Full Judgment Text
2026:BHC-KOL:1584
901-SA-591-2022.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.591 OF 2022
1. Ultra Tech Cement Company Ltd.
Unit Narmada Cement Works,
Ratnagiri Through the Authorized Officer
Shri Rajkumar Hanchate
Age: 55 years, Occ.: Service
R/o: Ratnagiri ...Appellant/Orig. Plaintiff
Vs.
2. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
Company Ltd.
Through Secretary MSEDCL Co.,
Prakashgad, Bandra (East) Mumbai -5.
3. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
Company Ltd.
Through Suprintendent Engineer,
Ratnagiri, Circle Ratnagiri, Administrative Building,
Nachane Road, Ratnagiri.
4. Government pf Maharashtra
Through Development Commissioner
(Industry), New Administrative Building
2nd Floor, Opp. Mantralaya Mumbai.
4. Government of Maharashtra
Through District Collector,
Ratnagiri ...Respondents
Mr. Shriniwas Patwardhan (through VC) i/b Mr. Padmanabh Pise,
(through VC), for the Appellant.
Mr. J. P. Patil, AGP for Respondent Nos.3 and 4- State.
Suresh
1/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
CORAM : MRS. VRUSHALI V. JOSHI, J.
th
DATED : 6 MARCH 2026
JUDGMENT :-
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated
14/12/2021 passed by the learned Principal District Judge,
Ratnagiri, in Regular Civil Appeal No.57 of 2018, arising out of the
judgment and decree dated 10/08/2018 passed by the learned Joint
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ratnagiri, in Regular Civil Suit No.68
of 2008, the appellants herein, to challenge the same, prefer this
Second Appeal.
2. The present appeal is based on the substantial question of law
as thus:
“Whether the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred under
the Electricity Act, 2003 in respect of disputes relating to
classification of industries as continuous or non-
continuous, or whether such bar is confined only to
disputes under Sections 126 and 127 relating to
assessment of electricity charges?”
3. The plaintiff’s pleadings are summarized as follows:
(a) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that , the
Suresh
2/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
appellant company, UltraTech Cement Ltd. (original plaintiff), is
engaged in cement production at Ratnagiri since 1982, which is a
continuous process industry requiring uninterrupted electricity
supply. The company obtained high tension electricity connections
both for its factory and its jetty used for unloading raw materials.
(b) It is the case of the plaintiff that, as per norms fixed by the
State Government, it falls under the category of continuous industry.
However, by letter dated 31/01/2008 issued by the Joint Director of
Industries/Advisory Committee, the plaintiff was declared to be a
non-continuous industry.
(c) The plaintiff contends that such classification is arbitrary,
without authority, and contrary to the continuous nature of its
operations. It asserts that it has always been treated as a continuous
industry, has paid substantial amount towards interest and electricity
bills, and that the impugned letter is null and void. Accordingly, the
plaintiff filed the suit seeking:
• A declaration that the letter dated 31/01/2008 is illegal and
inoperative.
Suresh
3/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
• A declaration that the plaintiff is a continuous process industry.
• A perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from acting
upon the impugned classification.
4. It is argued by the Appellant that Courts below dismissed the
suit as the civil Court jurisdiction is barred under the Electricity Act,
2003. However, Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers
jurisdiction on civil Courts to try all suits of a civil nature unless
expressly or impliedly barred. The bar under Sections 126 and 127 of
the Electricity Act is confined to disputes relating to unauthorized
use and assessment of electricity charges. The present dispute
concerns classification of the appellant’s industry as continuous or
non-continuous, which is not expressly barred. Therefore, the Courts
below erred in holding that the suit was not maintainable.
5. It is argued by the Appellant that the impugned letter dated
31/01/2008 was issued by the Advisory Committee/Joint Director of
Industries. The Electricity Act contemplates adjudication by
designated authorities such as the Adjudicating Officer or the
Regulatory Commission. Whether such an advisory body has
Suresh
4/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
statutory authority to conclusively determine classification affecting
tariff is a substantial question of law. The Courts below failed to
examine this aspect.
6. The appellant has consistently asserted that it has been a
continuous process industry since 1982, supported by prior
certificates and uninterrupted operations. The dismissal of the suit
under Order VII Rule 10 CPC at the threshold, without permitting
parties to lead evidence, has resulted in denial of natural justice.
Mixed questions of law and fact regarding classification and validity
of the impugned letter required adjudication on merits.
7. The Subordinate Courts also misapplied the MERC tariff orders
and government resolutions. While MERC authorized the
Development Commissioner (Industries) to certify continuous
industries, the subsequent delegation to District Industries Centres
required careful interpretation. Whether cement industries are
excluded from continuous process industries under the guidelines
dated 09/04/2007 is a matter requiring evidence and proper legal
analysis.
Suresh
5/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
8. In view of the above, the matter requires reconsideration on
merits, with proper framing of issues and opportunity to both parties
to lead evidence. Remand is therefore necessary to ensure justice and
fair adjudication.
9. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent
No.1 (MSEDCL) and Respondent No.2 (Superintendent Engineer,
Ratnagiri Circle) contend that the appellant company is not a
continuous process industry but a non-continuous one, and therefore
supplementary bills were rightly issued for the period October 2006
to April 2007. They rely upon the tariff orders of the Maharashtra
Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC) dated 20/10/2006,
which classified HT-I industries into continuous and non-continuous
categories based on load-shedding protocols.
10. It is their case that industries availing zero load-shedding hours
are treated as continuous, while those subject to load-shedding are
treated as non-continuous. MERC clarified that certification of
continuous process industries must be obtained from the
Development Commissioner (Industries) or other authorities
designated by the State Government. Pursuant to a government
Suresh
6/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
resolution dated 04/04/2007, powers were delegated to General
Managers of District Industries Centres to issue such certificates.
11. The respondents state that the appellant was repeatedly
directed to obtain the requisite certificate but failed to do so within
the stipulated time. On 31/01/2008, the Joint Director of Industries,
acting on the Advisory Committee’s decision, issued a letter treating
the appellant as a non-continuous industry. Based on this
classification, supplementary bills were raised.
12. Heard the learned counsel for both parties.
13. A short issue arises in the present matter, namely, whether the
Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the Plaintiff.
14. Initially, the learned trial Court, by invoking the provisions of
Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, returned the plaint
for presentation before the proper forum constituted under the
Electricity Act, 2003, holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the suit. The said order was challenged before the
Appellate Court. The Appellate Court set aside the order and
remanded the matter to the Trial Court for decision on merits.
Suresh
7/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
15. Upon remand, the trial Court framed the necessary issues and,
after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record,
again held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in view of the
alternate statutory remedy available under the Electricity Act, 2003.
Consequently, the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground of
want of jurisdiction. The said judgment and order came to be
confirmed by the Appellate Court.
16. As per the averments in the plaint, the case of the Plaintiff is
that the State Government had formulated certain guidelines for
categorization of industries and issuance of certificates in respect of
specific categories. Under the said guidelines, a certificate was
required to be obtained from the Development Commissioner of
Industries for recognition as a Continuous Process Industry.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff–Company submitted an application seeking
such certification. However, on 20/02/2008, a communication was
issued by the Circle Office of Defendant No.1 treating the Plaintiff–
Company as a Non-Continuous Process Industry for the period from
October 2006 to April 2007. Consequentially, an electricity bill for a
sum of Rs. 33,57,718.45/- and an additional amount of Rs.
1,04,789.60/- came to be raised against the Plaintiff–Company.
Suresh
8/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
17. While issuing the said electricity bill, Respondent No.1 relied
upon the letter issued by the Development Commissioner of
Industries bearing No. DI Power 20-CPI-5th AC 2008-B-30 dated
23/01/2008, along with a list of Continuous Process Industries. In
the said list, the Plaintiff–Company was categorized as a Non-
Continuous Process Industry, which formed the basis for the
impugned demand.
18. According to the Plaintiff/Company, it has been engaged in the
manufacture of cement continuously and round the clock since the
year 1982 and, therefore, qualifies as a Continuous Process Industry.
It is contended that, for several years, electricity bills were issued to
the Plaintiff–Company by treating it as a Continuous Process
Industry, and the tariff applicable to such category was consistently
applied. However, by letter dated 31/01/2008 issued by the Industry
Department, the Plaintiff–Company was categorized as a Non-
Continuous Process Industry. The said classification was based upon
the decision of the Advisory Committee/Junior Director of
Industries, and the same formed the basis for subsequent billing at a
higher tariff, resulting in substantial additional demand.
Suresh
9/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
19. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the Plaintiff-Company
instituted the suit.
20. The grievance of the Plaintiff is essentially directed against the
reclassification effected by the Industry Department, which,
according to the Plaintiff, is contrary to its actual manufacturing
process and long-standing treatment as a Continuous Process
Industry. The Defendants relying on the provisions of Electricity Act
have stated that, as per Section 145 of Electricity Act there is bar to
civil Court and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction. Therefore, it
is necessary to consider first Section 145 of the Electricity Act.
21. Section 145 of the Electricity Act,2003 reads as under:
“145. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.
No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any
suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which an
assessing officer referred to in section 126 or an
appellate authority referred to in section 127 or the
adjudicating officer appointed under this Act is
empowered by or under this Act to determine and no
injunction shall be granted by any court or other
authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken
Suresh
10/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this
Act.”
22. On perusal of the contents of Section 145, it appears that it
specifically applies to Sections 126 and 127 of Electricity Act.
23. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the scope and scheme of
Section 126 and Section 127 of the Act. Section 126 deals with
assessment in cases of unauthorized use of electricity, whereas
Sections 127 provides for an appeal against the final order of
assessment passed under Section 126.
24. In view of the specific bar contained in Section 145, matters
falling within the ambit of Sections 126 and 127 are excluded from
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The plaintiff has not challenged
the assessment. The issue which is raised by the plaintiff does not
come under Sections 126 or 127, therefore, as per Section 145 of the
Electricity Act, there is no bar to the relief claimed by the plaintiff.
25. The Respondent has taken recourse to Section 87 of the
Electricity Act, 2003. It is contended that an Advisory Committee is
constituted under Section 87 by the concerned Commission by
issuance of a notification.
Suresh
11/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
26. It is further argued that, the objects and functions of such
Advisory Committee are elaborately set out under Section 88 of the
said Act and said Committee will take care of the grievance of
plaintiff.
27. It is the contention of respondent that a conjoint reading of
Section 185 along with Section 111 of the Act makes it abundantly
clear that any person, including a consumer, aggrieved by any
decision or action taken under the provisions of the Act, has a
statutory remedy to approach the appropriate forum as provided
therein. The legislative scheme, therefore, expressly excludes the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters, the same being barred
under the provisions of the Act.
28. On perusal of Section 87 of the Electricity Act, 2003, it is
evident that the State Advisory Committee is constituted to advise
the Commission on major questions of policy. The objects and
functions of the said Committee are enumerated under Section 88 of
the Act. A plain reading of Section 88 makes it clear that the role of
the State Advisory Committee is confined to advising the Commission
on policy matters relating to the quality, continuity and extent of
Suresh
12/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
service provided by the licensees, compliance by licensees with the
conditions and requirements of their licence, protection of consumer
interests, electricity supply, and overall standards of performance.
29. In the present case, the subject matter of the suit does not fall
within the ambit of Sections 87 and 88 of the Electricity Act. The
dispute does not pertain to any policy decision or advisory function
of the Commission. The core issue raised in the suit is whether the
plaintiff-industry qualifies as a “continuous process industry” and
whether the communication dated 31/01/2008, declaring that it is
not a continuous process industry, is legal and valid. The said
communication has been specifically challenged and a declaration is
sought that it be declared null and void.
30. The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court dismissed the suit
and the appeal respectively, placing reliance upon Section 145 of the
Act and holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred.
However, both the Courts confined their consideration only to the
issue of jurisdiction and did not adjudicate the suit on merits.
31. Upon a careful consideration of the relevant provisions of the
Suresh
13/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::
901-SA-591-2022.doc
Act and the reliefs claimed in the suit, it appears that the dispute
does not fall within the domain of assessment under Section 126,
appeal under Section 127, or any other adjudicatory mechanism
provided under the Act so as to attract the bar under Section 145.
The relief sought is essentially declaratory in nature, concerning the
status of the industry and the validity of the letter dated
31/01/2008. Such a declaration can appropriately be granted only
by a competent Civil Court.
32. In view thereof, it is held that the Civil Court does have
jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The findings recorded by the
trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court to the effect that the
Civil Court lacks jurisdiction are unsustainable and are accordingly
set aside.
33. Appeal is partly allowed. The matter is remanded to the trial
Court for decision afresh on its own merits, in accordance with law
restore it on it’s original number.
(MRS. VRUSHALI V. JOSHI, J.)
Suresh
14/14
::: Uploaded on - 10/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/03/2026 17:57:59 :::