Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MURARI LAL S/o RAM SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/11/1979
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION:
1980 AIR 531 1980 SCR (2) 249
1980 SCC (1) 704
CITATOR INFO :
R 1992 SC2100 (30)
ACT:
Evidence Act-Expert opinion-Testimony of handwriting
expert-If could not be accepted without corroboration-
Opinion evidence-Its nature-Explained.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was charged with the offence of
committing the murder of the deceased. The two vital pieces
of evidence on which he was convicted were : (1) recovery of
a wrist watch which belonged to the deceased at the instance
of the appellant and (2) a note written in pencil in Hindi
found by the side of the deadman on the night of the
occurrence stating "Though we have passed B.A. we have not
secured any employment because there is none to care. This
is the consequence".
He was convicted under s. 302, I.P.C. and sentenced to
death. On appeal the High Court altered the conviction from
s. 302 to s. 302 read with s. 34, I.P.C.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of
the appellant that it was not permissible in law to act upon
uncorroborated opinion evidence of a handwriting expert and
that the High Court fell into a serious error in attempting
to compare the writing with the admitted writing of the
appellant; (2) the appellant could not be the author of the
note because while he was not even a matriculate the author
described himself as a graduate and that a murderer and
robber would not have left behind a note of the kind found
by the side of the dead man.
Dismissing the appeal,
^
HELD : 1. An expert is no accomplice. There is no
justification for condemning the opinion-evidence of an
expert to the same class of evidence as that of an
accomplice and insist upon corroboration. The view
occasionally expressed that it would be hazardous to base a
conviction solely on the opinion of an expert-handwriting
expert or any other kind of expert-without substantial
corroboration is not, because experts in general, are
unreliable witnesses, but because all human judgment is
fallible. The more developed and the more perfect a science,
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the less the chance of an incorrect opinion. The science of
identification of handwriting unlike the science of
identification of finger prints which has attained near-
perfection is not quite perfect and the risk is, therefore,
higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a
handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon
substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the
opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. An expert
opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons
given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His duty is
to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria
for testing the accuracy of his conclusion so as to enable
the judge to form his own independent judgment by the
application of these criteria to the facts proved in
evidence. [253 A-G]
250
2. There is no rule of law nor any rule of prudence
which has crystalized into a rule of law that opinion
evidence of a hand-writing expert must never be acted upon
unless substantially corroborated. But having due regard to
the imperfect nature of the science of identification of
handwriting, the approach should be one of caution. Reasons
for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All
other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate
cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the
reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no
reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated
testimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted. There
cannot be an inflexible rule on a matter which, in the
ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial
weight. [258 A-D]
3. Section 73 of Evidence Act expressly enables the
court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved
writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the
person by whom it purports to have been written. If is
hazardous to do so, it is one of the hazards to which a
judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it
becomes necessary. In cases where both sides call experts it
becomes the plain duty of the court to compare the writings
and come to its own conclusion. Where there are expert
opinions, they will aid the Court. Where there is none the
Court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative
text book and the Court’s own experience and knowledge. [258
D-G]
Ram Chander v. U.P. State A.I.R. 1957 S.C. Ishwari
Prasad Misra v. Mohammed Isa [1963] 3, S.C.R. 722; Shashi
Kumar v. Subhodh Kumar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 529; Fakhruddin v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1326=(1967) Crl.
L.J. 1197; Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1977
S.C. 1091, referred to.
In the instant case the courts below compared the
disputed handwriting with the admitted writing of the
appellant and found, in conjunction with the opinion of the
expert, that the author of the note was the same person. The
appellant was not able to say a word against the reasons
given by the expert. [259 A]
(b) The note was designed to lay a false trail by
making it appear that the murder and the robbery were the
handiwork of some frustrated and unemployed graduates
expressing their resentment against the world which had
shown no regard for their existence. [259 C]
(c) Had the recovery of the wrist watch of the deceased
in February, 1973 at the instance of the appellant been the
only circumstance it would have been difficult to link it
with the murder which took place ten months earlier in
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April, 1972. But there is the vital circumstance that a
writing made by the appellant was found on the table by the
side of the deceased on the day of occurrence. This
circumstance, coupled with the recovery of the dead man’s
watch, was sufficient to hold him guilty of the offence of
which he had man’s convicted. [259 G]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
125 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 15-1-1974 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 903/73.
R. L. Kohli, S. K. Gambhir and Miss B. Ramrakhiani for
the Appellant.
251
H. K. Puri and V. K. Bhat for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-Murari Lal, who was accused No. 2
before the Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, was convicted under s.
302 I.P.C. and sentenced to death. He was also convicted
under s. 460 read with ss. 34, 457, 380, 392, 394 and 397
I.P.C. but sentenced under s. 460 read with s. 34 and s. 394
read with s. 397 only to rigorous imprisonment for a period
of 7 years on each count. On appeal by Murari Lal and on
reference by the learned Sessions Judge, the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh altered the conviction from s. 302 I.P.C. to
s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and substituted the sentence
of imprisonment for life for the sentence of death.
Otherwise the appeal was dismissed. Murari Lal has preferred
this appeal by special leave of this Court.
H. D. Sonawala (the deceased) used to live alone in one
of the two ‘quarters’ in the compound of the Parsi
Dharamshala at Jabalpur. He was the Area Organiser of Cherak
Pharmaceuticals Company of Bombay. On the night of 12-7-1972
he went out to dinner at the house of P.W. 2 and returned
home at about midnight. He retired for the night. Next
morning, his driver PW 9 and his servant P.W. 6 came to the
house in the usual course to attend to their duties. The
gate was found locked. They called out their master but
there was no response. P.W. 6 who also had a key opened the
lock and went inside. Sonawala was found murdered in his
bed. A first information report was given at the police
station Omti, Jabalpur. The Station House Officer, P.W. 28,
came to the scene, found things in the room strewn about in
a pell-mell condition. He seized various articles. One of
the articles so seized was a prescription pad Ex. P. 9. On
pages A to F of Ex. P. 9, there were writings of the
deceased but on page G, there was a writing in Hindi in
pencil which was as follows :
Translated into
English it means : "Though we have passed B.A., we have
not secured any employment because there is none to care.
This is the consequence. sd/- Balle Singh." The dead body of
Sonawala was sent to the Medical Officer for post-mortem
examination. There was an incised wound on the neck 7 1/2"
long, the maximum width of which was 2" of tissues and
vessels upto the trachea were cut. Trachea was also cut. For
several months after the discovery of the murder, the
investigation made no progress till 18-2-1973. On that day
pursuant
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to information received in connection with one other case of
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theft, in which one Roop Chand appeared to be involved, the
Station House Officer secured the presence of Petrick (A-1)
and questioned. Petrick made a statement and led them to his
room from which two choppers and as many as 234 items of
stolen property were seized. We may mention that out of the
234 items so seized, only two were alleged to belong to
Sonawala, one was a tie-pin and the other was a cheque-book.
Thereafter, the house of Petrick’s father Gabriel was also
searched and 310 items of stolen property were recovered,
none of which has anything to do with this case. On 19-2-73,
Murari Lal (A-2) said to be a friend of Petrick was
questioned. He made a statement and led them to the house of
his maternal-uncle Suraj Prasad (A-4). Murari Lal asked his
uncle to produce the wrist-watch, which was done. The wrist-
watch had some special characteristics of its own and it was
later duly identified by unimpeachable evidence as belonging
to the deceased. Specimen writings Ex. P. 41 to Ex. P. 54 of
Murari Lal were obtained. They were sent to a handwriting
and finger-print expert P.W.15 along with the prescription
pad Ex. P. 9, for his opinion. The expert gave his opinion
that the writing in Hindi at page of Ex. P. 9 and the
specimen writings of P. 41 to P. 54 were made by the same
person. Petrick, Murari Lal, Gabriel and Suraj Prasad were
tried by the learned Sessions Judge. Suraj Prasad was
acquitted. Gabriel was convicted under s. 411. Petrick and
Murari Lal were both convicted under s. 302 I.P.C. and
sentenced to death as already mentioned. The sentence of
death passed on Petrick and Murari Lal was altered to
imprisonment for life by the High Court. Petrick has not
further appealed but Murari Lal has.
The two vital circumstances against Murari Lal were:
(1) the recovery of a wrist-watch which belonged to the
deceased Sonawala and (2) the writing in Hindi at page G of
Ex. P. 9, which was found to be in his handwriting
indicating his presence in the house of the deceased on the
night of the murder and his participation in the commission
of the offences. Shri R. C. Kohli, learned counsel for the
appellant, argued that the recovery of the wrist-watch was
too remote in point of time to connect the appellant with
the crime. He further argued that the High Court fell into a
grave error in concluding that the writing at page G of Ex.
P. 9 was that of the appellant. He submitted that the
evidence of P.W. 8 who claimed to be familiar with the
handwriting of the appellant was wholly unacceptable, that
it was not permissible in law to act upon the uncorroborated
opinion-evidence of the expert P.W. 15 and that the High
Court fell into a serious error in attempting to compare the
writing in Ex. P. 9 with the admitted writing of the
appellant.
253
We will first consider the argument, a stale argument
often heard, particularly in criminal courts, that the
opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert should not be acted
upon without substantial corroboration. We shall presently
point out how the argument cannot be justified on principle
or precedent. We begin with observation that the expert is
no accomplice. There is no justification for condemning his
opinion-evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an
accomplice and insist upon corroboration. True, it has
occasionally been said on very high authority that it would
be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a
handwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion
of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of
expert, is not because experts, in general, are unreliable
witnesses-the quality of credibility or incredibility being
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one which an expert shares with all other witnesses-, but
because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go
wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of
premises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed
and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of an
incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less
developed and imperfect. The science of identification of
finger-prints has attained near perfection and the risk of
an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the
other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is
not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher.
But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a
handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon
substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the
opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is
hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial
suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness.
His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the
reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His
duty ‘is to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific
criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as
to enable the judge to form his own independent judgment by
the application of these criteria to the facts proved in
evidence’. (vide Lord President Cooper in Dacie v. Edinbeagh
Magistrate : 1953 S. C. 34 quoted by Professor Cross in his
Evidence).
From the earliest times, courts have received the
opinion of experts. As long ago as 1553 it was said in
Buckley v. Rice-Thomas(1) :
"If matters arise in our law which concern other
sciences or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of
that science or faculty which it concerns. This is a
commendable thing in our law. For thereby it appears
that we do not dismiss
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all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them
and encourage them as things worthy of commendation."
Expert testimony is made relevant by s. 45 of the
Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon
a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a
person ‘specially skilled’ ‘in questions as to identity of
handwriting’ is expressly made a relevant fact. There is
nothing in the Evidence Act, as for example like
illustration (b) to s. 114 which entitles the Court to
presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he
is corroborated in material particulars which justifies the
court in assuming that a handwriting expert’s opinion is
unworthy of credit unless corroborated. The Evidence Act
itself (s. 3) tells us that ‘a fact is said to be proved
when, after considering the matters before it, the Court
either believes it to exist or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances
of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
exists’. It is necessary to occasionally remind ourselves of
this interpretation clause in the Evidence Act lest we set
an artificial standard of proof not warranted by the
provisions of the Act. Further, under s. 114 of the Evidence
Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which
it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the
common course of natural events, human conduct, and public
and private business, in their relation to facts of the
particular case. It is also to be noticed that s. 46 of the
Evidence Act makes facts, not otherwise relevant, relevant
if they support or are inconsistent with the opinions of
experts, when such opinions are relevant. So, corroboration
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may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the
opinion of handwriting expert and there need be no initial
suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case, a court
may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be
no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the
rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by
unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not
corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the
opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed
cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all
other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or
reject it.
Apart from principle, let us examine if precedents
justify invariable insistence on corroboration. We have
referred to Phipson on Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe
on Criminal Evidence, Archibald on Criminal Pleadings,
Evidence and Practice and Halsbury’s Laws of England but we
were unable to find a single sentence hinting at such a
rule. We may now refer to some of the decisions of this
255
Court. In Ram Chander v. U.P. State,(1) Jagannatha Das, J.
observed : "It may be that normally it is not safe to treat
expert evidence as to handwriting as sufficient basis for
conviction" (emphasis ours) "May" and "normally" make our
point about the absence of an inflexible rule. In Ishwari
Prasad Misra v. Mohammed Isa,(2) Gajendragadkar, J. observed
: "Evidence given by experts can never conclusive, because
after all it is opinion evidence", a statement which carries
us nowhere on the question now under consideration. Nor, can
the statement be disputed because it is not so provided by
the Evidence Act and, on the contrary, s. 46 expressly makes
opinion evidence challengeable by facts, otherwise
irrelevant. And as Lord President Cooper observed in Davie
v. Edinburgh Magistrate : "The parties have invoked the
decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular
pronouncement by an expert".
In Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar,(3) Wanchoo, J., after
noticing various features of the opinion of the expert said
:
"We do not consider in the circumstances of this
case that the evidence of the expert is conclusive and
can falsify the evidence of the attesting witnesses and
also the circumstances which go to show that this will
must have been signed in 1943 as it purports to be.
Besides it is necessary to observe that expert’s
evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence and it
can rarely, if ever take the place of substantive
evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is usual to
see if it is corroborated either by clear direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. In the present
case the probabilities are against the expert’s opinion
and the direct testimony of the two attesting witnesses
which we accept is wholly inconsistent with it".
So, there was acceptable direct testimony which was
destructive of the expert’s opinion; there are other
features also which made the expert’s opinion unreliable.
The observation regarding corroboration must be read in that
context and it is worthy of note that even so the expression
used was ‘it is usual’ and not "it is necessary’.
In Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh,(4)
Hidayatullah, J. said :
"Both under s. 45 and s. 47 the evidence is an
opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and
in the latter on the
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basis of familiarity resulting from frequent
observations and experience. In either case the Court
must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the
opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the
Court is to apply its own observation to the admitted
or proved writings and to compare them with the
disputed one, not to become an handwriting expert but
to verify the premises of the expert in the one case
and to comparison depends on an analysis of the
characteristics in appraise the value of the opinion in
the other case. This the admitted or proved writing and
the finding of the same characteristics in large
measure in the disputed writing. In this way the
opinion of the deponent whether expert or other is
subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start
with becomes probative. Where an expert’s opinion is
given, the Court must see for itself and with the
assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion
whether it can safely be held that the two writings are
by the same person. This is not to say that the Court
must play the role of an expert but to say that the
Court may accept the fact proved only when it has
satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe
to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other
witness."
These observations lend no support to any requirement
as to corroboration of expert testimony. On the other hand,
the facts show that the Court ultimately did act upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the expert though these Judges
took the precaution of comparing the writings themselves.
Finally, we come to Magan Bihari Lal v. State of
Punjab,(1) upon which Sri R. C. Kohli, learned counsel,
placed great reliance. It was said by this Court :
"......but we think it would be extremely
hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the
strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert.
It is now well settled that expert opinion must always
be received with great caution and perhaps none so with
more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert.
There is a profusion of presidential authority which
holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on
expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This
rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost
become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram
Chandra v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is
257
unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as
sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied
upon when supported by other items of internal and
external evidence. This Court again pointed out in
Ishwari Prasad v. Md. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert
evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because
it is, after all opinion evidence, and this view was
reiterated in Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC
529 where it was pointed out by this Court that
expert’s evidence as to handwriting being opinion
evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of
substantive evidence and before acting on such
evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it
is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. This Court had again occasion
to consider the evidentially value of expert opinion in
regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.,
AIR 1967 SC 1326 and it uttered a note of caution
pointing out that it would be risky to found a
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conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting
expert and before acting upon such evidence, the court
must always try to see whether it is corroborated by
other evidence, direct or circumstantial."
The above extracted passage, undoubtedly, contains some
sweeping general observations. But we do not think that the
observations were meant to be observations of general
application or as laying down any legal principle. It was
plainly intended to be a rule of caution and not a rule of
law as is clear from the statement ‘it has almost become a
rule of law’. "Almost", we presume, means "not quite". It
was said by the Court there was a "profusion of presidential
authority" which insisted upon corroboration and reference
was made to Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., Ishwari Prasad v.
Mohammed Isa, Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar and Fakhruddin v.
State of M.P. (supra). We have already discussed these cases
and observed that none of them supports the proposition that
corroboration must invariably be sought before opinion
evidence can be accepted. There appears to be some mistake
in the last sentence of the above extracted passage because
we are unable to find in Fakhruddin v. State of M. P.
(supra) any statement such as the one attributed. In fact,
in that case, the learned Judges acted upon the sole
testimony of the expert after satisfying themselves about
the correctness of the opinion by comparing the writings
themselves. We do think that the observations in Magan
Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab (supra) must be understood as
referring to the facts of the particular case.
258
We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of
law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystalized into a
rule of law, that opinion evidence of a handwriting expert
must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated.
But, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the
science of identification of handwriting, the approach, as
we indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for
the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other
relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases,
corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for
the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence
throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an
handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any
inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis,
is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have
said so much because this is an argument frequently met with
in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from
the judgments of this Court are often flaunted.
The argument that the court should not venture to
compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to
itself the role of an expert is entirely without force.
Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the Court
to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved
writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the
person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is
hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is
one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose
themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases
where both sides call experts and two voices of science are
heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an
expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it
becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings
and come to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided
by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert.
Where there are expert opinions they will aid the Court.
Where there is none, the Court will have to seek guidance
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from some authoritative textbook and the Court’s own
experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain
duty, with or without expert, with or without other
evidence. We may mention that Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar
and Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) were cases
where the Court itself compared the writings.
Reverting to the facts of the case before us, Sri Kohli
had not a word of criticism to offer against the reasons
given by the expert P.W. 15, for his opinion. We have
perused the reasons given by the expert as well as his
cross-examination. Nothing has been elicited to throw the
least doubt on the correctness of the opinion. Both the
259
Sessions Court and the High Court compared the disputed
writing at page G in Ex. P. 9 with the admitted writings and
found, in conjunction with the opinion of the expert, that
the another was the same person. We are unable to find any
ground for disagreeing with the finding.
We may at this juncture consider the argument of Sri
Kohli that the internal evidence afforded by the document
showed that the appellant was not its author. He argued that
the appellant was not even a matriculate whereas the author
of the document had described himself as a graduate. And,
what necessity was there for a murderer and robber to write
a note like that, questioned Mr. Kohli. It appears to us
that the note was designed to lay a false trail by making it
appear that the murder and the robbery were the handiwork of
some frustrated and unemployed young graduates, expressing
their resentment against the world which had shown no regard
for their existence.
The other important circumstance against the appellant
was the recovery of the deceased’s watch at the appellant’s
instance. That the deceased was the owner of the watch was
not disputed before us. That the watch was recovered at the
instance of the appellant was also not disputed before us.
What was urged was that there was no reason to reject the
explanation given by the appellant in his statement under s.
313 Cr. P. C. that he had purchased the watch from Roop
Chand. Apart from his statement, there is nothing in the
evidence to substantiate his case. On the other hand, we
think that, having come to know that the statement of Roop
Chand in connection with the investigation into another
theft case had led the police to interrogate Patrick, the
appellant very cleverly tried to foist previous possessions
of the watch on Roop Chand. We are not prepared to accept
the appellant’s explanation. Even so, it was urged, the
recovery was too remote in point of time to be linked with
the robbery and the murder. It is true that there was a
considerable time-lag. We might have found it difficult to
link the recovery of the watch with the robbery and the
murder had this been the only circumstance. But, we have the
other vital circumstance that a writing made by the
appellant was left on the deceased’s table that night. That
circumstance coupled with the recovery of the dead man’s
watch at the instance of the appellant, are sufficient, in
our opinion, in the absence of any acceptable explanation to
hold the appellant guilty of the offences of which he has
been convicted. The appeal is dismissed.
P. B. R. Appeal dismissed.
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