Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 582
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1834 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11042 of 2022)
PUNIT BERIWALA .…. APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS. ..…RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
MANMOHAN, J
1. The present appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated
th
17 October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge, Delhi High Court in
Crl. M.C. 4189/2022 (“impugned judgment”), whereby the petition under
Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (“Cr.P.C.”) filed by the
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein, was allowed and the First Information
Report (“FIR”) No. 94/2022 registered at Police Station Economic
Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi (“subject FIR” or “FIR”) for
offences punishable under Section 467/468/471/420/120B of the Indian
Penal Code (“IPC”), was quashed against Vikramjit Singh and Maheep
Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3).
2. The issue which arises for consideration in the present appeal is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2025.04.29
15:19:28 IST
Reason:
whether the learned Single Judge, Delhi High Court, was justified in
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 1 of 26
quashing the subject FIR against Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) and whether a cognizable offence against them
is prima facie made out from a reading of the subject complaint?
3. The relevant facts of the present case are as under:
3.1. It is the case of the Appellant that a Receipt-cum-
th
Agreement to Sell dated 12 April, 2004 (“Agreement to Sell”)
was executed by Bhai Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No. 2) and Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3)
(collectively referred to as “accused persons”) in favour of the
Appellant for sale of the property i.e. 28-A, Prithvi Raj Road,
New Delhi admeasuring 3727 sq. yds. (“property” or “subject
property”) for a total sale consideration of Rs. 28,00,00,000/-
(Rupees Twenty-Eight Crores). The accused persons, in the
th
Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004,
represented that Bhai Manjit Singh was Karta of Bhai Manjit
Singh HUF. It was further represented by Bhai Manjit Singh that
the property would be free from all encumbrances and that he
would get the subject property converted to freehold before the
transfer of the property in favour of the Appellant. The Receipt-
th
cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004 is reproduced
hereinunder:
“Receipt
Received a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty One Lacs Only) as
earnest money from Mr. Punit Beriwala, S/o Shri S.S. Beriwala, r/o
15/10 Sarvapriya Vihar, New Delhi, against the sale of property
No.28-A Prithiviraj Road, New Delhi, admeasuring 3727 sq. yards.
The total sale consideration agreed upon is Rs.28 Crores (Rupees
Twenty Eight Crores only). Further a sum of Rupees Thirty lakhs to
be made by Thursday.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 2 of 26
The sale is subject to the said property being free from all kinds’
charges, lien, encumbrances, prior sales, mortgages, litigation,
claims, etc. The seller has agreed to get the said property freehold
from the concerned authorities at his own expense before the transfer
of the said property in favor of the PURCHASER i.e. Shri Punit
Beriwala or his nominees.
-SD-
SELLER
Dated: 12.04.2004 Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
Through karta Bhai Manjit Singh S/o
r/o 2 south End Lane, New Delhi
WITNESS
1. -SD-
Maheep Singh
2 South End Lane, New Delhi
2. SD/-
Vikramjit Singh
2 South End Lane, New Delhi”
th rd
3.2. As per the complaint, from 12 April 2004 to 03 January
2005, the Appellant paid a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees
One Crore Sixty-Four Lacs Fifty Thousand) to Bhai Manjit
Singh, which was acknowledged by various receipts, some of
which were signed by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) as witnesses. In pursuance of the
Agreement to Sell, part physical possession of the servant
quarter of the property was handed over to the Appellant vide
nd
letter of possession dated 22 April 2004. It is the Appellant’s
case that the possession was mere paper possession, and he was
not put in actual physical possession of any part of the property.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 3 of 26
th
3.3. On 24 June 2016, one Ashok Gupta lodged an FIR No.
105/2016 against the accused persons alleging therein that an
th
Agreement to Sell dated 29 December 2010 for the subject
property had been executed in his favour and that he was also
put in possession of the servant quarter of the subject property.
The said FIR was subsequently quashed by the Delhi High
th
Court vide its Order dated 13 December 2019 in W.P. (Crl.)
465/2019 in view of the settlement between the parties.
3.4. Upon the alleged failure of the accused person to provide
documents for clear title of the property, the Appellant
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published a notice dated 18 July 2020 in the Hindustan Times
declaring to the public at large that an Agreement to Sell for the
subject property had been executed between the Appellant and
the accused persons.
3.5. In response to the said public notice, Punjab and Sind
Bank, Rajendra Place, New Delhi issued an objection letter
th
dated 20 July 2020 stating therein that the subject property had
th
been mortgaged on 15 January 1996 by Bhai Manjit Singh for
securing the loan granted to Montari Industries Limited.
3.6. Thereafter, SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI
nd
Equipment Finance Limited issued letters dated 22 July 2020
stating that the subject property had been mortgaged with them
as well.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 4 of 26
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3.7. Bhai Manjit Singh HUF issued a letter dated 23 July 2020
th
in response to the public notice dated 18 July 2020, denying
the existence of any Agreement to Sell for the subject property,
th
followed by a public notice dated 13 August 2020 in Hindustan
th
Times refuting the contents of the Appellant’s notice dated 18
July 2020.
nd
3.8. Surprisingly, on 22 September 2020, a reply was issued
by Bhai Manjit Singh HUF stating that Bhai Manjit Singh had
returned the amount paid by the Appellant.
3.9. The aforementioned events led to filing of a suit for
specific performance by the Appellant before the Delhi High
Court being CS(OS) No. 598 of 2021 (“civil suit”). On the first
st
date of hearing on 21 November 2021, the civil suit was
th
adjourned to 8 December 2021 directing the Appellant to file
th
requisite court fees. On 8 December 2021, counsel for the
accused persons informed the Court that the subject property
had been sold by Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. The Appellant
nd
thereafter obtained a copy of the sale deed dated 2 December
2021, which revealed that the subject property had been sold by
Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to a company, J.K. Paper Limited.
nd
3.10. In the sale deed dated 2 December 2021, it was stated
that Bhai Manjit Singh resigned as Karta of the Bhai Manjit
Singh HUF and transferred all rights, claim, title and
entitlements in favour of the remaining members of the HUF
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 5 of 26
and Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was recognized as
th
Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF from 10 March 2000. It was
further stated that an equitable mortgage was created in favour
of SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI Equipment
Finance Limited against the credit facility for an amount of
Rs.87,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eighty-Seven Crore) availed by
ADIZAA Investment Private Limited, in which Vikramjit Singh
and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were Directors.
th
3.11. The Appellant thereafter filed a complaint dated 12
January 2022 against the accused persons before the Economic
Offences Wing, which led to registration of the subject FIR on
th
16 June 2022.
3.12. In the meanwhile, the application under Order VII Rule 11
filed by the accused persons was dismissed by a learned Single
th
Judge of the Delhi High Court vide Order dated 7 February
th
2022. The said Order dated 7 February 2022 was challenged
by the accused persons in FAO (OS) 20/2022, wherein the civil
suit filed by the Appellant was stayed by the Division Bench of
th
the Delhi High Court vide its Order dated 29 March 2022.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
4. Ms. Mukta Gupta, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, stated
that the learned Single Judge while allowing the quashing petition had
erroneously laid great emphasis on the delay in registration of the FIR and
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 6 of 26
the fact that the FIR was registered after the civil suit had been stayed by
the Division Bench.
5. She contended that there was no delay in lodging the FIR. She stated
that from 2004 to 2020, the accused persons kept representing that they
were getting the subject property converted from leasehold to freehold,
even though the property had already been converted to freehold. She stated
that the accused persons denied the existence of the Agreement to Sell for
rd
the very first time through their letter dated 23 July 2020.
6. She stated that the Appellant became aware of further sale of property
th
on 8 December 2021 and thereafter obtained a copy of the sale deed dated
nd th
2 December 2021 in favour of J. K. Paper Limited, on 28 December
2021. She, therefore, stated that the dishonest intention of the accused
persons was revealed for the very first time upon the discovery of sale deed
and the mortgages mentioned therein, which were both prior and
subsequent to the Agreement to Sell in favour of the Appellant.
th
7. She pointed out that the FIR finally came to be registered on 16 June
2022; however, the Appellant had filed the complaint before the Economic
th
Offences Wing without any delay on 12 January 2022. She submitted that
the period of limitation in terms of Section 469 of the Cr.P.C. commences
from the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of the
person aggrieved. She, therefore, stated that in the present case, the period
th
of limitation commenced on 28 December 2021 and the complaint was
th
filed within fifteen days on 12 January 2022.
8. Even otherwise, she submitted that in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C.,
there is no limitation period prescribed for offences which are punishable
with imprisonment of more than 3 (three) years. She pointed out that the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 7 of 26
offences alleged in the present case are punishable with imprisonment of
more than 3 (three) years; thus, there is no period of limitation in lodging
the FIR.
9. She also submitted that delay in registration of the FIR cannot be the
basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. She emphasized that the
consequences for any alleged delay in registration of the FIR ought to be
adjudicated after appreciation of evidence and entire material on record.
10. She stated that at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-
th
Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004, accused persons represented that
Bhai Manjit Singh is the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. She pointed out
that the said Agreement to Sell-cum-Receipt was executed by Bhai Manjit
Singh in his capacity as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF and was
witnessed by Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) and Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No. 2) even though Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was
the Karta at the relevant time, which was revealed to the Appellant through
nd
sale deed dated 2 December 2021 in favour of JK Paper Limited, which
stated that Respondent No. 2 herein became Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh
th
HUF on 10 March, 2000.
11. She stated that the fact that the property was already mortgaged with
th
Punjab and Sind Bank on 15 January 1996, was revealed for the very first
th
time through the letter dated 20 July 2020 issued by Punjab and Sind Bank
th
in response to the Appellant’s public notice dated 18 July 2020 published
in the Hindustan Times.
12. She stated that the misrepresentation, deception and dishonesty to
induce the Appellant commenced from the date on which the receipt-cum-
th
Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004 was executed and therefore, the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 8 of 26
element of deception had existed from the very inception of the transaction.
She stated that the accused persons deceived the Appellant into parting with
a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees One Crore Sixty-Four Lacs Fifty
th rd
Thousand) between 12 April 2004 and 3 January 2005, which had been
acknowledged by receipts, wherein Bhai Manjit Singh had signed as Karta
and Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) had
signed as witnesses despite fully knowing that Bhai Manjit Singh was not
the Karta of the HUF.
13. She stated that the deception continued even after the execution of
th
the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004 as Bhai Manjit
Singh, Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh had executed another Agreement
th
to Sell dated 29 December 2010 in favour of one Ashok Gupta, who was
also allegedly put in part possession of the servant quarter of the subject
property. She emphasised that identical modus operandi had been adopted
by the accused persons with Ashok Gupta as well.
14. She stated that subsequent thereto, the property was once again
mortgaged with possession to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and an
equitable mortgage had been created in favour of SREI Equipment Finance
th
Limited on 7 January 2019. She stated that the said mortgage was cleared
nd
on the same day as the sale deed dated 2 December 2021 was executed in
favour of J.K. Paper Limited.
nd
15. She emphasized that the Sale Deed dated 2 December 2021
categorically states that the property is free from all encumbrances, third-
party claims, disputes, litigation even though the Appellant’s suit for
specific performance was pending before the learned Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court. She highlighted that the sale deed had been executed
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 9 of 26
during the pendency of the suit for specific performance filed by the
Appellant.
16. She stated that the accused persons acting in collusion had created
various chains of documents in favour of various persons. She pointed out
that the Agreements in favour of the Appellant and Ashok Gupta had been
executed by Bhai Manjit Singh, acting as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF,
nd
whereas the sale deed dated 2 December 2021 in favour of J.K. Paper
Limited had been executed by Vikramjit Singh acting as Karta of Bhai
Manjit Singh HUF. She further pointed out that all accused persons are
parties to the documents created in favour of various persons, thereby
showing a well-planned conspiracy to cheat, misrepresent and deceive.
rd
17. She highlighted that on 23 July 2020 Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
denied the existence of any Agreement to Sell. However subsequently, on
nd
22 September 2020, Bhai Manjit Singh stated that the advance
consideration had been returned to the Appellant and that except Bhai
Manjit Singh, no other person from the HUF had met the Appellant. She
th
pointed out that subsequently vide notice dated 09 October 2020, the
Appellant sought copies of receipts showing the alleged repayment;
however, till date no such receipts have been provided to the Appellant. She
nd
stated that on 22 August 2022, an FIR was registered by Bhai Manjit
Singh against the Appellant, alleging for the first time that the receipts of
payment in favour of the Appellant were forged and fabricated. She
emphasized that such contradictory stands of all three accused persons are
required to be investigated by the police authorities.
18. She stated that the Appellant was never handed over possession of
any part of the subject property. According to her, the letter of possession
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 10 of 26
nd
dated 22 April 2004 was only intended to give paper possession to the
Appellant and not the actual physical possession.
19. She contended that institution of civil proceedings cannot act as a bar
to the investigation of cognizable offences. She submitted that it is settled
law that civil and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
20. She pointed out that the present case involves two cross-FIRs. On the
th
one hand is the subject FIR dated 16 June 2022 registered by the Appellant
against the accused persons, which has been quashed qua the Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 vide the impugned judgment. Whereas the other FIR dated
nd
22 August 2022 registered by Bhai Manjit Singh against the Appellant
with respect to the same transaction is still subsisting even though the
subject FIR was registered prior to the FIR against the Appellant. According
to her, cross-FIRs are required to be investigated and tried together, and
investigation ought not to be stifled at a nascent stage.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2
21. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No. 2), stated that the subject FIR had been rightly quashed
by the learned Single Judge. He stated that there is not a single
representation or correspondence on record which shows that the Appellant
from 2004 to 2020 had taken any steps for purchase of the property. He
stated that it was unbelievable that the sale of a prime and valuable property
was done by way of an oral Agreement to Sell. He further stated that no
reasonable person would wait for a period of more than 16 (sixteen) years
to affect the sale of property in his favour. He stated that no complaint or
FIR should ‘ be entertained at this distance of time ’.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 11 of 26
th
22. He pointed out that it is only the first alleged receipt dated 12 April
2004 which bears the signature of Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) as witnesses. He stated that the only allegation
against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is that they had signed the alleged
Agreement to Sell as witnesses and that they were aware that Bhai Manjit
Singh was not Karta of the HUF. According to him, mere signatures of
Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) on a receipt
as witnesses is not sufficient to initiate criminal proceedings against them
and the same does not constitute any of the offences alleged in the FIR.
23. He emphasized that the criminal proceedings against Bhai Manjeet
Singh, who is the alleged executor of the Agreement to Sell, are continuing
till date and the FIR has been quashed only qua Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3). He stated that in addition to the
FIR against Bhai Manjeet Singh, the suit for specific performance of the
alleged Agreement to Sell is also pending before the Delhi High Court and
the Appellant can seek appropriate relief qua the subject property in the said
civil suit.
24. He submitted that an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating
is that the intention to deceive must exist at the very inception. He stated
that as part physical possession was handed over to the Appellant, there was
no intention of deceiving the Appellant from the inception. He pointed out
nd
that even alleged possession letter dated 22 April 2004 is signed only by
Bhai Manjit Singh, ruling out any involvement of Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3).
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 12 of 26
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 3
25. Learned senior counsel for Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) stated
that Maheep Singh is a 73-year-old lady, who had signed on only two of the
alleged receipts of payments made by the Appellant. He pointed out that
Maheep Singh was not the Karta of the HUF at any point of time. He
therefore stated that Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) cannot be treated at
par with either Bhai Manjit Singh or Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2).
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1/STATE OF NCT
OF DELHI
26. Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned ASG appearing for the State
(Respondent No. 1), stated that the FIR had been quashed at the nascent
stage of investigation. She stated that Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) had refused to furnish their specimen signatures
and refused to comply with Section 91 Cr.P.C. notices issued by the Police.
REASONING
SIMILAR RECEIPTS TREATED AS CONTRACT/AGREEMENT TO SELL
27. The common foundation underlying the submissions of learned
senior counsel for Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2
and 3) and the impugned order that the Agreement to Sell in question is not
a written but an oral Agreement, is contrary to facts and untenable in law.
The Delhi High Court, whose judgments shall bind the parties including the
police/investigating agency, has repeatedly treated receipts, like the receipt
th
dated 12 April 2004, as a Contract/Agreement to Sell whose specific
performance can be sought. In M/s. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Sh. Vinod Kumar Alag, ILR (1991) I Delhi 303 , Justice Arun Kumar, a
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 13 of 26
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court (as his Lordship then was)
has held, “Mere heading or title of a document cannot deprive the document
of its real nature. Law is well settled in such matters that it is the substance
which has to be seen and not the form the document though titled as a
‘receipt’ contains all the essential ingredients of a ‘contract’ and therefore,
this is a contract and the plaintiff can seek specific performance thereof.”
MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS A
BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES
28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground
for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute.
This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a
remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the
Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of
criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the
court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed
during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the
complaint did not warrant a further investigation and if necessary, a trial.
[See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.)
(2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP (2012) 3 SCC 132 and
Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal (1999) 8 SCC 686 ]
WHILE QUASHING, MUST BELIEVE ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT
29. It is settled law that power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be
exercised sparingly with circumspection and while exercising this power,
the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be
true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that save in exceptional cases
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 14 of 26
where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be
used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.
30. In Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC
401 , this Court has held as under:-
“33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our
final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High
Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of
investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during
the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in
what circumstances and whether the High Court would be
justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no
coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the
final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while
dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the
criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers
under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
33.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable
offence.
33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the
Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest of rare
cases” (not to be confused with the formation in the context of
death penalty).
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 15 of 26
33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint.
33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage.
33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
rather than an ordinary rule.
33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not
to tread over the other sphere.
33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial
process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences.
33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according
to its whims or caprice.
33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence
reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in
progress, the court should not go into the merits of the
allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not
deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process
of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that
there is no substance in the application made by the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 16 of 26
complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate
report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be
considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the
known procedure.
33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be more
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
court.
33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,
regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid
down by this Court in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the
jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under
Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations
in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not.
The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not
the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and
the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to
investigate the allegations in the FIR.
33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or
the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High
Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in
exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of
stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing
petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim
order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or
mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress
and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not
before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself
from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive
steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to
apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 17 of 26
competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not
justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive
steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is
completed and/or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under
Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing
petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the
opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim
stay of further investigation, after considering the broad
parameters while exercising the powers under Section
482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief
reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is
required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application
of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what
was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim
order.
33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court
of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid
parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by
“no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive
steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad
which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”
AS PER THE COMPLAINT/FIR, RIGHT FROM THE INCEPTION,
THERE WAS MISREPRESENTATION BY VIKRAMJIT SINGH AND
MAHEEP SINGH
31. This Court is of the view that the conclusion of the learned Single
Judge that the complaint / FIR on its face did not disclose offences under
Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120-B IPC against Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3), is factually incorrect. If the
averments in the complaint are to be believed, which is the norm that is to
be followed at this stage, then the subject FIR/complaint reveals
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 18 of 26
commission of cognizable offences by (son and mother) Vikramjit Singh
and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) also as they despite being
aware that Bhai Manjit Singh (father of Vikramjit Singh and husband of
Maheep Singh) had no authority to enter into an Agreement to Sell on
behalf of the HUF (as he was not the Karta of HUF on the said date),
allowed Bhai Manjit Singh to misrepresent with dishonest and fraudulent
intent that he was the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. This
misrepresentation assumes serious connotation as at the relevant time i.e.
th
12 April 2004, the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to the knowledge of
Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (witnesses to the receipt) was none
other than Vikramjit Singh. It was due to this
deception/misrepresentation/fraud that the Appellant parted with a sum of
Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees One Crore Sixty-Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand
th rd
Only) from 12 April 2004 to 03 January 2005 – some receipts of which
were also witnessed by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
Nos.2 and 3). Consequently, as per the allegation in the complaint/FIR,
right from the inception of the transaction between the parties, the
Appellant was misrepresented, defrauded, deceived with dishonest and
fraudulent intent by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2
and 3). Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that all accused persons
acted in conspiracy to deceive and cheat the Appellant with no intention of
selling the subject property to the Appellant.
MISREPRESENTATION BY ALL THREE ACCUSED IS THE OFFENCE
COMPLAINED OF
32. This Court is of the view that the learned Single Judge misdirected
himself by concluding that the only allegation against Vikramjit Singh and
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 19 of 26
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) is that they were witnesses to the
th
Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004, whereas, the
gravamen of the allegation was that Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were equally guilty of misrepresentation as,
despite their knowledge to the contrary (as they were all closely related as
well as members of the said HUF and Vikramjit Singh was actual Karta ),
they allowed Bhai Manjit Singh who was not competent to execute the
Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell on behalf of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to
represent himself as the Karta and execute the same. Consequently, the
underlying act of misrepresentation by Bhai Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh
and Maheep Singh (all three) is the offence by which the Appellant is
aggrieved, and not the mere act of signing the receipt as witnesses.
However, the learned Single Judge has neither dealt with nor examined the
said aspect in the impugned judgment.
DEFENCE OF PART POSSESSION INSPIRES NO CONFIDENCE
33. The learned Single Judge has also held that the intention to cheat was
not present since inception because as per the FIR, part possession of
servant quarter of the property was handed over to the Appellant. However,
what the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate is that the Appellant
had categorically alleged that the possession of the property is still with the
accused persons, thereby rendering a mere paper possession. Further, the
factum that the said possession was not treated seriously even by Vikramjit
Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) is apparent from the
fact that when a similar Agreement to Sell was subsequently executed with
Mr. Ashok Gupta, similar possession of the servant quarter was handed over
to him also. Moreover, the fact that a Sale Deed was ultimately executed
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 20 of 26
in favour of J.K. Paper Limited without reference to any such possession
being handed over to Appellant shows that even the accused treated the said
possession as a mere paper possession and a formality.
34. The learned Single Judge further failed to notice that admittedly
Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) continued to
deal with the property after executing the Receipt-cum- Agreement to Sell
by executing a registered mortgage, Agreement to Sell and Sale Deed. It is
pertinent to mention that the mortgage with possession with SREI
Infrastructure Finance Limited and an equitable mortgage in favour of SREI
Equipment Finance Limited was created for availing credit facility by
ADIZAA Investment Private Limited, wherein Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were Directors. This Court is of
the view that if the Appellant had indeed parted with part possession of the
property to the Appellant, then a registered mortgage with possession could
not have been created in favour of SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited or
an Agreement to Sell with Mr. Ashok Gupta or Sale Deed with J.K. Paper
Limited.
35. Admittedly, the property was sold to J.K. Paper Limited vide sale
nd
deed 2 December 2021, which was executed by Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No.2) as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. The fact that the
said sale deed had been executed after the Appellant filed the suit for
th
specific performance of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April
2004 lends credence to the allegations made by the Appellant that the
accused persons by misrepresentation and deception had entered into
multiple transactions with respect to the subject property.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 21 of 26
DELAY CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR QUASHING THE PRESENT FIR
36. Further, accepting the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in
the impugned order that ‘there had been a delay in registration of the FIR
and because of such delay, the allegations made by the Appellant are
unbelievable’ and the submissions of learned senior counsel for Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 that no complaint/FIR should be entertained ‘ at this distance
of time ’, would mean in effect in accepting the argument that delay is a
sufficient ground for quashing of the present FIR/complaint.
37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences
punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis
of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance
only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether
the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only
after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda
Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “ The mere delay on the part of the third
respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a
ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to
warrant any reference to precedents…..”
38. Further, as per the allegations in the complaint/FIR during 2004-2020
the accused persons kept representing that they were in the process of
getting the property unencumbered and converted to freehold. Upon the
failure of the accused persons to show documents for clear title of the
property, the Appellant had initially instituted a suit for specific
performance, and it was only during the suit proceedings that it came to
light that after the Agreement to Sell with the Appellant, the property was
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 22 of 26
subsequently mortgaged to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI
Equipment Finance Limited and the same was subsequently sold to J.K.
nd
Paper Limited vide sale deed dated 02 December 2021. The fact that
Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was the Karta of the Bhai Manjit Singh
HUF at the relevant time was also allegedly revealed for the very first time
nd
through the aforesaid sale deed dated 02 December 2021, certified copy
th
of which was obtained by the Appellant on 28 December 2021.
Consequently, the fact of misrepresentation and deception at the inception,
that is, at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated
th
12 April 2004, came to the knowledge of the Appellant (according to the
th
complaint) only on 28 December 2021.
39. The Appellant had, admittedly, filed the complaint before the
th
Economic Offences Wing on 12 January 2022. Section 469 Cr.P.C.
provides that the period of limitation commences from the date on which
the offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved. In the present
case, as noted above, the Appellant became aware of the offence only on
th
28 December 2021. Consequently, prima facie there is no delay in filing
the criminal proceedings.
40. Even otherwise, as the learned senior counsel for the Appellant has
rightly pointed out, in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C., there is no period of
limitation for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of more
than three years.
COMPLAINT WAS FILED MUCH BEFORE THE SUIT WAS STAYED
41. The learned Single Judge has also clearly erred in concluding that the
FIR was lodged after only after the civil suit filed by the Appellant had been
stayed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. However, the record
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 23 of 26
reveals that the application under Order VII Rule 11 filed by the accused
persons was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court
th th
on 7 February 2022. The said Order dated 7 February 2022 was
challenged by the accused persons, wherein the civil suit filed by the
Appellant was stayed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on
th
29 March 2022. The complaint against the accused persons was filed by
th
the Appellant on 12 January 2022 i.e. much before the civil suit was
stayed.
CROSS FIRs ARE REQUIRED TO BE HOLISTICALLY INVESTIGATED
42. The accused persons have taken various inherently contradictory
rd
stands with respect to the transaction with the Appellant. On 23 July 2020
Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF denied the existence of any
nd
Agreement to Sell. On 22 September 2022, Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai
Manjit Singh HUF stated that the advance consideration had been returned
to the Appellant and that except Bhai Manjit Singh, no other person from
the HUF had met the Appellant. Finally, after the registration of the subject
th
FIR dated 16 June 2022, Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
nd
registered an FIR dated 22 August 2022, alleging that the receipts of
payment in favour of the Appellant and relied upon by him in his civil suit
th
as well as the FIR dated 16 June 2022, were forged and fabricated.
43. Keeping in view the contradictory defences of the accused as well as
the registration and pendency of the cross FIRs, this Court is of the view
that the learned Single Judge should not have limited the scope of
investigation.
44. In the context of cross cases, this Court in Nathi Lal v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (1990) SCC (Cri) 638 has held as under:-
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 24 of 26
“2. We think that the fair procedure to adopt in a matter like the
present where there are cross cases, is to direct that the same
learned Judge must try both the cross cases one after the other.
After the recording of evidence in one case is completed, he must
hear the arguments but he must reserve the judgment.
Thereafter he must proceed to hear the cross case and after
recording all the evidence he must hear the arguments but
reserve the judgment in that case. The same learned Judge must
thereafter dispose of the matters by two separate judgments. In
deciding each of the cases, he can rely only on the evidence
recorded in that particular case. The evidence recorded in the
cross case cannot be looked into. Nor can the judge be
influenced by whatever is argued in the cross case. Each case
must be decided on the basis of the evidence which has been
placed on record in that particular case without being
influenced in any manner by the evidence or arguments urged
in the cross case. But both the judgments must be pronounced
by the same learned Judge one after the other.”
45. Even though the above decision was rendered in respect of trial of
cross cases, this Court is of the opinion that in cases involving cross-FIRs,
it would be prudent and fair if the investigation was carried out in a
comprehensive manner. After all, the object of the investigation is the
discovery of truth. In the present case, in view of cross-FIRs, the
investigating authority will conclude that either the receipts in favour of the
Appellant are forged and fabricated or that the receipts are genuine. The
complicity of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein can only be ascertained once
the investigation is permitted to reach its logical conclusion.
CONCLUSION
46. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings, the impugned judgment and
th
order dated 17 October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in Crl.
M.C. 4189/2022 is set aside and FIR No.94/2022 registered at Police
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 25 of 26
Station Economic Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi for offences
punishable under Section 467/468/471/420/120B IPC against Vikramjit
Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) is revived.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is disposed of.
47. It is clarified that the aforesaid findings have been given in the
context of quashing of the complaint/FIR and shall not bind the Courts
below while deciding the matter.
...…...……………….J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
……………….J.
[MANMOHAN ]
New Delhi;
April 29, 2025
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 26 of 26
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1834 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11042 of 2022)
PUNIT BERIWALA .…. APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS. ..…RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
MANMOHAN, J
1. The present appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated
th
17 October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge, Delhi High Court in
Crl. M.C. 4189/2022 (“impugned judgment”), whereby the petition under
Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (“Cr.P.C.”) filed by the
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein, was allowed and the First Information
Report (“FIR”) No. 94/2022 registered at Police Station Economic
Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi (“subject FIR” or “FIR”) for
offences punishable under Section 467/468/471/420/120B of the Indian
Penal Code (“IPC”), was quashed against Vikramjit Singh and Maheep
Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3).
2. The issue which arises for consideration in the present appeal is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2025.04.29
15:19:28 IST
Reason:
whether the learned Single Judge, Delhi High Court, was justified in
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 1 of 26
quashing the subject FIR against Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) and whether a cognizable offence against them
is prima facie made out from a reading of the subject complaint?
3. The relevant facts of the present case are as under:
3.1. It is the case of the Appellant that a Receipt-cum-
th
Agreement to Sell dated 12 April, 2004 (“Agreement to Sell”)
was executed by Bhai Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No. 2) and Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3)
(collectively referred to as “accused persons”) in favour of the
Appellant for sale of the property i.e. 28-A, Prithvi Raj Road,
New Delhi admeasuring 3727 sq. yds. (“property” or “subject
property”) for a total sale consideration of Rs. 28,00,00,000/-
(Rupees Twenty-Eight Crores). The accused persons, in the
th
Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004,
represented that Bhai Manjit Singh was Karta of Bhai Manjit
Singh HUF. It was further represented by Bhai Manjit Singh that
the property would be free from all encumbrances and that he
would get the subject property converted to freehold before the
transfer of the property in favour of the Appellant. The Receipt-
th
cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004 is reproduced
hereinunder:
“Receipt
Received a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty One Lacs Only) as
earnest money from Mr. Punit Beriwala, S/o Shri S.S. Beriwala, r/o
15/10 Sarvapriya Vihar, New Delhi, against the sale of property
No.28-A Prithiviraj Road, New Delhi, admeasuring 3727 sq. yards.
The total sale consideration agreed upon is Rs.28 Crores (Rupees
Twenty Eight Crores only). Further a sum of Rupees Thirty lakhs to
be made by Thursday.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 2 of 26
The sale is subject to the said property being free from all kinds’
charges, lien, encumbrances, prior sales, mortgages, litigation,
claims, etc. The seller has agreed to get the said property freehold
from the concerned authorities at his own expense before the transfer
of the said property in favor of the PURCHASER i.e. Shri Punit
Beriwala or his nominees.
-SD-
SELLER
Dated: 12.04.2004 Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
Through karta Bhai Manjit Singh S/o
r/o 2 south End Lane, New Delhi
WITNESS
1. -SD-
Maheep Singh
2 South End Lane, New Delhi
2. SD/-
Vikramjit Singh
2 South End Lane, New Delhi”
th rd
3.2. As per the complaint, from 12 April 2004 to 03 January
2005, the Appellant paid a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees
One Crore Sixty-Four Lacs Fifty Thousand) to Bhai Manjit
Singh, which was acknowledged by various receipts, some of
which were signed by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) as witnesses. In pursuance of the
Agreement to Sell, part physical possession of the servant
quarter of the property was handed over to the Appellant vide
nd
letter of possession dated 22 April 2004. It is the Appellant’s
case that the possession was mere paper possession, and he was
not put in actual physical possession of any part of the property.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 3 of 26
th
3.3. On 24 June 2016, one Ashok Gupta lodged an FIR No.
105/2016 against the accused persons alleging therein that an
th
Agreement to Sell dated 29 December 2010 for the subject
property had been executed in his favour and that he was also
put in possession of the servant quarter of the subject property.
The said FIR was subsequently quashed by the Delhi High
th
Court vide its Order dated 13 December 2019 in W.P. (Crl.)
465/2019 in view of the settlement between the parties.
3.4. Upon the alleged failure of the accused person to provide
documents for clear title of the property, the Appellant
th
published a notice dated 18 July 2020 in the Hindustan Times
declaring to the public at large that an Agreement to Sell for the
subject property had been executed between the Appellant and
the accused persons.
3.5. In response to the said public notice, Punjab and Sind
Bank, Rajendra Place, New Delhi issued an objection letter
th
dated 20 July 2020 stating therein that the subject property had
th
been mortgaged on 15 January 1996 by Bhai Manjit Singh for
securing the loan granted to Montari Industries Limited.
3.6. Thereafter, SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI
nd
Equipment Finance Limited issued letters dated 22 July 2020
stating that the subject property had been mortgaged with them
as well.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 4 of 26
rd
3.7. Bhai Manjit Singh HUF issued a letter dated 23 July 2020
th
in response to the public notice dated 18 July 2020, denying
the existence of any Agreement to Sell for the subject property,
th
followed by a public notice dated 13 August 2020 in Hindustan
th
Times refuting the contents of the Appellant’s notice dated 18
July 2020.
nd
3.8. Surprisingly, on 22 September 2020, a reply was issued
by Bhai Manjit Singh HUF stating that Bhai Manjit Singh had
returned the amount paid by the Appellant.
3.9. The aforementioned events led to filing of a suit for
specific performance by the Appellant before the Delhi High
Court being CS(OS) No. 598 of 2021 (“civil suit”). On the first
st
date of hearing on 21 November 2021, the civil suit was
th
adjourned to 8 December 2021 directing the Appellant to file
th
requisite court fees. On 8 December 2021, counsel for the
accused persons informed the Court that the subject property
had been sold by Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. The Appellant
nd
thereafter obtained a copy of the sale deed dated 2 December
2021, which revealed that the subject property had been sold by
Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to a company, J.K. Paper Limited.
nd
3.10. In the sale deed dated 2 December 2021, it was stated
that Bhai Manjit Singh resigned as Karta of the Bhai Manjit
Singh HUF and transferred all rights, claim, title and
entitlements in favour of the remaining members of the HUF
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 5 of 26
and Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was recognized as
th
Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF from 10 March 2000. It was
further stated that an equitable mortgage was created in favour
of SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI Equipment
Finance Limited against the credit facility for an amount of
Rs.87,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eighty-Seven Crore) availed by
ADIZAA Investment Private Limited, in which Vikramjit Singh
and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were Directors.
th
3.11. The Appellant thereafter filed a complaint dated 12
January 2022 against the accused persons before the Economic
Offences Wing, which led to registration of the subject FIR on
th
16 June 2022.
3.12. In the meanwhile, the application under Order VII Rule 11
filed by the accused persons was dismissed by a learned Single
th
Judge of the Delhi High Court vide Order dated 7 February
th
2022. The said Order dated 7 February 2022 was challenged
by the accused persons in FAO (OS) 20/2022, wherein the civil
suit filed by the Appellant was stayed by the Division Bench of
th
the Delhi High Court vide its Order dated 29 March 2022.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
4. Ms. Mukta Gupta, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, stated
that the learned Single Judge while allowing the quashing petition had
erroneously laid great emphasis on the delay in registration of the FIR and
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 6 of 26
the fact that the FIR was registered after the civil suit had been stayed by
the Division Bench.
5. She contended that there was no delay in lodging the FIR. She stated
that from 2004 to 2020, the accused persons kept representing that they
were getting the subject property converted from leasehold to freehold,
even though the property had already been converted to freehold. She stated
that the accused persons denied the existence of the Agreement to Sell for
rd
the very first time through their letter dated 23 July 2020.
6. She stated that the Appellant became aware of further sale of property
th
on 8 December 2021 and thereafter obtained a copy of the sale deed dated
nd th
2 December 2021 in favour of J. K. Paper Limited, on 28 December
2021. She, therefore, stated that the dishonest intention of the accused
persons was revealed for the very first time upon the discovery of sale deed
and the mortgages mentioned therein, which were both prior and
subsequent to the Agreement to Sell in favour of the Appellant.
th
7. She pointed out that the FIR finally came to be registered on 16 June
2022; however, the Appellant had filed the complaint before the Economic
th
Offences Wing without any delay on 12 January 2022. She submitted that
the period of limitation in terms of Section 469 of the Cr.P.C. commences
from the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of the
person aggrieved. She, therefore, stated that in the present case, the period
th
of limitation commenced on 28 December 2021 and the complaint was
th
filed within fifteen days on 12 January 2022.
8. Even otherwise, she submitted that in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C.,
there is no limitation period prescribed for offences which are punishable
with imprisonment of more than 3 (three) years. She pointed out that the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 7 of 26
offences alleged in the present case are punishable with imprisonment of
more than 3 (three) years; thus, there is no period of limitation in lodging
the FIR.
9. She also submitted that delay in registration of the FIR cannot be the
basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. She emphasized that the
consequences for any alleged delay in registration of the FIR ought to be
adjudicated after appreciation of evidence and entire material on record.
10. She stated that at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-
th
Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004, accused persons represented that
Bhai Manjit Singh is the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. She pointed out
that the said Agreement to Sell-cum-Receipt was executed by Bhai Manjit
Singh in his capacity as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF and was
witnessed by Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) and Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No. 2) even though Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was
the Karta at the relevant time, which was revealed to the Appellant through
nd
sale deed dated 2 December 2021 in favour of JK Paper Limited, which
stated that Respondent No. 2 herein became Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh
th
HUF on 10 March, 2000.
11. She stated that the fact that the property was already mortgaged with
th
Punjab and Sind Bank on 15 January 1996, was revealed for the very first
th
time through the letter dated 20 July 2020 issued by Punjab and Sind Bank
th
in response to the Appellant’s public notice dated 18 July 2020 published
in the Hindustan Times.
12. She stated that the misrepresentation, deception and dishonesty to
induce the Appellant commenced from the date on which the receipt-cum-
th
Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004 was executed and therefore, the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 8 of 26
element of deception had existed from the very inception of the transaction.
She stated that the accused persons deceived the Appellant into parting with
a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees One Crore Sixty-Four Lacs Fifty
th rd
Thousand) between 12 April 2004 and 3 January 2005, which had been
acknowledged by receipts, wherein Bhai Manjit Singh had signed as Karta
and Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) had
signed as witnesses despite fully knowing that Bhai Manjit Singh was not
the Karta of the HUF.
13. She stated that the deception continued even after the execution of
th
the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004 as Bhai Manjit
Singh, Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh had executed another Agreement
th
to Sell dated 29 December 2010 in favour of one Ashok Gupta, who was
also allegedly put in part possession of the servant quarter of the subject
property. She emphasised that identical modus operandi had been adopted
by the accused persons with Ashok Gupta as well.
14. She stated that subsequent thereto, the property was once again
mortgaged with possession to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and an
equitable mortgage had been created in favour of SREI Equipment Finance
th
Limited on 7 January 2019. She stated that the said mortgage was cleared
nd
on the same day as the sale deed dated 2 December 2021 was executed in
favour of J.K. Paper Limited.
nd
15. She emphasized that the Sale Deed dated 2 December 2021
categorically states that the property is free from all encumbrances, third-
party claims, disputes, litigation even though the Appellant’s suit for
specific performance was pending before the learned Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court. She highlighted that the sale deed had been executed
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 9 of 26
during the pendency of the suit for specific performance filed by the
Appellant.
16. She stated that the accused persons acting in collusion had created
various chains of documents in favour of various persons. She pointed out
that the Agreements in favour of the Appellant and Ashok Gupta had been
executed by Bhai Manjit Singh, acting as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF,
nd
whereas the sale deed dated 2 December 2021 in favour of J.K. Paper
Limited had been executed by Vikramjit Singh acting as Karta of Bhai
Manjit Singh HUF. She further pointed out that all accused persons are
parties to the documents created in favour of various persons, thereby
showing a well-planned conspiracy to cheat, misrepresent and deceive.
rd
17. She highlighted that on 23 July 2020 Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
denied the existence of any Agreement to Sell. However subsequently, on
nd
22 September 2020, Bhai Manjit Singh stated that the advance
consideration had been returned to the Appellant and that except Bhai
Manjit Singh, no other person from the HUF had met the Appellant. She
th
pointed out that subsequently vide notice dated 09 October 2020, the
Appellant sought copies of receipts showing the alleged repayment;
however, till date no such receipts have been provided to the Appellant. She
nd
stated that on 22 August 2022, an FIR was registered by Bhai Manjit
Singh against the Appellant, alleging for the first time that the receipts of
payment in favour of the Appellant were forged and fabricated. She
emphasized that such contradictory stands of all three accused persons are
required to be investigated by the police authorities.
18. She stated that the Appellant was never handed over possession of
any part of the subject property. According to her, the letter of possession
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 10 of 26
nd
dated 22 April 2004 was only intended to give paper possession to the
Appellant and not the actual physical possession.
19. She contended that institution of civil proceedings cannot act as a bar
to the investigation of cognizable offences. She submitted that it is settled
law that civil and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
20. She pointed out that the present case involves two cross-FIRs. On the
th
one hand is the subject FIR dated 16 June 2022 registered by the Appellant
against the accused persons, which has been quashed qua the Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 vide the impugned judgment. Whereas the other FIR dated
nd
22 August 2022 registered by Bhai Manjit Singh against the Appellant
with respect to the same transaction is still subsisting even though the
subject FIR was registered prior to the FIR against the Appellant. According
to her, cross-FIRs are required to be investigated and tried together, and
investigation ought not to be stifled at a nascent stage.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2
21. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No. 2), stated that the subject FIR had been rightly quashed
by the learned Single Judge. He stated that there is not a single
representation or correspondence on record which shows that the Appellant
from 2004 to 2020 had taken any steps for purchase of the property. He
stated that it was unbelievable that the sale of a prime and valuable property
was done by way of an oral Agreement to Sell. He further stated that no
reasonable person would wait for a period of more than 16 (sixteen) years
to affect the sale of property in his favour. He stated that no complaint or
FIR should ‘ be entertained at this distance of time ’.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 11 of 26
th
22. He pointed out that it is only the first alleged receipt dated 12 April
2004 which bears the signature of Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) as witnesses. He stated that the only allegation
against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is that they had signed the alleged
Agreement to Sell as witnesses and that they were aware that Bhai Manjit
Singh was not Karta of the HUF. According to him, mere signatures of
Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) on a receipt
as witnesses is not sufficient to initiate criminal proceedings against them
and the same does not constitute any of the offences alleged in the FIR.
23. He emphasized that the criminal proceedings against Bhai Manjeet
Singh, who is the alleged executor of the Agreement to Sell, are continuing
till date and the FIR has been quashed only qua Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3). He stated that in addition to the
FIR against Bhai Manjeet Singh, the suit for specific performance of the
alleged Agreement to Sell is also pending before the Delhi High Court and
the Appellant can seek appropriate relief qua the subject property in the said
civil suit.
24. He submitted that an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating
is that the intention to deceive must exist at the very inception. He stated
that as part physical possession was handed over to the Appellant, there was
no intention of deceiving the Appellant from the inception. He pointed out
nd
that even alleged possession letter dated 22 April 2004 is signed only by
Bhai Manjit Singh, ruling out any involvement of Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3).
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 12 of 26
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 3
25. Learned senior counsel for Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) stated
that Maheep Singh is a 73-year-old lady, who had signed on only two of the
alleged receipts of payments made by the Appellant. He pointed out that
Maheep Singh was not the Karta of the HUF at any point of time. He
therefore stated that Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) cannot be treated at
par with either Bhai Manjit Singh or Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2).
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1/STATE OF NCT
OF DELHI
26. Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned ASG appearing for the State
(Respondent No. 1), stated that the FIR had been quashed at the nascent
stage of investigation. She stated that Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) had refused to furnish their specimen signatures
and refused to comply with Section 91 Cr.P.C. notices issued by the Police.
REASONING
SIMILAR RECEIPTS TREATED AS CONTRACT/AGREEMENT TO SELL
27. The common foundation underlying the submissions of learned
senior counsel for Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2
and 3) and the impugned order that the Agreement to Sell in question is not
a written but an oral Agreement, is contrary to facts and untenable in law.
The Delhi High Court, whose judgments shall bind the parties including the
police/investigating agency, has repeatedly treated receipts, like the receipt
th
dated 12 April 2004, as a Contract/Agreement to Sell whose specific
performance can be sought. In M/s. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Sh. Vinod Kumar Alag, ILR (1991) I Delhi 303 , Justice Arun Kumar, a
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 13 of 26
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court (as his Lordship then was)
has held, “Mere heading or title of a document cannot deprive the document
of its real nature. Law is well settled in such matters that it is the substance
which has to be seen and not the form the document though titled as a
‘receipt’ contains all the essential ingredients of a ‘contract’ and therefore,
this is a contract and the plaintiff can seek specific performance thereof.”
MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS A
BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES
28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground
for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute.
This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a
remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the
Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of
criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the
court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed
during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the
complaint did not warrant a further investigation and if necessary, a trial.
[See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.)
(2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP (2012) 3 SCC 132 and
Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal (1999) 8 SCC 686 ]
WHILE QUASHING, MUST BELIEVE ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT
29. It is settled law that power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be
exercised sparingly with circumspection and while exercising this power,
the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be
true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that save in exceptional cases
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 14 of 26
where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be
used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.
30. In Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC
401 , this Court has held as under:-
“33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our
final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High
Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of
investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during
the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in
what circumstances and whether the High Court would be
justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no
coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the
final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while
dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the
criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers
under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
33.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable
offence.
33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the
Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest of rare
cases” (not to be confused with the formation in the context of
death penalty).
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 15 of 26
33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint.
33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage.
33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
rather than an ordinary rule.
33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not
to tread over the other sphere.
33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial
process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences.
33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according
to its whims or caprice.
33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence
reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in
progress, the court should not go into the merits of the
allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not
deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process
of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that
there is no substance in the application made by the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 16 of 26
complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate
report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be
considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the
known procedure.
33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be more
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
court.
33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,
regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid
down by this Court in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the
jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under
Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations
in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not.
The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not
the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and
the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to
investigate the allegations in the FIR.
33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or
the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High
Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in
exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of
stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing
petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim
order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or
mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress
and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not
before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself
from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive
steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to
apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 17 of 26
competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not
justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive
steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is
completed and/or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under
Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing
petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the
opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim
stay of further investigation, after considering the broad
parameters while exercising the powers under Section
482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief
reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is
required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application
of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what
was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim
order.
33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court
of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid
parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by
“no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive
steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad
which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”
AS PER THE COMPLAINT/FIR, RIGHT FROM THE INCEPTION,
THERE WAS MISREPRESENTATION BY VIKRAMJIT SINGH AND
MAHEEP SINGH
31. This Court is of the view that the conclusion of the learned Single
Judge that the complaint / FIR on its face did not disclose offences under
Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120-B IPC against Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3), is factually incorrect. If the
averments in the complaint are to be believed, which is the norm that is to
be followed at this stage, then the subject FIR/complaint reveals
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 18 of 26
commission of cognizable offences by (son and mother) Vikramjit Singh
and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) also as they despite being
aware that Bhai Manjit Singh (father of Vikramjit Singh and husband of
Maheep Singh) had no authority to enter into an Agreement to Sell on
behalf of the HUF (as he was not the Karta of HUF on the said date),
allowed Bhai Manjit Singh to misrepresent with dishonest and fraudulent
intent that he was the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. This
misrepresentation assumes serious connotation as at the relevant time i.e.
th
12 April 2004, the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to the knowledge of
Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (witnesses to the receipt) was none
other than Vikramjit Singh. It was due to this
deception/misrepresentation/fraud that the Appellant parted with a sum of
Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees One Crore Sixty-Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand
th rd
Only) from 12 April 2004 to 03 January 2005 – some receipts of which
were also witnessed by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
Nos.2 and 3). Consequently, as per the allegation in the complaint/FIR,
right from the inception of the transaction between the parties, the
Appellant was misrepresented, defrauded, deceived with dishonest and
fraudulent intent by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2
and 3). Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that all accused persons
acted in conspiracy to deceive and cheat the Appellant with no intention of
selling the subject property to the Appellant.
MISREPRESENTATION BY ALL THREE ACCUSED IS THE OFFENCE
COMPLAINED OF
32. This Court is of the view that the learned Single Judge misdirected
himself by concluding that the only allegation against Vikramjit Singh and
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 19 of 26
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) is that they were witnesses to the
th
Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April 2004, whereas, the
gravamen of the allegation was that Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
(Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were equally guilty of misrepresentation as,
despite their knowledge to the contrary (as they were all closely related as
well as members of the said HUF and Vikramjit Singh was actual Karta ),
they allowed Bhai Manjit Singh who was not competent to execute the
Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell on behalf of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to
represent himself as the Karta and execute the same. Consequently, the
underlying act of misrepresentation by Bhai Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh
and Maheep Singh (all three) is the offence by which the Appellant is
aggrieved, and not the mere act of signing the receipt as witnesses.
However, the learned Single Judge has neither dealt with nor examined the
said aspect in the impugned judgment.
DEFENCE OF PART POSSESSION INSPIRES NO CONFIDENCE
33. The learned Single Judge has also held that the intention to cheat was
not present since inception because as per the FIR, part possession of
servant quarter of the property was handed over to the Appellant. However,
what the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate is that the Appellant
had categorically alleged that the possession of the property is still with the
accused persons, thereby rendering a mere paper possession. Further, the
factum that the said possession was not treated seriously even by Vikramjit
Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) is apparent from the
fact that when a similar Agreement to Sell was subsequently executed with
Mr. Ashok Gupta, similar possession of the servant quarter was handed over
to him also. Moreover, the fact that a Sale Deed was ultimately executed
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 20 of 26
in favour of J.K. Paper Limited without reference to any such possession
being handed over to Appellant shows that even the accused treated the said
possession as a mere paper possession and a formality.
34. The learned Single Judge further failed to notice that admittedly
Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) continued to
deal with the property after executing the Receipt-cum- Agreement to Sell
by executing a registered mortgage, Agreement to Sell and Sale Deed. It is
pertinent to mention that the mortgage with possession with SREI
Infrastructure Finance Limited and an equitable mortgage in favour of SREI
Equipment Finance Limited was created for availing credit facility by
ADIZAA Investment Private Limited, wherein Vikramjit Singh and
Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were Directors. This Court is of
the view that if the Appellant had indeed parted with part possession of the
property to the Appellant, then a registered mortgage with possession could
not have been created in favour of SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited or
an Agreement to Sell with Mr. Ashok Gupta or Sale Deed with J.K. Paper
Limited.
35. Admittedly, the property was sold to J.K. Paper Limited vide sale
nd
deed 2 December 2021, which was executed by Vikramjit Singh
(Respondent No.2) as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. The fact that the
said sale deed had been executed after the Appellant filed the suit for
th
specific performance of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 April
2004 lends credence to the allegations made by the Appellant that the
accused persons by misrepresentation and deception had entered into
multiple transactions with respect to the subject property.
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 21 of 26
DELAY CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR QUASHING THE PRESENT FIR
36. Further, accepting the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in
the impugned order that ‘there had been a delay in registration of the FIR
and because of such delay, the allegations made by the Appellant are
unbelievable’ and the submissions of learned senior counsel for Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 that no complaint/FIR should be entertained ‘ at this distance
of time ’, would mean in effect in accepting the argument that delay is a
sufficient ground for quashing of the present FIR/complaint.
37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences
punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis
of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance
only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether
the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only
after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda
Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “ The mere delay on the part of the third
respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a
ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to
warrant any reference to precedents…..”
38. Further, as per the allegations in the complaint/FIR during 2004-2020
the accused persons kept representing that they were in the process of
getting the property unencumbered and converted to freehold. Upon the
failure of the accused persons to show documents for clear title of the
property, the Appellant had initially instituted a suit for specific
performance, and it was only during the suit proceedings that it came to
light that after the Agreement to Sell with the Appellant, the property was
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 22 of 26
subsequently mortgaged to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI
Equipment Finance Limited and the same was subsequently sold to J.K.
nd
Paper Limited vide sale deed dated 02 December 2021. The fact that
Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was the Karta of the Bhai Manjit Singh
HUF at the relevant time was also allegedly revealed for the very first time
nd
through the aforesaid sale deed dated 02 December 2021, certified copy
th
of which was obtained by the Appellant on 28 December 2021.
Consequently, the fact of misrepresentation and deception at the inception,
that is, at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated
th
12 April 2004, came to the knowledge of the Appellant (according to the
th
complaint) only on 28 December 2021.
39. The Appellant had, admittedly, filed the complaint before the
th
Economic Offences Wing on 12 January 2022. Section 469 Cr.P.C.
provides that the period of limitation commences from the date on which
the offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved. In the present
case, as noted above, the Appellant became aware of the offence only on
th
28 December 2021. Consequently, prima facie there is no delay in filing
the criminal proceedings.
40. Even otherwise, as the learned senior counsel for the Appellant has
rightly pointed out, in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C., there is no period of
limitation for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of more
than three years.
COMPLAINT WAS FILED MUCH BEFORE THE SUIT WAS STAYED
41. The learned Single Judge has also clearly erred in concluding that the
FIR was lodged after only after the civil suit filed by the Appellant had been
stayed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. However, the record
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 23 of 26
reveals that the application under Order VII Rule 11 filed by the accused
persons was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court
th th
on 7 February 2022. The said Order dated 7 February 2022 was
challenged by the accused persons, wherein the civil suit filed by the
Appellant was stayed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on
th
29 March 2022. The complaint against the accused persons was filed by
th
the Appellant on 12 January 2022 i.e. much before the civil suit was
stayed.
CROSS FIRs ARE REQUIRED TO BE HOLISTICALLY INVESTIGATED
42. The accused persons have taken various inherently contradictory
rd
stands with respect to the transaction with the Appellant. On 23 July 2020
Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF denied the existence of any
nd
Agreement to Sell. On 22 September 2022, Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai
Manjit Singh HUF stated that the advance consideration had been returned
to the Appellant and that except Bhai Manjit Singh, no other person from
the HUF had met the Appellant. Finally, after the registration of the subject
th
FIR dated 16 June 2022, Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
nd
registered an FIR dated 22 August 2022, alleging that the receipts of
payment in favour of the Appellant and relied upon by him in his civil suit
th
as well as the FIR dated 16 June 2022, were forged and fabricated.
43. Keeping in view the contradictory defences of the accused as well as
the registration and pendency of the cross FIRs, this Court is of the view
that the learned Single Judge should not have limited the scope of
investigation.
44. In the context of cross cases, this Court in Nathi Lal v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (1990) SCC (Cri) 638 has held as under:-
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 24 of 26
“2. We think that the fair procedure to adopt in a matter like the
present where there are cross cases, is to direct that the same
learned Judge must try both the cross cases one after the other.
After the recording of evidence in one case is completed, he must
hear the arguments but he must reserve the judgment.
Thereafter he must proceed to hear the cross case and after
recording all the evidence he must hear the arguments but
reserve the judgment in that case. The same learned Judge must
thereafter dispose of the matters by two separate judgments. In
deciding each of the cases, he can rely only on the evidence
recorded in that particular case. The evidence recorded in the
cross case cannot be looked into. Nor can the judge be
influenced by whatever is argued in the cross case. Each case
must be decided on the basis of the evidence which has been
placed on record in that particular case without being
influenced in any manner by the evidence or arguments urged
in the cross case. But both the judgments must be pronounced
by the same learned Judge one after the other.”
45. Even though the above decision was rendered in respect of trial of
cross cases, this Court is of the opinion that in cases involving cross-FIRs,
it would be prudent and fair if the investigation was carried out in a
comprehensive manner. After all, the object of the investigation is the
discovery of truth. In the present case, in view of cross-FIRs, the
investigating authority will conclude that either the receipts in favour of the
Appellant are forged and fabricated or that the receipts are genuine. The
complicity of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein can only be ascertained once
the investigation is permitted to reach its logical conclusion.
CONCLUSION
46. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings, the impugned judgment and
th
order dated 17 October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in Crl.
M.C. 4189/2022 is set aside and FIR No.94/2022 registered at Police
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 25 of 26
Station Economic Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi for offences
punishable under Section 467/468/471/420/120B IPC against Vikramjit
Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) is revived.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is disposed of.
47. It is clarified that the aforesaid findings have been given in the
context of quashing of the complaint/FIR and shall not bind the Courts
below while deciding the matter.
...…...……………….J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
……………….J.
[MANMOHAN ]
New Delhi;
April 29, 2025
SLP (Crl.) No.11042 of 2022 Page 26 of 26