Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 39
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _185_ OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9142 of 2022)
SURESH GARODIA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant has approached this Court being
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aggrieved by the order dated 22 August 2022 passed by the
learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, dismissing
the application filed by the appellant under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) for
quashing of criminal proceedings under Sections 376/506 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) so also for
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2024.01.13
12:35:50 IST
Reason:
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quashing of the order dated 4 July 2017 passed by the
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learned Magistrate for taking cognizance under Section
376/506 of IPC.
3. The facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are thus:-
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3.1 On 4 December 2016, the prosecutrix lodged a First
Information Report (for short, “FIR”) before the Bharalumukh
Police Station, District Kamrup (M), Guwahati, alleging
therein that when she was fifteen years of age, the appellant
herein committed rape on her and as a result of which she
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gave birth to a child, namely, Jasim Ahmed Garodia on 7
April 1983.
After the FIR was lodged, final report came to be filed.
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However, the learned Magistrate, after considering the said
final report, rejected the same and directed that the
cognizance be taken on the basis of the police report. Being
aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed a petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court, which was rejected vide
impugned order. Hence, the present appeal.
4. We have heard Mr. Ibad Mushtaq, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant, Ms. Diksha Rai, learned counsel
appearing for the State and Ms. S. Janani, learned counsel
appearing for the de facto complainant.
5. Mr. Mushtaq, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, submits that the present case is nothing else but
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an abuse of process of law. The FIR was filed after 34 years
only in order to blackmail the appellant herein. He therefore
submits that the order passed by the learned Magistrate
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dated 4 July 2017 for taking cognizance is not sustainable
in law.
6. Ms. Diksha Rai, learned counsel appearing for the State
and Ms. S. Janani, learned counsel appearing for the de facto
complainant, vehemently opposed the present appeal.
7. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that
merely because there is a delay of 34 years in lodging the
FIR, the same cannot be a ground for quashing of the
proceedings. She submits that prima facie the statement of
the prosecutrix has to be taken on face value. It is submitted
that since the de facto complainant stated in the FIR that she
was a minor at the time of the commission of offence, even if
it is said to be consensual, the offence under Section 376 IPC
would be made out.
8. After completion of the investigation, the Investigating
Officer (for short, “I.O.”) filed the final report, which reads as
under:-
“The brief of the final report is that on 04.12.2016
the informant lodged an FIR before the Police
Station and informed that in the year 1982 she was
raped by Suresh Garodia and as a result of which
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on 07.04.1983 a male child, Jasim Ahmed Garodia
was born and further the accused coerced her and
threatened the informant not to lodge FIR. The
investigation was done on receipt of the FIR.
During the investigation the statement of
informant and her son Jasim Ahmed Garodia and
the statement of accused was recorded. The
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of informant
and her son was recorded. The blood sample of all
the three persons were collected and sent for
ossification test at F.S.L. Kolkata the report of the
same was collected. During investigation it was
found that Jasin Ahmed Garodia is the son of
Suresh Garodia. It is further found during
investigation that Suresh Garodia even provided
cash money and other facilities as his son. Due to
greed of property of Suresh Garodia, his son Jasim
Ahmed Garodia with the aid of his mother Sabina
Ahmed lodged this FIR after a period of 34 (thirty
four) long years. Due to property dispute between
Suresh Garodia and Jasim Ahmed Garodia this case
has been lodged. And I pray before this Hon’ble
Court that as the matter relates to civil matter as
such Suresh Garodia shall be discharged from this
case and as such, the final report is submitted. A
notice was though sent to the informant but the
notice could not be served as the informant refused
to receive the notice.”
9. A perusal of the said report clearly reveals that the
statement of the prosecutrix as well as her son were
recorded. In the statement, the son of the prosecutrix even
admitted that the appellant herein was providing cash money
and other facilities to him as his son. The final report states
that only on account of greed for property of the appellant-
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Suresh Garodia, the prosecutrix, in connivance with her son,
has filed the FIR after a period of 34 years. The I.O. opined
that the case was of a civil nature and therefore the appellant
herein should be discharged from the said case. No doubt
that the learned Magistrate, while exercising his powers
under Section 190 Cr.P.C., is not bound to accept the final
report of the I.O. However, if the learned Magistrate disagrees
with the finding of the I.O., the least that is expected of him
is to give reasons as to why he disagrees with such a report
and as to why he finds it necessary to take cognizance
despite the negative report submitted by the I.O. Nothing of
that sort has been done by the learned Magistrate in his
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order dated 4 July 2017.
10. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and
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Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others , has observed thus:
“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chap-
ter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by
this Court in a series of decisions relating to the ex-
ercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we give the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power could be ex-
ercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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| though it may not be possible to lay down any pre-<br>cise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and<br>inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an<br>exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein<br>such power should be exercised. | ||
|---|---|---|
| (1) Where the allegations made in the fri st<br>information report or the complaint, even<br>if they are taken at their face value and<br>accepted in their entirety do not prima fa-<br>cie constitute any offence or make out a<br>case against the accused. | ||
| (2) Where the allegations in the first infor-<br>mation report and other materials, if any,<br>accompanying the FIR do not disclose a<br>cognizable offence, justifying an investiga-<br>tion by police officers under Section<br>156(1) of the Code except under an order<br>of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec-<br>tion 155(2) of the Code. | ||
| (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations<br>made in the FIR or complaint and the evi-<br>dence collected in support of the same do<br>not disclose the commission of any of-<br>fence and make out a case against the ac-<br>cused. | ||
| (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do<br>not constitute a cognizable offence but<br>constitute only a non-cognizable offence,<br>no investigation is permitted by a police<br>officer without an order of a Magistrate as<br>contemplated under Section 155(2) of the<br>Code. | ||
| (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR<br>or complaint are so absurd and inher-<br>ently improbable on the basis of which no<br>prudent person can ever reach a just con-<br>clusion that there is sufficient ground for<br>proceeding against the accused. |
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| (6) Where there is an express legal bar<br>engrafted in any of the provisions of the<br>Code or the concerned Act (under which a<br>criminal proceeding is instituted) to the<br>institution and continuance of the pro-<br>ceedings and/or where there is a specific<br>provision in the Code or the concerned<br>Act, providing efficacious redress for the<br>grievance of the aggrieved party. | ||
|---|---|---|
| (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mani-<br>festly attended with mala fide and/or<br>where the proceeding is maliciously insti-<br>tuted with an ulterior motive for wreaking<br>vengeance on the accused and with a<br>view to spite him due to private and per-<br>sonal grudge. | ||
| 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that<br>the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should<br>be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection<br>and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the<br>court will not be justified in embarking upon an en-<br>quiry as to the reliability or genuineness or other-<br>wise of the allegations made in the FIR or the com-<br>plaint and that the extraordinary or inherent pow-<br>ers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the<br>court to act according to its whim or caprice.” |
11. In the said case, the Court has given a caution that the
power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases. The Court would normally not embark
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the
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complaint.
12. However, we find that the present case would fall under
category Nos. 5 and 7 of the categories of cases culled out by
this Court in the said case.
13. We find that lodging a case after 34 years and that too
on the basis of a bald statement that the prosecutrix was a
minor at the time of commission of offence, could itself be a
ground to quash the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever
is given in the FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping
silent for a long period of 34 years. The material on record
shows that the relationship was consensual, inasmuch as the
son who is born out of the said relationship has been treated
by the appellant as his son and all the facilities, including
cash money, have been provided to him.
14. We find that the finding of the I.O. that the case was
filed only for the greed for the property of the appellant
herein cannot be said to be erroneous. We find that the
continuation of the proceedings would lead to nothing else
but an abuse of process of law.
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15. Therefore, the impugned order dated 22 August 2022
passed by the High Court and the order of the learned
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Magistrate dated 4 July 2017 are hereby quashed and set
aside and the present appeal is allowed.
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16. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
..............................J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 09, 2024
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