Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CHERAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD.COIMBATORE.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITYCOIMBATORE & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/01/1996
BENCH:
KIRPAL B.N. (J)
BENCH:
KIRPAL B.N. (J)
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1180 1996 SCC (7) 343
JT 1996 (1) 597 1996 SCALE (1)397
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
KIRPAL, J.
Leave granted.
The challenge in these appeals by special leave is to
the common judgment of the Madras High Court in Civil
Revision Petition Nos. 1852-1854 & 1886 of 1982 which set
aside the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal
(which in turn confirmed the order of the Regional Transport
Authority) (hereinafter referred to as ’the Tribunal’)
granting stage carriage permits to the appellant.
Since all these appeals involve a common question of
law, it is sufficient to give in detail the facts relating
to the case of respondent No. 2 N.T. Arasu.
Respondent No. 2 was an existing operator for the route
Coimbatore to Kottur. On the expiry of the permit, it
applied for renewal for a further period of five years
w.e.f. 10.4.1978. The appellant herein, which is a State
Transport Undertaking in the state of Tamilnadu made a
counter application for the grant of a stage carriage permit
for the said route in its favour.
The Regional Transport Authority applying its marking
system, determined the marks as 11 marks for the appellant
herein and 6 marks for respondent No. 2 which was a private
operator. The said Authority, accordingly, rejected the
renewal application of Respondent No. 2 and granted the
permit in favour of the appellant.
The Tribunal vide its order dated 31.3.1982, while
dismissing the appeal filed by respondent No. 2 upheld the
grant of a stage carriage permit in favour of the appellant,
after considering various questions involved on merits. It
came to the conclusion that the grant of the stage carriage
permit in favour of the appellant was in the public
interest.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent
filed Revision Petition before the Madras High Court and, by
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virtue of the interim orders which were passed, both the
respondent No. 2 as well as the appellant herein continued
to ply their vehicles on the route in question.
The said Revision Petition came up for hearing and was
ultimately decided by the judgment dated 28.8.90 of the High
Court. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that
inasmuch as respondent No. 2 had been permitted to operate
continuously for a period of ten years along with the
appellant herein, the Revision Petition should be allowed.
It was not disputed that the appellant had more marks than
the respondent No. 2 but the learned Judge referred to the
decision of this Court in M. Chinnaswamy Vs.
Dhandayuthanpani Roadways, AIR 1977 S.C. 2095 and observed
that when travelling public was accustomed to a particular
pattern of service for a number of years, that should bot be
disturbed lightly. It was, accordingly, directed that the
status quo or both the parties would continue, the effect of
which was that both were allowed to ply their stage
carriages on the same route.
Challenging the aforesaid judgment, it has been
contended that as there was only one permit which had to be
issued the High Court erred in directing that both the
appellant and respondent No. 2 could ply their stage
carriages on the same route primarily on the ground that for
a period of ten years, respondent No. 2 had been operating
the said route and the travelling public had become
accustomed to it. This can be no ground, it was submitted,
for the Court directing that instead of one, both the
carriers could ply their stage carriages.
The decision in the case of Chinnaswamy’s case (supra)
was sought to be relied in the subsequent case of S.V.
Sivaswami Vs. Motor Transport (Firm), 1990(3) SCR 802. In
Sivaswami’s case (supra) also by reason of the interim
orders which were passed by the High Court, both the parties
were allowed to operate on the same route. A common request
was made in this Court that an order similar to one in M.
Chinnaswamy’s case (supra) be passed and both the parties be
allowed to operate on the said route. This Court in
Sivaswami’s case (supra) (to which one of us was a party)
referred to the observations made in Chinnaswamy’s case
(supra) as well as another similar order which had been
passed in Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1980, and observed as
follows:
"With respect, we are unable to accept
this common request made to us in the
present case. It is obvious from the
above quoted orders on which the common
request is based that in none of them,
any point of law was considered or
decided and the order permitting both
the claimants to operate on the route,
even though the permit to be granted was
only one, was made without adverting to
the legal implications of such an order.
In the first place, grant of a permit is
to be made primarily with reference to
the object of serving the interests of
the general public and it cannot be
treated as a dispute relating to grant
of a permit between the rival claimants
only. It is not in the nature of a lis
for adjudication of conflicting
interests of private individuals alone.
It is, therefore, not a matter which can
be decided merely on the basis of an
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agreement between the two rival
claimants who alone out of several
claimants remain in the lis at this
stage. The question of grant of permit
is to be decided primarily by the R.T.A.
having regard primarily to the interests
of the general public and other
prescribed relevant factors. That apart,
under Section 47 (3) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, the R.T.A. is first
required to determine the number of
stage carriages for the route and then
to grant permits according to that
determination made earlier. Grant of any
permit in excess thereof was not
permissible without first making a fresh
determination and increasing the number,
if necessary. It is, therefore, obvious
that an order of this kind cannot be
made unless the grant of a permit to
both the rival claimants would be within
the limit fixed by the R.T.A. at the
relevant time. There is nothing in any
of these above quoted orders to indicate
that this aspect was even adverted to or
that there was material to indicate that
the consent order so made was within the
limit fixed by the R.T.A."
In this case the grant of permit to respondent No. 2 is
challenged by the appellant. In Chinnaswamy’s case (supra)
it was a consent order which was passed but that consent of
the parties is lacking in the present case. Apart from that,
there was only one permit which was to be given and the
Regional Transport Authority and the Tribunal, having
determined that the marks of the appellant were more than
that of respondent No. 2, had rightly come to the conclusion
that the route could be awarded only to the appellant.
Following the ratio of Sivaswami’s case (supra), it must be
held that the mere fact that the travelling public had been
using the carriages run by the appellant and the respondent
No. 2 can, by itself, not be a ground for following the said
respondent to continue to ply the carriages.
Counsel for the respondent then submitted that the
respondent No. 2 has been granted renewal of the permit upto
6.11.1996. While referring to Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu
Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992, it was sought
to be contended that because of the said provision, there
can be no challenge to the permit of the said respondent
which has now been renewed. The said Section 10 reads as
under:
"Notwithstanding anything continued in
Chapter V or VI including Section 98 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 all orders
passed granting permits or renewal or
transfer of such permits or any
variation, modification, extension or
curtailment of the route or routes
specified in a stage carriage permit
during the period commencing on the 4th
day of June 1976 and ending with the
date of the publication of this Act in
the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, shall
for all purposes be deemed to be and to
have always been taken or passed in
accordance with the provisions of this
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Act as if this Act had been in force at
all material times."
We fail to appreciate as to how the said provision can
be of any assistance to the said respondent. All that
Section 10 provides is that the orders passed granting
permits or renewal etc. under the provisions of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 are deemed to have been passed in
accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Motor
Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992. The said Section 10
does not validate any permit which was initially invalid. It
is a provision which continues the permits etc. which had
been validly granted under the old Act. As no valid permit
could have been granted to respondent No. 2 from the route
Coimbatore to Kottur, the provisions of Section 10 cannot
give a right to the respondent No. 2 to get the permit when
it had only six marks. When there was only one permit to be
given for the said route and the marks obtained by the
appellant were much more than that of respondent in our
opinion, the appellant Tribunal had rightly upheld the order
of the Regional Transport Authority granting the stage
carriage permit to the appellant and in not renewing the
permit of the respondent No. 2.
For the aforesaid reasons, these appeals are allowed
and the judgment of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. Nos.
1852-54 and 1856 of 1982 which is under appeal, is set aside
and the decision dated 31.3.1982 of the Tribunal is
restored. The appellant will be entitled to costs
throughout.