Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3889 OF 2006
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
BANGALORE …APPELLANT
VERSUS
M/S. G.M. EXPORTS & OTHERS ...RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7814 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7894 OF 2015
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 13028 OF 2012]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7895 OF 2015
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27811 OF 2012]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5119 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3082 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3086 OF 2011
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Page 1
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
| n S.L.P. | (Civil) No |
|---|
S.L.P. (Civil) No. 27811 of 2012.
2. Seven appeals are before us; some of them are from the
Bombay High Court judgment dated 15.12.2011 and the Kerala
High Court judgment dated 15.07.2009. Others are appeals
against a Karnataka Tribunal (Bangalore) judgment and a
Bombay Tribunal judgment, which follows the Bombay High
Court judgment referred to above. Since all these appeals
raise a common question of law of some complexity relating to
anti-dumping duty, the said appeals have been bunched
JUDGMENT
together and are being disposed of together. It may also be
stated that the preponderant view, that is the view of both the
Bombay and Kerala High Courts and the Bombay Tribunal, is in
favour of the construction suggested by revenue. Only the
Karnataka Tribunal (Bangalore) has decided in favour of the
assessee.
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Page 2
3. The question of law which arises in the instant appeals is
whether anti-dumping duty imposed with respect to imports
made during the period between the expiry of the provisional
| d the impo | sition of |
|---|
duty is legal and valid.
4. It is necessary in this case to begin at the very beginning.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Article
VI first laid down how, conceptually, anti-dumping duties were to
be imposed. The relevant part of Article VI reads as under:-
“Article VI
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping,
by which products of one country are introduced
into the commerce of another country at less than
the normal value of the products, is to be
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury
to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry. For the
purposes of this Article, a product is to be
considered as being introduced into the commerce
of an importing country at less than its normal value,
if the price of the product exported from one country
to another
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(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined
for consumption in the exporting country, or,
| ce of suc | h domes |
|---|
(i) the highest comparable price for the like
product for export to any third country in the
ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the
country of origin plus a reasonable addition for
selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for
differences in conditions and terms of sale, for
differences in taxation, and for other differences
affecting price comparability.
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2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a
contracting party may levy on any dumped product
an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the
margin of dumping in respect of such product. For
the purposes of this Article, the margin of dumping
is the price difference determined in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 1.”
5. In pursuance of the said Article VI, various member
nations entered into a World Trade Organisation Agreement to
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implement Article VI, in 1994. The said agreement is referred to
as “Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994”, and in its material
| portant i | n order t |
|---|
raised in these appeals, states as follows:-
“Members hereby agree as follows:
PART I
Article 1
Principles
An anti-dumping measure shall be applied
only under the circumstances provided for in Article
VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations
initiated and conducted in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement. The following
provisions govern the application of Article VI of
GATT 1994 in so far as action is taken under
anti-dumping legislation or regulations.”
JUDGMENT
“Article 10
Retroactivity
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10.2 Where a final determination of injury (but not
of a threat thereof or of a material retardation of the
establishment of an industry) is made or, in the case
of a final determination of a threat of injury, where
the effect of the dumped imports would, in the
absence of the provisional measures, have led to a
determination of injury, anti-dumping duties may be
levied retroactively for the period for which
provisional measures, if any, have been applied.
10.3 If the definitive anti-dumping duty is higher
than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the
amount estimated for the purpose of the security,
the difference shall not be collected. If the definitive
duty is lower than the provisional duty paid or
payable, or the amount estimated for the purpose of
the security, the difference shall be reimbursed or
the duty recalculated, as the case may be.”
JUDGMENT
“10.6 A definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied
on products which were entered for consumption
not more than 90 days prior to the date of
application of provisional measures, when the
authorities determine for the dumped product in
question that:
(I) there is a history of dumping which caused injury
or that the importer was, or should have been,
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aware that the exporter practises dumping and that
such dumping would cause injury, and
| duct in a r<br>ing and t<br>er circum | elatively<br>he volum<br>stances ( |
|---|
10.7 The authorities may, after initiating an
investigation, take such measures as the
withholding of appraisement or assessment as may
be necessary to collect anti-dumping duties
retroactively, as provided for in paragraph 6, once
they have sufficient evidence that the conditions set
forth in that paragraph are satisfied.
10.8 No duties shall be levied retroactively
pursuant to paragraph 6 on products entered for
consumption prior to the date of initiation of the
investigation.”
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“18.4 Each Member shall take all necessary steps,
of a general or particular character, to ensure, not
later than the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the
provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for
the Member in question.”
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6. In pursuance of the said Article VI and the said
Agreement, both of which India is a signatory to, amendments
were made in the Customs Tariff Act in the year 1995. The
| ich we a | re direct |
|---|
introduction of a new Section 9A to the said Act which reads as
under:-
“Section 9A. Anti - dumping duty on dumped
articles
(1) Where any article is exported by an exporter or
producer from any country or territory (hereafter in
this section referred to as the exporting country or
territory) to India at less than its normal value, then,
upon the importation of such article into India, the
Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, impose an anti-dumping duty not
exceeding the margin of dumping in relation to such
article.
JUDGMENT
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,-
(a) “margin of dumping” in relation to an article,
means the difference between its export price and
its normal value;
(b) “export price”, in relation to an article, means the
price of the article exported from the exporting
country or territory and in cases where there is no
export price or where the export price is unreliable
because of association or a compensatory
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| sis as<br>the rules | may be<br>made u |
|---|
(c) “normal value”, in relation to an article, means-
(i) the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like article when destined for
consumption in the exporting country or territory as
determined in accordance with the rules made
under sub-section (6); or
(ii) when there are no sales of the like article in the
ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of
the exporting country or territory, or when because
of the particular market situation or low volume of
the sales in the domestic market of the exporting
country or territory, such sales do not permit a
proper comparison, the normal value shall be either-
JUDGMENT
(a) comparable representative price of the like
article when exported from the exporting country or
territory to an appropriate third country as
determined in accordance with the rules made
under sub-section (6); or
(b) the cost of production of the said article in the
country of origin along with reasonable addition for
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administrative, selling and general costs, and for
profits, as determined in accordance with the rules
made under sub- section(6):
| the cas<br>other than<br>le has b | e of impo<br>the coun<br>een mer |
|---|
(1A). Where the Central Government, on such
inquiry as it may consider necessary, is of the
opinion that circumvention of anti-dumping duty
imposed under sub-section (1) has taken place,
either by altering the description or name or
composition of the article subject to such
anti-dumping duty or by import of such article in an
unassembled or dissembled form or by changing
the country of its origin or export or in any other
manner, whereby the anti-dumping duty so imposed
is rendered ineffective, it may extend the
anti-dumping duty to such article or an article
originating in or exported from such country, as the
case may be.
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(2) The Central Government may, pending the
determination in accordance with the provisions of
this section and the rules made thereunder of the
normal value and the margin of dumping in relation
to any article, impose on the importation of such
article into India an anti-dumping duty on the basis
of a provisional estimate of such value and margin
and if such anti-dumping duty exceeds the margin
as so determined,-
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(a) the Central Government shall, having regard to
such determination and as soon as may be after
such determination, reduce such anti-dumping duty;
and
(b) refund shall be made of so much of the anti-
dumping duty which has been collected as is in
excess of the anti-dumping duty as so reduced.
(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2), a notification
issued under sub-section (1) or any anti-dumping
duty imposed under sub-section (2), unless
specifically made applicable in such notification or
such imposition, as the case may be, shall not apply
to articles imported by a hundred per cent
export-oriented undertaking or a unit in a free trade
zone or in a special economic zone.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, the
expressions "hundred per cent export-oriented
undertaking", "free trade zone" and "special
economic zone" shall have the meanings assigned
to them in Explanations 2 to sub-section (f) of
section 3 of Central Excise Act, 1944.
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(3) If the Central Government, in respect of the
dumped article under inquiry, is of the opinion that -
(i) there is a history of dumping which caused injury
or that the importer was, or should have been,
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aware that the exporter practices dumping and that
such dumping would cause injury; and
| in a relat<br>timing an<br>and other | ively sho<br>d the vol<br>circumsta |
|---|
the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, levy anti-dumping duty
retrospectively from a date prior to the date of
imposition of anti-dumping duty under sub-section
(2) but not beyond ninety days from the date of
notification under that sub-section, and
notwithstanding any thing contained in any other
law for the time being in force, such duty shall be
payable at such rate and from such date as may be
specified in the notification.
(4) The anti-dumping duty chargeable under this
section shall be in addition to any other duty
imposed under this Act or under any other law for
the time being in force.
JUDGMENT
(5) The anti-dumping duty imposed under this
section shall, unless revoked earlier, cease to have
effect on the expiry of five years from the date of
such imposition:
Provided that if the Central Government, in a
review, is of the opinion that the cessation of such
duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of
dumping and injury, it may, from time to time, extend
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the period of such imposition for a further period of
five years and such further period shall commence
from the date of order of such extension.
| that wher<br>aforesai<br>conclusio | e a revie<br>d period o<br>n before |
|---|
(6) The margin of dumping as referred to in sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, from time to
time, be ascertained and determined by the Central
Government, after such inquiry as it may consider
necessary and the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for
the purposes of this section, and without prejudice
to the generality of the foregoing such rules may
provide for the manner in which articles liable for
any anti-dumping duty under this section may be
identified and for the manner in which the export
price and the normal value of and the margin of
dumping in relation to, such articles may be
determined and for the assessment and collection
of such anti-dumping duty.
JUDGMENT
(6A) The margin of dumping in relation to an article,
exported by an exporter or producer, under inquiry
under sub- section (6) shall be determined on the
basis of records concerning normal value and
export price maintained, and information provided,
by such exporter or producer:
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Provided that where an exporter or producer fails to
provide such records or information, the margin of
dumping for such exporter or producer shall be
determined on the basis of facts available.;
| ation issue<br>be after i | d under t<br>t is issue |
|---|
(8) The provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, (52 of
1962) and the rules and regulations made
thereunder, including those relating to the date for
determination of rate of duty, assessment, non-levy,
short levy, refunds, interest, appeals, offences and
penalties shall, as far as may be, apply to the duty
chargeable under this section as they apply in
relation to duties leviable under that Act.”
7. In exercise of powers conferred, inter alia , by Section 9A
(6) of the Customs Tariff Act, the Customs Tariff (Identification,
Assessment and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped
JUDGMENT
Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995 have been
framed. The Rules relevant to the determination of the present
controversy are set out hereunder:-
“2. Definitions. - In these rules, unless the context
otherwise requires-
(e) “provisional duty” means an anti dumping duty
imposed under sub-section (2) of section 9A of the
Act;
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| n under s | ub-rule (1 |
|---|
(a) dumping
(b) injury, where applicable, and
(c) where applicable, a causal link between such
dumped imports and alleged injury.
(3) The designated authority shall not initiate an
investigation pursuant to an application made under
sub-rule (1) unless –
(a) it determines, on the basis of an examination of
the degree of support for, or opposition to the
application expressed by domestic producers of the
like product, that the application has been made by
or on behalf of the domestic industry :
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Provided that no investigation shall be initiated if
domestic producers expressly supporting the
application account for less than twenty five per
cent of the total production of the like article by the
domestic industry, and
(b) it examines the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application and satisfies
itself that there is sufficient evidence regarding -
(i) dumping,
(ii) injury, where applicable; and
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(iii) where applicable, a causal link between such
dumped imports and the alleged injury, to justify the
initiation of an investigation.
| f the do<br>hose do | mestic i<br>mestic pr |
|---|
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule
(1) the designated authority may initiate an
investigation suo motu if it is satisfied from the
information received from the Collector of Customs
appointed under the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of
1962) or from any other source that sufficient
evidence exists as to the existence of the
circumstances referred to in clause (b) of sub-rule
(3).
(5) The designated authority shall notify the
government of the exporting country before
proceeding to initiate an investigation.
JUDGMENT
11. Determination of injury . - (1) In the case of
imports from specified countries, the designated
authority shall record a further finding that import of
such article into India causes or threatens material
injury to any established industry in India or
materially retards the establishment of any industry
in India.
(2) The designated authority shall determine the
injury to domestic industry, threat of injury to
domestic industry, material retardation to
establishment of domestic industry and a causal link
between dumped imports and injury, taking into
account all relevant facts, including the volume of
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dumped imports, their effect on price in the
domestic market for like articles and the consequent
effect of such imports on domestic producers of
such articles and in accordance with the principles
set out in Annexure II to these rules.
| ated auth<br>nding as | ority may<br>to the ex |
|---|
(i) there is a concentration of dumped imports into
an isolated market, and
(ii) the dumped articles are causing injury to the
producers of all or almost all of the production within
such market.
12. Preliminary findings. - (1) The designated
authority shall proceed expeditiously with the
conduct of the investigation and shall, in appropriate
cases, record a preliminary finding regarding export
price, normal value and margin of dumping, and in
respect of imports from specified countries, it shall
also record a further finding regarding injury to the
domestic industry and such finding shall contain
sufficiently detailed information for the preliminary
determinations on dumping and injury and shall
refer to the matters of fact and law which have led
to arguments being accepted or rejected. It will also
contain:-
JUDGMENT
(i) the names of the suppliers, or when this is
impracticable, the supplying countries involved;
(ii) a description of the article which is sufficient for
customs purposes;
(iii) the margins of dumping established and a full
explanation of the reasons for the methodology
used in the establishment and comparison of the
export price and the normal value;
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(iv) considerations relevant to the injury
determination; and
(v) the main reasons leading to the determination.
| its prelimi<br>provision | nary findi<br>al duty |
|---|
Provided that no such duty shall be imposed before
the expiry of sixty days from the date of the public
notice issued by the designated authority regarding
its decision to initiate investigations:
Provided further that such duty shall remain in force
only for a period not exceeding six months which
may upon request of the exporters representing a
significant percentage of the trade involved be
extended by the Central Government to nine
months.
17. Final findings. - (1) The designated authority
shall, within one year from the date of initiation of an
investigation, determine as to whether or not the
article under investigation is being dumped in India
and submit to the Central Government its final
finding –
JUDGMENT
(a) as to, -
(i) the export price, normal value and the margin of
dumping of the said article;
(ii) whether import of the said article into India, in
the case of imports from specified countries, causes
or threatens material injury to any industry
established in India or materially retards the
establishment of any industry in India;
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(iii) a causal link, where applicable, between the
dumped imports and injury;
| e Central<br>ecial circu | Govern<br>mstance |
|---|
Provided further that in those cases where the
designated authority has suspended the
investigation on the acceptance of a price
undertaking as provided in rule 15 and
subsequently resumes the same on violation of the
terms of the said undertaking, the period for which
investigation was kept under suspension shall not
be taken into account while calculating the period of
said one year,
(b) recommending the amount of duty which, if
levied, would remove the injury where applicable, to
the domestic industry.
(2) The final finding, if affirmative, shall contain all
information on the matter of facts and law and
reasons which have led to the conclusion and shall
also contain information regarding-
JUDGMENT
(i) the names of the suppliers, or when this is
impracticable, the supplying countries involved;
(ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for
customs purposes;
(iii) the margins of dumping established and a full
explanation of the reasons for the methodology
used in the establishment and comparison of the
export price and the normal value;
(iv) considerations relevant to the injury
determination; and
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(v) the main reasons leading to the determination.
| rters, prod<br>ved are s | ucers, im<br>o large a |
|---|
Provided further that the designated authority shall,
determine an individual margin of dumping for any
exporter or producer, though not selected initially,
who submit necessary information in time, except
where the number of exporters or producers are so
large that individual examination would be unduly
burdensome and prevent the timely completion of
the investigation.
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(4) The designated authority shall issue a public
notice recording its final findings.
18. Levy of duty. - (1) The Central Government
may, within three months of the date of publication
of final findings by the designated authority under
rule 17, impose by notification in the Official
Gazette, upon importation into India of the article
covered by the final finding, anti-dumping duty not
exceeding the margin of dumping as determined
under rule 17.
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| ed avera | ge marg |
|---|
(ii) where the liability for payment of anti-dumping
duties is calculated on the basis of a prospective
normal value/ the difference between the weighted
average normal value of the selected exporters or
producers and the export prices of exporters or
producers not individually examined:
Provided that the Central Government shall
disregard for the purpose of this sub-rule any zero
margin, margins which are less than 2 per cent
expressed as the percentage of export price and
margins established in the circumstances detailed in
sub-rule (8) of rule 6. The Central Government shall
apply individual duties to imports from any exporter
or producer not included in the examination who
has provided the necessary information during the
course of the investigation as referred to in the
second proviso to sub-rule (3) of rule 17.
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(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule
(1), where a domestic industry has been interpreted
according to the proviso to sub-clause (b) of rule 2,
a duty shall be levied only after the exporters have
been given opportunity to cease exporting at
dumped prices to the area concerned or otherwise
give an undertaking pursuant to rule 15 and such
undertaking has not been promptly given and in
such cases duty shall not be levied only on the
articles of specific producers which supply the area
in question.
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| any. |
|---|
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule
(1) –
(a) where a provisional duty has been levied and
where the designated authority has recorded a final
finding of injury or where the designated authority
has recorded a final finding of threat of injury and a
further finding that the effect of dumped imports in
the absence of provisional duty would have led to
injury, the anti-dumping duty may be levied from the
date of imposition of provisional duty;
(b) in the circumstances referred to in sub-section
(3) of section 9A of the Act, the antidumping duty
may be levied retrospectively from the date
commencing ninety days prior to the imposition of
such provisional duty:
JUDGMENT
Provided that no duty shall be levied retrospectively
on imports entered for home consumption before
initiation of the investigation:
Provided further that in the cases of violation of
price undertaking referred to in sub-rule (6) of rule
15, no duty shall be levied retrospectively on the
imports which have entered for home consumption
before the violation of the terms of such
undertaking.
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| duty. - (1) | If the a |
|---|
(2) If, the anti-dumping duty fixed after the
conclusion of the investigation is lower than the
provisional duty already imposed and collected, the
differential shall be refunded to the importer.
(3) If the provisional duty imposed by the Central
Government is withdrawn in accordance with the
provisions of sub-rule (4) of rule 18, the provisional
duty already imposed and collected, if any, shall be
refunded to the importer.”
8. We will take the facts contained in the judgment of the
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Bombay High Court dated 15.12.2011, in the case of Harsh
International v. Commissioner of Customs , Civil Appeal No.
5119 of 2012, which explain how the question which has to be
th
determined by this judgment arose. On 6 August, 2001 a
public notice was issued by the Designated Authority initiating
proceedings in regard to the import of Vitrified/Porcelain tiles
originating in or exported from the People’s Republic of China
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and the United Arab Emirates. The Designated Authority issued
rd
preliminary findings on 3 December, 2001. Following the
preliminary findings, the Union Government imposed, by a
| May, 2002, | a provisi |
|---|
under Section 9A(2) of the Customs Tariff Act read with Rules
13 and 20 of the Antidumping Rules. The Designated Authority
th
rendered its final findings on 4 February, 2003 and while
concluding that material injury had resulted to the domestic
industry recommended the imposition of antidumping duty. The
st
Union Government issued a notification on 1 May, 2003
imposing a final antidumping duty with effect from the date of
nd
the imposition of the provisional antidumping duty i.e. 2 May,
2002. The question before the Court is as to whether the
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Central Government was within its jurisdiction in imposing a
nd th
final antidumping duty between 2 November, 2002 and 30
April, 2003. This, according to the assessees, is the “gap
period” when the provisional duty had come to an end by efflux
of six months until a final notification was issued by the Union
st
Government on 1 May, 2003.
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9. The stage is now set for setting out the arguments of the
learned counsel both for the revenue and for the assessees.
| of the rev | enue arg |
|---|
and purposively Rule 20 leads to one conclusion and one
conclusion alone – that final anti-dumping duty would take
effect from the date of imposition of the provisional duty, which
would necessarily include the “gap” period i.e. the period
between the lapse of the provisional duty and the imposition of
the final duty. According to learned counsel, any other
construction would defeat the object and purpose of imposing a
final anti-dumping duty after the Designated Authority has
found, post investigation, that there is dumping of goods and
JUDGMENT
material injury to the domestic industry as a result. Thus,
despite dumping and material injury being present, no
anti-dumping duty would be leviable in the interregnum period
which would be wholly subversive of the object sought to be
achieved; that is, saving the domestic industry from unfair trade
practices of foreign exporters. She also argued that a literal
reading of Rule 20 is called for which makes it clear that the
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final anti-dumping duty is to be levied from the date of
imposition of provisional duty which would necessarily include
the “gap” period. Further, since the final duty is made to relate
| e provisio | nal duty |
|---|
employed which must be allowed to have full play and the mind
should not boggle in giving such fiction its logical consequence.
According to learned counsel, “levied” in Rule 20(2)(a)
obviously does not include “collection” as has been held in
several Supreme Court judgments and therefore, “levy” would
not include “collection” for which reason Rule 20 has to be read
on its own without reference to the consequence that is found in
Rule 21. She further argued that it is true that laws that are
made in pursuance of international treaties ought to be
JUDGMENT
construed in accordance with such treaties, but where the
Indian law deviates from the treaty agreement, Indian law
prevails. It is clear that unlike Article 10 of the WTO Agreement,
Rule 20(2)(a) only speaks of anti-dumping duty being levied
from the date of imposition of provisional duty and does not
speak of the period for which the provisional duty applied, thus
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making it clear that anti-dumping duty can be levied and
collected for the “gap” or interregnum period.
| gued tha | t Rule |
|---|
interpreted in the light of the WTO Agreement, and so
interpreted would necessarily be interpreted as meaning only
the period for which the provisional duty is levied, and not
beyond. It has been argued with some vehemence that this
also follows from a reading of clause 18.4 of the Agreement and
a reading of the Central Government’s own website which was
referred to us in the course of arguments stating that the
anti-dumping rules are in consonance with the WTO
Agreements on anti-dumping. Further, it has been argued that
JUDGMENT
the word “levied” under Rule 20(2)(a), in the context includes
even “collection” and this being so, whatever has not been
“collected” in the interregnum period obviously cannot be
collected retrospectively. It was also argued before us that
Section 9A(3) alone empowers the rule making authority to
impose a retrospective anti-dumping duty within the strict
confines of the said rule. Section 9A(2) and (6), in contrast, do
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not allow any imposition, retrospectively, of anti-dumping duty,
and therefore if Rule 20 were to be read in the manner
suggested by revenue, it would be ultra vires the parent statute.
| that the l | evy of an |
|---|
automatic and is only levied by the Central Government taking
into account a series of complex economic factors. This being
so, the continuity of such levy can only be for the period
indicated in the provisional duty levy notification and not
beyond. It was also argued that, on a true construction of Rule
20(2)(a), the said rule merely validates a provisional duty
already levied, and nothing beyond. It was further argued that
Rule 20(2)(a) has to be harmoniously construed with both Rules
13 and 21, or else, the suggested construction by revenue of
JUDGMENT
Rule 20(2)(a) would render Rules 13 and 21 nugatory. In this
context, it was further argued that no duty can be levied in the
interregnum period as the Government would then be doing
indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly – namely,
extending the period of six months of the levy of provisional
duty beyond six months and until the notification imposing the
final anti-dumping duty.
28
Page 28
12. Two earlier judgments of this Court have stated as to
what exactly was the object sought to be achieved by the
introduction of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act read with
| ules. But | before |
|---|
judgments, it is important to refer to our basic law, and in
particular Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India, which reads
as follows:
“51. Promotion of international peace and security.
—The State shall endeavour to —
(c) foster respect for international law and treaty
obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with
one another; and”
13. In S&S Enterprise v. Designated Authority and others ,
(2005) 3 SCC 337, this Court said:
JUDGMENT
“In our opinion, the interpretation of Rule 14(d) by
Respondent No.1 and the Tribunal is incorrect and
contrary to its language. The imposition of dumping
duty is under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act,
1975 and the Rules and is the outcome of the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) to
which India is a party. The purpose behind the
imposition of the duty is to curb unfair trade
practices resorted to by exporters of a particular
country of flooding the domestic markets with goods
at rates which are lower than the rate at which the
exporters normally sell the same or like goods in
29
Page 29
| of the do<br>tute 'dum | mestic m<br>ping', are |
|---|
14. To similar effect is the judgment of Reliance Industries
Ltd. v. Designated Authority and others , (2006) 10 SCC 368:
“The result was that an industrial base was created
in India after independence and this has definitely
resulted in some progress. The purpose of
Section 9-A can, therefore, easily be seen. The
purpose was that our industries which had been
built up after independence with great difficulties
must not be allowed to be destroyed by unfair
competition of some foreign companies. Dumping is
a well-known method of unfair competition which is
adopted by the foreign companies. This is done by
selling goods at a very low price for some time so
that the domestic industries cannot compete and
are thereby destroyed, and after such destruction
has taken place, prices are again raised.
JUDGMENT
The purpose of Section 9-A is, therefore, to
maintain a level playing field and prevent dumping,
while allowing for healthy competition. The purpose
is not protectionism in the classical sense (as
proposed by the German economist Friedrich List in
his famous book ' National System of Political
30
Page 30
15. A number of judgments, both English and Indian, have
laid down as to what is the correct approach to the construction
of a statute made in response to an international treaty
obligation by a member nation. Thus, in The Jade The
JUDGMENT
Eschersheim Owners of the motor vessel Erkowit v.
Owners of the ship Jade , [1976] 1 All ER 920, the House of
Lords stated:
“As the Act was passed to enable Her Majesty’s
government to give effect to the obligations in
international law which it would assume on ratifying
the convention to which it was a signatory, the rule of
statutory construction laid down in Salomon v.
Customs and Excise Commissioners [1966] 3 All ER
31
Page 31
871 and Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd. [1967] 3
All ER 633 is applicable. If there be any difference
between the language of the statutory provision and
that of the corresponding provision of the
convention, the statutory language should be
construed in the same sense as that of the
convention if the words of the statute are reasonably
capable of bearing that meaning.” [at page 924]
16. Similarly in Quazi v. Quazi, [1979] 3 All ER 897, the
House of Lords put it thus:
“In the instant case, however, this does not help the
respondent wife; it helps the appellant husband.
The purpose for which the Recognition Act was
passed is declared by the preamble to be with a
view to the ratification by the United Kingdom of the
Recognition Convention and for other purposes.
Where Parliament passes an Act amending the
domestic law of the United Kingdom in order to
enable this country to ratify an international treaty
and thereby assume towards other states that are
parties to the treaty an obligation in international law
to observe its terms, it is a legitimate aid to the
construction of any provisions of the Act that are
ambiguous or vague to have recourse to the terms
of the treaty in order to see what was the obligation
in international law that Parliament intended that
this country should be enabled to assume. The
ambiguity or obscurity is to be resolved in favour of
that meaning that is consistent with the provisions of
the treaty: see Salomon v. Customs and Excise
Commissioners [1966] 3 All ER 871 and Post Office
v. Estuary Radio Ltd. [1967] 3 All ER 633.” [at page
903]
JUDGMENT
32
Page 32
17. In Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1982] 2 All
ER 402, the same Rule was set out with an addition – that not
only should municipal law carry out treaty obligations, but it
| onsistent | with the |
|---|
was put by the House of Lords in the following words:-
“My Lords, even if the obligation to observe the
provisions of article 119 were an obligation
assumed by the United Kingdom under an ordinary
international treaty or convention and there were no
question of the treaty obligation being directly
applicable as part of the law to be applied by the
courts in this country without need for any further
enactment, it is a principle of construction of United
Kingdom statutes, now too well established to call
for citation of authority, that the words of a statute
passed after the Treaty has been signed and
dealing with the subject matter of the international
obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be
construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing
such a meaning, as intended to carry out the
obligation, and not to be inconsistent with it.” [at
page 415]
JUDGMENT
18. Another interesting aspect was brought out by the House
of Lords in The Hollandia’s case [1982] 3 All ER 1141, and
that is that a treaty provision embodied in a statute needs to be
construed uniformly in all the member nations who are its
signatories, and should therefore not be controlled by domestic
33
Page 33
precedents but should be construed on its own terms on broad
principles of general application in a purposive and not in a
narrow literal manner. This is stated in the following words:
| rovisions | in section |
|---|
“desirable in the interests of uniformity that
their interpretation should not be rigidly
controlled by domestic precedents of
antecedent date, but rather that the language
of the rules should be construed on broad
principles of general acceptation.”
JUDGMENT
They should be given a purposive rather than a
narrow literalistic construction, particularly wherever
the adoption of a literalistic construction would
enable the stated purpose of the international
convention, viz., the unification of domestic laws of
the contracting states relating to bills of lading, to be
evaded by the use of colourable devices that, not
being expressly referred to in the Rules, are not
specifically prohibited.” [at page No.1145]
34
Page 34
19. In Sidhu and others v. British Airways plc Abnett
(known as Sykes) v. British Airways plc, [1997] 1 All ER 193,
the same thought was echoed in the following words:-
| e answer | to the q |
|---|
20. To similar effect are some of the judgments of our court.
In Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India and
others , (1996) 5 SCC 647, when dealing with the Environment
Protection Act, this Court stated:
JUDGMENT
“Even otherwise once these principles are accepted
as part of the Customary International Law there
would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of
the domestic law. It is almost an accepted
proposition of law that the rules of Customary
International Law which are not contrary to the
municipal law shall be deemed to have been
incorporated in the domestic law and shall be
followed by the Courts of Law. To support we may
refer to Justice H.R. Khanna's opinion in Addl. Distt.
Magistrate Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [(1976) 2
SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207], Jolly George
35
Page 35
Varghese v. Bank of Cochin [(1980) 2 SCC 360 :
AIR 1980 SC 470] and Gramophone Co. of India
Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, [(1984) 2 SCC
534 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 313 : AIR 1984 SC 667].” [at
para 15]
| a Singh | Lahoria v |
|---|
others , (2001) 4 SCC 516, when construing Section 21 of the
Extradition Act, 1962, this Court referred to the Extradition
Treaty and construed Section 21 in the light of the international
position then obtained. This Court said:
“…. The Extradition Treaty contains several articles
of which Article 7 is rather significant for our
purpose, which may be quoted hereinbelow in
extenso:
"7. A person surrendered can in no case be
kept in custody or be brought to trial in the
territories of the High Contracting Party to
whom the surrender has been made for any
other crime or offence, or on account of any
other matters, than those for which the
extradition shall have taken place, until he has
been restored, or has had an opportunity of
returning, to the territories of the High
Contracting Party by whom he has been
surrendered.
JUDGMENT
This stipulation does not apply to crimes or
offences committed after the extradition."
The aforesaid Article unequivocally indicates that
the person concerned cannot be tried for any
other crime or offence than those for which the
36
Page 36
| y….” [at p | ara 3] |
|---|
22. In yet another judgment of this Court, i.e. S&S
Enterprise, already referred to, this Court construed Rule 14(d)
of the very anti-dumping rules with which we are concerned, in
the light of the very agreement on implementation of Article VI
of GATT. This Court was asked to compute the volume of
exports on the basis of price and not on the basis of quantity. In
repelling this contention, this Court referred to Article 5.8 of the
Agreement on implementation of Article VI and held:-
JUDGMENT
“However a negligible quantity of imports would not
be sufficient to cause such injury. Article 5.8 of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT, 1994 makes this clear:
"An application under paragraph 1 shall be
rejected and an investigation shall be
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities
concerned are satisfied that there is no
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of
injury to justify proceeding with the case.
There shall be immediate termination in cases
where the authorities determine that the
margin of dumping is de minimis , or that the
37
Page 37
| the volum | e of du |
|---|---|
| ular count | ry is foun |
| “Therefore, when Rule 14(d) says that the | |
|---|---|
| investigation must be ter<br>the dumped imports is les | minated if the 'volume' of<br>s than 3% of the imports |
| of the like product, it must | mean that the quantity of |
| dumped imports must acc | ount for less than 3% of |
| the total imports. To hold o | therwise would mean that |
| if the price is lower than | 3%, irrespective of the |
| quantity imported, the investigation would be | |
| dropped and it would, as submitted by the appellant, | |
| lead to the absurd situation that a small number of | |
| expensive imports would invite anti-dumping | |
| JUDGMENT<br>investigation but cheap imports flooding the | |
| domestic markets would not. In fact such a situation | |
| is exactly what the dumping rules have been framed | |
| to prevent.” [para 10] |
23. A conspectus of the aforesaid authorities would lead to
the following conclusions:
(1) Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India is a
Directive Principle of State Policy which states that the
38
Page 38
State shall endeavour to foster respect for international
law and treaty obligations. As a result, rules of
international law which are not contrary to domestic law
| the cou | rts in thi |
|---|
situation in which there is an international treaty to which
India is not a signatory or general rules of international
law are made applicable. It is in this situation that if there
happens to be a conflict between domestic law and
international law, domestic law will prevail.
(2) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an
international treaty, and a statute is passed pursuant to
the said treaty, it is a legitimate aid to the construction of
the provisions of such statute that are vague or
JUDGMENT
ambiguous to have recourse to the terms of the treaty to
resolve such ambiguity in favour of a meaning that is
consistent with the provisions of the treaty.
(3) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an
international treaty, and a statute is made in furtherance
of such treaty, a purposive rather than a narrow literal
construction of such statute is preferred. The
39
Page 39
interpretation of such a statute should be construed on
broad principles of general acceptance rather than earlier
domestic precedents, being intended to carry out treaty
| not to be i | nconsiste |
|---|
(4) In a situation in which India is a signatory nation to
an international treaty, and a statute is made to enforce a
treaty obligation, and if there be any difference between
the language of such statute and a corresponding
provision of the treaty, the statutory language should be
construed in the same sense as that of the treaty. This is
for the reason that in such cases what is sought to be
achieved by the international treaty is a uniform
international code of law which is to be applied by the
JUDGMENT
courts of all the signatory nations in a manner that leads
to the same result in all the signatory nations.
It is in the light of these principles that we must now
examine the statute in question.
Construction of Section 9A .
40
Page 40
24. Section 9A(1) refers to an anti-dumping duty. Such duty
is only imposed when an article is exported from a country
outside India to India at less than its normal value. Such duty
| overnmen | t’s discre |
|---|
rate that does not exceed the margin of dumping, which only
means the difference between the export price and the normal
value of such article in international trade. It is clear that
sub-section (1) refers to a “final” or “definitive” duty, and has to
be read with sub-section (3) thereof, which authorises the levy
of the “final” or “definitive” anti-dumping duty retrospectively in
the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (3). The scheme
therefore of Section 9A(1) and (3) is that an anti-dumping duty
is normally to be imposed with prospective effect unless, inter
JUDGMENT
alia , because of massive dumping of an article in a relatively
short time the remedial effect of the anti-dumping duty to be
levied would be seriously undermined. This would therefore
require a retrospective duty being levied, but not beyond a
period of 90 days, to undo the effect of undermining the
anti-dumping duty to be levied. Short of sub-section (3), no
41
Page 41
other part of Section 9A authorises the Central Government to
levy an anti-dumping duty with retrospective effect.
| levies o | n the ba |
|---|
estimate, thus referring to a provisional anti-dumping duty. The
Section further goes on to say that after a final determination is
made in accordance with the Rules, the Central Government
may reduce such provisional anti-dumping duty, having regard
to the final determination made by the designated authority
under the Rules. If and when this happens, what is important to
note is that refund shall be made of so much of the
anti-dumping duty which has been collected in excess of the
final anti-dumping duty so reduced. Under sub-section (5), a
JUDGMENT
maximum period of five years is allowable on the anti-dumping
duty imposed. This is extendable only for a further period of
five years and not beyond. Sub-section (6) in turn refers to the
Central Government’s power to make rules, inter alia , to assess
and collect anti-dumping duty.
26. It is important to note that neither sub-section (2) nor
sub-section (6) authorises the Central Government, either
42
Page 42
expressly or by necessary implication, to make rules and/or to
levy anti-dumping duty with retrospective effect. This is in
contrast with sub-section (3) which expressly so authorises the
| in the cir | cumstanc |
|---|---|
| es mentione | |
| sub-section.<br>Interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Rules | |
| 27. A reading of the Anti-Dumping Rule<br>they have been framed keeping in view the<br>1994 strictly in mind. A designated authority<br>Rule 3 who, under Rule 4, is to investig<br>degree, and effect of dumping in relation to i<br>and to submit its findings, provisional or fin |
be, to the Central Government. The designated authority is to
JUDGMENT
initiate an investigation either suo motu or upon receipt of a
written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry into
(i) dumping (ii) material injury to the domestic industry and (iii)
where applicable, a causal link between such dumped imports
and the material injury – see Rule 5. Such investigation is to be
initiated by issue of a public notice under rule 6. Since material
injury to an established domestic injury or material retardation
43
Page 43
of the establishment of any such industry is an important aspect
in levying anti dumping duty, the designated authority is to be
guided, under Rule 11, by Annexure II of the Rules, paragraphs
| ad as und | er:- |
|---|
“(iv) The examination of the impact of the dumped
imports on the domestic industry concerned, shall
include an evaluation of all relevant economic
factors and indices having a bearing on the state of
the industry, including natural and potential decline
in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investments or utilization of capacity;
factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of
the margin of dumping; actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital
investments.
(v) It must be demonstrated that the dumped
imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set
forth in paragraphs (ii) and (iv) above, causing injury
to the domestic industry. The demonstration of a
causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be
based on an examination of relevant evidence
before the designated authority. The designated
authority shall also examine any known factors
other than the dumped imports which at the same
time are injuring the domestic industry, and the
injury caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which
may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia ,
the volume and prices of imports not sold at
dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes
in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign
and domestic producers, developments in
JUDGMENT
44
Page 44
technology and the export performance and the
productivity of the domestic industry.”
28. It will thus be seen that the determination of material
| dustry de | pends on |
|---|
economic factors which are to be segregated from other factors
which may also cause injury to the said industry.
29. Under Rule 12, the designated authority is to “proceed
expeditiously” with the conduct of the investigation and shall in
appropriate cases record his preliminary findings on all the
aspects delineated above. No time frame is indicated except
that utmost dispatch is the order of the day.
30. Rule 13 is very important and when Rule 20 is read
harmoniously with both Rules 13 and 21, all the dark clouds
JUDGMENT
which come in on account of the suggested construction of
Rule 20 by revenue get dispelled by the sunlight of harmonious
construction of all the three Rules read together.
31. Rule 13, in line with clause 7.4 of the WTO Agreement,
enables the Central Government to impose provisional
anti-dumping duty not exceeding the margin of dumping, with
45
Page 45
two provisos. First, no such duty can be imposed before the
expiry of 60 days from the date of public notice issued by the
designated authority regarding its decision to initiate
| cond, su | ch duty c |
|---|
for a period of more than six months, which is only extendable
on request made by the foreign exporters who represent a
significant percentage of the trade involved, to a maximum
period of 9 months. The important words used in the second
proviso are “shall”, “only”, and “not exceeding”, all of which
point to the fact that the time period mentioned in the said
proviso is mandatory and cannot be exceeded by even a single
day.
32. Under Rule 17, the designated authority is given one year
JUDGMENT
from the date of initiation of an investigation to come out with its
final findings. This is extendable by the Central Government
only in special circumstances, and only by a further period of 6
months, and no more (Clause 5.10 of the WTO Agreement).
Significantly, the designated authority, in its final finding, may
also provide for a retrospective levy of duty, the reasons
therefor, and the date of commencement of such retrospective
46
Page 46
levy. This is obviously referable to Section 9A(3), which
reproduces clause 10.6 of the WTO Agreement. The reasons
must be the reasons mentioned in the said sub-section, and, as
| id sub-se | ction, su |
|---|
cannot commence beyond 90 days from the date of the
notification imposing provisional duty.
33. Under Rule 18, the Central Government may in its
discretion, and within a maximum period of three months from
the date of publication of the final findings by the designated
authority, impose a final anti-dumping duty.
34. This brings us to Rule 20, the correct construction of
which is determinative of the question raised in these appeals.
The first thing to notice about Rule 20 is, as its marginal note
JUDGMENT
states, that it is concerned only with the date of commencement
of duty. Once this is appreciated, it becomes clear that its focus
is only on when anti-dumping duties are to commence. In
sub-rule (1), it speaks of anti-dumping duties levied under Rule
13 and Rule 19, and states that they shall take effect only
prospectively, i.e. from the date of publication in the official
gazette. It is clear that Rule 19 is a mistake made by the
47
Page 47
draftsman of the Rules. Rule 18 is obviously referred to. Thus,
under sub-rule (1), the provisional anti-dumping duty takes
effect on and from the date of its publication in the official
| case wi | th the fin |
|---|
levied under Rule 18.
35. Sub-rule (2) is in two parts. Sub-clause (a) deals with the
date of commencement of an anti-dumping duty, having due
regard to a provisional duty that has been levied, whereas
sub-clause (b) specifically deals with duty to be retrospectively
imposed, that is a retrospective imposition prior to the
imposition of a provisional duty. It will immediately be noticed
that the subject matter of sub-clause (a) does not purport to be
the imposition of an anti-dumping duty with retrospective effect.
JUDGMENT
This is because it seeks to give effect to clause 10.2 of the
WTO Agreement. As has been argued by learned counsel on
both sides, the key to the understanding of the import of
sub-clause (a) is the expression “where a provisional duty has
been levied….” Obviously, the word “levied” has to be read as
levied in accordance with Rule 13 which, as its marginal note
indicates, provides for the “levy” of provisional duty. Once this
48
Page 48
is clear and the word “levied” is to be understood as levied
under Rule 13, the second proviso of Rule 13 gets attracted,
and under this proviso such levy cannot be for a period
| on facts i | n these c |
|---|
not in fact been extended beyond 6 months). Thus, it is clear
that all that sub-rule (2)(a) does is to enable the levy of a final
anti-dumping duty from the date of imposition of a provisional
duty so as to convert the provisional measure into a final
measure, or so as to take within its ken the provisional
anti-dumping duty already imposed. This aspect is succinctly
put by “A Handbook on Anti-Dumping Investigations” by Judith
Czako, Johann Human and Jorge Miranda. The learned
authors state:
JUDGMENT
“L. RETROACTIVE COLLECTION OF
DEFINITIVE DUTIES
The normal rule for application of definitive
duties, set out in Article 10.1 of the AD Agreement,
is that duties shall only be collected on imports
made (“entered for consumption”) after the effective
date of the final determination. Articles 10.2 and
10.6 establish two exceptions to this general rule,
providing for the retroactive collection of definitive
duties (that is, for the collection of definitive duties
before the effective date of the final determination)
in two situations:
49
Page 49
| sional m<br>sure); and | easure i |
|---|
36. On a correct reading of the said sub-rule, therefore, the
final anti-dumping duty only incorporates the provisional
anti-dumping duty within itself, but in the manner provided by
Rule 13. Thus, it is clear that such incorporation can only be
the period upto which the provisional duty can be levied and not
JUDGMENT
beyond. Thus understood, it is clear that both literally, and in
keeping with the object sought to be achieved – that is the
making of laws in conformity with the WTO Agreement, there
can be no levy of anti-dumping duty in the “gap” or interregnum
period between the lapse of the provisional duty and the
imposition of the final duty. Such interpretation makes it clear
that clause 10.2 of the WTO Agreement is reproduced in the
50
Page 50
same sense though not in the same form in sub-rule (2)(a). The
same result therefore as is envisaged in clause 10.2 is
achieved by the said construction – that is anti-dumping duty
may be levied retroactively for the period for which provisional
measures have been applied. The said construction is in
consonance with the principles already laid down earlier in this
judgment in that the WTO Agreement is intended to be applied
by the various signatory nations in a uniform manner. This can
only be done by construing the language of Section 9A read
with the Rules in the same sense as that of the WTO
Agreement.
37. At this juncture, it is interesting to note that a number of
member countries of the WTO agreement have opted for the
JUDGMENT
Rule by which anti-dumping duty is levied to the full extent of
the margin of dumping. Such nations like Argentina, Mexico
and USA therefore have, under the WTO Agreement, only a
period of 4 months extendable upto a maximum period of 6
months (instead of 6 months and 9 months respectively) so far
as the life span of a provisional duty is concerned. Most of
Europe and the rest of the world have opted to impose duties
51
Page 51
upto the margin of dumping depending upon the extent of injury
caused to their domestic industry. Interestingly, the European
Community Council Regulation No. 1225 of 2009 dated
| ection ag | ainst du |
|---|
countries not members of the European Community has this to
say:
“Article 9
Termination without measures; imposition of
definitive duties
4. Where the facts as finally established show that
there is dumping and injury caused thereby, and the
Community interest calls for intervention in
accordance with Article 21, a definitive anti-dumping
duty shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a
proposal submitted by the Commission after
consultation of the Advisory Committee. The
proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it
decides by a simple majority to reject the proposal,
within a period of one month after its submission by
the Commission. Where provisional duties are in
force, a proposal for definitive action shall be
submitted no later than one month before the expiry
of such duties. The amount of the anti-dumping duty
shall not exceed the margin of dumping established
but it should be less than the margin if such lesser
duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the
Community industry.”
JUDGMENT
38. It will be seen from this that an inflexible rule is laid down
that would ensure that no “gap” or intervening period occurs
52
Page 52
between the expiry of the provisional duty and the imposition of
the final duty, inasmuch as a proposal to levy final duty has to
be submitted no later than one month before the expiry of a
provisional duty.
39. However, interestingly enough, in the United States
Manual dealing with anti-dumping duties, the following is the
statement of law:-
“Therefore, a period of time, known sometimes as
the “gap period,” may exist between the expiration
of the end of the provisional measures, even if
extended, and the publication of the ITC’s final
determination (the starting of definitive duties)
where the DOC cannot require CBP to collect cash
deposits, bonds, or other securities. (The gap
period begins the day after the end of the 4- or
6-month period, and ends the day before the ITC’s
final determination is published). The DOC
normally administers this problem in one of two
ways. We either send instructions to CBP towards
the beginning of the gap period, instructing them to
stop collecting cash deposits or bonds, or we wait
until the order has been published, then instruct
CBP to liquidate all entries during the gap period
without regard to antidumping duties.”
JUDGMENT
40. We are heartened to note that one other signatory nation
has taken the stand that no duty can be collected during the
“gap period”.
53
Page 53
41. Viewed slightly differently, the suggested construction by
revenue would render Rule 2(a) ultra vires Section 9A. It has
already been seen that sub-section (2) and sub-section (6) of
| uthorize | the impo |
|---|
retrospective effect, in contrast with sub-section (3) thereof.
Any duty levied by a final duty notification during the
interregnum period would necessarily amount to a retrospective
levy of duty for the reason that such period is not covered by
the provisional duty notification, being beyond 6 months. This
would therefore render sub-rule (2)(a) ultra vires Section 9A.
A construction which is both in consonance with international
law and treaty obligations, which Article 51(c) of the
Constitution states as a directive principle of State policy; and
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with the application of the doctrine of harmonious construction
is to be preferred to a narrow doctrinaire meaning which would
lead to the Rule being read in such a manner that it is ultra
vires the parent statute.
42. One other interesting thing remains. Most of the debate at
the Bar was centered around the expression “levied” in Rule 20
sub-rule (2)(a), revenue contending, based on two judgments of
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this Court in N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central
Excise, Bombay and others v. The Elphinstone Spinning
and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. , 1971 (1) SCC 337 and
| of Centra | l Excise, |
|---|
National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., (1972) 2 SCC 560, that
“levy” does not include “collection”. This has been countered by
arguments on behalf of the assessees that the word “levied” in
the said sub-rule has been used in the same sense as the
expression “imposed and collected” in Rule 21(1), and would
therefore include “collection” as well. In view of what has been
held by us above, we find it unnecessary to decide this
contention.
43. The effect of Rule 21 on the aforesaid construction of
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Rule 20 now needs to be adverted to. Rule 21, in turn, is made
to carry out what is stated in clause 10.3 of the WTO
Agreement. Rule 21(2) echoes what is already found in
Section 9A(2). If provisional anti-dumping duty is found to be
higher than the final anti-dumping duty, the differential shall be
refunded to the importer. But sub-rule (1) goes a step further
and states that if the anti-dumping duty finally imposed is higher
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than the provisional duty already imposed and collected, the
differential shall not be collected from the importer.
| It is well | known th |
|---|
entered into long before anti-dumping duties may be imposed,
and in the interests of international trade, the importer should
not be put to a loss in case a final duty happens to be higher
than the provisional duty already imposed. The delicate
balancing act between protection of domestic industry and the
hardship caused in the course of international trade has thus
been tilted in favour of the latter. If learned counsel for the
revenue were right, despite the fact that such differential cannot
be collected from the importer under Rule 21(1) for the period
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that the provisional duty notification is in force, during the
interregnum period, the full amount of final duty is liable to be
recovered from the importer. This would turn Rule 21(1) on its
head and result in an absurdity. A simple example will suffice.
If provisional duty already imposed and collected is Rs. 50/- per
metric ton (PMT), and final duty imposed say one year later with
retroactive effect from the date of imposition of the provisional
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duty is Rs. 100/- PMT, the difference of Rs. 50/- PMT cannot be
recovered from the importer for the period that the provisional
notification is in force. Therefore, for the first 6 months in the
| he impor | ter is lia |
|---|
However, for the next 6 months, that is in the interregnum
period between the expiry of the provisional duty and the date
of imposition of the final duty, the importer becomes liable to
pay Rs.100/- PMT. The said example demonstrates how the
arguments of the revenue would lead to an absurdity such as
this.
45. Rule 21(1) also answers the contention of the Revenue
that the object of anti-dumping laws would be defeated if it were
found that dumping and material injury having been found, yet
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no anti-dumping duty can be levied. By application of this Rule,
it is clear that for the period that the provisional duty notification
is in force, the difference of Rs.50/-, in the example just given,
cannot be collected from the importer despite Rs.50/- having
been imposed because of dumping and material injury to the
domestic industry. Therefore, it is clear that there already
exists, within the scheme of the anti-dumping law, a situation in
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which there is dumping and material injury to the domestic
industry, for which an anti-dumping duty is levied, but which
cannot be collected. There is, therefore, a balance struck
| njury to | the do |
|---|
retrospective levy of duty in favour of the latter.
46. We also find force in the submission of learned counsel
for the assessees that the revenue’s construction of Rule 20
would achieve indirectly what cannot be achieved directly,
having regard to the mandatory language contained in Rule 13
second proviso. Here again a simple example would suffice.
Say the provisional duty is levied at the rate of Rs. 50/- PMT
and comes to an end after 6 months. 6 months later, a final
duty is imposed again at the same rate of Rs. 50/- PMT with
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effect from the date of levy of the provisional duty. If learned
counsel for the revenue were right, Rs. 50/- PMT could be
recovered under Rule 20(2)(a) for the interregnum period as
well which would, in effect, destroy the scheme of Rule 13
second proviso by extending the period of the provisional duty
notification beyond a period of 6 months, which clearly cannot
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be done. We find therefore that on all these counts, the
arguments of revenue cannot be countenanced.
| After sett | ing out t |
|---|
respective parties and referring to the relevant statutory
provisions and the WTO Agreement, the Bombay High Court
arrives at a finding that Parliament has made a departure from
the language used in the WTO Agreement and the Court must
therefore give effect to such departure.
48. We have already held that this would fly in the face of all
the judgments referred to in paragraphs 15 to 22 hereinabove,
and principles (3) and (4) of paragraph 23 of this judgment
which speak of how domestic legislation must be construed
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when it is made in furtherance of an international treaty. In
particular, in the facts of these cases, it would also ignore the
effect of Article 18.4 of the WTO Agreement, which expressly
states that all the signatory member nations have to make their
laws “conform” to the provisions of the WTO Agreement,
something which the Central Government itself states in its
internet website which deals with the law of anti-dumping.
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49. The High Court goes on to state that the construction
suggested on behalf of the assessee would lead to a manifest
absurdity as there would be no reason or justification to hold
| umping du | ty must |
|---|
the period between the expiry of the provisional duty notification
and the issuance of a notification imposing a final anti-dumping
duty. The High Court went on to hold that the object and
purpose underlying Section 9A would be defeated, as for the
interregnum period where both dumping and material injury to
domestic industry are found, no anti-dumping duty can be
issued. This conclusion again cannot be countenanced for the
simple reason that if Rule 20(2)(a) were to be construed n the
fashion suggested by the High Court, it would be ultra vires
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Section 9A for the reasons already given by us. Further, the
object and purpose of Section 9A is to impose an anti-dumping
duty in consonance with the WTO Agreement, which Section 9A
gives full effect to. These basic points have been missed by the
High Court in arriving at the aforesaid finding. Further, the High
Court fails to give due importance in its judgment to Rules 13
and 21. We have already seen how Rule 21(1) envisages
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precisely the situation spoken of by the High Court, and yet
states that, in the circumstances mentioned therein, despite
dumping and material injury to the domestic industry, differential
| ted from | the impor |
|---|
Court goes on to say that the expression “imposed and
collected” in Rule 21, not being there in Rule 20(2)(a), cannot
therefore be imported into the said sub-rule, so that “levied”
cannot mean “imposed and collected”. We have already held,
in view of our construction of Rule 20(2)(a), that this need not
be gone into. What has been missed by the High Court is that
the expression “levied” has to be understood as “levied” under
Rule 13 and once this is so, it becomes clear that such levy
cannot exceed a period of 6 months or a maximum period of 9
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months, as the case may be.
50. The Bombay High Court follows the Kerala High Court
reasoning, which is to the same effect. For the reasons given
by us in this judgment, we find it difficult to accede to such
reasoning. We, therefore, allow the appeals of the assessees
and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 3889 of 2006 of the revenue. We
make it clear that we have only decided the point of levy of
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anti-dumping duty during the interregnum between the expiry of
a provisional duty notification and the imposition of a final
anti-dumping duty. If either the assessees or the revenue have
| er point, s | uch point |
|---|
by this judgment. With these observations, all the said appeals
are disposed of.
……………………J.
(A.K. Sikri)
……………………J.
(R.F. Nariman)
New Delhi;
September 23, 2015.
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