Full Judgment Text
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1591 OF 2006
Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh ……..Appellant
Versus
Megh Raj Garg and another ……….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. Whether the decision taken by the Syndicate of the Panjab University
to entertain and accept the application made by respondent No.1 Megh Raj
Garg for changing the date of birth recorded in his matriculation certificate
was binding on the State Government and the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana (hereinafter described as `the appellant’) and whether the suit filed
by respondent No.1 for ordaining correction of the date of birth recorded in
his service book was maintainable are the questions which arise for
determination in this appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment of
the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Regular Second Appeal
No.901 of 1996.
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2. Respondent No.1 joined service as Sub Judge-cum-Judicial
Magistrate, II Class in March, 1973. His date of birth was recorded in the
service book as 27.3.1936 because that was the date mentioned in the
matriculation certificate and the application made by him in response to the
advertisement issued by the Punjab Public Service Commission. After ten
years of joining the service, respondent No.1 submitted an application to the
concerned authority of Punjab University for amendment of the date of birth
recorded in the matriculation certificate by asserting that his correct date of
birth was 27.3.1938 but by mistake the same was recorded as 27.3.1936. In
support of this assertion, respondent No.1 relied upon the certificates issued
by Government High School, Moonak and Hindu Sabha High School,
Sunam. The Date of Birth Committee of the University recommended that
the request made by respondent No.1 may be accepted. Thereupon, the
Syndicate of the University directed that the date of birth recorded in the
matriculation certificate of respondent No.1 be changed from 27.3.1936 to
27.3.1938. In compliance of the decision taken by the Syndicate, necessary
changes were made in the matriculation certificate of respondent No.1.
3. After having succeeded in persuading the University to change the
date of birth recorded in his matriculation certificate, respondent No.1
represented to the State Government for making corresponding change in the
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date of birth recorded in the service book. The State Government, in
consultation with the High Court, rejected the prayer of respondent No.1 and
he was informed about this vide letter dated 28.1.1993.
4. Respondent No.1 challenged the decision of the State Government in
Civil Suit No.417-A of 1993 and prayed for grant of a declaration that the
decision of the State Government and the High Court not to correct the date
of birth recorded in his service book is illegal, void and ineffective. He also
prayed for issue of a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to
change the date of birth recorded in the service book from 27.3.1936 to
27.3.1938.
5. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No.2 (appellant
herein), reliance was placed on Para 1 of Annexure-A to Chapter II of the
Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume 1 and it was pleaded that the
application made by respondent No.1 for correction of date of birth recorded
in his service book after twelve years of entering into service was rightly
rejected. It was further pleaded that correction of the date of birth recorded
in the matriculation certificate by the University was not binding on the
High Court and the State Government.
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6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following
issues:
“(1) Whether the order dated 28.1.1993 is illegal, null and
void as alleged? OPP.
(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of mandatory
injunction as prayed for? OPP.
(3) Whether the suit is not maintainable as it is not within
limitation? OPD.
(4) Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD
(5) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the
date of birth as mentioned in the office record? OPD.
(6) Relief.”
7. After considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the trial
Court decreed the suit and declared that rejection of the representation made
by respondent No.1 for correction of his date of birth was illegal and void.
The trial Court also issued a mandatory direction for alteration of the date of
birth recorded in the service book of respondent No.1 from 27.3.1936 to
27.3.1938. While dealing with the issue of limitation, the learned trial Judge
distinguished the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Harnam
Singh (1993) 2 SCC 162 and Secretary and Commissioner, Home
Department and others v. R. Kirubakaran 1994 Supp.(1) SCC 155, by
making the following observations:
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“In my opinion, these authorities which are based on Rules /
Administrative instructions prescribing period of limitation
within which the employee can submit his application for
correction of date of birth to his employer, have become
redundant so far as the present suit is concerned because Punjab
University has issued notification No. 11/4/93-5 PP-II/4499,
dated 21.6.1994, making Rules to amend the Punjab Civil
Services Rules, Volume-I, Part-I, inter alia to the effect that
employees of the Punjab Government can apply for the change
of date of birth to the Government within a period of two years
from the coming into force of the aforesaid Rules. Thus, the
aforesaid two rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court do not
debar the plaintiff from seeking his remedy in the Civil Court
and at least do not make the suit barred by limitation.”
8. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court on all the issues
and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. The second appeal
jointly filed by the appellant and the State of Punjab was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge, who held that the decree passed by the trial Court,
which was confirmed by the lower appellate Court was legally correct and
justified. The issue of limitation was decided by the learned Single Judge in
the following words:
“The second contention raised by learned counsel for the
appellants that the Punjab Civil Service Rules, which are
applicable to the plaintiff-respondent, bar the present suit, as the
same was not filed within two years after entry into service, is
also not acceptable. Vide notification dated 21.6.1994, an
amendment was made in the Punjab Civil Service Rules vide
Punjab Civil Service (First Amendment) Rules, Volume-I Part-
I, 1994, according to which the employee already in service of
the Government of Punjab on the date of coming into force of
the amended rules may apply for the change of date of birth
within a period of two years from coming into force of these
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Rules on the basis of documentary evidence, such as
Matriculation certificate or Municipal Birth Certificate etc. By
this amendment, one chance was given to those employees who
did not avail the opportunity to get their date of birth corrected
within the stipulated period of two years from entry into the
Government service and a fresh period of two years was
provided to them which was to start from the date of
amendment. The contention of counsel for the appellants, that
this amendment was subsequently withdrawn by the State
Government vide letter dated 13.12.1995 of the Deputy
Secretary (Personnel) of the Department of Personnel and
Administrative Reforms of Government of Punjab, was rightly
not accepted by the Courts below in view of Division Bench
decision of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No.1476 of 1996,
titled as Daljit Singh v. State of Punjab and others, wherein it
was held that simply on the basis of the letter dated 13.12.1995,
issued by the Deputy Secretary, the operation of the rules
cannot come to a stand still. Thus, in view of the said
amendment, the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent cannot be
said to be barred by limitation and the contention of the
appellants that the date of birth of an employee can only be
corrected within two years of entry into service cannot be
accepted. The first appellate court has also examined this aspect
of the matter and discussed the same in detail in paras 37 to 42
of its judgment. I find no infirmity or illegality in the findings
recorded by the Courts below in this regard. Even otherwise, it
has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Jiwan Dass
v. State of Haryana and another, 1989(2) I.L.R. Punjab 110,
that if a Government employee did not get his date of birth
altered under the service rules within a stipulated period, then
his remedy to get the same altered under the civil law will not
be barred because the administrative law do not bar jurisdiction
of Civil Court and the decision of the administrative authorities
allowing or rejecting the requests for alteration in date of birth
is open to judicial scrutiny when challenged before a court of
competent jurisdiction.”
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully
scrutinized the records. Para 1 of Annexure-A to Chapter II of the Punjab
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Civil Service Rules, Volume 1 (as it stood at the time respondent No.1
joined service and also on the date of his making an application for
correction of the date of birth recorded in his service book), which has direct
bearing on the issue relating to maintainability of the suit filed by respondent
No.1 reads as under:
"In regard to the date of birth declaration of age made at the
time of or for the purpose of entry into Government service
shall, as against the Government employee in question, be
deemed to be conclusive unless, he applies for correction of his
age recorded within two years from the date of his entry into
Government service. The Administrative Department in
consultation with the Department of Personnel &
Administrative Reforms, however, reserves the right to make a
correction in the recorded age of a Government employee at
any time against the interests of the Government employee
when it is satisfied that the age recorded in his service book or
in the history of service of a Gazetted Government employee is
incorrect and has been incorrectly recorded with the object that
the Government employee may derive some unfair advantage
therefrom."
10. An analysis of the above reproduced rule makes it clear that the
declaration of age made at the time of or for the purpose of entry into
government service is conclusive and binding on the government servant.
The only exception to this is that the government servant can make an
application for correction of age within two years from the date of entry into
service. This necessarily implies that an application made by a government
servant for correction of age after two years of his entry into service cannot
be entertained by the competent authority. However, the competent
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authority can, at any time, correct the age recorded in the service book or in
the history service of a gazetted government employee if it is satisfied that
the age has been so recorded with a view to give undue benefit to the
employee / officer like continuance in service beyond the age of
superannuation. Of course, while undertaking this exercise, the competent
authority is bound to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem and give a
reasonable opportunity to the concerned employee/officer to represent his
cause against the proposed change in the recorded age/date of birth. In other
words, while there is a complete bar to the making of an application by the
government servant for correction of his recorded age after two years from
the date of his entry into government service, the competent authority can
make correction at any time if it is found that the age recorded in the service
book is incorrect and has been so recorded with a view to enable the
concerned employee to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation
or gain any other advantage.
11. Undisputedly, the date of birth of respondent No.1, who joined service
in March 1973 was recorded in his service book as 27.3.1936. This was
done keeping in view the declaration made by him in the application form
submitted for the purpose of recruitment to the service and his matriculation
certificate. Being a law graduate, respondent No.1 must have been aware of
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the date of birth i.e., 27.3.1936 recorded in his matriculation certificate and
this must be the reason why he mentioned that date in the application form
submitted to the Public Service Commission. If the correct date of birth of
respondent No.1 was 27.3.1938 and this was supported by the certificates
issued by the schools in which he had studied before appearing in the
matriculation examination, then he would have immediately after joining the
service made an application to the University for change of date of birth
recorded in the matriculation certificate and persuaded the concerned
authority to decide the same so as to enable him to move the State
Government and the High Court for making corresponding change in the
date of birth recorded in his service book in terms of Para 1 of Annexure-A
to Chapter II of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume I. However,
respondent No.1 waited for more than ten years after entering into service
and submitted an application dated 27.10.1983 to the University for
effecting change in the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate
by citing the school certificates as the basis for his claim. The Syndicate of
the University took about one year and three months to decide the matter in
favour of respondent No.1 and the date of birth recorded in the matriculation
certificate was changed from 27.3.1936 to 27.3.1938 sometime in
January/February 1985. Thereafter, respondent No.1 submitted
representation dated 22.2.1985 to the Registrar of the High Court seeking
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correction in the date of birth recorded in the service book. His plea was
finally rejected in January 1993. It is thus evident that respondent No.1
applied for change of the date of birth recorded in his service book much
beyond the time limit of two years specified in the rule. The High Court or
for that reason the State Government did not have the power, jurisdiction or
authority to entertain the representation made by respondent No.1 after more
than twelve years of his entering into service. Therefore, neither of them
committed any illegality by refusing to accept the prayer made by
respondent No.1 on the basis of change effected by the University in the date
of birth recorded in his matriculation certificate. Unfortunately, the trial
Court, the lower appellate Court and the learned Single Judge of the High
Court totally misdirected themselves in appreciating the true scope of the
embargo contained in the relevant rule against the entertaining of an
application for correction of date of birth after two years of the government
servant’s entry into service and all of them committed grave error by
nullifying the decision taken by the State Government in consultation with
the High Court not to accept the representation made by respondent No.1 for
change of date of birth recorded in his service book. All the courts
overlooked the stark reality that respondent No.1 had made application for
change of date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate after more
than ten years of his entry into government service and the decision taken by
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the Syndicate to accept his request did not give him any cause for filing
application or making representation for change of the date of birth recorded
in the service book.
12. This Court has time and again cautioned civil courts and the High
Courts against entertaining and accepting the claim made by the employees
long after entering into service for correction of the recorded date of birth.
In Union of India v. Harnam Singh (supra), this Court considered the
question whether the employer was justified in declining the respondent’s
request for correction of date of birth made after thirty five years of his
induction into the service and whether the Central Administrative Tribunal
was justified in allowing the original application filed by him. While
reversing the order of the Tribunal, this Court observed:
“A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires the
right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by
the State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of
service, unless the services are dispensed with on other grounds
contained in the relevant service rules after following the
procedure prescribed therein. The date of birth entered in the
service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance
for the reason that the right to continue in service stands
decided by its entry in the service record. A Government
servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the
employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request
later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to
claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of
irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from
the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of
limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the
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Government servant must do so without any unreasonable
delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction
of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief on
grounds of laches or stale claims, is generally applied by the
courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the
Government to fix a time-limit, in the service rules, after which
no application for correction of date of birth of a Government
servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes
an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so
fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the
correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to
establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous.
The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be
applied with all its rigour and the courts or tribunals cannot
come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow
the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of
birth as recorded would determine his date of superannuation
even if it amounts to abridging his right to continue in service
on the basis of his actual age. Indeed, as held by this Court in
State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka a public servant may
dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and
apply for its correction but till the record is corrected he cannot
claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth
claimed by him. This Court said: (SCC pp. 625-26, para 4)
“... The date of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56( a )
must in our judgment, be determined on the basis of the
service record, and not on what the respondent claimed to
be his date of birth, unless the service record is first
corrected consistently with the appropriate procedure. A
public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in
the service record and may apply for correction of the
record. But until the record is corrected, he cannot claim
that he has been deprived of the guarantee under Article
311(2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily retired
on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of
the date of birth entered in the service record.”
(emphasis supplied)
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13. In Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department and others v.
R. Kirubakaran (supra), this Court considered the question whether the
Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain an
application made by the respondent for correction of his date of birth just
before superannuation. While answering the question in negative, the Court
observed:
“An application for correction of the date of birth should not be
dealt with by the tribunal or the High Court keeping in view
only the public servant concerned. It need not be pointed out
that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the
public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as
others waiting for years, below him for their respective
promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to
suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction
of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in
some cases for years, within which time many officers who are
below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose
their promotions for ever. Cases are not unknown when a
person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of
retirement of his immediate senior. According to us, this is an
important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or
the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant
in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a
clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be
conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or
the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of
materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any
such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully
satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person
concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been
made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within
the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been
framed or made, prescribing the period within which such
application has to be filed, then such application must be filed
within the time, which can be held to be reasonable. The
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applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim,
which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of
birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the
applicant, to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in
his service book. In many cases it is a part of the strategy on the
part of such public servants to approach the court or the tribunal
on the eve of their retirement, questioning the correctness of the
entries in respect of their dates of birth in the service books. By
this process, it has come to the notice of this Court that in many
cases, even if ultimately their applications are dismissed, by
virtue of interim orders, they continue for months, after the date
of superannuation. The court or the tribunal must, therefore, be
slow in granting an interim relief for continuation in service,
unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is
produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always
be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed
undeserved benefit of extended service and merely caused
injustice to his immediate junior.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy (supra), this Court, after an in
depth analysis of Rule 16-A of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement
Benefits) Rules, 1958, reversed the order passed by Hyderabad Bench of the
Central Administrative Tribunal which had directed alteration of the date of
birth of the respondent and observed:
“In matters relating to appointment to service various factors
are taken into consideration before making a selection or an
appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the
person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to
conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by
representing a date of birth which is different than that which is
later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable
to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance,
communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his
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intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth
should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority
for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact,
where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older
person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and,
therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that
advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date
of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after
taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against
public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit
to the person concerned. This being so, we find it difficult to
accept the broad proposition that the principle of estoppel
would not apply in such a case where the age of a person who is
sought to be appointed may be a relevant consideration to
assess his suitability.”
15. By applying the ratio of the above noted judgments, we hold that the
suit filed by respondent No.1 for correction of the date of birth recorded in
his service book after twelve years of his joining the service was clearly
misconceived and the trial Court committed a serious error by passing a
decree in favour of respondent No.1 and the lower appellate Court and the
High Court repeated the same error by refusing to set aside the decree passed
by the trial Court. The learned lower appellate Court and the High Court
also committed an error by relying upon the amendment made in the rule by
notification dated 21.6.1994 which enabled the government servant to seek
correction of date of birth within next two years. It is neither the pleaded
case of respondent No.1 nor it was argued by the learned counsel appearing
on his behalf that the amendment made in 1994 was retrospective or that his
client had applied for correction of date of birth after 21.6.1994. Rather, in
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response to the Court’s query, the learned counsel candidly stated that his
client had applied for correction of the date of birth recorded in the service
book for the first and last time in 1985 after the University entertained and
accepted his application for correction of his date of birth recorded in the
matriculation certificate.
16. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set
aside. The judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court and lower
appellate Court are also set aside and the suit filed by respondent No.1 is
dismissed. Ordinarily, we would have saddled respondent No.1 with costs
but keeping in view the fact that he has already retired from service, we have
refrained from doing so.
….………
………….…J.
[G.S. Singhvi]
…..…..………………..J.
[C.K. Prasad]
New Delhi;
May 20, 2010