STATE ELECTION COMMISSIONER, BIHAR PATNA vs. JANAKDHARI PRASAD .

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J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, CJI st Janakdhari   Prasad,   the   1   respondent   herein,   was elected in the year 2001 as a member of Panchayat Samiti, th   Nagarnausa.   On   13 February,   2004,   the   fifth   respondent, Ravindra   Nath   Sharma,   filed   a   petition   before   the   State Election   Commission,   Bihar   (for   short   “the   Commission”) contending,  inter alia , that the respondent No. 1 was working Signature Not Verified as an Assistant Government Pleader in Hilsa, sub­division of Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date: 2018.07.03 16:55:19 IST Reason: District Nalanda and, therefore, he was disqualified to hold the 2 post of member, Panchayat Samiti in view of Section 139(l)(c) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (for brevity, ‘the Act’). 2. The Election Commission, in order to decide the issue st whether   the   1   respondent   was   in   service   of   the   State Government within the sweep of Section 139(l)(c) of the Act, referred   to   the   appointment   letter   issued   by   the   Law Department, Government of Bihar,  vide  which the respondent herein was appointed as an Advocate in the panel of Assistant Government Advocates and thereafter observed that the said respondent was holding a post under the State Government and was receiving fees for the cases conducted by him from the   Government and  hence,   he  would  be  deemed  to  be in service   of   the   State.   Being   of   this   view,   the   Election Commission   vide   order   dated   29.03.2004   disqualified   the respondent under Section 139(l)(c) of the Act from the post of Member in the Panchayat Samiti. st 3.  Aggrieved   by   this   Order   of   the   Commission,   the   1 respondent   knocked   at   the   doors   of   the   High   Court   of Judicature at Patna by preferring a Writ Petition (CWJC) No. 3

4 Thereafter, the learned Single Judge examined the nature of   appointment   of   a   Government   pleader   who   is   paid   a retainer­ship as fee and differentiated between the nature of appointment of an Assistant Government Pleader from that of a Government Pleader and came to hold that so far as the Assistant Government Pleader is concerned, he is appointed to assist the Government Pleader and for the professional work rendered, he is paid remuneration but not paid any retainer fee. He further expressed the view that a Government Pleader is not entitled to appear against the State Government but an Assistant Government Pleader, can appear, against the State Government in a case. The Assistant Government Pleader is basically an Advocate on the roll of the State Bar Council and besides giving professional advice to other litigants by virtue of his/her  engagement by  the  State   Government,  he/she  also advises   and   represents   the   State   Government   in   Courts  of Law. The appointment of the Government Pleader is governed by the executive instruction which is a tenure appointment and he remains a legal practitioner for all purpose and intent. 5 That apart, the engagement of an advocate as an Assistant Government   Pleader   is   a   professional   engagement   and   the relationship   between   the   State   and   that   of   the   Assistant Government Pleader is that of a lawyer and client and not of Master and Servant. There is neither minimum or maximum age   limit   for   engagement   of   a   person   as   an   Assistant Government   Pleader   nor   there   is   any   age   of   retirement. Assistant Government Pleader is paid fees for the professional work  done by him  and his  remuneration is  not fixed in a particular time scale.  Additionally, no Discipline Rules govern his conduct and he is bound by same Code of Conduct as any other   lawyer.   Considering   all   the   aspects   in   a   cumulative manner,   he   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the   Assistant Government Pleader cannot be said to be in service of the State Government so as to bring him within the mischief of Section 139(l)(c) of the Act. 4. On the issue of office of profit, the learned Single Judge observed   that   the   expression   "in   service"   of   the   State Government   and   the   expression   "office   of   profit"   in   State 6 Government are not synonymous and, therefore, a person may hold   an   office   of   profit   under   the   State   but   that   does   not amount to the fact that he is "in service" of the State.  With the aforesaid reasoning, he set aside the order of the Commission. 5. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   view,   the   State   Election Commissioner filed an appeal, being L.P.A No. 879 of 2004, before a Division Bench of the High Court, which concurred with the view expressed by the Single Judge and dismissed the   appeal   vide   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated 27.10.2005.  The said dismissal has led to filing of the present appeal by special leave. 6. Criticising the impugned judgment and order of the High Court,   it   is   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the st appellants that the 1  respondent was appointed in respect of a   sanctioned   post   and,   therefore,   he   is   in   service   of   the Government which would indubitably disqualify him to remain as   a   member.   It   is   his   further   submission   that   the   word “service”   contextually   is   of   wider   import   and   it   has   to   be conferred   a   purposive   meaning   so   that   the   democracy   is 7 sustained at the ground level and the elected representatives remain connected to their electorate. 7. Despite service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of the respondents. 8. To appreciate the controversy at hand, we may refer to Article   243F(1)(b)   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   It   reads   as follows:­

xxxx xxxx xxxx (b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State."   Article 243F(1)(b) makes it quite clear that a member of Panchayat shall stand disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State. The Constitution of India has left it to the wisdom of the State Legislature. 9. The Legislature of the State of Bihar has enacted the Act and   Section   139   of   the   Act   stipulates   that   the   persons 8 disqualified shall cease to hold the office. The said provision is as under:­

(a) is not citizen of India; (b) is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the legislature of the State:   Provided   that   no   person   shall   be disqualified on the ground that he is less than   twenty   five   years   of   age,   if   he   has attained the age of twenty one years; (c) is   in   the   service   of   Central   or   State Government or any local authority; (d) is   in   service   of   any   such   institution receiving   aids   from   Central   or   State government or any local authority; (e) has   been   adjudged   by   a   competent court to be of unsound mind; (f) has been dismissed from the service of Central or  State  Government or  any  local authority   for   misconduct   and   has   been 9 declared to be disqualified for employment in the public service; (g) has been sentenced by a criminal court whether   within   or   out   of   India   to imprisonment for an offence, other than a political   offence,   for   a   term   exceeding   six months   or   has   been   ordered   to   furnish security for good behaviour under Section 109 or Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,   1973   (Act   2,   1974)   and   such sentence or order not having subsequently been reversed; (h) has under any law for the time being in force become ineligible to be a member of any local authority; (i) holds   any   salaried   office   or   office   of profit under the Panchayat; (j)  has   been   found   guilty   of   corrupt practices.   Provided that on being found guilty of corrupt practices, the disqualification shall cease after six years of general election. (2) If any question arises as to whether a member   of   a   Panchayat   at   any   level   has become   subject   to   any   of   the disqualifications   mentioned   in   sub­section (1),   the   question  shall  be   referred  for   the decision   of   such   authority   and   in   such manner   as   the   Government   may   by   law provide. (3) If   a   person,   who   is   chosen   as   a member   of   Panchayat,   a   Mukhia,   a 10 Sarpanch, is or becomes a member of the Lok   Sabha,   Rajya   Sabha,   Legislative Assembly,   Legislative   Council,   or   is   or becomes   a   municipal   councillor   or   a councillor of a Municipal Corporation or a member of Sanitary Board or a member of a notified area committee or a member of any other   Panchayat,   Mukhia,   Sarpanch,   then within   fifteen   days   from   the   date   of commencement   of   the   term   of   office   of   a member   of   Lok   Sabha,   Rajya   Sabha, Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council or of a councilor of municipality or Municipal Corporation or a member of Sanitary Board or notified area committee or a member of other   Panchayat   or   Mukhia   or   Sarpanch, his   seat   in   the   Panchayat   shall   become vacant   unless   he   has   previously   resigned his   seat   in   the   Lok   Sabha,   Rajya   Sabha, Legislative   Assembly,   Legislative   Council, Municipality or the Municipal Corporation, Sanitary   Board   or   the   notified   area committee or of any such Panchayat as the case may be." Rule 122 of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1995, as amended in 2002, empowers the State Election Commission to decide disqualification of an elected member of a Panchayat. The said Rule reads as follows:­ "Rule   122.   Under   provisions   of   Section 139(2)   of   the   Bihar   Panchayat   Raj   Act, 1993, the State Election Commission shall be   the   competent   authority   to   decide whether a member of the Panchayat at any 11 level   has   become   subject   to   any   of   the disqualifications   mentioned   in   Section 139(1)   of   the   Act.   The   matter   of disqualification   may   be   brought   to   the notice of the State Election Commission in the   form   of   a   complaint,   application   or information by any person or authority. The State   Election   Commission   may   also   take suo moto cognizance of such matters and decide   such   matters   expeditiously   after allowing   sufficient   opportunity   to   the affected parties of being heard." We have reproduced the relevant Section and the Rule to appreciate the controversy in entirety. 10. In   the   case   at   hand,   we   are   concerned   with   Section 139(1)(c) and (d) of the Act. In Section 139(1)(c), there is a postulate that a person shall be disqualified if such a person is in the service of Central or State Government or any local authority. Section 139(1)(d) lays down a disqualification if the person is in service of such institution receiving aids from Central   or   State   Government   or   any   local   authority.   As   is noticeable, the key word in both the provisions pertains to ‘service’.  12 11. As has been stated earlier, the learned single Judge has drawn   a   distinction   between   “office   of   profit”   and   “service under the Government”. We think it apposite to restate the legal position, the distinction between the two facets as above and   thereafter   x­ray   the   provision,   the   legislative   purpose behind the same and the nature of appointment. 12. A   three­Judge   Bench   in   Ravanna   Subanna   v.   G.S. 1 ,   was   dealing   with   the   acceptance   of Kaggeerappa nomination papers of the appellant on the ground that he was holding   an   office   of   profit   under   the   Government   at   the relevant time as he was the Chairman of Taluk Development Committee and was, hence, disqualified for being chosen as a Councillor under Section 14 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (for short, “1951 Act”). The objection was overruled by   the   Returning   Officer   and   eventually   the   appellant   was declared elected. Challenging the election, the respondent filed an   election   petition   before   the   concerned   Sub­Judge   who dismissed the petition opining that the elected candidate was not   holding   an   office   of   profit   under   the   Government   as 1  AIR 1954 SC 653 13 contemplated   by   Section   14   of   the   1951   Act.   The   said judgment   was   reversed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High Court   in   an   appeal   and   respondent   was   declared   elected. Section 14(1) enumerated various grounds of disqualification and one of such grounds was that of a person holding an office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule.  It further provided that if any person is elected as a councilor in contravention of the provisions, his seat shall be deemed to be vacant.   The Court addressed to the issue of disqualification and posed the question   whether   the   appellant   held   an   office   of   profit   as provided for under Section 14(1)(A)(a)(iii) of the 1951 Act.   The three­Judge Bench expressed thus:­ “12. … The plain meaning of the expression seems   to   be   that   an   office   must   be   held under Government to which any pay, salary, emoluments or allowance is attached. The word “profit” connotes the idea of pecuniary gain. If there is really a gain, its quantum or amount   would   not   be   material;   but   the amount of money receivable by a person in connection with the office he holds may be material in deciding whether the office really carries any profit.” 14 Analysing the facts of the case in detail, the Court ruled:­

 And, again:­

After   expressing   the   aforesaid   view,   the   three­Judge Bench of this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court. 15 2 13. In  Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa , the issue arose whether the nomination papers were correctly rejected by the Election Officer on the ground that the appellant therein was employed as a legal practitioner against the Municipality in a case under Section 198 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act. The candidate whose nomination paper was rejected moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ or order of prohibition to the State Government and the Election Officer restraining them from holding the election but the High Court rejected the said prayer. The Court took note   of   the   fact   that   the   Orissa   Municipal   Act,   1950   was passed by the State Legislature. Section 16 of the said Act prescribed the disqualification of a candidate for election and it provided that no person shall be qualified for election to a seat in a municipality if such person is employed as a paid legal   practitioner   on   behalf   of   the   municipality   or   as   legal practitioner against the municipality.  A contention was raised before the High Court that the person sought to contest the election could not be declared to be disqualified as the said Act 2  AIR 1955 SC 166 16 th had come into operation on 15  April, 1951 and consequently, th he could not have been disqualified from 15   March, 1951 when he filed the nomination papers. The Constitution Bench analysed   Section   1   of   the   said   Act   and   opined  that   the disqualification   was   attracted   regard   being   had   to   the sub­section (5) of Section 1 of the said Act that had stipulated that the said provision in express terms provided that after the Act had received the assent of the Governor elections could be held under the Act but were only to take effect on the Act coming into force, which meant the coming into force of the Act in such area or areas on such date or dates which the State   Government   might   appoint   from   time   to   time   under Section 1(3) of the Act. There was thus contemplation under the very provisions of Section 1(5) to the holding of elections under the Act in spite of the fact that the Act had not come into force in a particular area.  The Court further observed:­ “11.  The right of the appellant to practice the profession of law guaranteed by Article 19(1)( g )   cannot   be   said   to   have   been violated,   because   in   laying   down   the disqualification   in   Section   16(1)( ix )   of   the Act   the   Legislature   does   not   prevent   him 17 from practising his profession of law but it only lays down that if he wants to stand as a candidate for election he shall not either be employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the municipality or act as a legal practitioner against the municipality. There is no fundamental right in any person to stand   as   a   candidate   for   election   to   the municipality.   The   only   fundamental   right which is guaranteed is that of practising any profession  or   carrying   on   any   occupation, trade or business. There is no violation of the   latter   right   in   prescribing   the disqualification   of   the   type   enacted   in Section 16(1)( ix ) of the Act.” 

3 Sankari Prasad Ghosal and others   was dealing with an issue wherein the appellant was a chartered accountant and a partner of firm of auditors carrying on business under the name and style of a company and the said firm acted as the auditor of certain companies and corporations. The appellant carried   with   it   the   right   to   receive   fees,   remuneration   as Director of the West Bengal Financial Corporation. The Court, analyzing Article 102(l)(a) of the Constitution and concurring with the view of the High Court stated thus:­

18 "… We agree with the High Court that for holding   an   office   of   profit   under   the Government, one need not be in the service of   Government   and   there   need   be   no relationship of master and servant between them.,   The   Constitution   itself   makes   a distinction between 'the holder of an office of   profit   under   the   Government'   and   'the holder   of   a   post   or   service   under   the Government'; see Arts. 309 and 314. …”

the question arose before a Constitution Bench whether the returned candidate was holding an office of profit, for he was the manager of a school run by a committee of management formed under the provisions of Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955. It was contended before the Court that the Government of India had the power of appointment and removal of the members of the committee of management, as also the power to   appoint   the   administrator   in   consultation   with   the committee and, therefore, the returned candidate was under the control and supervision of the Government and hence, he was holding an office of profit under the Government of India. 4  AIR 1958 SC 52 19 The Court repelled the submission by drawing a distinction between the holder of an office of profit under the Government and the holder of an office of profit under some other authority subject to the control of Government. The Court expressed its opinion thus:­ “No   doubt   the   Committee   of   the   Durgah Endowment   is   to   be   appointed   by   the Government   of   India,   but   it   is   a   body corporate with perpetual succession acting within the four corners of the Act. Merely because the Committee or the members of the   Committee   are   removeable   by   the Government of India or the Committee can make bye­laws prescribing the duties and powers   of   its   employees   cannot   in   our opinion   convert   the   servants   of   the Committee   into   holders   of   office   of   profit under   the   Government   of   India.   The appellant   is   neither   appointed   by   the Government of India nor is removable by the Government of India nor is he paid out of the   revenues   of   India.   The   power   of   the Government to appoint a person to an office of profit or to continue him in that office or revoke his appointment at their discretion and   payment   from   out   of   Government revenues   are   important   factors   in determining whether that person is holding an   office   of   profit   under   the   Government though payment from a source other than Government   revenue   is   not   always   a 20 decisive factor. But the appointment of the appellant does not come within this test.”     The   aforesaid   passage   lucidly   states   what   basically constitutes an office of profit. 5 16. In  Mahadeo v. Shantibhai and others , question arose whether a lawyer had incurred disqualification on account of holding   an   office   of   profit   under   the   Government.   The appellant   was   kept   on   the   panel   of   Railway   Pleaders   for conducting suits filed against the Union of India in the courts of Ujjain on the terms and conditions therein mentioned. One of the terms shows that the appellant was ordinarily to be entrusted with cases up to valuation of rupees three thousand only. Another condition was that he would not accept any brief against any Railway in any court.  Clause (13) of the terms of the appointment letter read as follows:­ “You will be expected to watch cases coming up for hearing against this Railway in the various   courts   at   UJB   and   give   timely intimation of the same to this office. If no instructions   regarding   any   particular   case are received by you, you will be expected to appear   in   the   court   and   obtain   an adjournment   to   save   the   ex   parte 5  (1969) 2 SCR 422 21 proceedings   against   this   Railway   in   the court. You will be paid Rs 5 for every such adjournment if you are not entrusted with the conduct of the suit later on.” 17. The Court referred to the observations of House of Lords 6 in   wherein Lord Wright, delivering the Mcmillan v. Guest   opinion, said:­ “The word “office” is of indefinite content. Its various meanings cover four columns of the New English Dictionary, but I take as the most relevant for purposes of this case the following:   “A   position   or   place   to   which certain duties are “attached, especially one of a more or less public character.”    Eventually, the Court expressed the view:­ “If by “office” is meant the right and duty to exercise   an   employment   or   a   position   to which   certain   duties   are   attached   as observed by this Court, it is difficult to see why the engagement of the appellant in this case under the letter of February 6, 1962 would not amount to the appellant’s holding an   office.   By   the   said   letter   he   accepted certain   obligations   and   was   required   to discharge certain duties. He was not free to take   a   brief   against   the   Railway Administration. Whether or not the Railway Administration thought it proper to entrust any particular case or litigation pending in the court to him, it was his duty to watch all cases   coming   up   for   hearing   against   the 6  [1942] AC 561 22 Railway  Administration  and  to give timely intimation of the same to the office of the Chief   Commercial  Superintendent.   Even  if no   instructions   regarding   any   particular case were given to him, he was expected to appear in court and obtain an adjournment. In effect this cast a duty on him to appear in court and obtain an adjournment so as to protect   the   interests   of   the   Railway.   The duty or obligation was a continuing one so long as the railway did not think it proper to remove his name from the panel of Railway lawyers or so long as he did not intimate to the Railway Administration that he desired to   be   free   from   his   obligation   to   render service to the Railway. In the absence of the above  he was  bound  by  the terms  of the engagement   to   watch   the   interests   of   the Railway   Administration,   give   them   timely intimation   of   cases   in   which   they   were involved and on his own initiative apply for an adjournment in proceedings in which the Railway   had   made   no   arrangement   for representation. It is true that he would get a sum of money only if he appeared but the possibility   that   the   Railway   might   not engage him is a matter of no moment. An office   of   profit   really   means   an   office   in respect of which a profit may accrue. It is not necessary that it should be possible to predicate of a holder of an office of profit that he was bound to get a certain amount of profit irrespective of the duties discharged by him.” 23 In the aforesaid judgment, as we notice, the Court laid emphasis   on   the   terms   of   appointment   and   also   on   the concept of accrual of profit. 7 18. In  , Srimati Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana the   issue   that   arose   for   consideration   was   whether   the appellant was holding an office of profit within the meaning of Article   191   of   the   Constitution   or   not.   The   appellant   was appointed to assist the Government Advocate in the absence of any Assistant Counsel. The letter of appointment stipulated that the appellant was appointed as a Special Government Pleader to conduct the particular case on behalf of the State of Rajasthan alongwith Government Advocate.  The Government laid down the fees payable to the appellant.  In the said case, the High Court opined that the appellant held an office of profit. The majority referred to the decision in  Great Western 8 Railway   Company   v.   Beater   and   Mcmillan   case   and referring to  Mahadeo  (supra) opined:­ 7  (1969) 3 SCC 268 8  8 Tax Cases 231,235 24 “29.  That case in no way militates against the view which we have taken in this case. That case is more like the case of a standing Counsel   disqualified   by   the   House   of Commons.   It   is   stated   in   Rogers   (on Elections Vol. II) at p. 10: “However,   in   the     (121 Cambridge   case Journ.   220),   in   1866,   the   return   of   Mr Forsyth was avoided on the ground that he held a new office of profit under the Crown, within   the   24th   section.   In   the   scheme submitted to and approved by Her Majesty in   Council   was   inserted   the   office   of standing   counsel   with   a   certain   yearly payment   (in   the   scheme   called   ‘salary’) affixed to it, which Mr Forsyth received, in addition to the usual fees of counsel. The Committee avoided the return.”    The majority also referred to the decision in  Sakhawant Ali  (supra) which dealt with an instance where the legislature had provided that the paid legal practitioner could not stand in the municipal elections.   Elucidating further, it has been expressed thus:­ “36. In view of the above reasons, we must hold that the appellant was not disqualified for   election   under   Article   191   of   the Constitution.  But assuming  that  she  held an office of profit, this disqualification has been   removed   retrospectively   by   the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly by enacting the impugned Act.” 25

9   was dealing with Jaswant  Chobbildas Rajani and others the election of the President of a Municipal Council under the Maharashtra   Municipalities   Act,   1965.   An   unsuccessful candidate challenged the election of the returned candidate singularly on the ground that the candidate was disqualified under Section 16(1)(g) of the said Municipal Act inasmuch as on the date of nomination he was holding an office of profit under the Government, as he was then, admittedly working as a   panel   doctor   appointed   under   the   Employees’   State Insurance   Scheme   (ESI   Scheme),   a   beneficial   project contemplated by the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. The returned candidate, a doctor, was admittedly on the date of filing of nomination, functioning as such but had resigned before   actual   polling   took   place.   The   Election   Tribunal accepted the stand of the election petitioner and declared the election of the returned candidate void. It further proceeded to hold   that   the   election   petitioner,   being   the   sole   surviving candidate,   was   the   President.   Commenting   on   the   election 9  (1977) 1 SCC 70 26 petition in the backdrop of facts, Krishna Iyer, J., who penned the judgment, wrote:­ “6.  It   is   plain   democratic   sense   that   the electoral  process should ordinarily  receive no judicial jolt except where pollution of purity or contravention   of   legal   mandates   invite   the court’s   jurisdiction   to   review   the   result   and restore   legality,   legitimacy   and   respect   for norms. The frequency of forensic overturning of poll verdicts injects instability into the electoral system,   kindles   hopes   in   worsted   candidates and   induces   post­mortem   discoveries   of “disqualifications” as a desperate gamble in the system of fluctuating litigative fortunes. This is a   caveat   against   overuse   of   the   court   as   an antidote   for   a   poll   defeat.   Of   course, where a clear breach is made out, the guns of law shall go into action, and not retreat from the rule of law.” 20. In the said case, Section 16(1)(g) which provided for office of profit, read thus:­  “16(l)(g):   No   person   shall   be   qualified   to become   a   Councillor   whether   by   election, co­option   or   nomination,   who   is   a subordinate   officer   or   servant   of Government or any local authority or holds an office of profit under Government or any local authority;” It was contended before the Election Tribunal that the elected candidate was not entitled to become a councilor as he 27 held an office of profit under the Government.  To appreciate the concept of office of profit, this Court referred to Section 58 of the ESI Act, 1948, ESI Scheme and opined that the elected candidate although was a private doctor and running a private clinic was also an insurance medical practitioner subject to the   discipline,   directions,   obligations   and   control   of   the relevant   officers   appointed   by   the   State   Government   in implementing   the   medical   benefit   scheme.   His   letter   of appointment read that being a medical practitioner ‘appointed as   such   to   provide   medical   benefit   under   the   Act   and   to perform such other functions as may be assigned to him’.   21.  We may note with profit that in the said case, Krishna Iyer, J. clarified the conflict between     (supra) and Mahadeo   (supra) by stating thus:­ Srimati Kanta Kathuria “41.  …   Judicial   technology   sometimes distinguishes, sometimes demolishes earlier decisions; the art is fine and its use skilful. Both the cases dealt with advocates and we have referred to them in the earlier resume of  precedents.   Even  so,   a  closer   look   will disclose why we follow the larger Bench (as we are bound to, even if there is a plain conflict   between   the   two   cases).   Justice Rowlatt’s   locus classicus   in   Great Western Rly.   Co.   (followed   by   this   Court   in   many 28 cases)   helps   us   steer   clear   of   logomachy about   “office”   especially   since   the   New English   Dictionary   fills   four   columns. Rowlatt,   J.   rivetted   attention   on   a subsisting,   permanent,   substantive position,   which   had   an   existence independent from the person who filled it, which went on and was filled in succession by successive holders’. So, the first step is to   enquire   whether   “a   permanent, substantive   position,   which   had   an existence independent from the person who filled it” can be postulated in the case of an insurance medical practitioner. By contrast, is   the   post   an   ephemeral,   ad   hoc, provisional   incumbency   created,   not independently but as a list or panel elastic and   expiring   or   expanding,   distinguished from   a  thing   that   survives   even   when   no person   had   been   appointed   for   the   time being?   “Thin   partitions   do   their   bounds divide”,   we   agree,   but   the   distinction, though   delicate,   is   real.   An   office   of insurance   medical   practitioner   can   be conjured up if it exists even where no doctor sits in the saddle and has duties attached to it qua office. We cannot equate it with the post of a peon or security gunman who too has duties to perform or a workshop where government vehicles are repaired, or a milk vendor from an approved list who supplies milk   to   government   hospitals.  A   panel   of lawyers for legal aid to the poor or a body of doctors enlisted for emergency service in an epidemic   outbreak   charged   with responsibilities and paid by the Government cannot be a pile of offices of profit. If this   perspective be correct,      Kanta      and    Mahadeo 29 fit into a legal scheme. In the former, an ad hoc   Assistant   Government   Pleader   with duties   and   remuneration   was   held   to   fall outside   “office   of   profit”.   It   was   a   casual engagement,   not   exalted   to   a   permanent   position, occupied      pro tempore      by    A      or        B.  In ,   a   permanent   panel   of   lawyers   Mahadeo   “maintained by the Railway Administration” with   special   duties   of   a   lasting   nature constituted the offices of profit — more like standing counsel. …”  [Emphasis supplied]   We   may   hasten   to   say   that   we   concur   with   the   said harmonization   as   we   find   that   it   is   founded   on   apposite reasoning and also in accord with the precedents holding the view as regards ‘office of profit’.   Be it noted, eventually, the Court ruled that the appellant therein a doctor functioning under the ESI Scheme was not holding an office of profit. 22. In   Ashok Kumar Bhattacharyya v. Ajoy Biswas and 10 others ,  a three­Judge Bench while dealing with the issue whether   the   respondent   No.   1   was   disqualified   for   being elected as a member of the House of People as he held an office of profit under the Government of Tripura within the meaning of Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution, for on the 10  (1985) 1 SCC 151 30 relevant date  he was an Accountant­ in­charge of the Agartala Municipality.  After referring to many an authority, the Court ruled that for determination of the question whether a person holds   an   office   of   profit   under   the   Government,   each   case must be  measured   and  judged  in  the  light  of  the  relevant provisions.  The Court further opined:­ “21. … Local Authority as such or any other authority   does   not   cease   to   become independent entity separate from Government. Whether   in   a   particular   case   it   is   so   or   not must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the relevant provisions. To make in all cases employees of Local Authorities subject to the control of Government, holders of office of profit under the Government would be to obliterate the specific differentiation made under Article 58(2)   of   the   Constitution   and   to   extend disqualification   under   Article   102(1)( a )   to   an extent  not warranted  by the  language  of the article.”    On the basis of the aforesaid, ultimately the three­Judge Bench recorded its finding that the first respondent did not hold an office of profit under the Government of Tripura on the date of filing of the nomination.  31 11 . 23 In   Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay and others , a three­Judge   Bench,   while   dealing   with   the   office   of   profit, opined   that   the   expression   "office   of   profit"   has   not   been defined either in the Constitution or in the Representation of People Act. Anaylsing further, the Court proceeded to state that in common parlance, the expression 'profit' connotes an idea of some pecuniary gain. If there is really some gain, its label ­ 'honorarium' ­ 'remuneration' ­ 'salary' is not material. It is the substance and not the form which matters and even the quantum or amount of "pecuniary gain" is not relevant. What needs to be found out is whether the amount of money receivable   by   the  concerned   person  in  connection   with  the office he holds, gives to him some "pecuniary gain", other than as 'compensation' to defray his out of pocket expenses, which may   have   the   possibility   to   bring   that   person   under   the influence of the executive, which is conferring that benefit on him.  Eventually, the Court held that:­ “The   question  whether   a  person  holds  an office   of   profit,   as   already   noticed,   is required   to   be   interpreted   in   a   realistic 11  (2001) 7 SCC 425 32

  The   aforesaid   passage   emphasizes   on   the   purpose   of disqualification, the approach of the Court while appreciating the expression and to reduce the risk of conflict of interest between the duties and interest. 12 24. In  Jaya Bachchan v. Union of India and others , the issue arose whether the petitioner was holding an office of profit. She was appointed as Chairman of the Uttar Pradesh 12  (2006) 5 SCC 266 33 Film Development Council and was entitled to certain benefits. The  Court analyzing  the  law  enunciated  in   Ravanna  Subanna

where   the   office   carries   with   it   certain   emoluments   or  the order   of   appointment   states   that   the   person   appointed   is entitled  to  certain emoluments, then it  will be an office of profit,   even   if   the   holder   of   the   office   chooses   not   to receive/draw such emoluments. What is relevant is whether pecuniary gain is "receivable" in regard to the office and not whether   pecuniary   gain   is,   in   fact,   received   or   received negligibly. 25. In the case at hand, the first respondent was treated as disqualified on the foundation that he was in service of the Government. In this context, we may usefully refer to the letter of   appointment   issued   by   the   Government   of   Bihar,   Legal (Justice) Department to the District Magistrate, Nalanda. It reads as follows:­ "Letter No.­C/A(S) 40­01/98/3049/B  Government of Bihar Legal (Justice)  Department 34 From Sri Birendra Singh, Joint Secretary to the Government, Bihar To District Magistrate,  Nalanda, Biharsharif th        Patna, Dated 18  August, 2000 Sub.: In relation to appointment of Assistant Government Advocate for the Court at  Nalanda and Hilsa Sir, In reference to your letter No. 6224 dated 20.7.99   on   above   mentioned   subject   and law   Department   Letter   No.   2413   dated 6.7.2000 as per direction I have to inform that the State Government has been kind to appoint Sri Janakdhari Prasad, Advocate on the post of Assistant Government Advocate in   the   panel   of   Assistant   Government Advocates   constituted   for   the   Court   at Nalanda and Hilsa. After this appointment the total number of Assistant   Government   Advocates   in   the Court   of   Nalanda   would   be   19   (Nineteen) and   the   total   number   of   Assistant Government Advocates in the Court of Hilsa would be 4 (four). Faithfully yours,                                                  Sd/­ Joint Secretary to the Govt., Bihar" 35 Analyzing the letter, the Election Commission has held that the elected candidate was holding a post under the State Government and, therefore, he was disqualified under sub­ section (l)(c) of Section 139 of the Act.   26. On a careful scrutiny of the communication, it is quite vivid that the respondent No. l was appointed to the post of Assistant   Government   Advocate   in   the   panel   of   Assistant Government Advocates constituted for the courts at Nalanda and Hilsa. There is no mention of any fixed remuneration.   27. In the obtaining factual score, would it be appropriate to accept   the   submission   of   the   appellants   that   the   elected candidate was in the service of the government. The legislature has, in exercise of its legislative power and wisdom, not used the words “office of profit”. Therefore, whether such a letter of appointment can be construed to determine if the person is holding an office of profit is not necessary to be addressed although we have referred to certain authorities to appreciate the context and its fundamental purpose. In the instant case, the election pertains to a Panchayat Samiti which basically 36 relates to the concept at the grass root level. The legislature, as it seems to us, has not thought of office of profit because had it thought so it would have provided in that manner.   In Sakhawant   Ali   (supra),   the   legislature   had   provided   a disqualification   keeping   in   view   the   conflict   of   interest.   The absence of such a provision possibly is to include persons from different fields as long as they are not in service under the government or a service in an institution receiving aids from the Central or State Government or any local authority. The legislature, as the postulate stands today, has confined to categories of service mentioned hereinbefore. It depends on the legislative   wisdom.   It   further   needs   to   be   stated   that   the nature of disqualification has to be strictly construed keeping in mind that right to contest an election is not a fundamental right but the said right may be curtailed under valid statutory provision.   28. The aforesaid being the position, we may presently focus

37 13 v. Kanak Chandra Dutta  , Bachawat, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, held that a person holding a post under a State is a person serving or employed under the State. There is a relationship of master and servant between the State and a person   holding   a   post   under   it.   The   existence   of   this   relationship   is   indicated   by   the State's   right   to   select   and appoint   the   holder   of   the   post,   its   right   to   suspend   and dismiss him, its right to control the manner and method of his doing   the   work   and   the   payment   by   it   of   his   wages   or remuneration .   A relationship of master and servant may be established by the presence of all or some of these indicia, in conjunction with other circumstances and it is a question of fact in each case whether there is such a relation between the State and the alleged holder of a post. 29. In this regard, reference to another Constitution Bench

apposite. In the said case, it has been opined that the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than a 13  AIR 1967 SC 884 14  AIR 1967 SC 1889 38 contract. The hall­mark of status is the attachment to legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement by the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. As   is   evincible,   emphasis   was   given   on   the   status   in contradistinction to contractual service. 30. Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   Commission,   has placed heavy reliance on   Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and 15 others   v.  State of U.P. and others .  In the said case, the Government of the State of U.P. had terminated by a general order   the   appointments   of   all   Government   Counsel   (Civil, Criminal, Revenue) in all the districts of the State of U.P. The High Court had upheld the circular by which the order was passed. In appeal, by special leave, the Court dealt with two contentions,   namely,   the   nature   of   appointments   and   the minimum basis of status attached to those appointments. For 15  (1991) 1 SCC 212 39 the   purpose   of   examination   whether   the   ground   of arbitrariness was available to vitiate the circular, the Court referred to the Legal Remembrancer's Manual and especially paragraphs 7.06 to 7.09 which deals with appointment and renewal   of   local   practitioners   finally   selected   by   the government.  The said paragraph deals with the term, tenure, bar on political activity,  renewal of term and character roll. 31. Relying on the same and other aspects, the Court held:­ "The  above  provisions  in  the  L.R.  Manual clearly show that the Government Counsel in the districts are treated as Law Officers of the State who are holders of an 'office' or ‘ post'. The aforesaid provisions in Chapter VII relating to appointment and conditions of   engagement   of   District   Government Counsel show that the appointments are to be made and ordinarily renewed on objective assessment   of   suitability   of   the   person based on the opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge; and character roll is maintained   for   keeping   a   record   of   the suitability   of   the   appointee   to   enable   an objective assessment for the purpose of his continuance as a Law Officer in the district. There are provisions to bar private practice and   participation   in   political   activity   by D.G.Cs. Apart from clause 3 of para 7.06 to which we  shall  advert  a  little  later,  these provisions   clearly   indicate   that   the 40 appointment   and   engagement   of   District Government   Counsel   is   not   the   same   as that by a private litigant of his counsel and there is obviously an element of continuity of the appointment unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable either by his own work, conduct or age or in comparison to any more suitable candidate available at the place   of   appointment.   Suitability   of   the appointee being the prime criterion for any such   appointment,   it   is   obvious   that appointment   of   the   best   amongst   those available, is the object sought to be achieved by these provisions, which, even otherwise, should be the paramount consideration in discharge   of   this   governmental   function aimed at promoting public interest. All Govt. Counsel are paid remuneration out of the public exchequer and there is a clear public element attaching to the 'office' or 'post'." After   so   stating,   the   Court   referred   to   Sections   24 and   321   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   and   further

17 and   came   to   hold   that   the   office   of   the   Public others   Prosecutor is a public one and the primacy given to the Public Prosecutor under the scheme of Code has a social purpose. 16  (1979) 4 SCC 701 17  (1988) 3 SCC 144 41 32. In this regard, we may reproduce a passage from the said authority which is as follows:­

opined:­

42

by the concept of public element attached to the office or post of Government Pleader.  It has not expressed the opinion that they are under the Government service. Be that as it may, as has been held by the learned Single Judge and rightly so, there is no master­servant relationship and the respondent was   not   amenable   to   any   disciplinary   proceeding.   He   has correctly expressed the view that the conduct of the advocate is subject to the discipline of the  Bar Council.  As we notice, there is nothing on record to show that he was getting any remuneration. Even if some remuneration is attached to the 43 office, he cannot be treated to be under the service of the State Government.  The aspects which are essential for establishing a relationship of master and servant are absent. Therefore, the returned   candidate   could   not   have   been   treated   to   be   in service under the State Government.

substance   in   the   appeal   and   the   same   is,   accordingly, dismissed.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ……………………………CJI. (Dipak Misra) ……………………………...J. (A.M. Khanwilkar) ……………………………...J. New Delhi;  (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud) 03 July, 2018