taken in this regard. If the Legislature under
such circumstances seek to intervene in the
interests of these weaker sections of the
community and choose to substitute a speedier
and cheaper method of recovery of these
granted lands which were otherwise liable to be
resumed through legal process, it cannot, in
our opinion, be said that any vested rights of
the transferees are affected. Transferees of
granted lands with full knowledge of the legal
position that the transfers made in their favour
in contravention of the terms of grant or any
law, rule or regulation governing such grant are
liable to be defeated in law, cannot and do not
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have in law or equity, a genuine or real
grievance that their defeasible title in such
granted lands so transferred is, in fact, being
defeated and they are being dispossessed of
such lands from which they were in law liable
to be dispossessed by process of law. The
position will, however, be somewhat different
where the transferees have acquired such
granted lands not in violation of any term of
the grant or any law regulating such grant as
also where any transferee who may have
acquired a defeasible title in such granted lands
by the transfer thereof in contravention of the
terms of the grant or any law regulating such
grant has perfected his title by prescription of
time or otherwise. We shall consider such cases
later on. But where the transferee acquires only
a defeasible title liable to be defeated in
accordance with law, avoidance of such
defeasible title which still remains liable to be
defeated in accordance with law at the date of
commencement of the Act and recovery of
possession of such granted land on the basis of
the provisions contained in Section 4 and
Section 5 of the Act cannot be said to be
constitutionally invalid and such a provision
cannot be termed as unconscionable, unjust
and arbitrary. The first two contentions raised
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on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore,
overruled.”
46. Though the Apex Court was dealing with the case of
persons who had purchased the granted land, said
principle would apply with even more vigour in its
application to the grantee in respect of alienations
made after the land was resumed in his favour,
simply because the grantee had also become aware
of the restrictive provisions of the PTCL Act, having
invoked it to secure a benefit.
47. If a grantee has secured the benefit under the
provisions of the PTCL Act, surely, he would also be
bound by the provisions of the very same Act which
curtails his benefit of alienating the land without the
permission of the Government. If a grantee seeks to
disregard the prohibition contained in the remedial
statute and essentially abuses it, he cannot
obviously be given the benefit of the beneficial
provisions of the Act. A grantee, while being entitled
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to the benefits of the Act, would also be bound by
the restrictive clauses in the Act and is liable for the
consequences of disregarding the provisions of the
PTCL Act.
48. The provisions of the PTCL Act were not meant to
grant a licence to grantees to sell the lands that
were resumed in their favour and once again seek
restoration. In other words, a grantee who is aware
of the beneficial provisions of the PTCL Act is also
presumed to be aware of the restrictive clauses in
the same Act which curtails his benefit in dealing
with the resumed land. A grantee cannot abuse a
remedial statute to perpetuate an illegality and, at
the same time, secure a process which legitimizes
his illegal act repeatedly. The Act was designed to
help the weak and downtrodden and not abuse their
weakness in order to unjustly enrich themselves.
49. In fact, if such a procedure—of selling the granted
lands in contravention of the terms of the grant,
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then securing its resumption and thereafter, once
again selling the resumed land before seeking its
resumption again—is allowed, it would clearly
amount to a mockery of the law, making the entire
procedure of resumption a mere parody.
50. The PTCL Act was designed to safeguard the interests
of the persons belonging to SC/ST who were socially
and financially weak and the provisions of the Act
cannot be used by persons belonging to the SC/ST
to do an illegal act and reap an immoral and
unethical benefit by invoking the provisions of the
Act. A legislative armour, designed to protect a
deprived class, cannot be used by the deprived class
to perpetuate an illegality and gain immunity from
such illegal acts.
51. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhadre
11
Gowda ’s case has held as follows:
11
Bhadre Gowda v. Deputy Commissioner, (2012) 2 KCCR 1529.
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“ 6. Despite our aforesaid conclusion, it is
imperative for us not to leave the matter without
examining the further consequences which are
liable to flow after the grantee succeeds in getting
the sale made by him, set aside. It is essential for
us to travel a little further and determine the
matters arising out of violation of Section 4 of the
PTCL Act, wherein, the original grantee
repeatedly sells the grant land, and then seeks
annulment of the sale. These are cases where the
vendor successfully reaps the benefit of his own
wrong. This case, like others dealt with by us,
reveals the misuse of a legislative enactment for
personal gains. In the first instance, the original
grantee Cheluvaiah sold the grant land on
01.10.1962. Having succeeded in getting the
aforesaid sale declared as void, the grant land
came to be restored back to him. Fully aware of
the fact that he could not have sold the grant
land, he sold it yet again to Somegowda on
03.02.1992. Cheluvaiah again succeeded in
getting the second sale made by him set aside, so
as to retrieve the land. The question that we wish
to determine is, whether having got the sale
revoked, the original grantee is entitled to retain
the consideration amount received by him?. We
are satisfied, that repeated sales at the hands of
the original grantee constitutes the offence of
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cheating under the Section 420 of the Penal
Code, 1860. A person who cheats, is definitely
not entitled to seek restoration of the grant land
and retain the consideration received by him by
sale thereof. It is therefore, that we desire to
hereby grant liberty to the appellants to recover
the sale consideration paid by Somegowda to
Cheluvaiah on 03.02.1992 as the grant land has
been restored to Cheluvaiah (now his legal heirs).
The other alternative, as we have concluded
hereinabove, is not available to the appellants in
view of the Section 4 of the PTCL Act. Cheluvaiah
(his legal heirs as is the position in this case) are
certainly not entitled to retain the consideration
received by them, based on a sale in violation of
Section 4 of the PTCL Act. Thus, it shall be open
to the appellants herein to seek the refund of the
sale consideration along with interest thereon, if
they are so advised, by proceeding against the
respondents through a civil litigation, if the
amount is unilaterally not refunded.
7. It also needs to be recorded here, that when a
grantee repeatedly sells the grant land, it is open
to the vendee to initiate criminal prosecution
against him. Such repeated sale is nothing but a
process of cheating. Even though the instant
determination at our hands may not be available
to the appellants herein against Cheluvaiah, who
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has since died, but this determination shall
certainly deter to the original grantees from
misusing the legislative enactment under
reference for personal monitory (monetary)
gains.”
( emphasis supplied )
52. It is therefore clear that this Court has clearly held
that the act of a grantee in repeatedly selling the
granted lands which had been resumed in his favour
would be a criminal offence amounting to cheating.
The provisions of a remedial statute cannot be
utilized for perpetuating a crime.
53. Learned Counsel appearing for the grantee, Sri.
Shastry, however, sought to rely upon a
Constitutional Bench judgment of the Apex Court
12
rendered in the case of Hansoli Devi to contend
that a literal interpretation of statutory provision
would have to be adopted when the language of the
provision was clear and unambiguous, and it was
12
Union of India v. Hansoli Devi & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 3240.
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only when there was a doubt that a plain reading
would lead to anomalies or injustice should a
purposive interpretation be adopted.
54. It is to be stated here that there is no ambiguity in
Section 4 of the PTCL Act. On a plain reading of
Section 4, it cannot be in doubt that an alienation
made in contravention of the terms of the grant or
under a transfer in violation of Section 4(2) would be
null and void. However, Section 4 only contemplated
that a transfer made for the first time alone was
required to be annulled and it did not contemplate
subsequent alienations made by a grantee after the
lands were restored to his favour. In fact, if the
argument that the grantee, on getting the land
resumed, can once again proceed to sell the lands
without obtaining the permission of the Government
is accepted, this would only mean that a literal
interpretation would only lead to an anomalous
situation where the provisions of the PTCL Act was
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capable of rampant abuse. Such an argument would
also lead to an unjust situation where a grantee is
being granted a benefit despite his illegal action.
Thus, in this case, a literal interpretation of Section
4 would not be appropriate, and a purposive
interpretation would be absolutely needed. In fact, it
would be the need of the hour since the Division
Bench of this Court in Bhadre Gowda ’s case
(extracted supra ) has clearly held that the action of
a grantee, in once again (or repeatedly) selling the
lands which are resumed in his favour, amounts to a
crime.
55. In this view of the matter, the clear proposition of law
that would emerge is that if a grantee or his legal
heirs, on getting the lands resumed and restored in
their favour, once again choose to sell the lands that
are restored to them, then, they would not be
entitled to invoke the provisions of the PTCL Act for
the second time and seek resumption and
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restoration of the lands. The second question is
accordingly answered.
56. It therefore follows that the proceedings initiated
under the PTCL Act for resuming the lands which had
been sold after they had been earlier resumed under
the provisions of the PTCL Act would be illegal and
without jurisdiction.
57. This writ petition is therefore dismissed .
SD/-
(N S SANJAY GOWDA)
JUDGE
RK
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 117