Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 661 of 2002
PETITIONER:
State of Haryana & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
Jai Singh
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/02/2003
BENCH:
N Santosh Hegde & B P Singh.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
SANTOSH HEGDE, J.
In this appeal the State of Haryana is challenging the
judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at
Chandigarh rendered in Crl. Misc. No.2176-M/2000 dated
26.4.2001.
Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that
while the respondent was serving a sentence of 7 years’ RI for
having committed an offence of rape punishable under Section
376 IPC, the Government of Haryana, on the eve of the
Independence Day, issued a notification dated 14.8.1995 in
exercise of its power vested under Section 432 of the Code,
granting remission of prison sentence to all convicts except
those excluded in the said notification. The said notification
excluded such convicts who had been convicted for the
offences of rape, dowry death, abduction and murder of a child
below 14 years, unnatural offences, robbery, persons sentenced
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
(NDPS), TADA, the Foreigners’ Act, Passport Act, the persons
detained under the detention laws, the persons sentenced under
Sections 2 and 3 of the Criminal Laws Amendment Act, the
persons convicted under Sections 121 and 130 of the IPC, and
the convicts found guilty of violation of Jail Manual.
Because of the above exclusion of certain offences from
the benefit of remission under the notification, the respondent
became ineligible for such remission, therefore, he questioned
the classification of offences for the purpose of denying
remission in a petition filed before the High Court alleging that
the said classification amounts to discrimination, thus, being
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court accepting the said argument and following an earlier
judgment of the same court made in Crl. Misc. No.21746-M of
1998 - Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana - came to the
conclusion that it is not open to the State Government while
granting general remission to carve out special exceptions in
cases which, according to it, could be termed as heinous
offences and deny the benefit of remission to such class of
convicts, therefore, while allowing the petition, it directed the
State Government to grant the benefit of remission to the
respondent also.
It is necessary to note herein that the High Court in the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5
previous petition, namely, that of Suresh Kumar v. State of
Haryana (supra) following a Division Bench judgment of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Jagaram & Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (1986 Crl.L.J. 1424) had come
to the conclusion that the State had no power to place a
restriction on the grant of remission because such power of
restriction has already been exercised by the Parliament while
amending Section 433A of the Code. It also held that the
classification of convicts based on the nature of offences
committed by them for the purpose of granting remission is
impermissible and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Though the State of Haryana had preferred an appeal to this
Court as against the said judgment of the High Court in Suresh
Kumar (supra), the said appeal [Crl. A. No.726 of 2000]
came to be dismissed by this Court on a concession made by
the learned counsel for the parties, without going into the
question of classification.
In this appeal, learned counsel appearing for the State
contended that the High Court was in error in coming to the
conclusion that the classification of convicts based solely on
their criminal acts is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
He contended that for the purpose of granting remission, such
classification would be a reasonable classification while Mr.
Anil Hooda, learned counsel appearing for the respondent as an
amicus curiae, contended that Section 432 of the Code being an
enabling provision, the State Government while exercising the
said power, cannot create a classification so as to deny a class
of convicts the benefit of such remission while the said benefit
was made available to another class of convicts. He also
contended that if the gravity of offence is the sole criteria then
by the impugned notification, the State had extended the benefit
to many convicts who had been held guilty of offences
involving more serious charges than those excluded from the
benefit of remission. He further contended that as had been held
by the High Court in the case of Suresh Kumar (supra), apart
from the ground of arbitrary classification, the notification is
also bad for want of statutory authority to create a restriction on
the right of some convicts to get the benefit of remission. In this
regard, learned counsel points out that the Parliament having
exercised the power of imposing restriction in granting
remission under Section 433A, the State Government as a
delegatee, does not have the power to further impose any
restriction beyond what has been restricted under Section 433A
of the Code.
We will first take up for consideration the argument
accepted by the High Court in the impugned judgment that the
impugned classification is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution. While considering the
challenge based on Article 14 as to the arbitrariness in the
impugned classification, the court has to examine whether the
impugned classification satisfies certain constitutional mandates
or not. They are (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from others left out of the group; (ii)
that the differentia must have a rational relationship with the
objects sought to be achieved by the Act. (See Kathi Raning
Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra [1952 SCR 435]).
In the instant case, the State Government under the
impugned notification granted the benefit of remission to all
convicts except those excluded in the said notification. Though
the notification in question does not give any specific reason for
exclusion of such convicts, from the pleadings of the State
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5
Government, it is clear that this exclusion was done based on
the nature of offence committed by the said convicts and taking
into consideration the effect of such offence on the society as
also the integrity of the State. The question then is whether such
classification of convicts based on the nature of offence
committed by them, would be an arbitrary classification having
no nexus with the object of the Code.
The answer to the said question, in our opinion, should
be in the negative. This Court in a catena of decisions has
recognised that the gravity of an offence and the quantum of
sentence prescribed in the Code could be a reasonable basis for
a classification. This Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v.
Mohinder Singh etc. (2000 (3) SCC 394) held : "Prisoners have
no absolute right for remission of their sentence unless except
what is prescribed by law and the circular issued thereunder.
That special remission shall not apply to a prisoner convicted of
a particular offence can certainly be a relevant consideration for
the State Government not to exercise power of remission in that
case." (emphasis supplied)
In Maru Ram etc. etc. v. Union of India & Anr. (1981 (1)
SCR 1196), this Court while repelling an argument of
discrimination in regard to the sentence to be imposed in
murder cases, held :
"The logic is lucid although its wisdom, in
the light of penological thought, is open to
doubt. We have earlier stated the parameters
of judicial restraint and, as at present
advised, we are not satisfied that the
classification is based on an irrational
differentia unrelated to the punitive end of
social defence. Suffice it to say here, the
classification, if due respect to Parliament’s
choice is given, cannot be castigated as a
capricious enough to attract the lethal
consequence of Art. 13 read with Art. 14."
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (AIR 1978
SC 1675), this Court upheld the validity of a classification
based on the gravity of the offence.
From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that
the gravity of the offence can form the basis of a valid
classification if the object of such classification is to grant or
not to grant remission.
Having come to the conclusion that the gravity of the
offence can be the basis for a valid classification, we will now
consider whether the offences excluded from the impugned
notification can be said to be such offences which have been
wrongly excluded from the benefit of remission. We notice that
the convicts who have been excluded from the benefit of said
notification, are those convicts who have been sentenced for
offences of rape, dowry death, abduction and murder of a child
below 14 years, offences coming under Sections 121 to 130
IPC, dacoity, robbery, etc. These are the offences for which the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5
Code has prescribed the sentence of rigorous imprisonment
extending up to life, therefore, from the very nature of the
sentence which the offence entails, the said offences can be
categorised as grave offences, therefore, they can be aptly
classified as grave offences, which classification will be a valid
classification for the purpose of deciding whether the persons
who have committed such offences should be granted remission
or not. On this basis, we are of the opinion that the State
Government having decided not to grant remission to these
offenders/offences which carry life imprisonment, should not
be granted remission, is justified in doing so.
Similarly, the offences under the NDPS and the TADA
Acts, apart from carrying heavy penal sentences are offences
which could be termed as offences having serious adverse
effect on the society, cognisance of which is required to be
taken by the State while granting remission, therefore, they can
also be classified as offences which should be kept out of the
purview of remission.
The offences enumerated in Sections 121 to 130 IPC are
the offences against the State, though some of them may not be
punishable with life imprisonment, still taking into
consideration the nature of offence which undermines the
security of the State, in our opinion, can be classified for
exclusion from the benefit of remission.
Again the offences under the Foreigners Act, Passport
Act, Official Secrets Act also being offences against the State,
they can be classified as offences which will not be entitled to
the benefit of remission. The persons who have indulged in the
breach of mandate of the Jail Manual can also be classified as
the offenders who should not be granted the incentive of
remission because of their conduct during the period of their
conviction. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the offences
excluded from the benefit of remission under the impugned
notification have been properly classified which classification,
in our opinion, is a valid classification for the purpose of
making them ineligible for the grant of remission.
Learned counsel for the respondent, as stated above,
relying on the judgment of the High Court in Suresh Kumar’s
case (supra), has argued that the State Government did not have
the power to create a further restriction than what is provided in
Section 433A of the Code in view of the Parliamentary
enactment of the said Section in the Code. We notice that the
legislature by enacting Section 432 in the Code has given wide
powers of suspension, remission and commutation to
appropriate Government which can utilise the said power at any
time with or without condition. Such power can be exercised by
the appropriate Government either with reference to a single
convict or with reference to a class of convicts so long as such
classification is a valid classification. However, by enacting
Section 433A in the Code, the Parliament has only restricted
the power of the appropriate Government to grant remission to
the convicts mentioned in that Section. It does not do anything
more. To grant or not to grant is the power vested in the
appropriate Government under Section 432 which the said
Government can exercise either by granting remission to all
convicts except those mentioned in Section 433A or by
restricting the remission to a class of convicts provided such
classification is valid. The High Court in the case of Suresh
Kumar (supra) erred in holding that the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Jagaram’s case (supra) has held that the power of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5
appropriate Government to restrict the remission to any class of
convicts stands excluded by virtue of the introduction of
Section 433A of the Code. This understanding of the judgment
in Jagaram’s case (supra) by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
is wholly erroneous. A reading of the judgment of A.P.High
Court in Jagaram’s case (supra) at para 7 clearly shows an
argument addressed in that case as to the curtailment of the
power of the appropriate Government by virtue of the
introduction of Section 433A of the Code was specifically
rejected which the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Suresh
Kumar’s case (supra) misread as having upheld the said
argument. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that by
introduction of Section 433A of the Code, the Parliament has
not excluded or denuded the power of the appropriate
Government to restrict the grant of remission to a class of
prisoners only or exclude a class of prisoners from such benefit
of remission.
Before we conclude, we must note that the notification in
question was valid only for the year 1995 and the respondent
herein having been given the benefit of remission by the High
Court as far back as on 20.10.2001, we do not think the interest
of justice requires us to interfere with that benefit given to the
respondent. We, however, as stated above, uphold the
classification made by the State Government in the impugned
notification.
We place on record our appreciation for the services
rendered by Mr. Anil Hooda, learned counsel, as an amicus
curiae in this case.
For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds to the
extent indicated hereinabove, and is thus disposed of.
1
1