Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF U.P.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
P.A. MADHU
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/07/1984
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1984 AIR 1523 1984 SCR (3) 1
1984 SCC (4) 83 1984 SCALE (2)6
ACT:
Constitution of India-Art. 136-Supreme Court-When would
interfere with the appreciation of evidence by the High
Court.
Code of Criminal Procedure-S. 154-FIR-Cryptic
information on phone to police-Cannot be treated as FIR-
Being first in point of time make no difference-Name of
assistant not mentioned in telephonic message-Whether
discredits prosecution case.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent, Secretary of the workers union of a
construction company, D.W. 1, Vice-President of the Union,
the deceased and P.Ws. 5 and 7, officers of the company and
P.W. 6, standing counsel of the company were all coming out
of the office of an industrial tribunal after filing their
written statements in a dispute raised by the workers. The
prosecution case was that at the main gate of the tribunal’s
building the respondent suddenly star ted firing from a
pistol and shot dead the deceased. As firing was going on, a
telephonic message conveying the fact that gunshots were
being fired was sent to the nearby police station on receipt
of the telephonic message the police arrived at the spot,
seized the pistol and took the respondent and some of the
witnesses to the police station where a formal FIR was
registered. The Session Judge convicted the accused under s.
302 IPC and s. 25 (1) (a) of Indian Arms Act and sentenced
him to life imprisonment and one years’ rigorous
imprisonment respectively. On appeal the High Court reversed
the judgment of the Sessions Judge. The High Court observed
that if P.W. 7 had given the telephonic message, as stated
by D.W. 1. he would have mentioned the name of the assailant
because he was a full-fledged eye-witness but since his name
had not been mentioned it was the strongest Possible
circumstance to discredit the prosecution case. Hence this
appeal.
Allowing the appeal,
^
HELD: Normally this Court does not interfere against
the judgment of
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the High Court purely on appreciation of evidence. But this
Court would interfere with the decision of the High Court if
there appear to be very special circumstances which have
been either overlooked or not considered by the High Court
or the High Court does not appear to have examined the
intrinsic merits of the evidence of the witnesses but has
proceeded to acquit the accused on general grounds which are
wholly untenable. [5B-C]
A cryptic information on telephone has been held by
this Court to be of no value at all. The mere fact that the
information was the first in point of time does not by
itself clothe it with the character of first information
report.
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, [1971] 1 SCR 599,
referred to
In the instant case the telephonic message was an
extremely cryptic one and could not be regarded as a FIR in
any sense of the term.
The High Court has applied two different standards to
assess the evidence of the prosecution and that of the
defence. While the High Court accepts the uncorroborated
evidence of D.W. 1, who is as much interested in the dispute
as the deceased, if not more, being Vice-President of the
Union and also in possession of the brief case of the
respondent, yet it disbelieves the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7
mainly on the ground that they were highly interested.
[7H, 8A-B]
The High Court completely lost sight of two important
facts-(1) that P.Ws. 5 and 7 were high officers of the
company and were not likely to depose falsely on a matter
like this, and (2) that r.W. 6, who was the standing counsel
of the company and other labour cases for more than 3
decades, fully corroborates the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7.
We have examined the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 with very
great care and caution but we are unable to find any
discrepancy or defect in their evidence so as to lead any
court to reject the same. [8E-F]
The finding of the High Court that it is difficult to
believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he
continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt
to escape is also most unrealistic. There is clear evidence
of P.Ws. 5, 6 and 7 that after the respondent threw down the
pistol he was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he
could not escape. The High Court has failed to consider this
important aspect of the matter. Moreover, if a person
commits a cold-blooded murder in the premises of a court
which is bound to be full of other litigants also, he cannot
think of escaping and is bound to be caught by some one or
the other. [9A-C]
Relying on the evidence of D.W. 1, the conclusion
reached by the High Court that it is extremely doubtful that
the witnesses could see the incident from inside the court
room as there was no door or window through which
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the incident could be seen is purely speculative and against
the weight of evidence on record. The evidence of D.W. 1,
who was a highly interested witness, should not have been
acted upon in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case unless corroborated by independent evidence. [9D; F-G]
The High Court seems to have completely overlooked the
fact that there was no reason for the three eye-witnesses,
one of whom was a standing counsel for about 30 years, to
have falsely implicated the respondent merely because he was
Secretary of the Union. The consistent course of conduct of
the respondent speaks volumes against his innocence. He was
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caught red-handed at the spot and was surrounded by the
witnesses so that he could not escape, and the police
arrived within fifteen minutes of the occurrence and took
him to the police station. [9H; 10A]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
611 of 1981.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 6th February, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in
Crl. Appeal No. 11478 of 1980.
Dalveer Bhandari, H.M. Singh and Ranbir Singh Yadav for
the Appellant.
R.L. Kohli and Girish Chandra for the Respondent.
Ram Jethmalani, Ms. Rani Jethmalani and S.B. Jethmalani
for the Intervener.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J. Our hard-won freedom from British yoke
ushered in a new era of progress and prosperity resulting in
setting up of a large number of industries of all sorts and
kinds in various spheres, some of them being Government
controlled and some of them in the private sector. Labour
and industrial laws of the country passed after independence
created a sense of new awakening in the labour force which
became more and more conscious of the rights and privileges
conferred on them by the laws. Although disputes between the
labour and management is now a common feature of the
industrial life of the country yet seldom in the history of
industrial disputes has it ever happened that a dispute
assumed such large proportions as to take the toll of a
human life resulting in a cold-blooded murder in broad day
light and that too in a court premises.
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Such an extraordinary event is the subject-matter of
this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court where a Secretary of the labour Union
seems to have run amuck and fired several shorts by a
country-made pistol shots on an officer of the management
and killed him at the spot
The facts of the case have been detailed in the
judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court
and need not be repeated. The matter, therefore, lies within
a narrow compass and we purpose only to examine the reasons
and the inferences drawn by the High Court for acquitting
the respondent, Madhu.
M/s. Hindustan Construction Company (hereinafter
referred to as the ’company’), had undertaken the
construction of Jamuna Hydel Project in Khadar, District
Dehradun.
To begin with, it appears that there was some dispute
about the dearness allowance claim of the labour from the
management which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
The respondent, who was the Secretary of the Union, was
looking after the case on behalf of the workers, while PWs 5
and 7 were the officers appearing on behalf of the
management before the Tribunal. The deceased, S.J.
Sirgaonkar, was Deputy Personnel Manager of the Bombay
Branch of M/s. Hindustan Construction Company. He was shot
dead by the respondent after he (deceased), alongwith the
other officers of the management, had come out of the
Tribunal’s office at Meerut after filing their written
statements. Thereafter one of the eye-witnesses, S.K. Gui
(PW 7) asked someone to give a telephone call to the police
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station, which was nearby, on receipt of which the police
arrived at the spot, seized the pistol and took the accused
and some of the witnesses to the police station where a form
FIR was registered. The Panchanama was prepared and other
formalities were, however, done at the spot.
The learned Sessions Judge, after a careful
consideration of the evidence of the three main eye-
witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) as also the evidence of Durga Das
(DW 1), came to a clear conclusion that the prosecution case
against the respondent was fully proved and accordingly be
convicted the respondent under
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s. 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
He also convicted the respondent under s. 25(1)(a) of the
Indian Arms Act and sentenced him to one year’s R.I. The
respondent went up in appeal to the High Court against the
decision of the Sessions Judge which was reversed by the
High Court and the respondent was acquitted of the charges
framed against him.
Normally, this Court does not interfere against the
judgment of a High Court purely on appreciation of evidence.
But, in this case, there appears to be very special
circumstances which have been either overlooked or not
considered by the High Court. Besides this, the High Court
does not appear to have examined the intrinsic merits of the
evidence of the witnesses but has proceeded to acquit the
respondent on general grounds which, we shall show
hereafter, are wholly untenable.
It appears that July 5, 1977 was the date fixed in the
Industrial Tribunal, Meerut for the parties to file their
written statements and in this connection the deceased
alongwith the other eye-witnesses (PWs 5, and 7) attended
the Tribunal and PWs 5 and 7 filed their written statements.
P.W. 6 was, the standing counsel of the Company and had been
representing the same in all labour disputes concerning the
Company. The respondent was holding the post of hydel
lineman of the Project and was the Secretary of the labour
Union. DW 1, Durga Das, who was also at the spot was the
Vice-President of the said Union.
It appears that after filing the written statements at
about 11.30 a.m. the witnesses and the respondent came out
of the court premises and were talking between themselves.
As soon as the respondent and Sirgaonkar (the deceased)
reached the main gate of the Tribunal building, the
respondent is alleged to have taken out a country-made
pistol and fired five shots one after the other in quick
succession, with the result that Sirgaonkar fell down and
died at the spot. Thereafter, the respondent threw away the
pistol but he was surrounded by the witnesses and later
handed over to the police on their arrival. It is also
alleged by the prosecution that while the firing was going
on a telephonic message was sent to the police station Civil
Lines, Meerut about the firing and it was received by
Masroor Ali, PW 9, who made an entry to that effect in the
general diary at 11.39 a.m. The telephonic information
merely conveyed the fact that gunshots
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were being fired on receipt of the information, PW-10. Ram
Datt Gautam, the Sub-Inspector of Police, proceeded to the
place of occurrence and found the body of Sirgonkar Lying
outside the main gate of the Tribunal building and the
respondent being apprehended by the witnesses. The police
officer took the accused into custody and proceeded to the
police station alongwith PW 7, S.K. Gui, where a regular FIR
was registered. The usual proceedings about the postmortem
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and inquest the followed and after a thorough investigation
the police submitted a charge-sheet against the respondent
which resulted in his conviction by the Sessions Judge.
This, in short, is the prosecution case.
The main grounds on which the High Court has reversed
the judgment of the Sessions Judge may be summarised as
follows:
Durga Das, DW 1 who was admittedly at the scene of the
occurrence has stated that as the shooting started, PW 7 had
given a telephonic message to the police station. The High
Court by an implied process of reasoning has observed that
if PW 7 had given the telephonic message he would have
mentioned the name of the assailant because he was a full-
fledged eye witness but since his name had not been
mentioned it is the strongest possible circumstance to
discredit the prosecution case. We are, however, unable to
agree with this somewhat involved reasoning of the High
Court. In fact, DW, 1, merely says that Gui telephoned to
the police station about the firing and said something in
English, The High Court seems to have presumed that from
this the irresistible inference to be drawn is that Gui did
not mention the name of the assailant of the deceased and on
this ground alone the prosecution must fail. This argument
is based on a serious error. In the first place, the
telephonic message was an extremely cryptic one and could
not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of the term. Secondly,
assuming that Gui had given the telephonic message in utter
chaos and confusion when shots after shots were being fired
at the deceased, there was no occasion for Gui to have
narrated the entire story of the occurrence. In fact, in his
evidence Gui has denied that he personally telephoned the
police but he stated that he asked somebody to telephone the
police which appears to be both logical and natural.
Moreover such a cryptic information on telephone has been
held by this
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Court to be of no value at all. In Tapindar Singh v. State
of Punjab this Court in identical circumstances observed
thus:
"The telephone message was received by Hari Singh,
A.S.I., Police Station, City Kotwali at 5.35 p.m. On
September 8, 1969. The person conveying the information
did not disclose his identity, nor did he give any
other particulars and all that is said to have been
conveyed was that firing had taken place at the taxi
stand, Ludhiana. This was, of course, recorded in the
daily diary of the police station by the police officer
responding to the telephone call. But prime facie this
cryptic and anonymous oral message which did not in
terms clearly specify a cognizable offence cannot be
treated as first information report The mere fact that
this information was the first in point of time does
not by itself clothe it with the character of first
information report."
In view of this decision, therefore, the fundamental
reasoning of the High Court falls to the ground. Moreover,
Durga Das himself does not appear to be an independent
witness but he was highly interested because being the Vice-
President of the labour Union he was looking after the case
in tho Industrial Tribunal on behalf of the workers. There
is clear evidence of prosecution witnesses that even the
brief case of the respondent was handled by DW 1 at the time
of the occurrence. Although DW 1 denied this fact, it is
amply proved by the evidence of PW-5. The only comment made
against this witness was that he did not state this fact
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before the investigating officer. But, as this was a matter
of detail it may not have been necessary for him to have
stated all possible details in his statement to the police.
This witness is corroborated by PW 6, an independent
witness, who says that the brief case of the respondent was
being carried by Durga Das. It, therefore, appears that DW 1
being the Vice-President of the Union and a pairvikar of the
workers was highly interested and in the face of the
evidence of independent witness like PW-6, there is no
reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW 5 that the brief
case of the respondent was being handled by DW 1.
We might state here that the High Court has applied two
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different standards to assess the evidence of the
prosecution and that of the defence. While the High Court
accepts the uncorroborated evidence of DW 1, who is as much
interested in the dispute as the deceased, if not more,
being Vice-President of the Union and also in possession of
the brief case of the respondent, yet it disbelieves the
evidence of PWs 5 and 7 mainly on the ground that they were
highly interested. The relevant finding of the High Court on
this point may be extracted thus:
"In the first place, it shows that Subrat Kumar
Gui and M.R. Bhaumik were mainly responsible for the
prosecution of the case, although the deceased had been
in general supervision of all labour disputes of the
company at all the places. In the second place, it also
points out that these two witnesses were not happy with
the appellant who had been representing the cause of
the labourers before the Industrial Tribunal and that
they were sore about his conduct. In these
circumstances these two witnesses could not be said to
be independent "
Here, the High Court completely lost sight of two
important facts-(1) that PWs 5 and 7 were high officers of
the Company and were not likely to depose falsely on a
matter like this, and (2) that PW-6, who was the standing
counsel of the Company and other labour cases for more than
3 decades, fully corroborates the evidence of PWs 5 and 7.
We have examined the evidence of PWs S and 7 with very great
care and caution but we are unable to find any discrepancy
or defect in their evidence so as to lead any court to
reject the same. On the other hand, on a consideration of
their evidence. we are satisfied that are throughout
consistent and congruous and that their evidence bears a
ring of truth; We are indeed surprised how the High Court
could disbelieve the evidence of the eye-witnesses in the
case of a cold-blooded murder committed in broad day light
where the respondent was caught red-handed at the spot. The
High Court also over looked the crying conduct of the
respondent who went on firing one shot after the other so as
to make sure that Sirgaonkar does not survive at any cost.
Another ground on which the High Court has reversed the
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judgment of the Sessions Judge is that it is difficult to
believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he
continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt
to escape. With due respect, this finding of the High Court
is also most unrealistic. There is clear evidence of PWs. 5,
6 and 7 that after the respondent threw down the pistol he
was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he could not
escape. The High Court has failed to consider this important
aspect of the matter. Moreover, if a person commits a cold-
blooded murder in the premises of a court which is bound to
be full of other litigants also, he cannot think of escaping
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and is bound to be caught by someone or the other.
The High Court was further of the view that it is
extremely doubtful that the witnesses could see the incident
from inside the court room as there was no door or window
through which the incident could be seen. To buttress this
observation, the High Court seems to have relied on the
evidence of DW 1 that the four persons, including DW 1,
entered the court room as soon as the first shot was fired.
This statement is obviously wrong because all the three
witnesses stated that the shots were fired while they were
outside the court room and they actually saw the respondent
firing the shots. It was only after a few shots were fired
that they entered the court room and even so they were able
to see the whole occurrence from the glass panes of the
court room. There is absolutely no evidence on record to
show that there were no glass panes in tho window and that
the place of occurrence could not be visible from the court
room. In these circumstances the conclusion of the High
Court is purely speculative and against the weight of
evidence on the record.
The High Court seems to have placed some reliance on
the evidence of D.W.1 but as he was highly interested, his
evidence unless corroborated by independent evidence should
not have been acted upon in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case.
Lastly, the High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the fact that there was no reason for three eye-
witnesses, one of whom was a standing counsel far about 30
years, to have falsely implicated the respondent merely
because he was Secretary of the Union. The consistent course
of conduct of the respondent speaks volumes against his
innocence. He was caught red-handed
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at the spot and was surrounded by the witnesses so that he
could not escape, and the police arrived within fifteen
minutes of the occurrence and took him to the police
station. Some comment was made by the High Court about the
delay in the inquest report but that does not appear to be
of any consequence if the evidence of the three eye-
witnesses is to be believed.
We have given our anxious consideration to the evidence
of the three witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) and we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the Sessions Judge that
these witnesses were both reliable and trustworthy. In fact,
the High Court committed a grave error of law in not going
into the intrinsic merits of the evidence of each of the
eye-witnesses and in discarding the same on general ground
which also have no substance.
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that this
is not a case in which it could be said by any stretch of
imagination that another reasonable view may be possible on
the evidence and circumstances of the case, viz. that the
accused was innocent. The result is that the appeal is
allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the
appellant is convicted under s.302 of the Indian Panel Code
to imprisonment for life as also under s.25(1)(a) of the
Indian Arms Act to one year’s R.I. because he was
undoubtedly found using a country made pistol which was
recovered from the place of occurrence.
H.S.K. Appeal allowed.
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