Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1689 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1522 of 2012)
The State of Maharashtra .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Vishwanath Maranna Shetty .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Sathasivam, P. J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 10.08.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
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Bombay in Criminal Bail Application No. 872 of 2011 whereby
learned single Judge of the High Court granted bail to the
respondent herein - Accused No.9 in MCOC Special Case No.
10 of 2010 pending before the Special Court under the
Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 for Greater
Bombay.
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3) Brief facts:
(a) According to the prosecution, an “organised crime
syndicate” headed by wanted accused Bharat Nepali and Vijay
| rseas. T<br>s unlawf | he said<br>ul activi |
|---|
extortion and contract killings in Mumbai and other places
through their members. All the accused persons pending on
the file before the MCOC Special Court, Greater Bombay are
alleged to be the members of the said syndicate.
(b) On 03.06.2010, one Farid Tanasha, known criminal, was
shot dead at his residence at Tilaknagar, Chembur, Mumbai.
On the same day, an FIR being No. 122 of 2010 was registered
against the accused persons under Sections 302 and 452 read
with Section 34 and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,
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1860 (in short ‘IPC’) and under Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the
Arms Act, 1959 at Tilaknagar Police Station.
(c) During investigation, DCB, CID, Unit No. 6, Mumbai
learnt that the murder was committed on the instructions of
Bharat Nepali and Vijay Shetty (wanted accused). Further, it
was revealed in the investigation that one Dattatray Bhakare
(Accused No. 7 therein) - a builder, had contracted Bharat
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Nepali and Vijay Shetty for eliminating Farid Tanasha (since
deceased), who agreed to help the members of a Co-op.
Housing Society in order to settle their dispute with the
| vealed in<br>ced a su | the inv<br>m of Rs. |
|---|
killing.
(d) It was further revealed during investigation that the
respondent herein was an active member of the “organised
crime syndicate” and was managing funds of the syndicate and
through him the money changed hands from co-accused
Dattatray Bhakare to Jafar Razialam Khan @ Abbas and
Mohd. Sakib Shahnawaz Alam Khan, Accused Nos. 1 & 2
respectively, who killed Farid Tanasha.
(e) On 25.09.2010, Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay,
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accorded sanction for prosecution of the arrested accused
persons including the respondent herein under Section 3(1)(i),
(2) and (4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,
1999 (in short ‘the MCOCA’) and hence the respondent is
alleged to have committed the offences provided hereinabove
along with the offence under Section 302 read with Section
120B of the IPC.
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(f) The respondent herein preferred an application for bail in
Special Case No. 10 of 2010 before the MCOC Special Court,
Greater Bombay. By order dated 07.05.2011, the Special
| id applic<br>, the | ation.<br>responde |
|---|
Criminal Bail Application No. 872 of 2011 before the High
Court. By impugned order dated 10.08.2011, the High Court
accepted the case of the respondent and granted him bail by
imposing certain conditions.
(h) Questioning the order granting bail to the respondent, the
State of Maharashtra has filed the present appeal by way of
special leave.
4) Heard Mr. Chinmoy Khaladkar, learned counsel for the
appellant-State and Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for
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the respondent-accused.
5) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether
in the light of the allegations made and materials placed by the
prosecution, the High Court was justified in granting bail,
particularly, in the light of restriction imposed under Section
21(4) of MCOCA?
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6) Learned counsel for the State, after taking us through the
averments in the FIR, confessional statement of Mohd. Rafiq
Abdul Samad Shaikh @ Shankar (Accused No. 6 therein),
| MCOCA<br>rt was f | and othe<br>ully jus |
|---|
application for bail filed by the respondent, who is arrayed as
Accused No. 9. On the other hand, according to him, the High
Court, having failed to notice the involvement of the
respondent and his role in passing of the amount from
Dattatray Bhakare - a builder to the actual killers, A-1 and A-
2, granted bail to him.
7) Per contra, Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the
respondent, by pointing out the confessional statement of co-
accused, who retracted later, and in the light of the provisions
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of MCOCA, submitted that the High Court was fully justified in
granting bail to the respondent.
8) In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is useful to
refer the relevant provisions of MCOCA which are extracted
hereinbelow. There is no dispute that apart from Section 302
read with Section 120-B of IPC, the respondent was charged
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with Section 3(1)(i), 3(2) and 3(4) of MCOCA. The relevant
provisions of MCOCA read as under:
Section 2 of MCOCA deals with various definitions:
| In this Act<br>its gra | , unless t<br>mmatical |
|---|
( i ) the communication or association with any person with the
actual knowledge or having reason to believe that such person
is engaged in assisting in any manner, an organised crime
syndicate;
( ii ) the passing on or publication of, without any lawful
authority, any information likely to assist the organised crime
syndicate and the passing on or publication of or distribution of
any document or matter obtained from the organised crime
syndicate; and
( iii ) the rendering of any assistance, whether financial or
otherwise, to the organised crime syndicate;
*
*
( d ) ‘continuing unlawful activity’ means an activity prohibited
by law for the time being in force, which is a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken
either singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime
syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of which
more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent
court within the preceding period of ten years and that court
has taken cognizance of such offence;
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( e ) ‘ organised crime ’ means any continuing unlawful activity
by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an
organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of
violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other
unlawful means, with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits,
or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any
other person or promoting insurgency;
( f ) ‘organised crime syndicate ’ means a group of two or more
persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as a syndicate or
gang indulge in activities of organised crime;
(g)…….”
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“3. Punishment for organised crime- (1) Whoever commits
an offence of organised crime shall,
(i) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be
punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall
also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees
one lac;
| , be punis<br>t be less t<br>ent for lif | hable with<br>han five y<br>e and sha |
|---|
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates,
abets or knowingly facilitates the commission of an
organised crime or any act preparatory to organised crime,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall be not less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine,
subject to a minimum of rupees five lacs.
(3) Whoever harbours or conceals or attempts to harbour or
conceal, any member of an organised crime syndicate; shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine,
subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime
syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less, than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a
fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
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(5) Whoever holds any property derived of obtained from
commission of an organised crime or which has been
acquired through the organised crime syndicate funds shall
be punishable with a term which, shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life
and shall also be liable to fine, subject to a minimum fine of
rupees two lacs.”
“4. Punishment for possessing unaccountable wealth on
behalf of member of organised crime syndicate.
If any person on behalf of a member of an organised crime
syndicate is, or, at any time has been, in possession of
movable or immovable property which he cannot
satisfactorily account for, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three
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years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be
liable to fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees one lac
and such property shall also liable for attachment and
forfeiture, as provided by section 20.”
“21. Modified application of certain provisions of the
Code.-
(1)…
(2)…
(3)…
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no
person accused of an offence punishable under this Act
shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond,
unless—
( a ) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to
oppose the application of such release; and
( b ) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”
9) The very same provisions have been considered by this
Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 294. In this case, the
provisions of MCOCA were invoked against one Telgi who was
arrested and proceeded against for alleged commission of
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offence of printing counterfeit stamps and forgery in various
States including the State of Maharashtra. He was figured as
Accused No. 23 and one Shabir Sheikh as Accused No.25.
After narrating all the details, this Court posed the following
question:
“36. Does this statute require that before a person is
released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie, must come to
the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is it
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necessary for the court to record such a finding? Would
there be any machinery available to the court to ascertain
that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not
commit any offence whatsoever?”
In an answer to the same, this Court held as under:
| urthermor<br>power of t | e of the<br>he court |
|---|
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“44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does
not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a
positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed
an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed,
the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that
the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an
event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a
judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the
intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA,
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| y other o<br>onduct of<br>this aspe | ffence. Si<br>an accu<br>ct of the |
|---|
“46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the
evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis
of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special
statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions
contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the
court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to
enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected
against the accused during the investigation may not justify
a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court
while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be
tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the
merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to
decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial,
without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.”
10) It is relevant to note that MCOCA was enacted to make
special provisions for prevention and control of, and for coping
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with, criminal activity by organized crime syndicate or gang,
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting the said Act is
as under:
“Organised crime has for quite some years now come up
as a very serious threat to our society. It knows no national
boundaries and is fuelled by illegal wealth generated by
contract killings, extortion, smuggling in contrabands, illegal
trade in narcotics, kidnappings for ransom, collection of
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| g in the<br>urb their a<br>d that the | State an<br>ctivities.<br>organised |
|---|
2. The existing legal framework i.e. the penal and
procedural laws and the adjudicatory system were found to
be rather inadequate to curb or control the menace of
organised crime. Government, therefore, decided to enact a
special law with stringent and deterrent provisions including
in certain circumstances power to intercept wire, electronic
or oral communication to control the menace of the
organised crime.
It is the purpose of this Act to achieve these objects.”
We have already mentioned the relevant definitions including
the definition of ‘abet’, ‘continuing unlawful activity’,
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‘organised crime’ and ‘organised crime syndicate’.
11) Keeping the above Objects and Reasons and various
principles in mind, statutory provisions of MCOCA, restrictions
for the grant of bail and the materials placed by the
prosecution, let us consider whether the respondent has made
out a case for bail?
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12) Considering the arguments advanced by both the sides,
we have meticulously analysed the reasoning of the special
Court rejecting the application for bail filed by the respondent
| order of<br>placed in | the Hig<br>dicate t |
|---|
having an association with the overseas base wanted accused
Nos. 1 and 2. It also indicates that the respondent knowingly
handled the funds of the syndicate. The statement of one of
the witnesses indicates that the respondent had asked the said
witness to collect a sum of Rs.25 lakhs from the co-accused –
Ravi Warerkar, however, the same was not materialized. In
addition to the same, there is a statement of co-accused –
Mohd. Rafiq that he collected Rs.15 lakhs from co-accused –
Dattatray Bhakare and delivered it to the respondent. The
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confessional statement further indicates that the wanted
accused - Vijay Shetty used to make calls using cell phone no.
0061290372184 to the respondent. The confessional
statement also reveals that Accused No. 6 received Rs. 6 lakhs
from the man of the respondent-accused. On perusal of the
materials relied on by the prosecution, the special Judge
concluded that the respondent had been working for the
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wanted accused, Vijay Shetty, and he used to receive ill-gotten
money for him and prima facie the ingredients of the offence
punishable under Section 4 of MCOCA attracts against the
respondent-accused.
| t of our j | udgmen |
|---|
21(4) of MCOCA which bars the Court from releasing the
accused of an offence punishable under the said Act subject to
the conditions prescribed in clauses (a) and (b) therein. We are
of the view that sub-section (4) of Section 21 mandates that it
is incumbent on the part of the Court before granting of bail to
any person accused of an offence punishable under MCOCA
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
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14) In the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (in short ‘the NDPS Act’), similar provision, namely,
Section 37, corresponding to Section 21(4) of the MCOCA has
been substituted by Act 2 of 1989 with effect from 29.05.1989
with further amendment by Act 9 of 2001 which reads as
under:
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| ommercial<br>ond unless<br>cutor has | quantity<br>—<br>been give |
|---|
Sub-clause (2) also makes it clear that the limitations on
granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in
addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force,
on granting of bail.
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15) The above provision was considered by this Court in
Union of India vs. Rattan Mallik Alias Habul , (2009) 2 SCC
624. In this case, Union of India filed an appeal before this
Court challenging the order of the Allahabad High Court
suspending the sentence awarded by the trial Court to the
respondent/accused therein for having committed offences
under Sections 8/27-A and 8/29 of the NDPS Act and granting
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him bail. Considering the limitation imposed in sub-section (1)
(b) of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, this Court held thus:
| er to gran<br>ffence un<br>tions imp | t bail to<br>der the N<br>osed unde |
|---|
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After saying so, on going into the materials placed and the
reasoning of the High Court for grant of bail, this Court has
concluded that the order passed by the High Court clearly
| require | ment of S |
|---|
Act and set aside the same with a liberty to decide afresh in
the light of the limitations imposed. In the case on hand, we
have already extracted the limitation/restrictions imposed in
Section 21(4) of MCOCA for granting bail.
16) It is relevant to point out that the materials placed by the
prosecution show that one Vijay Shetty and the respondent are
members of Bharat Nepali’s “organized crime syndicate”. It is
also the definite stand of the prosecution that the said Bharat
Nepali as well as Vijay Shetty, who murdered Farid Tanasha
are said to be out of India and are indulging into the organized
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crime through the members of the syndicate. The materials
placed further show that Dattatray Bhakare-a builder, was
doing a project at Chembur, Mumbai and some members of
the Co-operative Housing Society had some dispute with him,
therefore, they had approached Farid Tanasha, who had a
criminal background and he also agreed to help those persons
in their dispute with the builder. On knowing this, Dattatray
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Bhakare contacted Bharat Nepali and Vijay Shetty for
eliminating Farid Tanasha and for that he allegedly financed a
sum of Rs.90 lakhs which was paid to the said wanted accused
| e arrest<br>als that a | ed accu<br>bout Rs |
|---|
the main shooter – Mohd. Sakib Shahnawaz Alam Khan
(Accused No.2) through Mohd. Rafiq (Accused No. 6). The said
Accused No.6 made a confessional statement as far as the
respondent herein is concerned. It was alleged that Accused
No.6, on the instructions of the wanted accused - Vijay Shetty,
used to collect money from the respondent and on several
occasions, he handed over the same to Accused No. 2. It was
also alleged that on the instructions of the wanted accused –
Vijay Shetty, Accused No. 6 paid a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs to the
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respondent herein on 28.05.2011. It is the further case of the
prosecution that in the third week of June, 2010, Accused No.
6 received an amount of Rs. 6 lakhs from an employee of the
respondent. The substance of the allegation against the
respondent is that part of the amount, which was given to the
shooter for killing Farid Tanasha, had been passed on through
him to the actual shooter. It is not in dispute that sanction
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under Section 23(2) of MCOCA had been accorded by the
Commissioner of Police on 25.09.2010.
17) Considering the materials, particularly, in the light of the
| 4) of MC<br>n for bail | OCA, th<br>filed by |
|---|
From the materials placed, prima facie , it is clear that the
respondent-accused had association with the wanted accused,
Vijay Shetty and Bharat Nepali, who are notorious criminals
and the act of the respondent comes within the definition of
‘abet’ as defined in Section 2(1)(a) of MCOCA.
18) As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the State
that the High Court ought to have appreciated the statement of
the co-accused-Mohammad Rafiq that on 28.05.2010, he
collected Rs. 15 lakhs from co-accused- Dattatray Bhakare
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and delivered it to the respondent. The confessional
statement further indicates that the wanted accused, Vijay
Shetty used to make calls from cell phone no. 0061290372184
and call records also indicate that the cell phone that was
being used by the respondent did receive overseas calls. The
confessional statement further indicates that he received Rs. 6
lacs from the man of the respondent. The material placed by
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the prosecution also indicate that the respondent has been
working for the wanted accused-Vijay Shetty and he used to
receive ill-gotten money for him. We have already extracted
| interdict<br>re reason | grant o<br>able gro |
|---|
to be guilty of offence under MCOCA.
19) We are satisfied that the High Court failed to appreciate
the fact that the materials placed against the respondent
consist of the confession made by the co-accused – Mohd.
Rafiq which has been recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA,
the statement of the employee of the respondent which
indicates that the respondent handed over cash to him in the
third week of June, 2010 and that the money received by the
respondent and handed over to the main accused were part of
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the illegal transactions. The act of the respondent, prima facie ,
is well within the definition and also the statement of object
and reasons of the MCOCA which we have already extracted.
The act of the respondent is of the abetment of the offence
enumerated in MCOCA. At any rate, the materials placed by
the prosecution show that the respondent had received ill-
gotten money for the wanted accused – Vijay Shetty and,
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therefore, ingredients of Section 4 of MCOCA were attracted
against him. We are satisfied that all these aspects have been
correctly appreciated by the Special Court.
| Court h<br>d finding | as adve<br>that all |
|---|
be considered during the trial and even after finding that “it
cannot be said that there are no reasonable grounds for
believing that the applicant (respondent herein) has not
committed an offence punishable under the MCOCA”, on an
erroneous view, granted him bail which runs contrary to
Section 21(4) of MCOCA.
21) While dealing with a special statute like MCOCA, having
regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section
21 of this Act, the Court may have to probe into the matter
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deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the
materials collected against the accused during the
investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction.
Similarly, the Court will be required to record a finding as to
the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail.
What would further be necessary on the part of the Court is to
see the culpability of the accused and his involvement in the
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commission of an organized crime either directly or indirectly.
The Court at the time of considering the application for grant
of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether
| the requi<br>rate tha | site men<br>t when |
|---|
offence(s) under a special statute and that statute contains
specific provisions for dealing with matters arising there under,
these provisions cannot be ignored while dealing with such an
application. Since the respondent has been charged with
offence under MCOCA, while dealing with his application for
grant of bail, in addition to the broad principles to be applied
in prosecution for the offences under the IPC, the relevant
provision in the said statute, namely, sub-section (4) of Section
21 has to be kept in mind. It is also further made clear that a
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bare reading of the non obstante clause in sub-section (4) of
Section 21 of MCOCA that the power to grant bail to a person
accused of having committed offence under the said Act is not
only subject to the limitations imposed under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but also subject to the
restrictions placed by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of
Section 21. Apart from giving an opportunity to the prosecutor
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to oppose the application for such release, the other twin
conditions, viz., (i) the satisfaction of the Court that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
| and (ii)<br>n bail, | that he i<br>have to |
|---|
satisfaction contemplated in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(4) of Section 21 regarding the accused being not guilty, has to
be based on “reasonable grounds”. Though the expression
“reasonable grounds” has not been defined in the Act, it is
presumed that it is something more than prima facie grounds.
We reiterate that recording of satisfaction on both the aspects
mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 21
is sine qua non for granting bail under MCOCA.
22) The analysis of the relevant provisions of the MCOCA,
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similar provision in the NDPS Act and the principles laid down
in both the decisions show that substantial probable cause for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence for which
he is charged must be satisfied. Further, a reasonable belief
provided points to existence of such facts and circumstances
as are sufficient to justify the satisfaction that the accused is
not guilty of the alleged offence. We have already highlighted
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the materials placed in the case on hand and we hold that the
High Court has not satisfied the twin tests as mentioned above
while granting bail.
| he impug<br>ory requ | ned ord<br>irements |
|---|
MCOCA, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the impugned
order of the High Court dated 10.08.2011 in Criminal Bail
Application No. 872 of 2011 granting bail to the respondent is
set aside and the order of the special Judge dated 07.05.2011
in M.C.O. Special Case No.10 of 2010 is restored. In view of
the same, the respondent is directed to surrender before the
Special Court within a period of two weeks from the date of
passing of this order, failing which, the special Court is
directed to take appropriate steps for his arrest.
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24) The appeal of State of Maharashtra is allowed.
...…………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
..…....…………………………………J.
(RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 19, 2012.
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