Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAM SAKAL SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MOSAMAT MONAKO DEVI (DEAD) & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/02/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgement
of the Patna High Court, 1984, dismissing the second appeal
in limine at the admission stage.
The undisputed facts are that one Sheo Charan Singh,
the common ancestor, left behind him two sons, Lal Singh and
Shanker Singh. Shanker Singh left behind his son Banjhoo
Singh who died issueless. Lal Singh had seven sons by name,
Kirtarth Singh, Padarath Singh, Ujagir Singh, Sukhari Singh,
Ratan Singh, Budhan Singh and Mangru Singh. We are
concerned, in this litigation, with Sukhari Singh of this
branch. It is now an admitted case that Sukhari Singh had
executed a gift deed with respect to the properties
mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint in favour of the
appellant, a stranger to the family, on December 4, 1995.
Thereafter, he cancelled the gift deed by another deed on
April 4, 1960. He thereafter exceed a sale deed in favour of
the first respondent on November 22, 1970. Therefore, the
first respondent filed a suit in 1995 for a declaration that
the gift deed dated December 4, 1959 was obtained by the
appellant by playing fraud on Sukhari Singh and, therefore,
it was voidable. He also sought a declaration that Sukhari
Singh had validly executed , after its cancellation, the
sale deed in his favour. He also sought decree for
possession of the Schedule-A properties. Pending the suit,
the notification under Section 3 of the Bihar Consolidation
of Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (for
short, the ’Act’) was issued in the year 1974-75 and,
thereafter, an objection was raised, a part from the other
pleading, that the suit stood abated by operation of Section
4(1)(c) of the Act. It was also pleaded that Sukhari Singh
had validly executed gift deed i n favour of the appellant
on December 4, 1959 and, therefore, the sale in favour of
the respondent was not binding on him. The trial Court
upheld the contention of the appellant but issue No.4 on the
question of fraud, was decided against the appellant. On
appeal, the District Judge decided both the points against
the appellant and held that the document, the gift deed
December 4, 1959, is voidable and that the civil Court alone
could give declaration. As a result, the suit had not
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abated. The appellant Court also recorded a finding that
gift deed was obtained by playing fraud and, therefore, it
was voidable document. Accordingly, the declarations came to
be made. The suit was decreed on that basis. As stated
earlier, the High Court has dismissed the second appeal in
limine. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant,
with his usual thorough preparation and clarity of his
submission, raises three-fold contention. Under Section
4(1)(c) of the Act, the suit stands abated and, therefore,
the civil Court was devoid of jurisdiction to proceed with
the trial to decree the suit. He also contends that Sukhari
Singh, having gifted over the undivided share in the joint
family property, had no right to alienate the property by
way of sale in favour of the respondent. So that sale deed
itself is invalid in law. All these questions touch upon the
properties held by Sukhari Singh which should be gone into
by the consolidation authorities but not by the civil court.
The contentions are resisted by Shri Rakesh K. Khanna,
learned counsel for the respondents. He argues that the
consistent view of the Patna High Court is that if a
document is wholly void, the civil Court has no jurisdiction
to go into its legality. But if the document is voidable,
unless the civil Court gives a declaration that the document
is voidable, Consolidation authorities get no jurisdiction
to decide the matter. As a consequence, civil Court alone
has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute and give the
declaration, as sough for. He also contends that the
question whether Sukhari Singh had divested himself of the
joint interest had in the joint family, was not an issue nor
is any finding in this behalf recorded. Therefore, the
question cannot be gone into in this appeal. He has further
stated that in view of the finding recorded by the appellate
court that the gift deed executed in favour of the appellant
was voidable, Sukhari Singh had power to dispose of his
property. The sale made in favour of the respondent is
valid. He further contends that pending appeal, the
respondent Nos. 7,8 and 15 have died and an application to
delete them from the array having been filed, the appeal
stands abated.
In view of the respective contentions, the primary
question which arises for consideration is: whether the
civil Court has jurisdiction to go into the question of
declaration that the gift deed is void of voidable? Section
4 of the Act postulates thus:
"The effect of notification under
Section 3(1) of the Act- Upon the
publication of the notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 3
in the official Gazette the
consequences, as hereinafter set
forth, shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, from the
date specified in the notification
till the close of the consolidation
operation, ensue in the area to
which the notification relates,
namely :-
(c) every proceedings for the
correction of records and every
suit and proceedings in respect of
declaration of rights or interest
in any land lying in the area or
for declaration or adjudication of
any other right in regard to which
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proceedings can or ought to be
taken under this Act, ending before
any court or authority whether of
the first instance or of appeal,
reference or revision, shall, on an
order being passed in that behalf
by the court or authority before
whom such suit or proceedings is
pending stand abated."
As a consequence of the publication of the notification
under Section 3(1) of the Act, every proceedings for the
correction of record and every suit and proceedings in
respect of declaration of right or interest in any land
lying in the area or for declaration of adjudication of any
other right in regard to such proceedings can or ought to be
taken under the Act, pending before any court or authority
whether in the first instance or in appeal, reference or
revision , shall, on an order being passed, in that behalf
by the Court or authority before whom such suit or
proceedings is pending, stand abated. Therefore, the
prohibition of the civil court to proceed further, after the
publication of the notification under Section 3(1), was in
respect of the declaration of a right or interest in any
land lying in an area or for the declaration or adjudication
of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or
ought to be taken under the Ac. All pending proceedings
before the Court, either at the trial or in appeal or
reference or revision, shall sand abated, unlike in U.P.
Act, only on an order being passed in that behalf by the
concerned Court or authority before whom such suit or
proceedings is pending. The next question is: as to when
Consolidation authorities get jurisdiction to declare that a
if deed executed by a holder of a land under the Act is
obtained by fraud or collusion etc.? This controversy was
considered by this Court in Gorakh Nath Dube vs. Hari Narain
Singh & Ors. [(1974) 1 SCR 339]. After consideration of the
entire case law in that behalf, this court had held thus:
"We think that a distinction can be
made between cases where a document
is wholly or partially invalid so
that if can be disregarded by any
court or authority and one where it
has to be actually set aside before
it can cease to have legal effect.
An adjudication on the effect to
such a purported alienation would
be necessarily implied in the
decision of a dispute involving
conflicting claims to rights or
interests in land which are the
subject matter of consolidation
proceedings. The existence and
quantum of rights claimed or denied
will have to be declared by the
consolidation authorities which
would be deemed to be invested with
jurisdiction, by the necessary
implication of their statutory
powers to adjudicate upon such
rights and interests in land, to
declare such documents effective or
ineffective, but, where there is a
document the legal effect of which
can only be taken away by setting
it aside or its cancellation, it
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could be urged that the
consolidation authorities have no
power to cancel the deed, and,
therefore, it must be held to be
binding on them so long as it is
not cancelled by a court having the
power to cancel it.
On the facts in that case since the declaration of one
half share in the property was matter within the
jurisdiction of the Consolidation authority, this Court had
held that the suit stood abated.
In Paras Singh V/s. Baikunth Singh [1979 PLJR (Vol.12)
567] and Tarkeshwar Upadhya Anr. V/s. Mahesh kehar & Ors.
[AIR 1981 Patna 348], the learned Single Judge had held that
a suit for cancellation of the deed on the ground that they
were executed by an insane person would stand abated. If the
notification under Section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation
of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act is already
published, the civil court has no jurisdiction. A Division
Bench in Jiwan Pandey & Anr. vs, Mahendra Rai [1985 PLJ 686]
had held that when the decree is voidable but not void, the
suit does not get abated since the civil Court alone has to
grant declaratory relief to avoid the decree. Later, a
reference was made to the Full bench decision of the Patna
High Court for resolving the conflict. Following the ratio
in Gorakh Nath Dube’s case (supra), the full Bench in
Sheoratan Chamar & Ors. V/s. Ram Murat Singh [1985 BLJR
(Vol.33) 45] had held in para 14 that all cases where lis is
rested wholly would abate if such document is void. But no
such abatement would result if the same is voidable and the
same has to be set aside by the court for adjudication.
Therein also the voidity or voidability of the gift deed was
in question. Having found the gift deed voidable, the full
bench held that found the gift deed voidable. The same view
was reiterated by another Division Bench in Dharmanath
Pandey & Ors. V/s. Dhumun Manjhu & Ors. [1985 BLJR (Vol.33)
110]; Jaleshwar Tiwary & Ors. V/s. Suresh Tiwary & Ors.
[1986 BLJR (Vol.34)378] and Shivaji Rai vs. Rajendra Rai &
Anr. [(1993) 1(Vol.44) BLJR 258].
It is thus settled law that if the document is invalid,
it can be disregarded by the court or the authority and it
may proceed to consider declaration or adjudication of any
other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to
be taken under the Act. Since we have in the present case
proceedings before the Consolidation authorities, it would
necessarily imply in the adjudication of a dispute involving
conflicting claims in respect of rights or interests in land
which is subject matter of the proceedings before the
Consolidation authorities but if a dispute relating to the
land was in respect of the land and was based upon a
document where its validity is impugned, it is for the court
to declare such document effective or ineffective and the
legal effect would hinge upon such a declaration. Based
thereon, if the document requires to be set aside or
cancelled, the Consolidation authorities under the Act have
no power to cancel such deed. Therefore, the proceedings
would not abate. As held, if the document is void, the
proceedings pending in any court or authority stand abated.
Therefore, the civil Court gets jurisdiction to declare
the document to be voidable. In consequence, the
notification under Section 3(1) does not have the effect of
abatement under Section 4(1)(c) of the Act. If the document
is void, there would be no need to set aside or cancel the
document/deed. Then the Consolidation authorities get
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all questions relating
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to declaration of a right or interest in any land or for
declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to
such proceedings. The Court or authority before whom any
suit etc. is pending should record that the suit or
proceedings have abated leaving it to the parties to avail
of the remedy under the Act.
The appellate Court has gone into the question of fraud
and recorded the finding thus:
"Having learnt about such a
fraudulent deed of gift Sukhari
Singh cancelled it by another deed
dated 4.4. 1960. But, defendant
No.1 somehow, obtained the deed of
gift to him. Defendant No.1 never
came in possession over the
properties covered by the deed of
gift properties covered by the deed
of gift and the same are coming in
possession of the plaintiffs and
the other defendants.’
".......even if it si held that it
is a voidable document because of
fraud and undue influence practiced
upon Sukhari mahto, it must be held
that the plaintiffs are entitled to
get the deed to gift set aside and
cancelled.
That, although the scribe of the
deed of gift and attesting
witnesses Ram Prabesh are deed but
the attesting witness Ram Bachan
and the identifying witness Dukdama
as also serval other person who
have been named by D.W. 2 and who
are alive and who are said to have
seen the Rasid Behi have not been
examined and, therefore, competent
person who could therefore,
competent person who could
therefore, competent person who
could have testified regarding the
execution of the deed of gift and
exchange of the equivalent have
been purposely withheld, which in
circumstances pointing at the
fraudulent nature of the deed of
gift in question.
In the instant case, I have already
shown that the plaintiffs have
alleged that the executant, namely,
Sukhari was slow of under standing,
fraud was practiced in obtaining
the deed of gift and he was
subjected to cohesion, undue
influence and misrepresentation and
had he known about the true nature
of the document he would not have
executed that deed. The plaintiffs
have not denied that Sukhari had
executed the deed of gift in suit.
An alternative relief has been
asked for the cancellation of the
deed of gift in the suit as it is
illegal and invalid. The appellants
have cited 1981 Bihar Law Judgments
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page 112 (Srimati Surajmani Devi
Vs. Srimati Janaki Devi and others)
in support of their contention that
there a suit has been filed of r
declaration of title on the ground
that the registered deed of gift is
illegal and void on account of
fraud practiced upon the executant,
it cannot be held to be void ab
initio and it si voidable document
and has to be set aside on the
ground of fraud. In my opinion, the
facts of the case cited above are
similar to the facts of the present
suit under consideration, and, upon
the allegations in the plaint the
deed of gift is not a void document
rather it is voidable document and
it is held accordingly. That being
so, the suit shall not abate under
Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar
Consolidation of Holdings and
prevention of Fragmentation Act,
1956 as decide in the above quoted
decision in Srimati Devi’s case.
Accordingly, it is held that the
suit has not abated and the
decision of the Additional
Subordinate Judge in this regard is
reversed and set aside.
In the result, the suit is decreed
and the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover possession of the suit
lands. The deed of gift dated
4.12.1959 is also hereby cancelled
and it is held to be not binding on
the plaintiffs and the defendants
other than the contesting defendant
No.1. The title of the plaintiffs
with respect to the suit properties
is hereby declared. Thus, the
appeal is allowed on contest, but,
in the circumstances of the case
without cost of this appeal."
In view of the above finding recorded after elaborate
consideration, the District Judge held that the gift deed
dated December 4, 1959 was voidable. Therefore, the
declaration that the gift deed is voidable is well
justified. The contention that it is void is devoid of
force. As a consequence, the civil Court had jurisdiction
and the suit had not abated. The question whether Sukhari
Singh had only undivided joint interest in the coparcenary
and that he had denuded himself of the same after he had
executed another gift deed in favour of one of his agates,
was not in issue before the trial Court or the appellate
Court nor is any finding recorded to that effect. As a
result, we cannot hijack the procedure and go into the
question for the first time. Therefore, Sukhari Singh
having, admittedly, cancelled the gift deed axecuted in
favour of the appellant, which was found to be a voidable
document, the respondent had got the title to the property
under the sale deed. As such the declaration of title
granted in his favour is legal and valid. It is true that
the trick of the pleading and camouflaging of the relief
cannot conclusively confer the jurisdiction on the civil
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Court or the Consolidation authorities to decide a
particular dispute in question. The substratum of the lis
has to be considered and decided on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence on record. In this case, the relief
of declaration of title, as asked for, was the first relief
in the plaint and declaration of title was only
consequential to the declaration of the voidability of the
gift deed executed in favour of the appellant. Unless the
document was avoided, Sukhari Singh could not get any title
to alienate the property by a sale deed to the respondent.
Therefore, the declaration of the voidability would be the
main relief and the declaration of the title on the basis of
the sale deed is consequential to the primary relief.
Therefore decree for possession are sequential to the first
declaration. The reliefs in the suit, as a whole, are to be
granted by the civil Court only.
The next question is: whether the appeal before this
Court stands abated? It is true that an application came to
be filed and an order came to be passed deleting respondent
Nos. 7,8 and 15, who died pending appeal. With regard to
respondent No.7, Smt. Kamala Devi, since she died issuless
the question of abatement does not arise because if the
appellant succeeds, the share of her agates would get
enlarged. Therefore, the appeal does not get abated. But
with regard to respondent Nos. 8 and 15 the stand taken by
the appellant is not correct in law. Order XXII, Rule 4, CPC
postulates that in case one of the respondents on record
dies, appeal does not stand abated unless the interest held
by them is joint and indivisible. In this case, the interest
held by them is joint and indivisible. It is true that, in
the application, it was stated that respondent Nos.9 and 10
are already on record to replace respondent no.8 and he was
deleted on that premise. Similarly, respondent No.16, who is
the son of respondent No.15, replaced him on his death
pending appeal. The appellant has stated that the respondent
No. 16 was already on record and, therefore, the respondent
No.15 was deleted. The procedure adopted is not correct in
law. The order of this Court is that the consequence of
their deletion would be considered at the time of disposal.
It is the mistaken perception of the counsel. The deceased
are not to be deleted but the legal representatives who are
not already on record are to be transposed as legal
representatives of the respective deceased respondents.
Other XXII, Rule 4(1), CPC posiulates that where one of the
the two or more defendants/ respondents dies and the right
to sue does not survive against the surviving
defendants/respondents alone or a sole defendant/respondent,
the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall
cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to
be made a party and shall proceed with the suit/appeal.
Under sub-rule (5) if such an application is not made within
the prescribed limitation, the suit/appeal, in consequence,
gets abated under clause (b) of sub-rule (5). Only on an
application made to set aside the abatement and for
condonation of the delay showing sufficient cause for
failure to make the application with in the specified time,
the court having regard to the facts of the case, may
condone the delay and order abatement. The salutary
principle to bring on record the legal
representative/representatives is to have the estate of the
deceased in the litigation represented in the absence of
which the Court would be unable to pronounce upon the rights
of the deceased vis-a-vis parties to the suit. That is
manifested by Rule 6 of Order XXII, CPC which provides that
after hearing the case and before judgement is pronounced,
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if one of the parties dies, there would be no abatment by
reason of such death. It is, therefore, one of the duties of
the counsel to ensure proper representation by a legal
representative of the estate of the deceased. An application
should be duly, and within limitation, filed and it is the
duty of the court to pass order as per law.
Shri Ranjit Kumar, obviously due to mistaken perception
of the procedural part, has, instead of seeking
transposition of the legal representatives to represent the
estates of the deceased respondents Nos.8 and 15, sought
deletion of the names of the deceased. Without there being
already on record some persons eligible and entitled in law
to represent the estate of the deceased, the deceased
defendants/ respondents were deleted. The consequence of
deletion is that the decree of the courts below as against
the deceased decree of the courts below as against the
deceased becomes final. If the decree is inseparable and the
rights of the parties are indivisible between the contesting
parties and the deceased, the consequence would be that the
suit/appeal stands abated as a whole. But it one of the
respondent/respondents or defendant/defendats is already on
record, what needs to be done is an intimation to the court
by filing a formal application or memo to transpose the
existing defendant/defendats or respondent/respondents as
legal representatives of the deceased defendant/defendants
or representatives of the deceased defendant/defendants or
respondent/respondents. In view of the mistake committed by
the counsel, the Court has to consider the effect thereof.
On the facts, we think that cause of justice would get
advanced if the misconception as to the procedure on the
part of the counsel is condoned and if respondent Nos.8 and
15 instead of being deleted respondent Nos.9 and 10 are
substituted and transposed as the legal representatives of
the deceased respondent No.8 and respondent No.16 is
transposed as legal representative of respondent No.15.
However, in view of the above findings, on merits the
appeal stands dismissed but, in the circumstances, without
costs.