Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 869
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2963/2025
(@Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.4880/2025)
SHAILESH KUMAR SINGH ALIAS SHAILESH R. SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad dated 7-3-2025 by which the High Court in a
Writ Petition filed by the appellant – herein praying for quashing
of the First Information Report lodged by the Respondent No.4 –
herein for the offence punishable under Sections 60(b), 316(2) and
318 (2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNS,
2023”) directed the parties to go for mediation and simultaneously
also directed the appellant – herein to hand-over a demand draft of
Rs.25,00,0000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Lakh only) for the purpose of
mediation to the Respondent No.4 (original complainant).
3. The impugned order passed by the High Court reads thus”-
“1. Heard Ms. Sana Raees Khan, learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned A.G.A. appearing for the State
respondents.
2. The petitioner, by means of this writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, has invoked the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court with prayer to quash the impugned
First Information Report dated 09.01.2025 registered as Case
Crime No.12 of 2025 under Sections 60(b), 316(2) and 318(2) of
B.N.S., 2023, P.S. Hariparwat, District Agra. Further request is
made to issue direction to the respondents not to arrest the
petitioner.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.07.17
17:33:12 IST
Reason:
2
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner is a co-founder and production head of M/s. Karma
Media and Entertainment LLP, which is primarily engaged in
production of motion picture. The respondent no.4 (informant) is
running the business under the name and style of M/s Polaroid
Media, which is engaged in the business of financing, co-
production and co- financing media projects. The informant has
lodged the impugned FIR by dragging a civil dispute inter-se the
parties into criminal case. A bare perusal of the impugned FIR,
no criminal offence is made out against the petitioner. It is
submitted that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution
is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the
accused. Even though the proceedings are pending and neither the
charge-sheet nor the final report has been submitted in the
present case. In support of her submission she has placed
reliance on the judgements of Apex Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 0 Supreme 689
(paras 25, 28, 29 and 30) and In the case of Radheyshyam & ors
vs. State of Rajasthan & another Criminal Appeal No.3020 of 2024
decided on July 22, 2024. She lastly submits that as there is a
commercial dispute and both the parties are reputed in the
society, instead of dragging the matter in the criminal
proceeding. it would be apt that the matter may be referred to
the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
4. In response to the aforesaid request, we have asked learned
counsel for the petitioner to seek instructions from the
petitioner for upfront payment to the informant so that the
matter may be referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre
and we have adjourned the proceeding. Later on, on the
instructions, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the petitioner is inclined to pay Rs.25 lakhs within three weeks
from today.
5. Accordingly, the matter is referred to the Mediation Centre
of this Court with the direction that after deposit of such
amount by the petitioner, the Mediation Centre shall make all
possible efforts to conclude the mediation and conciliation
proceedings expeditiously, preferably within a period of three
months.
6. Let the parties be present at the Mediation and Conciliation
Centre of this Court on 08.04.2025. The demand draft of Rs.25
lakhs would be handed over to the informant on the said date and
a separate draft of Rs.5000/ towards the mediation fee shall
also be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Centre.
7. List after expiry of aforesaid period before the appropriate
Bench along with the report of Mediation Centre.
8. Till the next date of listing, respondents are restrained to
arrest the petitioner pursuant to the impugned F.I.R. subject to
cooperation in the on-going investigation.
9. It is made clear that in case there occurs default by the
petitioner either in depositing the amount or in appearing
before the Mediation Centre on the date fixed, the interim order
3
shall cease to operate and the Mediation Centre shall
immediately communicate with the office which in tum shall list
the case within a week before the appropriate Bench for passing
orders in the matter.”
4. We heard Ms. Sana Raees Khan, the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant (accused), Mr. Anand Mishra, the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.4 and and Mr. Shaurya Krishna, the
learned counsel appearing for the State of U.P.
5. Section 60(b) of the BNS, 2023 reads thus:-
6 0. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with
imprisonment .—
“Whoever, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be
likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an
offence punishable with imprisonment, voluntarily conceals,
by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design
to commit such offence, or makes any representation which
he knows to be false respecting such design shall,—
( a ) if the offence be committed, be punished with
imprisonment of the description provided for the offence,
for a term which may extend to one-fourth; and
( b ) if the offence be not committed, to one-eighth, of the
longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is
provided for the offence, or with both.
6. Section 316(2) of the BNS, 2023 reads thus:-
316. Criminal breach of trust . (2) Whoever commits criminal
breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, or with
fine, or with both.
7. Section 318(2) of the BNS,2023 reads thus:-
318. Cheating . (2) Whoever cheats shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
8. We called upon the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent No.4 to make us understand in what manner the FIR
4
discloses commission of a cognizable offence. We also called upon
the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 to make us
understand in what manner his client could be said to have been
cheated so as to constitute the offence of cheating.
9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral
agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have
parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it
may be that the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be
paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether
prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been
committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to
constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more
than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the
accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The
plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of
criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement
of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said
decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and
criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively
explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by
the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High
Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own
merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go
for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to
5
th
the 4 respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand,
why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court
may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed
or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made
out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the
complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused.
It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to
look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in
any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or
under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire
dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has
initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It
appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money
till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a
civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information
Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of
process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing
anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to recover a
particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other
appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted
to take recourse of criminal proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court
has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the
6
appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4 and
thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That’s not what
is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for
quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected
of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations
levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if
any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled
principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the
“State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported in
1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.
16. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
17. The impugned FIR stands quashed.
18. We once again clarify that it shall be open for the Respondent
No.4 to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate forum
in accordance with law for the recovery of the alleged amount due
and payable to him.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI
14TH JULY, 2025.
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 869
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2963/2025
(@Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.4880/2025)
SHAILESH KUMAR SINGH ALIAS SHAILESH R. SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad dated 7-3-2025 by which the High Court in a
Writ Petition filed by the appellant – herein praying for quashing
of the First Information Report lodged by the Respondent No.4 –
herein for the offence punishable under Sections 60(b), 316(2) and
318 (2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNS,
2023”) directed the parties to go for mediation and simultaneously
also directed the appellant – herein to hand-over a demand draft of
Rs.25,00,0000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Lakh only) for the purpose of
mediation to the Respondent No.4 (original complainant).
3. The impugned order passed by the High Court reads thus”-
“1. Heard Ms. Sana Raees Khan, learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned A.G.A. appearing for the State
respondents.
2. The petitioner, by means of this writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, has invoked the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court with prayer to quash the impugned
First Information Report dated 09.01.2025 registered as Case
Crime No.12 of 2025 under Sections 60(b), 316(2) and 318(2) of
B.N.S., 2023, P.S. Hariparwat, District Agra. Further request is
made to issue direction to the respondents not to arrest the
petitioner.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.07.17
17:33:12 IST
Reason:
2
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner is a co-founder and production head of M/s. Karma
Media and Entertainment LLP, which is primarily engaged in
production of motion picture. The respondent no.4 (informant) is
running the business under the name and style of M/s Polaroid
Media, which is engaged in the business of financing, co-
production and co- financing media projects. The informant has
lodged the impugned FIR by dragging a civil dispute inter-se the
parties into criminal case. A bare perusal of the impugned FIR,
no criminal offence is made out against the petitioner. It is
submitted that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution
is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the
accused. Even though the proceedings are pending and neither the
charge-sheet nor the final report has been submitted in the
present case. In support of her submission she has placed
reliance on the judgements of Apex Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 0 Supreme 689
(paras 25, 28, 29 and 30) and In the case of Radheyshyam & ors
vs. State of Rajasthan & another Criminal Appeal No.3020 of 2024
decided on July 22, 2024. She lastly submits that as there is a
commercial dispute and both the parties are reputed in the
society, instead of dragging the matter in the criminal
proceeding. it would be apt that the matter may be referred to
the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
4. In response to the aforesaid request, we have asked learned
counsel for the petitioner to seek instructions from the
petitioner for upfront payment to the informant so that the
matter may be referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre
and we have adjourned the proceeding. Later on, on the
instructions, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the petitioner is inclined to pay Rs.25 lakhs within three weeks
from today.
5. Accordingly, the matter is referred to the Mediation Centre
of this Court with the direction that after deposit of such
amount by the petitioner, the Mediation Centre shall make all
possible efforts to conclude the mediation and conciliation
proceedings expeditiously, preferably within a period of three
months.
6. Let the parties be present at the Mediation and Conciliation
Centre of this Court on 08.04.2025. The demand draft of Rs.25
lakhs would be handed over to the informant on the said date and
a separate draft of Rs.5000/ towards the mediation fee shall
also be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Centre.
7. List after expiry of aforesaid period before the appropriate
Bench along with the report of Mediation Centre.
8. Till the next date of listing, respondents are restrained to
arrest the petitioner pursuant to the impugned F.I.R. subject to
cooperation in the on-going investigation.
9. It is made clear that in case there occurs default by the
petitioner either in depositing the amount or in appearing
before the Mediation Centre on the date fixed, the interim order
3
shall cease to operate and the Mediation Centre shall
immediately communicate with the office which in tum shall list
the case within a week before the appropriate Bench for passing
orders in the matter.”
4. We heard Ms. Sana Raees Khan, the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant (accused), Mr. Anand Mishra, the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.4 and and Mr. Shaurya Krishna, the
learned counsel appearing for the State of U.P.
5. Section 60(b) of the BNS, 2023 reads thus:-
6 0. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with
imprisonment .—
“Whoever, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be
likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an
offence punishable with imprisonment, voluntarily conceals,
by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design
to commit such offence, or makes any representation which
he knows to be false respecting such design shall,—
( a ) if the offence be committed, be punished with
imprisonment of the description provided for the offence,
for a term which may extend to one-fourth; and
( b ) if the offence be not committed, to one-eighth, of the
longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is
provided for the offence, or with both.
6. Section 316(2) of the BNS, 2023 reads thus:-
316. Criminal breach of trust . (2) Whoever commits criminal
breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, or with
fine, or with both.
7. Section 318(2) of the BNS,2023 reads thus:-
318. Cheating . (2) Whoever cheats shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
8. We called upon the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent No.4 to make us understand in what manner the FIR
4
discloses commission of a cognizable offence. We also called upon
the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 to make us
understand in what manner his client could be said to have been
cheated so as to constitute the offence of cheating.
9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral
agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have
parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it
may be that the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be
paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether
prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been
committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to
constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more
than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the
accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The
plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of
criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement
of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said
decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and
criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively
explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by
the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High
Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own
merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go
for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to
5
th
the 4 respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand,
why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court
may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed
or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made
out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the
complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused.
It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to
look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in
any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or
under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire
dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has
initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It
appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money
till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a
civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information
Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of
process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing
anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to recover a
particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other
appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted
to take recourse of criminal proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court
has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the
6
appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4 and
thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That’s not what
is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for
quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected
of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations
levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if
any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled
principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the
“State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported in
1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.
16. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
17. The impugned FIR stands quashed.
18. We once again clarify that it shall be open for the Respondent
No.4 to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate forum
in accordance with law for the recovery of the alleged amount due
and payable to him.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI
14TH JULY, 2025.