Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF KERALA ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
K. P. GOVINDAN TAPIOCA EXPORTER ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT07/11/1974
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
CITATION:
1975 AIR 152 1975 SCR (2) 635
1975 SCC (1) 281
CITATOR INFO :
E 1976 SC2243 (20)
ACT:
Essential Commodities Act 1955-The Kerala Tapioca
Manufacture and Export (Control) Order 1966-Administrative
surcharged levied under a scheme formulated by the State
Government-Scheme not under any provision of the Act, if
surcharge could be levied.
HEADNOTE:
The Kerala Tapioca Manufacture and Export (Control) Order,
1966 was made by the State Government under the Essential
Commodities Act 1955. Even before the promulgation of that
order the State Government levied an. administrative
surcharge under a scheme formulated by it. The, respondents
plea that the levy of administrative surcharge was ultra
vires the State Government and unwarranted by law had been
accepted by the High Court and their writ petitions were
allowed.
On an appeal by the State it was contended that the
administrative surcharge on the export of tapioca wag in
effect and substance a licence fee charged irk! exercise of
the police powers of the State for granting permission to
export Tapioca.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : The administrative surcharge levied by the State
Government on the export of tapioca was bad. The
realisations were without the authority of law.
Assuming that the’ State has got the police power to
charge licence fee, the levies were bad as they were not
levies of licence fee for regulating the trade or for grant
of permits. The scheme was not an order under any of the
provisions of the Essential Commodities Act. in
substance and in effect it was an impost on export which
indisputably the State had no power to do. The Kerala
Tapioca Manufacture Export (Control) Order 1966 did not
provide for imposition of any licence fee for the grant of
permits for export of tapioca.
For the appellants
Examining the Act and the provisions of the Section as a
whole it is manifest that an order providing for the
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granting of a licence or permit and charging for fees is
still an order under Sec. 3(1).
An order of the nature mentioned in Sec. 3 (2) (ii) is an
order for maintaining or increasing supplies of essential
commodities and for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices. it is manifestly not an
order for rendering any services and admittedly no service
is rendered under the provisions of Sec. 3. The power itself
is simply for the benefit of the community at large. Thus
Sec. 3(2)(ii) does not provide for a fee for services
rendered. It is manifest from the scheme as a whole that
export is banned except under a permit. The imposition is
connected and is for the purposes of permission to export;
is precisely what the licence fee may mean. The ground,
therefore on which the High Court has acted is erroneous.
For the respondents :
Power under the Essential Commodities Act to make
orders under Section 3(1) and (2) vested in the Central
Government. Under Section 5 of the Central Government can
delegate its powers to State Government subject to such
conditions as it may choose to impose. ’the Central
Government has limited the powers to delegate by Resolution
No. GSR 906 dated 9-6-1966. It delegates the powers under
Section 3(1) for the purposes stated in the different
clauses of Section 3(2). The general power of regulation
claimed by the appellant is therefore not available.
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Second clause in the delegation provides that in matters
which affect transport etc. of the commodity would require
the sanction of the Central Government. Since imposition of
export duty restricts the transport of the commodity,
sanction would be required, which is absent in this case.
This also would in-validate the levy.
The levy is really not a licence fees but is on export as it
clearly purports to be and is a tax. Under regulating
powers no such tax can be_imposed. Article 366(28) defines
a tax in wide terms and all imposts would be tax. Viewed
from the point of view of even regulatory impost, it is
clearly a tax for levying which Article 265 requires a
legislative enactment. All taxing statutes must in clear
language authorise the levy, and if authorised it must be
within the legislative competence of the State. Admittedly
there is no legislation. The Central Government alone would
have the power to levy the tax and not the State Government.
What is delegated to the State Government is merely a power
to levy fee for licence, permits, etc. In such a case that
must be a quid pro quo, which is admittedly absent here.
The impost is clearly bad.
The levy made in connection with the export of Tapioca is
not a tax. It is in the nature of a fee and it could be
sustained only if there is correlation and legitimate
connection between the quantum of the levy and the expenses
incurred by the Government. But in the instant case. the
Government have not furnished any data, i.e. any particulars
about the total collections made, the nature of the services
rendered and the actual expenses incurred by the Government
in the matter of services rendered. No particulars whatever
have been given by the, Government.
Section 3(2)(ii) does not empower the Government to levy any
charge it likes and its powers in levying are circumscribed
by the very words employed in Section 3 (2) (ii) the fees in
relation to the permit or any other document which in the
nature of things should only be nominal. It is therefore
submitted that Section 3(2)(ii) has no application and
cannot justify the levy.
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In the counter-affidavit filed by Government, the Government
has taken the specific ground that the levy is made as a fee
to meet the heavy expenditure incurred on behalf of those
who engage themselves in the export trade of tapioca. The
Government’s further stand is that unauthorised export will
spoil the trade, diminish the profits of the authorised
exporters and that to meet the expenditure incurred and to
protect the interests of the authorised exporters and its
return for the services rendered. the Government is charging
a fee as a quid pro quo. In the face of this specific plea
by the Government as a specific ground on which they are
levying the charges, it will not be open to the Government
to contend that it is not a fee for services rendered but a
fee for the issue of a permit and that there is no necessity
to establish any correlation between the expenses incurred
and the quantum of the levy.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 729 to 757
of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 27th September, 1971
of the Kerala High Court in O.P. Nos. 5103 and 5105/68 4261,
4329, 4369, 4518, 4580, 4618, 4657, 4769, 4829, 4837, 4870,
4948, 5919, and 5056/1969, 240-241, 433, 534, 536, 866, 869,
1559, 4982, 5050, and 5220, of 1970 and O.P. No. 3834 of
1969 (In CA No. 731/ 72 only), and
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 514 of 1973 and 515 of 1973.
Appeals from the Judgments and Order dated the 28th March,
1972 and 11th February, 1972 of the Kerala High Court in
Writ Petition No. 33 of 1972 and W. Appeal No. 466 of 1971
respectively.
637
M. Sinha Solicitor General for India and A. G. Pudissery for
the appellants, (In, all the appeals).
Y. S. Chitale, D. V. Patel K. S. Ramamurthy, V. J.
Francis, V. Hassan Koyan, P. Sankaran Kutty and A. S.
Nambiar for respondent No. 1 (In CA No. 746 and 748/72)
respondent No. 2 (In CA 735/72, respondent No. 3 (In CA No.
754/72) and for Respondents (In rest of the Appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J.-All these Civil appeals filed on grant of
certificates of fitness by the High Court of Kerala have
been heard together ,and. are being disposed of by a common
judgment as their facts and the points involved in them are
identical. The respondents filed various writ petitions
questioning the validity of the orders of the State
Government of Kerala levying administrative surcharge on the
export of tapioca. Respondents are dealers in tapioca and
do the business of exporting it also outside the State of
Kerala. In their writ petition, they also claimed refund of
the amounts realised by the State Government on the basis of
the impugned orders. Writ petitions were allowed by a bench
of the Kerala-High Court and Civil Appeals 729-757 of 1972
are directed against the orders in the writ Petitions. Two
of the Civil Appeals namely Civil Appeals 514 and 515 of
1973 arise out. of the Appellate order of the Kerala High
Court dismissing the appeals from the orders allowing the
writ petitions.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) and
subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities
Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of 1955), hereinafter referred to
as the Act, read with the order of the Government of India
dated the 9th June, 1966 and with the prior concurrence, of
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the, Central Government. the Govt. of Kerala made the Kerala
Tapioca Manufacture and Export (Control) Order, 1966. Under
clause 5 of the said order no person could export tapioca
except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the
Commissioner or any officer authorised by him in this
behalf. Clause 6 of the order provides for the filling of
applications for the grant of permits for tapioca in Form
III and the permit for the export of tapioca shall be in
form IV. Even before the promulgation of the Kerala Tapioca
Manufacture and Export (Control) Order, administrative
surcharge was levied under a Scheme formulated by the State
Government, on the 15th April, 1966 published in the Kerala
Gazette dated 3-5-1966. The rates of administrative charge
levied on tapioca in the Scheme dated 15th April, 1966 was
varied from time to time and a copy of the order dated 20th
October, 1967 specifying the revised rates was Ext. P-1 in
one of the writ petitions. A copy of the order dated 15th
April, 1966 was given to us by the- learned Solicitor
General appearing for the appellant State. The respondents’
plea that the levy of, administrative charges, was ultra
vires the State Government and unwarranted by law has been
accepted by the Kerala High Court. Learned Solicitor
General appearing for the appellant State submitted that the
orders levying administrative charge on the export of.
tapioca, was, in effect and substance a licence fee charged
in the exercise of the police powers of the State for
permitting the
638
respondents by grant of permits to export tapioca. Such a
levy counsel submitted, can very well be supported with
reference to the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-
section(2) of 53 the Act, whereby the State as a result of
the authorisation under section 5 of the Act is empowered to
regulate the transport or export of tapioca, and essential
foodstuffs.
Learned Solicitor General strenuously attached the findings
of the Kerala High Court that the administrative charge
imposed on the export of tapioca was a fee and since it had
no correlation with the service rendered by the State, the
most was bad.
In the instant case it is not necessary for us to decide
whether the view aforesaid of the Kerala High Court or the
submission made on behalf of the appellant in that regard is
correct or not. The Tapioca Export Control Order was made
by the State Government on being authorised by the Central
Government in its notification dated the 9th June, 1966. A
copy of the said notification was placed before us at the
time of hearing of these appeals. It purported to authorise
the State Government to make orders under section 3 of the
Act to provide for some of the matters mentioned in the
various clauses. of sub-section (2) Learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that it was not a general
authorisation to make an order under sub-section(1). It is
not necessary for us to go into this question either.
We shall assume in favour of the appellant that while
regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and
distribution of tapioca and trade and commerce therein it
has got the police power to charge licence fee for the
purpose of regulating the tapioca trade or to charge fees
for grant of issue of licences/permits or other documents in
accordance with clause (ii) of sub-section(2) of Section 3
of the Act. Still we find that the impugned levies have
rightly been held to be bad as they were not levies of
licence fees for regulating the trade or for grant of
permits. The order dated 15th April, 1966 formulating the
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scheme was not an order under any of the provisions of
section is 3 of the Act. It did not impose any licence fee
or fee for grant of permit. It merely provided for levying
of administrative surcharge for the export of tapioca and
its products at the specified rates which varied from time
to time. In substance and in effect it was an impost on
export which indisputably the State had no power to do. The
orders levying the administrative charge which followed the
Tapioca Export Control Order did, not refer to the exercise
of any power under the said Order. It was completely
independent of it. The Tapioca Export Control Order did not
provide for imposition of any licence fee for the grant of
permit for export of tapioca. Argument put forward on
behalf of the appellant that the order dated the 15th April,
1966 was in substance and in effect an order under section 3
of the Act runs counter to its case in the’ petitions of
appeal wherein it has been stated "That the deterioration in
food position in the State of Kerala started from 1963
onwards and to avert the further won seeing of the food
position, the Government, under Rule 125 of the
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Defence of India Rules, 1962 issued the Tapioca Control
Order, 1964, whereby Government imposed certain restrictions
in the export of tapioca and its products from the State and
permitted the export of limited quantity through selected
dealers. The State, in accordance with this order framed a
scheme known as "Scheme for the export of Tapioca and its
products" on 15-4-1966 whereby the Govt. clarified the
manner and mode of selection of the dealer, the details
regarding the submission of applications of the intending
exporters, the issue of permits and the payments of
Administrative Surcharge."
The stand taken in the petitions of appeal was not pursued
at the time of the hearing. It is, therefore, clear that
the administrative surcharge levied by the State Government
on the export of tapioca,as it was bad. The realisations
thereunder were without the authority of law. It will,
however, be open to the State Government to impose tax or
fee, as they may be advised to do in accordance with law and
if permissible under it, for permitting the respondents to
export tapioca outside the State of Kerala. The debatable
question as to the nature of impost, its constitutional
validity and legal justifiability will have to be gone into
then.
On the facts as they stand in these appeals, we uphold the
orders of the Kerala High Court for the reasons given by us.
The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing
fee.
P.B.R. Appeals dismissed
L319SupCI/75
640