Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 616 of 1999
PETITIONER:
Anil Kumar
RESPONDENT:
State of U.P.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/09/2004
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Acquittal of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the
’accused’) by the trial court was reversed by the High Court by the
impugned judgment. Three persons, namely, Akshay Kumar, Anil Kumar and
Shiv Kumar faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable
under Sections 302 and 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (in short the ’IPC’).
Accusations which led to the trial of the accused persons are
essentially as follows:
Goverdhan Lal son of Guljari Lal lodged first information report
(hereinafter referred to as FIR) on 27.2.1980 at about 4.45 p.m. with
the allegation that about 3.00 p.m. on the same date accused Akshay
Kumar, Anil Kumar and Shiv Kumar came towards their house. Accused
Shiv Kumar was driving a tractor while Akshay Kumar and Anil Kumar were
sitting on the trolley of the tractor with double barrel gun in the
hands of each of them. They wanted to take the tractor through the
land of the complainant. In front of the house and the land of the
complainant and his brothers, there is some open land. Gram Pradhan
Akshay Kumar wanted to make path (Rasta) over the said land. He filed
a case in the Munsif’s court about 21-22 years ago for the said
purpose. He won the case. The accused persons bore enmity for that
reason. Before three years of the present occurrence accused Anil
Kumar and Shiv Kumar went to the plot of the complainant and wanted to
assault by fire. The complainant had lodged a report in the police
station to this effect. On 27.2.1980 at about 3.00 p.m. Kunji Lal
brother of the complainant and Kali Charan, nephew of the complainant
(each of them described as "deceased" by name) were keeping potatoes in
bags in the west of their house. They asked the accused persons that
since there was no path in front of house of the complainant where they
are taking the tractor. They stopped the tractor in front of the house
of deceased Kunji Lal. Accused Shiv Kumar exhorted to kill them. On
this Akshay Kumar and Anil Kumar got down from the tractor and started
to abuse. Accused Anil Kumar fired the gun and the bullet hit Kunji
Lal. Akshay Kumar fired the gun and the bullet hit Kali Charan and both
of them died on the spot. The accused persons sat on their tractor and
went towards their house proclaiming that if anybody tried to raise his
head, he shall also be killed. The occurrence was said to have been
seen by Kalloo son of Sukha, Ram Beti wife of Gokaran and Rakesh Kumar
son of Siya Ram.
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Rakesh Kumar has since died. Govardhan Lal, the complainant was
examined as PW-1, Kallo as PW-2 and Ram Beti as PW-3.
In order to further its version the prosecution examined 6
witnesses. The accused persons pleaded innocence. The appellant took
the plea that his driver Navin Chandra was driving the tractor to
plough the field of one Virendra son of Onkar. Near the house of
complainant, Kali Charan, Munshi Lal, Hari Shankar, Siyaram etc.
emerged with lathies and country made pistols, stopped the tractor and
threatened the driver and he cried out for help. Appellant Anil Kumar
came along with licenced gun of his father to save them. When he
reached near the tractor, Kali Charan and Kunji Lal fired at him as
well as Navin Chandra. Both of them suffered fire-arm injuries. In self
defence, he fired twice. He was medically examined and injuries were
x-rayed.
Learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that it was amply
clear that the occurrence took place at the time, place and date as
claimed by the prosecution. But accused Anil Kumar and Shiv Kumar were
incapable of committing any crime. Their presence at the spot appeared
to be out of question in view of their age. Injuries on the accused
were not explained and, therefore, the prosecution had not come to
Court with clean hands. The first information report was ante-timed
and there was no immediate motive for the crime. Accused Anil Kumar
and Shiv Kumar did not play any active role in the commission of the
offence. Though accused Anil Kumar had played active role it was in
exercise of right of self defence. Accordingly, all the 3 persons were
acquitted. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed the appeal before the
Allahabad High Court. During the pendency of the appeal before the High
Court Akshay Kumar and Shiv Kumar died and the appeal was taken to have
been abated so far as they are concerned and was continued against the
accused-appellant Anil Kumar.
The High Court found that the approach of the trial court was not
correct. In view of the clear and cogent evidence of the eye-witnesses,
the trial court should not have come to a conclusion based on surmises
and presumptions about the inability of Shiv Kumar and Askhay Kumar to
commit the crime. The injuries on the accused and Navin Chandra were
of very superficial nature. Interestingly, though the incident took
place on 27.2.1980, medical records so far as accused-appellant Anil
Kumar and Navin Chandra are concerned came into existence on 29.2.1980.
The stand that when Navin Chandra was attacked Anil Kumar came and
fired in defence, was too fragile to warrant acceptance as was wrongly
done by the trial court. High Court noticed that neither Navin Chandra
nor Virendra, who it was claimed by the defence were present all
through, had not been examined as defence witnesses. The High Court
also noticed that without any basis the trial court held that at least
four gunshots were made for causing injuries on the two deceased
persons. The plea regarding private defence was not proved and no
material was placed to substantiate the plea. Without any material the
trial court came to hold that the FIR was ante-timed. That being so,
the trial court’s conclusions were erroneous. Accordingly, State’s
appeal was allowed and accused-appellant Anil Kumar was found guilty of
offence punishable under Section 302, as well as Section 302 read with
Section 34 of IPC.
In support of the appeal learned counsel for the accused-
appellant submitted that the High Court has lightly interfered with the
judgment of acquittal. The view taken by the trial court was a possible
view. Even though the occurrence was admitted by the accused, the same
was not unqualified. High Court proceeded on the basis as if the
accused accepted the prosecution version. The High Court should not
have acted on part of the statement recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Code’) and ignored rest
of the same. It should have scanned the entire evidence to arrive at
the conclusion. The High Court may have recorded different conclusion
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but that does not render the judgment of the trial court illegal when
it was reasonable and possible view. The Investigating Officer clearly
noted that the accused-appellant Anil Kumar and Virendra were injured,
but no further inquiry was conducted. There is no material for the
genesis of the dispute. There was no immediate motive as was held by
the trial court. The medical evidence is also at variance with the
oral evidence. The FIR was rightly held to be ante-timed when the
evidence of Ram Beti (PW-3) is taken note of. Admittedly, the
litigation took place two decades back. If there was any motive the
victim would have been Girdhari Lal and not the two deceased persons.
In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the
first information report was lodged immediately. The evidence of the
eye-witnesses has not been shaken during the cross-examination at
length. The trial court had only held that the possibility of role
played by Shiv Kumar was not sufficient to implicate him and whatever
discussions were made related to Shiv Kumar. After having come to the
conclusion that Anil Kumar might have been responsible for the
mischief, it was illogical to give any benefit of doubt on the ground
that he acted in self defence. This is a conclusion without any
foundation. The High Court has rightly discarded the plea of the
defence about non-explanation of injuries which were clearly
superfluous in nature. PWs were unarmed at the time of assaults.
Accordingly it was submitted that the High Court was justified in
reversing the acquittal.
There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence
upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of
acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of
innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The
golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice
in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the
other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to
ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of
justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than
from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence
is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate
the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any
offence or not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2002 (2) Supreme 567). The principle to be followed by appellate Court
considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to
interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for
doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and
relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in
the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects
were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v.
State of Maharashtra (AIR 1973 SC 2622), Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State
of Gujarat (1996 (4) Supreme 167), Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana
(2000 (3) Supreme 320), Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors.
(2003 (7) Supreme 152), State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003 (5)
Supreme 508 and State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr. (2003 (7)
Supreme 17) and Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal and Anr. (JT 2003 (9) SC 17).
We shall first deal with the question regarding non-explanation
of injuries on the accused. Issue is if there is no such explanation
what would be its effect? We are not prepared to agree with the learned
counsel for the defence that in each and every case where prosecution
fails to explain the injuries found on some of the accused, the
prosecution case should automatically be rejected, without any further
probe. In Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. The State of Bihar (1968 (3) SCR
525), it was observed:
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"...In our judgment, the failure of the
prosecution to offer any explanation in that regard
shows that evidence of the prosecution witnesses
relating to the incident is not true or at any rate
not wholly true. Further those injuries probabilise
the plea taken by the appellants."
In another important case Lakshmi Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar
(1976 (4) SCC 394), after referring to the ratio laid down in Mohar
Rai’s case (supra), this Court observed:
"Where the prosecution fails to explain the
injuries on the accused, two results follow:
(1) that the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses is untrue; and (2) that the injuries
probabilise the plea taken by the appellants."
It was further observed that:
"In a murder case, the non-explanation of the
injuries sustained by the accused at about the time
of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is
a very important circumstance from which the Court
can draw the following inferences:
(1) that the prosecution has suppressed the
genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has
thus not presented the true version;
(2) that the witnesses who have denied the
presence of the injuries on the person of the
accused are lying on a most material point and,
therefore, their evidence is unreliable;
(3) that in case there is a defence version
which explains the injuries on the person of the
accused assumes much greater importance where the
evidence consists of interested or inimical
witnesses or where the defence gives a version which
competes in probability with that of the prosecution
one."
In Mohar Rai’s case (supra) it is made clear that failure of the
prosecution to offer any explanation regarding the injuries found on
the accused may show that the evidence related to the incident is not
true or at any rate not wholly true. Likewise in Lakshmi Singh’s case
(supra) it is observed that any non-explanation of the injuries on the
accused by the prosecution may affect the prosecution case. But such a
non-explanation may assume greater importance where the defence gives a
version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. But
where the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy and where the
Court can distinguish the truth from falsehood the mere fact that the
injuries are not explained by the prosecution cannot by itself be a
sole basis to reject such evidence, and consequently the whole case.
Much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. These aspects
were highlighted by this Court in Vijayee Singh and Ors. v. State of
U.P. (AIR 1990 SC 1459).
Non-explanation of injuries by the prosecution will not affect
prosecution case where injuries sustained by the accused are minor and
superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so
independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and
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creditworthy, that it outweighs the effect of the omission on the part
of prosecution to explain the injuries. As observed by this Court in
Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1972 SC 2593) prosecution is not
called upon in all cases to explain the injuries received by the
accused persons. It is for the defence to put questions to the
prosecution witnesses regarding the injuries of the accused persons.
When that is not done, there is no occasion for the prosecution
witnesses to explain any injury on the person of an accused. In Hare
krishna Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1988 SC 863), it was
observed that the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries
sustained by the accused in the same occurrence may not arise in each
and every case. In other words, it is not an invariable rule that the
prosecution has to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the
same occurrence. If the witnesses examined on behalf of the
prosecution are believed by the Court in proof of guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, question of obligation of prosecution to
explain injuries sustained by the accused will not arise. When the
prosecution comes with a definite case that the offence has been
committed by the accused and proves its case beyond any reasonable
doubt, it becomes hardly necessary for the prosecution to again explain
how and under what circumstances injuries have been inflicted on the
person of the accused. It is more so when the injuries are simple or
superficial in nature. In the case at hand, trifle and superficial
injuries on accused are of little assistance to them to throw doubt on
veracity of prosecution case. (See Surendra Paswan v. State of
Jharkhand (2003) 8 Supreme 476).
The trial court’s conclusions were patently based on surmises and
conjectures and were contrary to the evidence. There was no basis for
the trial court to conclude that accused-appellant Anil Kumar acted in
exercise of right of private defence. Merely because such a statement
was made in the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code that
was not sufficient. The High Court did not endorse the view as this
plea was not established and the material on record was on the contrary
established that Anil Kumar had fired the shot resulting in the death
of one of deceased persons. The presumption that FIR was ante-timed was
on an erroneous reading of the evidence of PW-3. The trial court
completely lost sight of the fact that PW-3 was an illiterate rustic
lady and minor variance in her statement should not be given primacy
when the evidence itself was recorded long time after and it should not
have been made basis for coming to a conclusion that the FIR was ante-
timed. It is trite law that when oral evidence is credible and cogent,
medical evidence is contrary, is inconsequential. Only when the medical
evidence totally improbabilises the oral evidence, adverse inference
can be drawn. This is not a case of that nature.
Above being the position, we find no infirmity in the judgment of
the High Court to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed.