S. CHANDRASEKHARAN vs. M. DINAKAR

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 11-07-2022

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  4688­4689 OF 2022 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 8119­8120 of 2019) S. CHANDRASEKHARAN & ORS.  …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS  M. DINAKAR & ANR.           ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellants before us are the claimants in an action for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1988 Act). An th accident  had  occurred  on  28   February  2011 at  about 10:45 A.M., which resulted in death of one Bala Babitha, a 37 year old lady,   and   caused   injuries   to   her   husband   and   her   minor daughter. The first appellant is the husband of the deceased. The second   and   the   third   appellants   are   their   children,   who  were Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Rajni Mukhi Date: 2022.07.11 18:49:20 IST Reason: minors by age at the point of time the accident occurred. The fourth appellant is the mother of the deceased. The first appellant 1 and the third appellant alongwith the deceased were travelling in an auto rickshaw from Velachery to Adambakkam in the city of Chennai, which was hit by a vehicle (bearing registration no. TN­ 04­W­6189). The respondent no. 1 was the owner of that vehicle. The second respondent is the insurance company, whose policy covered the offending vehicle.  3. Claim was lodged by the appellants under Section 166 of the 1988 Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chennai (the Tribunal). Before the Tribunal, rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle was proved, and that finding was not upset in   appeal   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   in   its th judgment delivered on 27   February 2018. The present appeals arise from that judgment. The Tribunal awarded compensation in favour  of   the  appellant  no.1  for  a  sum   of  Rs.4,77,100/­. The minor daughter (appellant no.3)  of the  deceased and the first appellant   was   awarded   compensation   of   Rs.2,06,000/­.   The quantum   of   compensation   on   account   of   death   of   said   Bala Babitha was computed by the Tribunal to be of Rs.36,92,350/­. Monthly income of the deceased was calculated as one­third of 2 her husband’s income. The Tribunal found the husband’s income to be Rs.78,700/­ per month. This finding of monthly income of the   husband   was   not   disturbed   by   the   High   Court.   The compensation   amount   was   to   carry   an   interest   of   7.5%   per annum from the date of filing of the claim, till the date of deposit. Deposit of the awarded sum was directed to be made within two months from the date of the award.  Both the insurance company and the appellants preferred 4. separate appeals in respect of sums awarded as compensation in relation to the deceased and the injured victims.  The High Court reduced the sum awarded as compensation in respect of the first appellant to Rs.3,41,000/­.  As regards the third appellant, award of Rs.2,06,000/­ as compensation was retained. Compensation awarded to the family of the deceased victim was modified and reduced to Rs.32,82,090/­ by the High Court. The Tribunal had quantified compensation for the surviving members of the family of deceased on her notional income calculated on the basis of her husband’s income, following a judgment of this Court delivered in the case   of   Arun Kumar Agrawal  And  Another vs.  National 3 . [(2010) 9 SCC 218]. The Insurance Company Ltd. And Others High  Court,  however,  considered  her  salary  in  a  job   she was engaged in three years back to be the basis for quantifying the pecuniary loss to be awarded to the surviving members of her family. Both the Tribunal and the High Court had applied the multiplier   principle   to   arrive   at   the   figure   of   pecuniary   loss. Before   us,   arguments   have   been   advanced   on   the   point   of reduction of compensation to the family of the deceased victim and we shall confine our judgment to that issue only.   5. The heads under which award was made by the Tribunal quantifying   the   compensation   to   be   paid   on   account   of   the deceased victim were:­
Pecuniary Loss:Rs.31,50,000
Loss of consortium:Rs. 1,00,000
Funeral expenses:Rs. 25,000
Loss of love and<br>affection:Rs.4,00,000
Medical expenses:Rs.17,350
TotalRs.36,92,350/­
6. While modifying the award, the High Court computed the compensation under the following heads:­ 4
Pecuniary lossRs.30,94,740.00
Loss of consortiumRs.40,000.00
Funeral ExpensesRs.15,000.00
Loss of Love and affection to<br>the claimants­Rs.25,000Rs.1,00,000.00
Loss of EstateRs.15,000.00
Medical ExpensesRs.17,350.00
TotalRs.32,82,090.00
which had occurred on account of death of the victim has to be computed on pegging it on her personal income she earned from her employment approximately three years back or it should be relatable to the income of her surviving husband.  This question arises   as   there   was   evidence   before   the   Tribunal   that   the deceased was a graduate with B. Com. degree and was employed till   the   year   2008   in   a   company   earning   monthly   salary   of Rs.34,385/­. At the time of the accident, however, the deceased was not employed.   The Tribunal determined the compensation relying on the case of  Arun Kumar Agrawal  (supra).   It has been held in this judgment:­ “35.  In   our   view,   it   is   highly   unfair,   unjust   and inappropriate to compute the compensation payable to the dependants of a deceased wife/mother, who does not have a regular income, by comparing her services with that of a housekeeper or a servant or an employee,   who   works   for   a   fixed   period.   The 5
gratuitous services rendered by the wife/mother to<br>the husband and children cannot be equated with the<br>services of an employee and no evidence or data can<br>possibly be produced for estimating the value of such<br>services. It is virtually impossible to measure in terms<br>of money the loss of personal care and attention<br>suffered by the husband and children on the demise<br>of the housewife. In its wisdom, the legislature had,<br>as early as in 1994, fixed the notional income of a<br>non­earning person at Rs. 15,000 per annum and in<br>case of a spouse, 1/3rd income of the<br>earning/surviving spouse for the purpose of<br>computing the compensation.”
The High Court, on the other hand, proceeded on the basis 8. that it would be appropriate to fix the sum of Rs.34,385/­ as the monthly   income   of   the   deceased   to   arrive   at   just   and   fair compensation   in   quantifying   pecuniary   loss.   Reasoning   of   the High Court on this aspect was:­ “Though   at   the   time   of   death,   the   deceased   Bala Babitha was a housewife, earlier she was working in a private company and earning a sum of Rs.34,385/­ per   month,   which   is   evident   from   Ex.Ps.23   &   24. Hence,   it   would   be   appropriate   to   fix   the   sum   of Rs.34,385/­ as monthly income of the deceased to arrive at a just and proper compensation under the head of pecuniary loss. If a sum of Rs.34,385/­ is taken   as   monthly   income   of   the   deceased,   50% amount   has   to   be   deducted   towards   personal expenses   and   if   so   deducted,   the   monthly contribution to the family works out to Rs.17,193/­. The   deceased   was   aged   37   years   at   the   time   of accident; hence, the correct multiplier that has to be applied   in   this   case   is   15.   If   the   multiplier   15   is applied,   the   total   pecuniary   loss   works   out   to Rs.30,94,740/­ (17,193 x 12 x 15). Consequently, the sum   of   Rs.31,50,000/­   awarded   by   the   Tribunal 6 under the head Pecuniary Loss is hereby modified and reduced to Rs.30,94,740/­.”          ( quoted verbatim from the paperbook) . In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court on this point 9 suffers from error on two counts. At the time of her death, the deceased was not in employment. She was a homemaker.  It was not a case where the deceased at the time of accident had just left her job.  If that was the case, her last drawn salary might have had given reliable guidance for computing her monthly income at that   point   of   time.   Here   the   deceased   remained   without employment for a period of approximately three years and what she earned prior to that ought not to have been treated to be her monthly income to arrive at just and proper compensation under the head of pecuniary loss, as has been held by the High Court. There is a long time gap between the time she was in employment and   the   occurrence   of   the   accident.   Her   monthly   salary approximately   three   years   back   thus   would   be   an   unreliable guide for fixing her notional income when she succumbed to her injuries  caused  by   the  accident.   Moreover,  at  the   time   of the accident, she was a homemaker providing care and support to her   family.   In   this   context,   in   our   opinion,   the   computation 7 methodology   prescribed   in   the   case   of   Arun   Kumar   Agrawal (supra) would be more appropriate to apply, which was done by the Tribunal.   10. Plea has been taken before us on behalf of the insurance company   that   the   appellants   could   not   take   a   stand   for computing the income of the deceased in the manner held in the case   of   Arun   Kumar   Agrawal   (supra),   since   before   the   High Court, they had run a case that the pecuniary loss ought to be computed on the basis of her last drawn salary.  Just because the appellants urged their claim based on the last drawn salary of the deceased before the High Court, this Court ought not to anchor its decision on that argument alone. It remains open to this Court to   examine   the   nature   of   the   claim   and   compute   the compensation   on   a   different   criterion   applying   a   different parameter. This is more so, because such compensation figure could  be  arrived   at  on the   basis  of   materials  on  record, that includes   evidence   on   monthly   earning   of   the   husband   of   the deceased and the applied parameter stands judicially recognised as a legitimate mode for computing pecuniary loss. Further, in this case, plea was made in the claim petition for compensation 8 calculated on the basis of one­third of the husband’s income. In the petition for special leave to appeals also, one of the points formulated is as to whether compensation on account of death of Bala Babitha would be calculated on the basis of her last drawn salary or her husband’s income.  11.   Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 stipulates:­ 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal .—On receipt of an   application   for  compensation   made  under  section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of  the  claims  and, subject  to  the  provisions  of section   163   may   make   an   award   determining   the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and   specifying   the   person   or   persons   to   whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the   Claims   Tribunal   shall   specify   the   amount   which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:  ….. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. (3) When   an   award   is   made   under   this   section,   the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award  shall, within  thirty days  of  the  date  of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the   entire   amount   awarded   in   such   manner   as   the Claims Tribunal may direct.” The aforesaid provision vests the Tribunal with the power 12. and jurisdiction to make an inquiry into claims arising out of 9 deaths and injuries caused from an accident and make award determining the compensation which appears to it to be just.  It would defeat the legislative purpose in the event the Tribunal or the Appellate Forum is made to confine its inquiry to the plea of the claimant as regards the factors which ought to be taken into consideration for determining the compensation amount.  Power to   hold   an   inquiry   under   the   aforesaid   provision   cannot   be construed in such a restrictive manner.  If the factors on which quantification of claim is asked for cannot be established, the adjudicatory forum under the 1988 Act would stand divested of its power to arrive at just compensation even if in course of the proceeding,   materials   disclosed   could   justify   award   of compensation based on certain criteria other than those on which the   claim   is   founded.   In   the   instant   case,   we   find   that   the Tribunal,   while   proceeding   to   award   compensation   to   the appellants/claimants had relied on the principle laid down by this Court in the case of  Arun Kumar Agrawal  (supra) and there was evidence before the Tribunal to assess the income of the husband   of   the   deceased.   In   fact,   the   first   appellant’s compensation was quantified taking into consideration his own 10 income at the material point of time.   In our opinion, the High Court ought not to have proceeded on the basis of the income drawn by the deceased victim approximately three years before the accident ended her life. The Tribunal did not indulge in pure guesswork in pegging the notional income of the deceased to her husband’s income. As we have already observed, in the claim petition itself, against the column “Occupation of the deceased”­ income   calculation   of   the   deceased   was   contemplated   on   the basis of her husband’s income. The Tribunal had rightly followed the course laid down in the case of  Arun Kumar Agrawal  (supra), which   in   the   given   facts,   constituted,   a   more   definitive   and reliable methodology for quantifying pecuniary loss. 13. So far as deduction on account of personal expenses of the deceased, following the case of   Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another   [(2009) 6 SCC rd 121], the Tribunal directed deduction of 1/3   of the earning of the deceased, the latter being determined on the income of her spouse.   That was, in our view, the proper course. We hold so because, even if we leave out the husband of the deceased from 11 being treated as a dependent, there were two minor children at the material point of time who ought to have been treated as dependent   family   members.   At   that   point   of   time   the   second appellant was twelve years old and the age of injured daughter was   three   years.     In   the   case   of   Sarla   Verma   (supra)   the deduction has been held to be valid in a case where there were dependent family members. We should not restrict the expression “dependent” to mean those financially dependent only.   Minor children are emotionally dependent on the mother. They lost care and guidance of their mother at a very young age. While arriving at just compensation, the Tribunal ought to factor in the loss of dependency in these terms.   14. The High Court did not give any reason for deducting 50% in computing   pecuniary   loss   and   we   do   not   think   this   was   the rd correct   view.     We   are   of   the   view   that   deduction   of   1/3   of determined income of the deceased towards personal expenses is valid on the basis of the decision of this Court in the case of  Sarla (supra). We also find that neither the Tribunal nor the Verma   High Court had considered loss of future prospect to arrive at the 12 quantum of pecuniary loss. In the case of   Rajendra Singh and Others vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others [(2020) 7 SCC 256], addition of loss of future prospects has been held to be a factor for determining compensation under the head of pecuniary loss even in a case where the income of deceased is arrived at on a notional basis. In this judgment it has been held:­ “11. The notional income of the first deceased is therefore held to be Rs 5000 per month at the time of death. The compensation on that basis with a deduction of 1/4th i.e. Rs. 15,000 towards personal expenses with a multiplier of 17   is   assessed   at   Rs   7,65,000.   If   the   deceased   had survived, in view of observations in Lata Wadhwa [Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197], her skills as a matured and  skilled housewife in contributing to the welfare and care of the family and in the upbringing of the children would have only been enhanced by time and for which reason we hold that the appellants shall be entitled to   future   prospects   @   40%   in   addition   to   the   loss   of consortium   and   future   expenses   already   granted.   We therefore  assess  the  total  compensation  payable  to  the appellants in the first appeal at Rs 11,96,000.” 15. The deceased was 37 years old at the time of her death. Hence,  there   ought   to  be   an  addition   of   40%  to   the   notional income   of   the   deceased   towards   future   prospects   as   she   was below 40 years of age. In the present case, it is not in dispute that multiplier of 15 ought to be applied. In these circumstances, the 13 total entitlement of the appellants under the head of pecuniary loss would thus be:­
Monthly income of the<br>deceasedRs.26,250/­
future prospects @ 40% of<br>the income (notional)Rs.26,250 x 40/100 =<br>Rs.10,500/­<br>[Rs.26,250 + Rs.10,500<br>= Rs.36,750/­]
Deduction of 1/3rd for<br>personal living expensesRs.36,750 x 1/3 =<br>Rs.12,250/­<br>[Rs.36,750 ­ Rs.12,250<br>= Rs.24,500/­]
Total pecuniary loss of the<br>deceased (with 15 as the<br>multiplier)Rs.24,500 x 12 x 15 =<br>Rs.44,10,000/­
16. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of the High Court to the extent of computation made of pecuniary loss on account of death of said Bala Babitha for a sum Rs.30,94,740/­. We quantify the said sum to be Rs.44,10,000/­. 17. Argument was also advanced on behalf of the respondents that compensation awarded towards loss of love and affection is contrary to the ratio of the judgement of this Court in case of  United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Satinder Kaur Alias Satwinder Kaur and Others  [(2021) 11 SCC 780].  It was held in this decision that   loss   of   love   and   affection   is   comprehended   in   loss   of 14 consortium, and there is no justification to award compensation towards loss of love and affection as a separate head. The relevant paragraphs from the judgement are reproduced below:­ “34. At this stage, we consider it necessary to provide uniformity with respect to the grant of consortium, and loss of love and affection. Several Tribunals and the High Courts have been awarding compensation for both loss of consortium and loss of love and affection. The Constitution Bench   in   Pranay   Sethi,   has   recognized   only   three conventional   heads   under   which   compensation   can   be awarded viz. loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses.   In   Magma   General,   this   Court   gave   a comprehensive   interpretation   to   consortium   to   include spousal consortium, parental consortium, as well as filial consortium. Loss of Love and affection is comprehended in loss of consortium. 35. The Tribunals and  the High Courts are  directed to award compensation for loss of consortium, which is a legitimate Conventional head. There is no jurisdiction to award compensation towards loss of love and affection as a separate head.” 18. We accept this argument advanced by the respondents. The High Court has thus committed error in law while providing for compensation under the heads of loss of love and affection and also loss of consortium. Instead, in our opinion, compensation provided   under   the   head   of   loss   of   consortium   would   be   Rs. 40,000/­ for each appellant, comprehending the loss of love and affection within it. Hence, the total compensation provided under 15 this   head   would   amount   to   Rs   1,60,000/­.   That   part   of   the judgment of the High Court shall stand modified accordingly. 19. We find no reason to interfere with the High Court’s finding as regards computation of compensation on other heads. Interest of 7.5% per annum has been awarded by both the Tribunal and the High Court. We do not disturb the concurrent views of the High   Court   and   the   Tribunal   on   the   rate   of   interest.   Certain authorities were cited on behalf of the appellants in support of their argument for enhancing the rate of interest. The first one, reported in [(2001) 2 SCC 9] related to an accident that occurred th on 20  March 1986. The next one, reported in [(2009) 8 SCC 507] related to insurance claim on loss of stocks by fire and the date of th occurrence of the accident in that case was 24  August 1999. The bank rate of interest has fallen over the years and for this reason we sustain the  award  of  the  Tribunal and  the  High  Court in appeal on this point.  The total amount payable to the appellants on account of death of Bala Babitha, thus, would be:­
Pecuniary lossRs. 44,10,000/­
Loss of consortiumRs. 1,60,000/­
Funeral expensesRs. 15,000/­
16
Loss of estateRs. 15,000/­
Medical expensesRs. 17,350/­
TotalRs.46,17,350/­
The aforesaid sum shall be payable to the appellants in the 20. proportion directed by the High Court except that in the case of th the 4   appellant (that is the mother of the deceased), we direct lumpsum payment of Rs.2,00,000/­ instead of Rs.1,00,000/­ as directed   by   the   High   Court.   The   aforesaid   sum   shall   be  paid within   two   months   from   this   date   adjusting   therefrom   any amount which may have already been paid to the appellants. Unpaid amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment is made in terms of this judgment and order. The appeals are allowed in the above terms, without any 21. order as to costs.  22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stands disposed of. ………………………………., J. (DINESH MAHESHWARI) ………………………………., J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) 17 NEW DELHI; th 11  JULY 2022 18