Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
TRIBHUBAN PARKASH NAYYAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE UNION OF INDIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
10/10/1969
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
SHELAT, J.M.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 540 1970 SCR (2) 732
1969 SCC (3) 99
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1973 SC1461 (97)
RF 1984 SC1801 (1,2,3)
R 1989 SC1019 (7)
ACT:
Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950-Displaced Persons
(Claims) ’Supplementary Act, 1954-Section 5(1)(b)-Revisional
Powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner-If extends to
matters which had become final under the 1950 Act-Scope of
power--Displaced Persons (Verification of Claims)
Supplementary Rules, 1954-Rule 18, cl. (iv)-If can be cons-
trued ejusdem generis.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, a displaced person from West Pakistan,
submitted his claim under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act
of 1950 in respect of the property left by him there The
Claims Officer verified the claim for Rs. 8 lacs. The
Claims Commissioner, in revision, raised the value of the
verified claim to Rs. 10 lacs. The Settlement Commissioner,
exercising the revisional powers of the Chief Settlement
Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Claims)
Supplementary Act, 1954, reduced the claim of Rs. 10 lacs to
Rs. 15,000. In a writ petition filed by the appellant a
single Judge of the High Court quashed the order of the
Settlement Commissioner holding that there were clear errors
of law on the fact of the record. It was left open to the
department to reconsider the matter as to evaluation and
come to a proper conclusion on evidence. A Letters Patent
Bench reversed the order of the single Judge and dismissed
the: writ petition. In appeal to this Court it was
contended that : (i) the order of the Settlement
Commissioner was vitiated by errors of law on the face of
the record; (ii) the Settlement Commissioner exercising the
power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the
Supplementary Act had no jurisdiction to revise the order
made by the Claims Commissioner exercising revisional power
under the Act of 1950; (iii) the power of revision conferred
on the Chief Settlement Commissioner by section 5(1)(b) of
the Supplementary Act was restricted to the verification of
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the claim and its valuation was outside its purview and (iv)
the power was circumscribed within the four-corners of rule
18 of the Displaced Persons (Verification of Claims)
Supplementary Rules, 1954. Allowing the appeal,
HELD : (i) The learned single Judge was right in his
conclusions. The order and the material on record show that
the Settlement Commissioner had, at more places than one,
based his conclusions on pure conjectures and surmises
without there being any legal evidence on the record to
support them.
(ii) The language used in Section 5(1)(b) of the
Supplementary Act is unambiguous and it clearly empowers the
Chief Settlement Commissioner, subject to any rules that may
be made, to revise any verified claim and make such orders
in relation thereto as he thinks fit. On a plain reading of
the section in the light of the definition of the expression
"verified claim" and the statutory scheme, the Chief
Settlement Commissioner’s special power of revision would
extend’ to suo motu revision of the verified claims which
had become final under the Act of 1950 Is a result of orders
made by the Claims Commissioner on revision. The use of the
words "revised any verified claim"’ seem prima facie to
extend the power of revision also to verified claims bearing
the stamp of scrutiny by ’the Chief Settlement Commissioner.
There being no doubt as to the mean-
733
ing of s. 5(1)(b) the preamble cannot be used to control or
qualify its unambiguous language. [737 A-F]
(iii) The definition of verified claim in s. 2(f) of the
Supplementary Act speaks of the final order and it includes
valuation. The Claims Officer under the Act has also to
value the claim and the final order embraces, both
verification of title and valuation. [738 G-H]
(iv) The categories contained in clauses (i) to (iii) of
rule 18 do not form a genus or a class with the result that
the expression "other sufficient reason" occurring in cl.
(iv) of this rule would not attract the ejusdem generis rule
for its construction. But assuming that the first three
clauses constitute a class or kind of objects or genus, the
grounds given by the Settlement Commissioner are analogous
to cl. (iii) which speaks of gross and material irregularity
and disparity in the evaluation of the claim. [741 H]
[The case was remitted to the Chief Settlement Commissioner
for a fresh decision in accordance with law.]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1568 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 9, 1964
of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 2-D of 1963.
K. L. Gosain, K. L. Mehta, D. N. Bhasin, S. K. Mehta.
Inderjeet Gulati and Sona Bhatiani, for the appellant.
B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J. The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, now
in West Pakistan, submitted his claim in respect of the
immovable property left by him there. The claim was
submitted under the provisions of the Displaced Persons
(Claims) Act. XLIV of 1950 (hereafter called the principal
Act). The property in respect of which the claim was
submitted was valued by the appellant at Rs. 10 lacs. It
consisted of a building 21/2 storeyed high with 12 shops and
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a well as also some platform etc. in Landa Bazar, in Lahore.
The Claims Officer verified this claim for Rs. 8 lacs.
Against this order a revision was taken by the appellant to
the Claims Commissioner who on May 1, 1953 in a brief order
raised the value of the verified claim to Rs. 10 lacs. The
relevant part of that order reads as under
"I have gone through the order of the learned
Claims Officer and I find that he has given a
queer argument to allow Rs. 8,00,000/- to the
claimant. By every method tried by him the
assessment went beyond Rs. 10,00,000/- and I
think he ought to have allowed Rs. 10,00,000/-
as claimed by the claimant I enhance the
assessment and allow Rs. 10,00,000/to the
claimant."
734
We would assume that the Claims Commissioner had been duly
delegated the power of the Chief Claims Commissioner to
revise the order of the Claims Officer, because no dispute
was raised on this point. On the strength of the verified
claim the appellant purchased two properties in Delhi at a
public auction; one of them is situated in Daryaganj and the
other in New Rajinder Nagar. On November 8, 1957 Shri M. S.
Chaddha, Settlement Commissioner, exercising power of the
Chief Settlement Commissioner issued to the appellant a
notice under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary
Act, 1954 calling upon him to show cause why the order of
the Claims Commissioner dated May 1, 1953 be not revised and
varied. On May 23, 1958 the said officer reduced the
appellant’s claim of Rs. 10 lacs to Rs. 15,000/-. The
appellant then filed a writ petition under Art. 226 in the
Punjab High Court challenging the order reducing the value
of his claim. A learned Single Judge on November 1, 1962
allowed the writ petition holding that the learned
Settlement Commissioner exercising the power of the Chief
Settlement Commissioner had proceeded to deal with the value
of the property on wholly conjectural grounds. In a
detailed order the learned Single Judge came to the
conclusion that the Settlement Commissioner had not only
ignored important evidence but had also held certain
documents to be forged without any evidence in support of
the finding. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge,
therefore, there were clear errors of law on the face of the
record rendering the order of the Settlement Commissioner
open to challenge in writ proceedings in the High Court. On
this view the order was set aside and quashed. It was,
however, observed that it would be open to the department to
reconsider the entire matter as to valuation and come to a
proper conclusion on evidence.
The respondent took the matter on appeal to a Division Bench
under the Letter Patent and the Letters Patent Bench
reversed the order of the learned Single Judge holding that
on a reading of the order of the Settlement Commissioner it
could not be said that his finding was based on no legal
evidence. The appeal was accordingly allowed and setting
aside the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant’s
writ petition was dismissed. The appellant has come to this
Court on appeal with certificate.
On behalf of the appellant two main points were raised
before us. It was contended, in the first instance, that
Shri M. S. Chaddha, while exercising the power of the Chief
Settlement Commissioner, had no jurisdiction to revise the
order made by the Claims Commissioner exercising the
revisional power of the Chief Claims Commissioner under the
principal Act. Secondly,
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735
it was contended that there was a clear error of law
apparent on the face of the record with the result that the
learned Single Judge was fully justified in quashing the
order of the Settlement Commissioner, and that the Letters
Patent Bench was in error in allowing the appeal. While
developing this ground of attack the counsel also submitted
that in exercising the power of revision the Settlement
Commissioner could not interfere with conclusions of fact
and that he had, therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction in so
doing.
In order to examine the first submission we have to turn to
the provisions of the Principal Act and of the Displaced
Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act 12 of 1954 (hereafter
called the Supplementary Act). The principal Act, enacted
with the object of providing for the registration and
verification of claims of displaced persons in respect of
immovable property in Pakistan, was brought on the statute
book on May 18, 1950 and was initially to remain in force
for a period of two years only. Its life was extended by a
further period of one year by means of an amendment in 1952.
On the expiry of the third year the Displaced Persons
(Claims) Supplementary Ordinance No. 3 of 1954 was
promulgated pending the passage, by the Parliament of the
bill which later emerged in the shape of Supplementary Act.
The Ordinance was enforced on January 18, 1954. The supple-
mentary Act was enacted, as its preamble shows, to provide
for the disposal of certain proceedings pending under the
principal Act and for matters connected therewith. We have
specifically referred to the preamble because on behalf of
the appellant strong reliance was placed on the preamble in
support of his construction of ss. 4 and 5 of the
supplementary Act, which deal with the revisional power of
the Chief Settlement Commissioner appointed under this Act.
It is not disputed at the bar that this Act was primarily
designed to finalise the disposal of certain proceedings
pending under the principal Act at the time of its expiry.
According to the appellant the words "for matters connected
therewith" in the preamble are intended to have the effect
of restricting the ambit of its provisions exclusively to
the proceedings actually pending on the date of the expiry
of the principal Act, whereas, according to the respondent
these words demand a liberal construction so as to bring
within the fold of the Act all proceedings initiated for the
registration of claims, notwithstanding the fact that final
order of verification and valuation had already been made
thereon. The respondent also placed strong reliance on the
language used in s. 5 which, he argued, is plain and
unambiguous and its ambit cannot be restricted by the
Preamble. That section reads as under
736
"Special power of revision in respect of cases decided under
Act XLIV of 1950.
5. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in the principal Act, the Chief Settlement
Commissioner
(a) may, on an application for revision made
to him within time by any person aggrieved by
the decision of the Claims Officer, call for
the record of the case and make such order in
the case as he thinks fit.
"Explanation-For the purposes of this clause,
an application for revision shall be deemed to
be or to have been made within time, if-
(i) such application was not barred by
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limitation on the appointed day under the
rules made under the principal Act and is
filed within one month from the commencement
of this Act; or
(ii) such application had been filed before
the appointed day and was not, on the date on
which it was filed barred by limitation under
the rules made under the principal Act;
(b) may, on his own motion, but subject to
any rules that may be made in this behalf,
revise any verified claim and make such order
in relation thereto as he thinks fit.
(2) No order varying the decision of the
Claims Officer or revising any verified claim
which prejudicially affects any person shall
be made without giving an opportunity of being
heard."
This special power of revision was conferred on the Chief
Settlement Commissioner in addition to the ordinary power of
revision conferred by the proviso to S. 4(3) which was
similar to the power of revision conferred on the Chief
Claims Commissioner, under the principal Act. The suo motu
power to revise verified claims, according to the
appellant’s learned counsel, was designedly vested in the
Chief Settlement Commissioner, he ,being the final authority
under the supplementary Act. But this power, argued the
counsel, was not intended to extend to proceedings, which
could not be considered to be pending under the principal
Act. This argument was sought to be founded on the Preamble
of the supplementary Act. A verified claim which had been
subjected to scrutiny by the Chief Claims Commissioner and
737
bore that officer’s seal under the principal Act, according
to the appellant’s counsel, could not be described to be a
matter pending under the principal Act and a revision of
such a claim could not be held to be a matter connected with
a pending proceeding.
The object and purpose of a preamble to a statute is well
settled and at the bar before us there was no serious
dispute on this point. A preamble is a key to open the mind
of the legislature but it cannot be used to control or
qualify precise and unambiguous language of the enactment.
It is only when there is/ a doubt as to the meaning of a
provision that recourse may be had to the preamble to
ascertain the reasons for the enactment and hence the
intention of the Parliament. If the language of the
enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that one
is to be preferred which comes nearest to the ;purpose and
scope of the preamble. In other words, Preamble may assist
in ascertaining the meaning but it does not affect clear
words in a statute. The courts are thus not expected to
start with the preamble for construing a statutory provision
nor does the mere fact that a clear and unambiguous
statutory provision goes beyond the preamble give rise, by
itself, to a doubt on its , meaning.
Now the language used in s. 5(1)(b) of the supplementary Act
is unambiguous and it clearly empowers the Chief Settlement
Commissioner, subject to any rules that may be made, to
revise any verified claim and make such orders in relation
thereto as he thinks fit. A verified claim, as defined in
s. 2(f) of the Supplementary Act, means any claim registered
under the principal Act in respect of which a final order
has been passed under that Act. Now it is difficult to’
contend that on a plain reading of s. 5(1)(b) in the light
of the definition of the expression "verified claim", the
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Chief Settlement Commissioner had no power suo motu to
revise a claim on which a final order had been passed under
the principal Act by the Chief’ Claims Commissioner. It may
be pointed out that according to the statutory scheme, under
s. 5(1) (a) of the Supplementary Act an aggrieved party is
entitled to apply to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for
revision of decisions of the Claims Officers and there is
adequate provision for safeguarding the interests of the
aggrieved parties from any possible injury by reason of
lapse of time. The difference in the language used in
clauses (a) and (b) of s. 5(1) throws sufficient light on
the legislative intent. The use of the words "revise any
verified claim" seems prima facie to extend the power of
revision also to verified claims bearing the stamp,/of
scrutiny by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Had the
Parliament intended this power to be restricted, as
suggested on behalf of the appellant,
738
then it would have expressed such intention in clear words.
The statutory scheme also supports this view. Under the
proviso to S. 4(3) the Chief Settlement Commissioner has
suo motu power of revision from the decisions of the
settlement Officers and under s. 5(1)(a) he has the power
of revision on applications by aggrieved parties from
the decisions of Claims Officers. But under s. 5 (1) (b)
the suo motu power of revision does not extend to all
decisions but is confined only to verified claims though in
this respect it takes within its fold all such claims and is
not restricted to the claims verified only by the Claims
Officers. On a plain reading of s. 5(1)(b), therefore, the
Chief Settlement Commissioner’s special power of revision
would seem to us to extend to suo motu revision of the
verified claims which had become final under the principal
Act as a result of orders made by the Chief Claims
Commissioner on revision., Neither any statutory bat’ nor
any precedent has been cited against the exercise of this
power; nor has any principle been brought to our notice
which would induce us to restrict the plain language of s.
5(1)(b).
The submission that an order made on a revision can in no
case be subjected to further revision, is also unacceptable
on the statutory scheme and language. No constitutional bar
to further scrutiny of such orders on revision was pointed
out. It may in this connection be, borne in mind that
verification of claims under the principal Act involved
proof in regard to title to, and value of, property left by
the displaced persons in West Pakistan; and this had to be
completed within a period of, originally, two years which
was later extended by one year. The best evidence in this
respect was only available in West Pakistan, and it is a
matter of common knowledge that it was not easy for an
average displaced person to secure such evidence. Chances
of errors in verification and valuation of claims, in these
circumstances, being Not too few, the highest authority was
advisedly in larger public’ interest vested with a wide
power to review and reassess such verified claims.
It was then contended that the power of revision under s.
5(1)(b) is restricted to the verification of the claim and
its valuation is outside its purview. This contention is
difficult to accept. It is true that "claim" as defined in
the principal Act broadly speaking means the assertion of a
right to ownership of, or to any interest in, immovable
property. But the Claims Officer under that Act has also to
value the claim and the final order embraces both
verification of title and valuation. The definition of
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"verified claim" in s. 2(f) of the supplementary Act speaks
of the final order and it includes valuation.
This takes us to the submission that the power of revision
of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is circumscribed within
the
739
four corners of r. 18 of the Displaced Persons (Verification
of Claim) Supplementary Rules, 1954. This rule, of course,
specifically controls the exercise of the power of revision
conferred by s. 5(1)(b) and this is not disputed. Rule 18
is in the following terms :
"Special revision of verified claims under
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5.
18. The Chief Settlement Commissioner may,
while exercising the powers of special
revision conferred on him by clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of section 5, call for the
record of any verified claim and may pass any
order in revision in respect of such verified
claim in such manner as he thinks fit, if he
is satisfied that such order should be passed
on one or the other of the following grounds,
namely:-
(i) the discovery of any new matter or
documentary evidence which after the exercise
of due diligence was not within the knowledge
of or could not be produced by the claimant at
the time when the claim was verified; or
(ii) correction of any clerical or
arithmetical mistake apparent on the face of
the record; or
(iii) gross or material irregularity or
disparity in the valuation of the claim; or
(iv) any other sufficient reason
Provided that the Chief Settlement
Commissioner shall not entertain or take into
consideration any application or
representation made to him under this rule by
any claimant if such application or
representation is made after the 30th
day of
April, 1954."
It was contended that the grounds on which the Chief
Settlement Commissioner revised the verified claim do not
fall within the first three clauses of this rule. The
fourth clause, according to Shri Gosain’s argument, must be
read ejusdem generis and so read this clause would also be
inapplicable to the case. Reliance in support of this
argument was placed on M.M.B. Catholicos and another v. The
Most. Rev. Mar Poulose and others(1), a case dealing with
the power of review under Order 47 rule 1 Civil P.C., the
language of which, according to the appellant’s counsel, is
completely identical with that of rule 18..
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 520.
L5SupCI(NP)/70-2
740
Let us examine the language of these two provisions. Rule
18 has already been reproduced. Order 47 r. 1(c) Civil P.C.
which alone is relevant for our purpose is in the following
terms.
"Rule 1. Any person considering himself
aggrieved
(a)
(b)
(c) by a decision on a reference from a
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Court of Small Causes and who, from the
discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when
the decree was passed or order made, or on
account of some mistake or error apparent on
the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review
of the decree passed or order made against
him, may apply for a review of judgment to the
Court which passed the decree or made the
order.
(2) . . . . . . .
From a plain reading of these two provisions the difference
in their language is quite obvious. Clauses (i) and (ii) of
r. 18 are certainly similar to cl. (c) of Order 47 r. 1, but
clause (iii) of r. 18 is wholly different from cl. (c) of
r. 1 of Order 47.It is difficult to hold these clauses to
be similar in kind or to have a common genus. The former
seems not only to take within its fold gross and material
irregularity in the valuation of the claim, which to some
extent resembles one of the grounds on which revisional
power as contemplated by S. 115 Civil P.C. can be exercised,
but also to include cases where there is disparity in the
valuation of the claim. Quite clearly this clause is much
wider in scope than Order 47 r. 1 (c). The expression
"other sufficient cause" occurring in cl. (iv) of r. 18 has
therefore to be construed in this context. When in a
statute there are general words following particular and
specific words, the general words are sometimes construed as
limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This
rule of interpretation generally known as ejuedem generis
rule has been pressed into service on behalf of the
appellant. This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile
incompatibility between the specific and general words, in
view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in
a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to
be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are
presumed to be superfluous. Ejusdem generis rule being one
of the rules of interpretation, only serves, like all such
rules, as an aid to discover the legislative intent; it is
neither final nor conclusive and is attracted only when the
specific words enumerated, constitute a class,
741
which is not exhausted and are followed by general terms and
when there is no manifestation of intent to give broader
meaning to the general words.
The first three categories contained in r. 18, in our
opinion, do not form a genus or a class with the result that
clause (iv) would not attract the ejusdem generis rule for
its construction. But assuming that they constitute a class
or kind of objects or genus, it appears to us that grounds
given by the Settlement Commissioner are analogous to clause
(iii) which speaks of gross and material irregularity or
disparity in the valuation of the claim. This submission
must, therefore, be rejected.
We now come to the merits of the order of the Settlement
Commissioner. After going through the order and the
material on the record, to which our attention has been
drawn, we are satisfied that the Settlement Commissioner has
at more places than one based his conclusions on pure
conjectures and surmises without there being any legal
evidence on the record to support them. We do not consider
it necessary to exhaustively deal with the argument in
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support of the errors of law on the face of the record for
the purpose of considering the alleged infirmities in the
order of the Settlement Commissioner. The learned Single
Judge has dealt with this question at length and we are in
agreement with his conclusions. We may only add that we
have also looked at the original documents which appeared
suspicious to the Settlement Commissioner, but we are unable
to find any circumstance which could be said to be
suspicious or abnormal so as to give rise to any reasonable
doubt about their genuineness. The respondent’s learned
counsel also expressed his inability to bring to our notice
any material throwing suspicion on the, genuineness of
these documents. Indeed the learned counsel was frank en-
ough to express his inability to support the view taken by
the Letters Patent Bench or to find fault with the
conclusions of the learned Single Judge, whose order seems
to be unexceptionable. We accordingly allow the appeal and
setting aside the order of the Letters Patent Bench restore
that of the Single Judge. It was agreed at the bar that as
directed by the Single Judge the case should go back to the
Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision in
accordance with law. That this case can be remitted back to
the Chief Settlement Commissioner in these proceedings was
not disputed before us. We should, however, make it clear
that this order is not to be construed to contain any
expression of opinion on merits on the evidentiary value of
the material on the record on the question of valuation of
the claim. The appellant is entitled to his costs.
Appeal allowed
R.K.P.S.
742