Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SMT. RAMTI DEVI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/10/1994
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BHARUCHA S.P. (J)
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
CITATION:
1995 SCC (1) 198 JT 1995 (1) 223
1994 SCALE (4)676
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
ORDER
1. This appeal by special leave arises against the
judgment and decree of the Delhi High Court in R.F.A. No. 59
of 1978 dated February 26, 1979. The plaintiff appellant
filed the suit for declaration that she is the absolute
owner and is in possession of the house bearing old
Municipal No. 5925 and new Municipal No. 4477, Ward No. XI,
situated at Plot No. 7/1 8, Darya Ganj, Delhi. She claimed
to have purchased the property from one Kaushalya Devi under
a sale deed dated May 11, 1946 registered on May 29, 1946
and thereby she is said to be the owner. Shri Ratti Ram had
no right, title or interest to alienate the property by the
sale deed dated January 29, 1947 which was said to have been
executed to stiffle the prosecution in tended to be lodged
against him. The trial court dismissed the suit. On
appeal, the High Court confirmed it.
2. The question is whether the suit is within limitation.
In the evidence, it was admitted that she had knowledge of
the execution and registration of the sale-deed on January
29, 1947. Initially a suit was filed in 1959 but was
dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit. Ad-
mittedly, the present suit was filed on July 30, 1966. The
question, therefore, is whether the suit is within
limitation. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation
Act, 1963, relied on by the appellant herself, postulates
that to cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for
the rescission of a contract, the limitation is three years
and it begins to run when the plaintiff entitles to have the
instrument or the decree cancelled or set aside or the con-
tract rescinded first become known to him. As seen, when
the appellant had knowledge of it on January 29, 1949 itself
the limitation began to run from that date and the three
years limitation has hopelessly been barred on the date when
the suit was filed. It is contended by Shri V.M. Tarkunde,
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learned senior counsel for the appellant, that the counsel
in the trial court was not right in relying upon Article 59.
Article 113 is the relevant Article. The limitation does
not begin to run as the sale deed document is void as it was
executed to stifle the prosecution. Since the appellant
having been remained in possession, the only declaration
that could be sought and obtained is that she is the owner
and that the document does not bind the appellant. We are
afraid that we cannot agree with the learned counsel. As
seen, the recitals of the documents would show that the sale
deed was executed for valuable consideration to discharge
pre-existing debts and it is a registered document. Apart
from the prohibition under s. 92 of the Evidence Act to
adduce oral evidence to contradict the terms of the recital
therein,
225
no issue in this behalf on the voidity of the sale-deed or
its binding nature was raised nor a finding recorded that
the sale-deed is void under s.23 of the Contract Act.
Pleading itself is not sufficient. Since the appellant is
seeking to have the document avoided or cancelled,
necessarily, a declaration has to be given by the court in
that behalf. Until the document is avoided or cancelled by
proper declaration, the duly registered document remains
valid and binds the parties. So the suit necessarily has to
be laid within three years from the date when the cause of
action had occurred. Since the cause of action has arisen
on January 29, 1947, the date on which the sale-deed was
executed and registered and the suit was filed on July 30,
1966, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The
courts below, therefore, were right in dismissing the suit.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.