Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GOPAL KRISHNA DAS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SAILENDRA NATH BISWAS & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT26/02/1975
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
GUPTA, A.C.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 1290 1975 SCR (3) 726
1975 SCC (1) 815
ACT:
Civil Procedure Code--Order 21 Rule 71--Meaning of
deficiency of price accrued by reason of the auction
purchasers’ default--Whether deficiency should be
attributable to the default of auction purchaser--Section
12(2) of Limitation Act 1963--Time requisite for obtaining
certified copy--Whether means time properly required or
includes time spent negligently.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was one of the joint owners of the premises in
question. In ,,execution of a money decree obtained against
the appellant his share in the property was put to sale and
was purchased by the father of the first respondent for Rs.
77,000. The purchaser deposited 25 per cent of the purchase
price. The property was put to sale once again and was in
fact knocked down for a sum of Rs. 700/- in favour of the
father of respondent No. 1. The appellant made an
application under Order XXI Rule 71 of C.P.C. for recovering
the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale from
the purchase. Order XXI Rule 71 C.P.C. reads as under :--
"Any deficiency of price which may happen on a
re-sale by reason of the purchaser’s default
and all expenses attending such re-sale, shall
be certified to the Court by the Officer or
other person holding the sale, and shall at
the instance of either the decree holder or
the judgment debtor, be recoverable from the
defaulting purchaser under the provisions
relating to the execution of a decree for the
payment of money."
The proclamation of sale for the first sale stated that the
premises were free from encumbrances. Proclamation for the
second sale, however, states that the entire ground floor
excepting two road-side shops, was let out.
The Learned Single Judge allowed the application of the
appellant and directed the purchaser to pay the deficiency
with interest. The Division Bench ,of the High Court
allowed the appeal and dismissed application filed by the
appellant under Order XXI Rule 71 for recovering from the
auction purchaser the deficiency in the said price. On
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appeal by certificate under Article 133(1)(a) & (c) it was
contended before this Court by the appellant that he was
entitled to recover from the first respondent the deficiency
in the price realised in the second sale under Order XXI
Rule 71. The respondent contended that the appellant can
recover the defficiency in the second sale only if it can be
attributed to default of the auction purchaser.
HELD:
The application of Order XXI rule 71 is limited to cases in
which the deficiency of price has occurred by reason of the
auction purchaser’s default. Property once put to sale in
execution proceedings may have to be resold for reasons
which may or may not be connected with the default of the
auction purchaser. It is not enough that the resale is
occasioned by the default of the auction purchaser. It is
further necessary that the resale must result in a defi-
ciency of price which deficiency is attributable to the
default of the auction purchaser. In the first proclamation
of sale there was no mention of the lease. In the second
proclamation the lease has been mentioned. In the city of
Calcutta where premises are situated, the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was in force at the time of the
second sale. Under that Act tenants enjoyed the privileges
of standard rent and immunity from eviction. The reference
in the second sale proclamation to a lease and to the fact
that substantial part of the property was in occupation of
the tenant was bound to affect the marketability of the
property. Order XXI rule 71 is intended to provide an
expeditious remedy to the judgment debtor or the decree
holder who has suffered a detriment due to the default of
the auction purchaser. [729C; G; 731B-D]
727
(2) The appeal before the Division Bench was not time
barred. The time requisite for obtaining Certified copy
means time properly required and an appellant cannot in
computation of the period of limitation :for filing the
appeal ask for exclusion of time which was spent
negligently. in the present case settlement of the, draft
decree was adjourned from time to time by an officer of the
court on being properly satisfied that there was good reason
for adjournment. The Auction purchaser cannot be blamed for
the time thus spent in settling the draft of the decree
under appeal. [734F-G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal no. 10, 2332 &
2333 of 1968.
From the Judgment & Order dated the 21st March, 1967 of the
Calcutta High Court in Appeal Nos. 9, 10 and 43 of 1959.
P. K. Sen and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
A. K. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Mrs. Anjana Sen,
for respondent No. 1
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J. Premises No. 4-A, Chowringhee Road, Cal-
cutta, belonged to the appellant Gopal Krishna Das and four
others, each having an undivided one-fifth share therein.
In 1951, one Ganga Prosad Gupta obtained two money-decrees
against the appellant and another person in the total sum of
Rs. 12,378. In execution of these decrees, the undivided
one-fifth share of the appellant was put to sale on June 16,
1954 and was purchased by Pashupati Nath Biswas, the father
of the first respondent, for Rs. 77,040. Pashupati Nath
Biswas deposited Rs. 19,260 in the court, being 25% of the
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purchase price and later he deposited a further sum of Rs.
15,000. He however, failed to pay the balance of the
purchase price whereupon the appellant made an application
that the property be put to a fresh sale. Accordingly, the
property was put to sale on March 20, 1957 and once again
Pashupati Nath Biswas was the highest bidder. But whereas
in the first sale he had offered a bid of Rs. 77,040 this
time the sale was knocked down in his favour for a paltry
sum of Rs. 700. The second sale was confirmed on May 29,
1957.
In the meanwhile, on May 16, 1957 the Sheriff certified
under Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure that
the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale due
to the default of the auction purchaser, after giving him
credit in the sum of Rs, 15,000 paid by him in the first
sale, amounted to Rs. 61,340 apart from the cost and
expenses of the sales.
On June 28, 1957 the appellant made an application under
Order XXI, Rule 71 C.P.C. for recovering the deficiency from
Pashupati Nath Biswas. A learned single Judge of the
Calcutta High Court allowed that application and direct by
an order dated August 19, 1958 that Pashupati Nath Biswas do
pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 42,080 with interest at 6%
per annum. This order was challenged by Pashupati Nath
Biswas in appeal No. 10 of 1959.
The auction purchaser had also filed an application asking
that the appellant be restrained from taking execution
proceedings for recover-
728
ing the deficiency in price. That prayer was rejected. It
may be mentioned that pursuant to an application dated April
13, 1957 filed by the auction purchaser himself, it was
directed by an order dated May 21, 1957 that a sum of Rs.
22,000 be paid by the, Sheriff out of the sale proceeds
lying with him, to the Official Receiver in satisfaction of
the decree obtained by Ganga Prosad Gupta against the appe-
llant, in execution of which the two sales were held. Ganga
Prosad Gupta’s estate, it seems, had come to be vested in
the Official Receiver, he is the second respondent to these
appeals. The auction purchaser prayed that the Sheriff do
pay to him the balance after deducting therefrom the sum of
Rs. 22,000 and the cost and the expenses of the Sheriff.
This prayer was also rejected. The auction purchaser filed
appeal No. 9 of 1959 against the order rejecting this
application.
The appellant then filed an application for an order
directing that the Sheriff do pay to him all the moneys
lying with him after deducting the cost and the expenses of
the sales. That application was allowed by the learned
single Judge on December 11, 1958. The auction purchaser
challenged that order in appeal No. 43 of 1959.
The three appeals were heard together and disposed of by a
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by three separate
judgments. By its. judgment dated March 21, 1967 the
Division Bench allowed appeal No. 10 of 1959, and dismissed
the application filed by the appellant under order XXI, Rule
71 for recovering from the auction purchaser the deficiency
in the sale price. The two other appeals were disposed of
consistently with that judgment. The auction purchaser
Pashupati Nath Biswas having died on April 16, 1964, the
first respondent Sailendra Nath Biswas came on the record of
the, appeals as his Executor and legal representative. On
December 15, 1967 the High Court granted to the appellant
leave to file an appeal to this Court under Article
133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution.
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Questions ’raised in the High Court by the rival parties as
regards the disbursement by the Sheriff of the balance
remaining with him after.satisfying Ganga Prosad Gupta’s
decree are incidental to the main controversy arising out of
the appellant’s application- under Order XXI, Rule 71, Code
of Civil Procedure. The real question for decision is
whether the appellant is entitled under Order XXI, Rule 71,
to recover from the first respondent the deficiency in the
price realised in the second sale.
The scheme of the Code in relation to execution sales is
like this Under Order XXI, Rule 64 any Court executing a
decree may order the sale of a property in satisfaction of
the decree. Order 21, Rule 66 provides that the Court shall
cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made. Sub-
Rule (2) of Rule 66 specifies the details which are required
to be mentioned in the proclamation of sale. The person
declared to be the purchaser must under order XXI, Rule 84,
pay immediately after the declaration a deposit of 25% of
the purchase-money. In default of such deposit the property
has to be re-sold forthwith. By Rule 85 the full amount of
purchase-money has to be paid by the purchaser within 15
days from the date of sale. If the
729
purchaser commits a default, the deposit is liable to be
forfeited to the Government by virtue of Rule 86 and the
property is liable to be re-sold. A re-sale of property, in
default of payment of the purchase-money, can be made only
after the issue of a fresh proclamation as provided in Rule
87. Under Order 21, Rule 71 :
"Any deficiency of price which may happen on a
re-sale by reason of the purchaser’s default,
and all expenses attending such re-sale, shall
be certified to the Court by the officer or
other person holding the sale, and shall, at
the instance of either the decree holder or
the judgment debtor, be recoverable from the
defaulting purchaser under the provisions
relating to the execution of a decree for the
payment of money
It is clear on a careful reading of Rule 71 that its
application is limited to cases in which the deficiency of
price has occurred by reason of the auction purchaser’s
default. Property once put to sale in execution proceedings
may have to be re-sold for reasons which may or may not be
connected with the default of the, auction purchaser. A re-
sale consequent on the failure of the auction purchaser to
deposit 25% of the purchase price immediately after he is
declared to be the purchaser of the property or a re-sale
consequent upon his failure to deposit the balance of the
purchase price within 15 days of the safe are instances’
when the re-sale is occasioned by the default of the auction
purchaser. On the other hand, re-sale consequent upon the
setting aside of the sale on the ground of material
irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale as
provided in Order XXI, Rule 90, may not be attributable to
the default of the purchaser.’ The provisions of Order XXI,
Rule 71, come into play only if the property is required to
be resold on account of the default of the action purchaser.
If the re-sale, is not due to the auction purchaser’s
default, there can be no question of mulcting him with the
deficiency in the price realised in the re-sale.
The words : "Any deficiency of price which may happen on a
resale by reason of the purchaser’s default" occurring in
Rule 71 therefore mean : "Any deficiency of price which on a
resale may happen by reason of the purchaser’s default". As
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stated before, the question of holding the auction purchaser
liable to make good the defficiency in price can arise only
if the re-sale is occasioned by his default. But though,
this is necessary, it is not enough to meet the requirements
of Rule 71. What is necessary is that the re-sale
occasioned by the auction purchaser’s default must result in
a deficiency of price, which deficiency is attributable to
his default. A resale may have to be held because the
auction purchaser has committed default in paying the
deposit of 25% under Order XXI, Rule 84, or because of his
default in paying the full price which 15 days of the sale
as required by Rule 85. And yet the deficiency of price
realised in the re-sale may not be attributable to his
default as, for example, where the market value of the
property is reduced to the discovery or disclosure of an
infirmity in the right, title and interest of the judgment-
debtor in the property put to sale. An encumbrance existing
on the property at
730
the time of the first sale but not disclosed in the
proclamation of that sale will have no bearing on the price
realised in the auction sale, unless the existence of the
encumbrance was otherwise known to the bidders. The
disclosure of that encumbrance in the sale proclamation
accompanying the re-sale must, on normal commercial con-
siderations, have a direct impact on the price, of the
property put to sale. In such a case the deficiency of
price realised in the resale will be attributable not
necessarily to the default of the auction ,purchaser but to
circwnstances extraneous to his default. Order XXI, Rule
71, concerns itself not with that class of cases but with
those in which the deficiency of price realised in the re-
sale is attributable to the default of the auction
purchaser.
Even a broad and non-too-meticulous examination of the two
proclamation of sale in the instant case is enough to
conclude that the deficiency in price realised in the re-
sale cannot be said to have happened on account of the
auction purchaser’s default. The first sale was held on
June 16, 1954 and the proclamation of sale accompanying it
is dated May 10, 1954. The second sale was held on March
20, 1957 for which the relevant sale proclamation is dated
February 8, 1957. Both the proclamations mention that what
was being put to sale was the right, little and interest of
the appellant, Gopal Krishna Das, in the undivided one fifth
share in the particular property. But there is a material
difference in the terms of the two proclamations in regard
to the encumbrances existing on the property. The
proclamation of 1954 sets out in a tabular form encumbrances
like leases and mortgages to which the ,Property was
previously subjected, as appearing from the affidavit of one
Damodar Mullick. The proclamation then says :-
"It appears from the said affidavit that all
the Mortgages have been reconveyed. The lease
has expired. The sale is in respect of the
undivided 1/5th share of Purna Ch. Das. It
appears from the said affidavit that the 1/5th
share of Gopal Kr. Das in the said premises
is free from encumbrances."
The proclamation of 1957, relying on an affidavit of one
Sudhansu Kumar Roy says undoubtedly that the, appellant’s
one-fifth share was free from encumbrances but the tabular
statement of encumbrances included in the proclamation
refers to a Term Lease and Agreement of 1955 and the
proclamation says :
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"The lease of 1955 is for five years from
October, 1955 and the same is in respect of
the Restaurant "Bombay Crown" containing the
entire ground floor excenting two road side
shops and was executed by one Abde Ali Abdul
Hussain, in favour of Ashlifaq and Jaffar
Hussain."
It is notorious that properties in possession of tenants who
enjoy the protection of Rent Acts do not fetch the same
price as properties of which the purchaser can obtain vacant
possesion. In the
731
city of Calcutta where the Property in question is situated,
The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, XII of 1956, was in
force, at the time of the second sale. Under that Act the
tenants enjoyed the privileges of standard rent and immunity
from eviction save on stated grounds. It is unnecessary to
enter into refinements arising out of the West Bengal Act
but even the sub-tenants would appear to enjoy thereunder a
certain amount of immunity from eviction. Reference may in
this behalf be made to sections 13(2), (4), (5) and section
16 of the Act of 1956.
The reference in the second sale proclamation to a live
lease and sub-lease and to the fact that a substantial part
of tlie property was in occupation of the tenant or the sub-
tenant was bound to affect the marketability of the
property. The paltry price realised in the second sale may
justifiably be attributed to the disclosure of encumbrances
in the second proclamation, which were not mentioned in the
first proclamation. It is not without significance that
apart from the auction purchaser there were no bidders at
the second sale. The paucity of bidders may reasonably be
taken to reflect the fall in the value of the property in
the estimation of prospective bidders.
Order XXI, Rule 71 is intended to provide an expeditious
remedy to the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder who has
suffered a detriment due to the default of the auction
purchaser. The officer or other person holding the sale has
to. certify to the Court the deficiency of price which on,
the re-sale has happened by the purchaser’s default and all
expenses attending the re-sale. Upon such certification the
amount becomes recoverable from the defaulting purchaser at
the instance of the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor,
"under the provisions relating to the execution of a decree
for the payment of money". The Code has not made the
certificate conclusive of the facts stated therein and
consequently it is permissible to the purchaser who is
alleged to have defaulted to challenge the correctness of
the certificate in all its particulars. But the object of
certification, as evidenced even more clearly by the
provision that the proceeding to recover the amount will be
governed by provisions relating to the execution of a money
decree is to eschew an elaborate inquiry into the competing
causes culminating in the deficiency of price., This object
can be achieved only if the property successively put to
sale is in material respects identical, that is to say if
the right. title and interest of the judgment debtor is put
to sale under substantially the same description. If that
happens it is easy to predicate that the deficiency of price
has resulted on account of the purchaser’s default. But if,
as here, what was shown as unencumbered in the previous
proclamation is expressly described in the later
proclamation as being subject to an encumbrance which on a
reasonable assessment, is calculated to affect the market
value of the property, the proceeding ceases to be a simple
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enough matter like the execution of a money decree and
assumes the form of a contentious claim open to diverse
defences as in a substantive suit. The speedy remedy intend
to be provided by Order XXI, Rule 71 will lose its meaning
and
732
purpose if the executing court seized of the claim against
the, alleged defaulting purchaser has to embark upon a
comparative, evaluation of the causes that led to the
deficiency in the price. Such, meat is not for the
executing court.
Counsel for the appellant relied on certain decisions to
fasten liability on the auction purchaser but those
decisions will not help. In Annavajhula Venkatachellamayya
v. Rama Girjee Milakanta Girjee(1), a purchaser in a court
auction of the judgment-debtor’s right to get a re-
conveyance of certain lands on payment of a specified sum
was, on default in payment of the balance purchase money,
held liable to pay the deficiency in price on re-sale under
Order XXI, Rule 71, C.P.C., though the date stipulated for
making the payment in order to get the re-conveyance
happened to be shortly after the court sale and before the
expiry of the 15 days within which the auction purchaser
could deposit the balance of the purchase-money. Wallis
C.J. observes in his judgment that the sale and the re-sale,
were of the, judgment-debtor’s interest as it existed at the
date of the sale and the re-sale and that the depreciation
which occurred in the meantime was one for which the auction
purchaser was exclusively responsible. In his concurring
judgment Kumaraswami Sastriyar J. observes that having
regard to the fact that there is no warrant of title in a
court auction, the maxim caveat emptor applies and therefore
the purchaser cannot avoid the sale so long as the judgment-
debtor has some saleable interest in the property, howsoever
small. The learned Judge further observes that the
objections which a defaulting purchaser can urge are
practically confined to those which can be. urged in an
application for setting aside the sale under Order XXI.
Relying on these observations it is contended on behalf of
the appellant that since in the instant case the judgment-
debtor had a saleable interest the auction purchaser cannot
avoid his liability to make up the deficiency in price on
the ground that the deficiency was caused by the disclosure
of the encumbrance. We are unable to appreciate the
relevance of the maxim caveat emptor on a question like the
one before us. The auction purchaser is not attempting to
avoid the sale. Far from it. He adheres to his purchase
but disputes his liability for the deficiency. There is no
question of any failure on his part to take due care at the
time of the first sale because that sale was held in 1954
whereas the encumbrance referred to in the second
proclamation was stated to have been created in 1955.
Madho v. Watsalubai(2), on which the appellant relies, was a
case in which the existence of a maintenance charge and the
right of residence were omitted to be mentioned in the sale
proclamation. The High Court at Nagpur held that the
auction purchaser could not avoid his liability to make good
the deficiency in the sale price as the decree-bolder in
whose favour the charge was created had reiterated again and
again that she was willing to waive the charge. Hidaya-
tullah J. who decided the case further observes in his
judgment that
(1) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 474.
(2) I.L.R. [1947] Nag. 939.
733
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on a comparison of the two sale proclamations he found that
the existence of the charge was not mentioned in either.
Naturally, the deficiency in price could not be attributed
to the, existence of the charge.
In Nelluri Brahmaiah vs. Mohd. Sheik Mohiddin and Anr.,(1)
the auction purchaser disputed his liability for the,
deficiency on the ground that the judgment debtor had no
saleable interest in the property. This contention was
based on the circumstance that though the property was
situated in Venkatapuram it was wrongly described as lying
within the limits of Borrampalem. There was no dispute
about the boundaries, about the survey number or the area
and it was not suggested that there was any other property
of the particular description in Borrampalem. The High
Court of Andra Pradesh held that in these circumstances the
property could be easily identified, that the location of
the property put to sale was known to everyone concerned and
therefore it was difficult to posit that the judgment-debtor
had no saleable interest in the property.
The decisions in Baijnath Sahai vs. Moheep Narain Singh(")
and in Gangadas Dayabhai vs. Bai Suraj(3) , are more to the
point. These cases arose under section 293 of the Code of
1882 corresponding to Order XXI, Rule 71, of the Code of
1908. In the Calcutta case, at the first sale no
encumbrance upon the properties sold was notified. In the
re-sale two encumbrances were notified. The second sale was
held because the auction purchaser had committed a default
in paying the balance, of the purchase-price in the first
sale. The price fetched in the second sale resulted in a
deficiency for which the auction purchaser was sought to be
made liable. Apart from the circumstance that the decree-
holder was himself to blame for not mentioning the
encumbrances in the first proclamation and was therefore
attempting to obtain an advantage of his own wrong, the
Calcutta High Court expressed the legal position correctly
by saying that "the re-sale contemplated by s. 293 of the
Code of Civil Procedure must be a sale of the same property
that was first sold, and under the same description, and any
substantial difference of description at the sale and the
re-sale in any of the matters required to be specified by s.
287 to enable intending purchasers to judge of the value of
the property should disentitle the decree-holder to recover
the deficiency of price ,under s. 293." In the Bombay Case
the errors in the two proclamations were so confusing that
the deficiency in the price could not, it was held, be
attributed to the default of the purchaser. The description
in the second proclamation being materially different from
that in the first, the re-sale was not of the same property
and the auction purchaser, though he had defaulted in paying
the balance of the purchase-price was absolved from making
good the deficiency.
It was contended that Pashupati Nath Biswas, the auction
purchaser, being in possession of a part of the property
must be deemed
(1) [1964] (1) Andhra Law Times, 321.
(2) I. L. R. 16 Cal. 535.
(3) I. L. R. 36 Bom. 329.
734
to have been aware of the lease and the sub-lease and
therefore he is estopped from relying upon the same as
having led to the deficiency in, price. No estoppel can
arise against the auction purchaser on the question whether
the deficiency in price can be recovered from him. The
question which arises under Order XXI, Rule 71 is whether
the deficiency can be attributed to the default of the,
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auction purchaser or whether it can be reasonably attributed
to any other supervening circumstance. This is not a case
in which the auction purchaser can be said to be taking
advantage of his own wrong. He cannot therefore be estopped
from contending that the disclosure of the encumbrance is
the operative cause of the fall in price.
We may mention that the matter under consideration arose out
of the Ordinary Original civil jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court and therefore the Original Side Rules of the High
Court would govern the matter. That will, however, not make
any difference to our decision because Chapter XXV, Rule 7
of the Rules of 1914 provides by the Third clause for re-
sale of the property in default of the payment of the price
by the purchaser within the stipulated time,. The Third
clause of Rule 7 provides : "Where the proceeds of the re-
sale are less than the price bid by such defaulting
purchaser, the difference shall be leviable from him under
the rules contained in Order XXI of the Code for the
execution of a decree for money." The Fifth clause of Rule 7
also provides that the sale. is made under and subject to
all other provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure relating to sales in execution of decrees. Order
XXI, Rule 71 of the Code would therefore apply.
It was finally contended on behalf of the appellant that the
appeal filed by the auction purchaser from the judgment of
the single Judge to the Division Bench of the High Court was
barred by limitation. We see no substance in this
contention. The time requisite for obtaining certified
copies undoubtedly means "the time properly required" and an
appellant cannot in the computation of the period of
limitation for filling the appeal ask for exclusion of time
which was spent negligently. But the facts and dates
mentioned to us by the appellant’s counsel show that the
settlement of the draft decree was adjourned from time to
time by an officer of the court on being property satisfied
that there was good reason for adjournment. The auction
purchaser cannot be blamed for the time thus spent in set-
tling the draft of the decree under appeal. The argument
must therefore fail.
For these reasons we confirm the judgments and dismiss these
appeals with Costs. Costs shall be in one set.
P.H.P. Appeals dismissed.
735