Ms. Y vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 19-04-2022

Preview image for Ms. Y vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 649  of 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) No. 7893 of 2021) Ms. Y     … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR.               … RESPONDENTS     JUDGMENT N.V. RAMANA, CJI. 1. Leave granted The present appeal has been filed against the final judgment 2. and   order   dated   20.09.2021   passed   in   S.B.   Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 14458 of 2021 by the High Court of Rajasthan, at Jaipur, whereby the High Court granted regular bail to respondent no. 2 ­ accused.  The counsel for the appellant­prosecutrix submits that the 3. High   Court   erred   in   granting   bail   to   the   respondent   no.   2   ­ Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2022.04.19 18:56:14 IST Reason: accused in a mechanical manner without any reasoning. Learned counsel submits that the High Court did not consider the facts of 1 the case before it, more particularly, the gravity of the offences alleged   to   have   been   committed   by   the   respondent   no.   2   ­ accused. Additionally, the High Court did not consider that the respondent no. 2 – accused is a hardened criminal with nearly twenty   criminal   cases   pending   against   him.   Under   such circumstances, this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution and set aside the bail granted to respondent no. 2 ­ accused. 4. Learned Counsel for respondent no. 1­ State supported the submissions of the appellant and submitted that the impugned order is a cryptic one which is liable to be set aside. He submitted that there is a strong  prima facie  case against the respondent no. 2   ­   accused   who   committed   the   heinous   offence   of   rape   and sexual assault upon his minor niece for nearly three to four years. Further, respondent no. 2 ­ accused is an infamous criminal who has   twenty   criminal   cases   registered   against   him,   in   some   of which he has already been convicted. The list of cases registered against him include cases relating to murder, attempt to murder, kidnapping, dacoity,   . Therefore, the order of the High Court etc granting bail to respondent no. 2 ­ accused should be set aside. 2 5. Per contra , learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submits that the High Court passed the impugned order granting bail after hearing the respondent no. 2 ­ accused and the State. No new materials have been placed on record before this Court, requiring this Court to interfere with the impugned order. Further, it is a settled position of law that an appellate Court must be slow to interfere in an order granting bail to the accused.  6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.  7. Before adverting to the submissions made by the parties relating to the grant of bail, it is necessary to provide a brief conspectus of the allegations made against respondent no. 2 – accused. As per the chargesheet dated 29.06.2021 filed in the present case, it is stated that the appellant­prosecutrix registered an   FIR  on   30.05.2021   wherein   it   was   stated   that   on   the   16­ 17.05.2021 the respondent no. 2 – accused, her uncle, had come to her house. At around mid­night to 1 am the respondent no. 2 – accused had called her to his room and forcibly raped her on two occasions. Although, initially, she did not narrate this to anyone because she was scared, some of her relatives noticed her strange behaviour. When they asked her why she was sad, she narrated the entire incident to her family. Even before this incident, the 3 respondent no. 2 – accused had misbehaved with her. In 2014, he touched her inappropriately. In 2015, he had attempted to rape her. He used to try to chat with her and used obscene language, and   attempted   to   establish   physical   relationship   with   her   on various  occasions.   She   had   never   disclosed   these   incidents   to anyone as he threatened her. It is in the background of these allegations that the appropriateness of the impugned order passed by the High Court granting bail to respondent no. 2 – accused must be considered.  8. This   Court   has,   in   a   catena   of   judgments,   outlined   the considerations  on  the  basis  of   which  discretion  under  Section 439, CrPC has to be exercised while granting bail. In  Gurcharan this Singh v. State (Delhi Administration),  (1978) 1 SCC 118  Court   has   held   as   to   the   various   parameters   which   must   be considered while granting bail. This Court held as follows: “24 . …Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session   will   have   to   exercise   its   judicial discretion   in   considering   the   question   of granting of bail under Section 439(1) CrPC of the new Code. The overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) CrPC of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position 4 and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the   case;   of   tampering   with   witnesses;   the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.” 9. The above factors do not constitute an exhaustive list. The grant of bail requires the consideration of various factors which ultimately depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case before the Court. There is no strait jacket formula which can ever be prescribed as to what the relevant factors could be. However, certain important factors that are always considered, inter­alia,  relate to  prima facie  involvement of the accused, nature and gravity of the charge, severity of the punishment, and the character, position and standing of the accused [see  State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi , (2005) 8 SCC 21 ]. 10. At the stage of granting bail the Court is not required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence in the case.  Such an exercise may be undertaken at the stage of trial.  5 11. Once bail has been granted, the Appellate Court is usually slow to interfere with the same as it pertains to the liberty of an individual. A Constitution Bench of this Court in   Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India , (1986) 4 SCC 767 observed as follows: . … It is for this reason that the Apex Court “3 has   evolved,   as   a   matter   of   self­discipline, certain norms to guide it in the exercise of its discretion in cases where special leave petition are filed against orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail.… We reiterate this policy principle   laid   down   by   the   bench   of   this Court and hold that this Court should not ordinarily,   save   in   exceptional   cases, interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or   anticipatory   bail,   because   these   are matters   in   which   the   High   Court   should normally be the final arbiter.” (emphasis supplied) 12.  The above principle has been consistently followed by this Court. In  Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,  (2010) 14 SCC 496  this Court held as under: “ 9.   We are of the opinion that the impugned order is  clearly  unsustainable.  It is  trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order   passed   by   the   High   Court   granting   or rejecting   bail   to   the   accused.   However,   it   is equally   incumbent   upon   the   High   Court   to exercise   its   discretion   judiciously,   cautiously and   strictly   in   compliance   with   the   basic 6 principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i)  whether   there   is   any   prima   facie   or reasonable   ground   to   believe   that   the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv)   danger   of   the   accused   absconding   or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii)   danger,   of   course,   of   justice   being thwarted by grant of bail.    xxx xxx xxx 10.  It is  manifest  that if the High Court does not advert   to   these   relevant   considerations   and mechanically grants bail, the said order would suffer from the vice of non­application of mind, rendering it to be illegal…..”  7 13. In   Mahipal   v.   Rajesh   Kumar ,   (2020)   2   SCC   118   this Court followed the holding in   Prasanta Kumar Sarkar   (supra) and held as follows: “17 . Where a court considering an application for   bail   fails   to   consider   relevant   factors,   an appellate   court   may   justifiably   set   aside   the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non­application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess whether, on the basis of the evidentiary record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had   committed   the   crime,   also   taking   into account the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment…” 14. Recently, a three Judges’ Bench of this Court in   Jagjeet . in   Criminal Singh & Ors. V. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr Appeal No. 632 of 2022,  has reiterated the factors that the Court must consider at the time of  granting bail under Section 439 CrPC, as well as highlighted the circumstances where this Court may   interfere   when   bail   has   been   granted   in   violation   of   the requirements   under   the   above­mentioned   section.   This   Court observed as follows: “28 . We may, at the outset, clarify that power to grant bail under Section 439 of CrPC, is one of 8 wide amplitude.   A High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, are bestowed with considerable   discretion   while   deciding   an application for bail.   But, as has been held by this Court on multiple occasions, this discretion is not unfettered.   On the contrary, the High Court   of   the   Sessions   Court   must   grant   bail after the application of a judicial mind, following well­established principles, and not in a cryptic or mechanical manner.” 15. It is worth noting that what is being considered in this case relates to whether the High Court has exercised the discretionary power  under   Section   439   CrPC   in   granting   bail   appropriately. Such   an   assessment   is   different   from   deciding   whether circumstances   subsequent   to   the   grant   of   bail   have   made   it necessary   to cancel  the   same.  The   first situation  requires  the Court   to   analyze   whether   the   order   granting   bail   was   illegal, perverse,   unjustified   or   arbitrary.   On   the   other   hand,   an application for cancellation of bail looks at whether supervening circumstances have occurred warranting cancellation. In   Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. , (2014) 16 SCC 508  this Court held as follows:  We have referred to certain principles to be “12. kept in mind while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after 9 it   is   granted   because   the   accused   has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances   warranting   such   cancellation have   occurred   is   in   a   different   compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into   consideration   while   dealing   with   the application for bail have not been taken note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably   the   superior   court  can   set  aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs   to   a   different   category   and   is   in   a separate   realm.   While   dealing   with   a   case   of second nature, the court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently.   It,   on   the   contrary,   delves   into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the court.” In the present case, it is necessary to determine whether the 16. High Court while granting bail to the respondent no. 2 ­ accused has properly exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC by following   various   parameters   laid   down   by   this   Court.   A  bare perusal of the impugned order passed by the High Court does not suggest that the Court has considered any of the relevant factors for grant of bail. It would be fruitful to extract the impugned order at this juncture: “1.   The present bail application has been filed under Section 439  Cr.P.C. The  petitioner has 10 been   arrested   in   connection   with   FIR   No. 319/2021 Registered at Police Station Udhyog Nagar,   District   Sikar   for   the   offence(s)   under Sections   354,   354B,   354D,   376(2)F,   376(2)N, 450, 506, 509 IPC and Sections 9N/10, 5L/6, 5(N)/6 and 18 of POCSO Act. 2.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in this   case.   He   is   behind   the   bars   since 30.05.2021. Charge­sheet has been filed against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that during trial, statement of the   prosecutrix   was   recorded   by   the   learned trial Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner also   submits   that   the   prosecutrix   has   made improvement   in   her   statement.   Conclusion   of trial may take long time. 3.   Learned   counsel   for   the   complainant   has opposed the bail application and submitted that the petitioner is a habitual offender and he has been booked in PASA. 4.   Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the bail application. 5.  Considering the contentions put­forth by the counsel   for   the   petitioner   and   taking   into account the facts and circumstances of the case and   without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the merits of the case, this court deems it just and proper to enlarge the petitioner on bail.  6.   Accordingly,   the   bail   application   under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that   the   accused­petitioner   Omprakash   @ Jeevanram @ Oma Thehat S/o Boduram shall be   enlarged on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in 11 the   sum   of   Rs.50,000/­   with   two   sureties   of Rs.25,000/­   each   to   the   satisfaction   of   the learned   trial  Judge   for   his   appearance   before the court concerned on all the dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so. ”  Apart   from   the   general   observation   that   the   facts   and 17. circumstances of the case have been taken into account, nowhere have the actual facts of the case been adverted to. There appears to be no reference to the factors that ultimately led the High Court to grant bail. In fact, no reasoning is apparent from the impugned order.  Reasoning is the life blood of the judicial system.  That every 18. order must be reasoned is one of the fundamental tenets of our system. An unreasoned order suffers the vice of arbitrariness. In this Court held as under: Puran v. Rambilas , (2001) 6 SCC 338  “8 . …Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits. At the stage of granting bail a   detailed   examination   of   evidence   and elaborate   documentation   of   the   merits   of   the case   has   not   to   be   undertaken.   What   the Additional Sessions Judge had done in the order dated 11­9­2000 was to discuss the merits and demerits of the evidence. That was what was deprecated.   That   did   not   mean   that   whilst granting  bail   some   reasons   for   prima  facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.(emphasis supplied) 12 19. In   Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan , (2004) 7 this Court indicated the importance of reasoning in the SCC 528  matter concerning bail and held as follows: “11 . The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is   very   well   settled.   The   court   granting   bail should   exercise   its   discretion   in   a   judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at   the   stage   of   granting   bail   a   detailed examination   of   evidence   and   elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken , there is a need to indicate in such   orders   reasons   for   prima   facie concluding   why   bail   was   being   granted particularly where the accused is charged of having   committed   a   serious   offence.   Any order   devoid   of   such   reasons   would   sufferfrom non­application of mind   (emphasis supplied) 20. In   Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna , (2009) 1 SCC 678, which concerned a challenge to grant of bail in a serious offence, this Court has reiterated the same position as was observed in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar  (supra) This   Court has held as under: … However, we find from the order that no “12 reasons were given by the learned Judge while granting   the   bail   and   it   seems   to   have   been granted   almost   mechanically   without considering  the   pros  and   cons   of  the   matter. While   granting   bail,   particularly   in   serious cases   like   murder   some   reasons   justifying the grant are necessary. ” 13 (emphasis supplied) 21. From the above, it is clear that this Court has consistently upheld   the   necessity   of   reasoned   bail   orders,   with   a   special emphasis on matters involving serious offences. In the present case, respondent no. 2 ­ accused has been accused of committing the grievous offence of rape against his young niece of nineteen years.  The fact that the respondent no. 2 ­ accused is a habitual offender and nearly twenty cases registered against him has not even found mentioned in the impugned order. Further the High Court has failed to consider the influence that the respondent no. 2 ­ accused may have over the prosecutrix as an elder family member. The period of imprisonment, being only three months, is not of such a magnitude as to push the Court towards granting bail in an offence of this nature.  The impugned order passed by the High Court is cryptic, 22. and does not suggest any application of mind. There is a recent trend of passing such orders granting or refusing to grant bail, where the Courts make a general observation that “the facts and the circumstances” have been considered. No specific reasons are 14 indicated   which   precipitated   the   passing   of   the   order   by   the Court.  23. Such a situation  continues despite  various  judgments  of this Court wherein this Court has disapproved of such a practice. In the case of  Mahipal   (supra)  this Court observed as follows:  “ 25 .   Merely   recording   “having   perused   the record” and “on the facts and circumstances of the case” does not subserve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order.  It is a fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that factors which have weighed   in   the   mind   of   the   Judge   in   the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this commitment. Questions   of   the   grant   of   bail   concern   both liberty   of   individuals   undergoing   criminal prosecution   as   well   as   the   interests   of   the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who   commit   crimes   are   not   afforded   the opportunity   to   obstruct   justice.   Judges   are duty­bound   to   explain   the   basis   on   which they have arrived at a conclusion.”   (emphasis supplied) 24. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed. Bail   bonds   stand   cancelled.   Respondent   no.   2   ­   accused   is 15 directed to surrender within one week from the receipt of this order, failing which, the concerned police authorities shall take him into custody. .............................CJI.        (N.V. RAMANA) ...............................J.                                                          (KRISHNA MURARI) NEW DELHI; APRIL 19, 2022 16