Full Judgment Text
Reportable
2026 INSC 25
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ................. OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9198 of 2019)
The State (NCT) of Delhi … Appellant
versus
Khimji Bhai Jadeja …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KUMAR, J
1. Leave granted.
2. The State (NCT) of Delhi is aggrieved by the judgment dated
08.07.2019, whereby a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
answered Criminal Reference No. 1 of 2014. By the said reference, the
learned Additional District & Sessions Judge – II, North-West District,
1
Rohini Courts, Delhi , had referred three questions of law to the High
Court of Delhi for its decision, under Section 395(2) of the Code of
2
Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The questions read as under: -
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2026.01.06
17:09:37 IST
Reason:
1
For short, ‘Additional Sessions Judge’
2
For short, ‘CrPC’
1
‘a. Whether in a case of inducement, allurement and cheating
of large number of investors/depositors in pursuance to a
criminal conspiracy, each deposit by an investor constitutes a
separate and individual transaction or all such transactions can
be amalgamated and clubbed into a single FIR by showing one
investor as complainant and others as witnesses?
b. If in case the Hon'ble Court concludes that each deposit has
to be treated as separate transaction, then how many such
transactions can be amalgamated into one charge sheet?
(Note: - As per the provisions of Section 219 CrPC and as
observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Narinderjit
Singh Sahni & anr. vs. Union of India & ors., only three
transactions in a particular year can be clubbed in a single
charge sheet).
c. Whether under the given circumstances the concept of
maximum punishment of seven years for a single offence can
be pressed into service by the accused by clubbing and
amalgamating all the transactions into one FIR with maximum
punishment of seven years?
(Note: - If this is done, this would be in violation of concept of
Proportionality of Punishment as provided in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs.
Union of India & ors., it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that this cannot be done but in case if we go
by the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court in the case of
State vs. Ramesh Chand Kapoor this is possible. Hence, this
aspect requires an authoritative pronouncement by a larger
Bench).’
3. The Division Bench answered the questions as follows: -
‘…. Thus, our answer to Question (a) is that in a case of
inducement, allurement and cheating of large number of
investors/depositors in pursuance to a criminal conspiracy,
each deposit by an investor constitutes a separate and
2
individual transaction. All such transactions cannot be
amalgamated and clubbed into a single FIR by showing one
investor as the complainant and others as witnesses. In
respect of each such transaction, it is imperative for the State
to register a separate FIR if the complainant discloses
commission of a cognizable offence.
…. Thus, our answer to question (b) is that in respect of each
FIR, a separate final report (and wherever necessary
supplementary/further charge sheet(s)) have to be filed, and
there is no question of amalgamation of the final reports that
may be filed in respect of different FIRs. The amalgamation,
strictly in terms of Section 219 Cr.P.C., would be considered by
the Court/ Magistrate at the stage of framing of charge, since
Section 219(1) mandates that where the requirements set out
in the said Section are met, the accused "may be charged with,
and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding
three".
…. In our view, the aforesaid question [ sic , (c)] does not survive
in view of the answer to question (a) and (b). It would be for
the Trial Court to consider the sentence to which the convict
may be subjected as per law, keeping in view the well settled
principles of sentencing. In this regard, we may only refer to
Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. which, inter alia , provides that when
a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the
Court, may subject to the provisions of Section 71 IPC,
sentence him for such offences to the several punishments
prescribed therefore which such Court is competent to inflict. It
further provides that such punishments, which consist of
imprisonment, would commence one after the expiration of the
other, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run
concurrently. The limitation on the quantum of sentence is
prescribed by sub-section 2 of Section 31 of the Cr.P.C., but
the same would apply in respect of convictions at one trial of
two or more offences. However, where the trials are multiple,
which result into multiple convictions, the proviso to Section 31
(2) would have no application.’
3
4. The State filed the present appeal assailing these answers. By order
dated 25.11.2019, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned
judgment. Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel, was requested to assist
the Court as an amicus curiae . Despite service of notice, Khimji Bhai
Jadeja, the respondent, did not enter appearance before this Court.
5. The reference by the learned Additional Sessions Judge arose in
the context of FIR No. 89 of 2009 registered on 01.06.2009 by the
Economic Offences Wing of the Delhi Police under Sections 420 and
3
120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , at the behest of one Rajesh Kumar.
His complaint was that Ashok Jadeja and his accomplices, one of whom
was Khimji Bhai Jadeja, the respondent herein, had falsely represented
that Ashok Jadeja was blessed with the divine power of Sikotar Mata to
triple money in a few days. A large number of people were stated to have
been induced to invest their monies and were ultimately duped. During
the investigation into this complaint, it was found that altogether 1,852
victims had been cheated of their monies, to the tune of ₹ 46.40 crores.
The other 1851 complaints were clubbed with FIR No. 89 of 2009 and
those complainants were made witnesses by treating their complaints as
statements. On 09.02.2014, the Delhi Police filed a charge sheet against
15 persons. Six more supplementary charge sheets came to be filed
3
For short, ‘IPC’
4
between 2014 and 2025. Meanwhile, when Khimji Bhai Jadeja, the
respondent herein, filed a petition in 2014 seeking bail, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge framed the aforestated three questions of law,
vide order dated 14.03.2014, and referred them to the High Court for
appropriate decision under Section 395(2) CrPC, leading to that reference
being answered by way of the impugned judgment.
6. The Division Bench of the High Court was of the opinion that
registering a single FIR and treating the other complainants as witnesses
would result in deprivation of the rights of such complainants to pursue
their individual complaints. The Bench conceded that they could, at the
most, be treated as witnesses to establish the criminal conspiracy, but
treating them only as witnesses would deprive them of the right to file
protest petitions in the event a closure report was filed by the police in the
sole FIR that was registered or if the Magistrate concerned did not accept
the final report and discharged the accused. It was on this basis that the
Division Bench answered question (a) by concluding that such complaints
could not be amalgamated into one FIR by treating all such complainants
as witnesses therein. Apropos question (b), the Bench opined that the
police could not club separate offences investigated under separate FIRs
into one final report and that a separate final report had to be filed in
relation to each FIR. Referring to Section 219 CrPC, the Bench opined
that amalgamation thereunder could be considered by the Magistrate
5
concerned at the stage of framing of charges, upto a maximum of three.
As regards question (c), the Bench opined that it would be for the Trial
Court to consider the sentence that could be imposed on a convicted
accused in accordance with the well-settled principles of sentencing and
the legal provisions relevant thereto.
7. The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the
appellant-State, would contend that a conspiracy to procure deposits from
several persons so as to dupe them would be a ‘single transaction’,
irrespective of the number of people defrauded and each such transaction
ought not to be treated as a separate offence, requiring an individual FIR
to be registered therefor. She would argue that clubbing of FIRs is
permissible in law and that requiring individual FIRs to be registered in a
case of this nature would be cumbersome and wholly unnecessary. She
would point out that the statute provides for charges being consolidated
against multiple persons for multiple offences, if such offences form part
of the same transaction. Reliance is placed upon State of Andhra
4
Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another , wherein this
Court observed thus: “where several acts committed by a person show a
unity of purpose or design, that would be a strong circumstance to indicate
that those acts form part of the same transaction.” She would argue that
4
AIR 1963 SC 1850 = (1964) 3 SCR 297
6
the acts of the accused persons in the case on hand also constitute a
‘single transaction’, justifying the clubbing of all the complaints with the
first FIR. Lastly, she would assert that requiring registration of individual
FIRs for each such complaint would lead to multiplicity of proceedings,
which would be violative of public policy, and would also increase the
burden upon the prosecution as well as the judiciary.
8. Mr. R. Basant, learned amicus curiae , made detailed submissions
on all aspects of the matter. He would state that the reference itself was
premature, as the investigation was still pending and the police were yet
to determine whether all the alleged acts of cheating were part of the same
transaction, falling within the ambit of Section 220(1) CrPC and Section
223(a) and (d) CrPC. He would further state that, perusal of the allegations
in FIR No. 89 of 2009 manifests that a single conspiracy was alleged and,
therefore, the course adopted by the Delhi Police in registering one single
FIR was appropriate. He would point out that even if multiple FIRs had
been registered, consolidation of such FIRs is permissible in law, as was
pointed out by this Court time and again. He would submit that no
exception could be taken to the registration of one FIR and treating the
complaints of the other victims as part of the investigation in the said FIR.
Referring to the charge sheets filed by the Delhi Police in the present case,
the learned amicus would point out that general allegations were made
therein that a criminal conspiracy was hatched, thereby attracting Section
7
120B IPC. In summation, he would submit that the answers by the Division
Bench of the High Court to questions (a) and (b) are incorrect. He would
assert that, as to whether consolidation of charges can be effected or not
is a question that would arise for consideration only at the stage of framing
of charges and if the alleged offences formed part of the same transaction,
whatever be the number of complainants, such consolidation is
permissible under the provisions of the statute and, if not, separate
charges would have to be framed, subject to Section 219 CrPC.
9. The issue, therefore, boils down to whether or not the offences
allegedly committed against the 1,852 complainants were part of the
‘same transaction’. We may first note the case law that has developed
over time on the issue of consolidation of FIRs. In S. Swamirathnam vs.
5
State of Madras , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention
of the accused that there was misjoinder of charges as several
conspiracies, distinct from each other, had been lumped together and tried
at one trial. The Bench observed that the charges, as framed, disclosed
one single conspiracy spread over several years and the only object of
the conspiracy was to cheat members of the public. Per the Bench, the
mere fact that others joined in the conspiracy in the course of those years
or the fact that several incidents of cheating took place pursuant to the
5
AIR 1957 SC 340 = (1956) 2 SCC 144
8
conspiracy did not change the conspiracy or split it up into several
conspiracies. It was held that the instances of cheating were in pursuance
of one conspiracy and were, therefore, parts of the same transaction.
10. In Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala and others vs. Union of India and
6
another , this Court dealt with the question as to what is meant by ‘every
distinct offence’. It was held that ‘distinct’ meant ‘not identical’ and two
offences would be distinct if they are not, in any way, inter-related. It was
further held that if there is some inter-relation, there would be no
distinctness and it would depend upon the circumstances of the case in
which the offences were committed whether there be separate charges
for those offences or not.
11. In Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao ( supra ), a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court observed that, what is to be ascertained under Section 235(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (equivalent to Section 218(1) CrPC),
was whether the offences arise out of acts so connected together as to
form the same transaction. It was noted that ‘same transaction’ is not
defined anywhere in the 1898 Code and it was held that whether
transactions can be regarded as the same transaction would necessarily
depend upon the particular facts of each case. The Bench noted that the
general thought is that, where there is proximity of time or place or unity
6
AIR 1963 SC 1620 = 1963 Supp (2) SCR 338
9
of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts,
it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. The
Bench, however, cautioned that it is not necessary that every one of these
elements should co-exist for transactions to be regarded as the same
transaction and elaborated that if several acts committed by a person
show a unity of purpose or design, then it may be a strong circumstance
to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. Noting that a
transaction may consist of an isolated act or a series of acts, the Bench
held that such series of acts must, of necessity, be connected with one
another and if some of them stand out independently, they would not form
part of the same transaction but would constitute a different transaction. It
was concluded that the ‘same transaction’ means a transaction consisting
either of a single act or of a series of connected acts.
12. In State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation vs.
7
Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad , this Court observed that even if the
modus operandi is the same, it would not make it a single offence when
the offences are separate. This Court held that, if a conspiracy is furthered
into several distinct offences, there have to be separate trials. Illustrating
the point, it was observed there may be a situation where, in furtherance
of a general conspiracy, offences take place in different parts of the
7
(2017) 8 SCC 1
10
country, leading to several persons being killed at different times and, in
such a situation, each trial would have to be held separately so that the
accused are punished separately for each offence committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It was pointed out if there is only one trial
for such a conspiracy, in spite of separate offences being committed, it
would enable the accused to go scot-free, despite committing a number
of offences, which is not the intendment of law.
8
13. In Amish Devgan vs. Union of India and others , seven FIRs
came to be registered in the States of Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Telangana
and Uttar Pradesh in relation to a television telecast, which formed the
basis for the offences alleged. Applying the law laid down in T.T. Antony
9
vs. State of Kerala and others , which was followed thereafter in Arnab
10
Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India and others , this Court directed
the clubbing of the FIRs. It was observed that, when the subject matter of
the FIRs is the same incident or occurrence or is in regard to incidents,
which are two or more parts of the same transaction, then a separate and
second FIR need not be proceeded with. It was observed that, in terms of
the law laid down in T.T. Antony ( supra ), the subsequent FIRs would be
treated as statements under Section 161 CrPC. It was held that it would
8
(2021) 1 SCC 1
9
(2001) 6 SCC 181
10
(2020) 14 SCC 12
11
be open to the other complainants to file protest petitions in case a closure
report was filed by the police. It was observed that upon filing of such
protest petitions, the Magistrate is obliged to consider the contentions
urged; even reject the closure report and take cognizance of the offence
as, otherwise, such complainants would face difficulty in contesting the
closure report, even if there is enough material to make out a case of
commission of the offence.
11
14. In Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India and others , this
Court again followed the exposition in Amish Devgan ( supra ) and
deemed it appropriate to exercise power under Article 142 of the
Constitution to direct clubbing of all the FIRs in different States so that
they could proceed together to a single trial, as far as possible. This
measure was adopted with the consent of all the concerned States.
15. In T.T. Antony ( supra ), this Court observed that there can be no
second FIR in relation to the same cognizable offence and, consequently,
there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence
or incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. It was
observed that, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or any
incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering
11
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1936
12
the FIR in the Station House Diary, the officer in charge of the police
station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in
the FIR, but also any other connected offences that may be found to have
been committed. In this regard, it was specifically observed as under:
‘18 . …….. All other information made orally or in writing after
the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable
offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first
information report and entered in the station house diary by the
police officer or such other cognizable offence as may come to
his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling
under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can
properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house
diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same
cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC.’
12
16. In Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka and others , following the
ratio decidendi in Amish Devgan ( supra ), this Court exercised power
under Article 142 of the Constitution and consolidated six FIRs registered
in the State to be tried together, as multiplicity of proceedings would not
be in the larger public interest or in the interest of the State. Again, in
13
Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab and others , this Court
observed that it is now fairly well settled that multiplicity of proceedings
would not be in the larger public interest and the correct course of action
would be to merge the later FIRs with the earliest FIR with the State’s
12
(2023) 14 SCC 801
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1164
13
consent. On the same lines, in Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar and
14
others , this Court noted that 81 FIRs were registered and directed the
first FIR to be treated as the main FIR and all other FIRs to be treated as
statements under Section 161 CrPC. Earlier, in Satinder Singh Bhasin
15
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
followed the principle enunciated in Amish Devgan ( supra ) and clubbed,
with consent, the 118 FIRs relating to the Bike Bot scheme registered
across the State of Uttar Pradesh and one FIR registered by the Economic
Offences Wing, New Delhi, by exercising power under Article 142 of the
Constitution. Before that, in Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana and
16
others , the very same 3-Judge Bench took note of multiple FIRs in
connection with a network marketing scheme in as many as 12 States and
directed the clubbing of all the FIRs, which could thereafter proceed to
one trial as far as possible, duly noting that all the States concerned voiced
no objection to such course of action.
17. However, in Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi and
17
others , this Court refused to consolidate the FIRs registered against the
petitioner therein in different States, not only under the provisions of the
IPC but also invoking respective State enactments for which Special
14
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1728
15
(2023) 14 SCC 805
16
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1935
17
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1851
14
Courts were designated to try the offences thereunder, on the ground that
clubbing of such FIRs would mean that the jurisdiction of such Special
Courts would be taken away and a special jurisdiction would be conferred
on that one Court where the FIRs were clubbed to try offences arising
under different State enactments.
18. We must also refer to Narinderjit Singh Sahni and another vs.
18
Union of India and others , a decision that weighed heavily with the
High Court in answering the reference. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court dealt with a case involving 250 FIRs registered throughout the
country. The argument before this Court was that they constituted a single
offence or, in the alternative, an offence which could only have been
committed in the course of the same transaction. Dealing with this
argument, the Bench observed that the fact situation did not permit any
credence being given to the submission that the FIRs pertained to a single
offence. It was held that each individual deposit agreement had to be
treated as a separate and individual transaction brought about by the
allurement of the financial companies, since the parties were different, the
amount of deposit was different as also the period for which the deposit
was made. The Bench, therefore, observed that all the characteristics of
independent transactions were there and it did not see any compelling
18
(2002) 2 SCC 210
15
reason to hold otherwise. However, we may note, with all due respect, that
there was no in-depth analysis of statutory provisions or case law in the
context of commission of offences in the course of the same transaction,
whereby persons accused of multiple offences committed in the course of
that same transaction could be charged and tried together. In any event,
the development of law on the point, referred to hereinabove, including
later decisions of 3-Judge Benches, is indicative of the legal position
prevailing as on date. The above referred judgments sum up the legal
position adequately and we see no purpose in burdening this decision with
more case law on the point.
19. We may note that Section 218(1) CrPC requires a distinct and
separate charge for every distinct offence and each such separate charge
should be tried separately. Sections 219 to 223 CrPC constitute
exceptions to this general rule and stipulate the circumstances in which
deviation therefrom can be made. Under Section 219 CrPC, three such
offences committed during a year can be the subject matter of a single
trial [now, five such offences, under Section 242 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)]. Under Sections 220(1) CrPC and
223(a) and (d) CrPC, consolidated charges can be framed against several
accused persons in relation to several offences, if such offences are
committed during the course of the same transaction. It would, therefore,
turn upon the offences forming part of the ‘same transaction’.
16
20. As already noted hereinabove, precedential law has laid down triple
tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide when separate
actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ – 1) unity of
purpose and design; 2) proximity of time and place; and 3) continuity of
action. These tests may be applied to ascertain whether a series of acts
form part of the same transaction or not. It is not necessary at the present
stage to consider whether consolidation of charges under Section 220(1)
CrPC should be resorted to, as that would depend upon the opinion of the
Magistrate on the strength of the findings recorded during the
investigation. If it is opined that all the incidents partake of the same
transaction, there can be one trial under Section 220(1) CrPC and Section
223(a) and (d) CrPC. If, however, it is concluded that there are several
transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, there
have to be separate trials for each offence, subject to Section 219 CrPC/
Section 242 BNSS, which allows the Trial Court to try three/five offences
of the same kind committed within a year. Once all the incidents are taken
to be part of the same transaction and amalgamated into one FIR, the
punishment would follow accordingly as per law.
21. We agree with the learned amicus that the reference by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge was premature, as the stage had not arisen for
her to have entertained any doubt so as to raise the questions of law that
she did for the decision of the High Court. The investigation was still
17
ongoing and it could not have been ascertained at that stage as to whether
the alleged offences formed part and parcel of the same transaction. Even
otherwise, consolidation of FIRs is permissible in law but that would have
also depended upon the conclusions to be arrived at after the
investigation. However, as on date, as many as six supplementary
chargesheets have been filed during the pendency of this case, in addition
to the main chargesheet that was filed in the year 2014. We find that the
end result of the investigation undertaken is that an offence under Section
120B IPC has been alleged, i.e., a criminal conspiracy. Therefore, as a
conspiracy is alleged, leading to multiple acts of cheating against different
individuals, the course adopted by the Delhi Police in registering one FIR
and treating the complaints received from 1851 other complainants as
statements under Section 161 CrPC, was the correct course of action to
have been adopted at that stage.
22. The inference to be drawn from the chargesheets, as filed, is left to
the Magistrate concerned to consider, so as to ascertain whether the
various acts of cheating attributed to the accused persons constitute part
of the ‘same transaction’, thereby bringing them within the ambit of
Section 220(1) CrPC and Section 223 (a) & (d) CrPC. If the offences
formed part of the same transaction, the Magistrate would be entitled to
charge and try them together, as enabled by the aforestated provisions,
as it would be in the larger public interest to do so. Further, in such an
18
event, as pointed out in Amish Devgan ( supra ), the complainants, who
would then be treated as witnesses in relation to the FIR which was first
registered, would be entitled to file protest petitions in the event of a
closure report being filed or if the Magistrate is inclined to discharge the
accused, and the Magistrate concerned is bound to consider the same on
merits. Coming to the aspect of sentencing, the provisions of Section 71
IPC along with Sections 31 and 325 CrPC would have to be adhered to,
depending upon the established facts and findings in the case.
23. Viewed thus, we set aside the answers on questions (a) & (b)
by the Division Bench of the High Court. The judgment dated 08.07.2019
passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Reference No. 1 of 2014 is,
accordingly, set aside to that extent.
The appeal is allowed in the aforestated terms.
Before, we part with the case, we would like to place on record our
appreciation and gratitude for the able and erudite assistance rendered
by Mr. R Basant, learned amicus curiae .
……………………...J
[SANJAY KUMAR]
.……………………...J
[ALOK ARADHE]
January 6, 2026
New Delhi.
19
2026 INSC 25
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ................. OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9198 of 2019)
The State (NCT) of Delhi … Appellant
versus
Khimji Bhai Jadeja …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KUMAR, J
1. Leave granted.
2. The State (NCT) of Delhi is aggrieved by the judgment dated
08.07.2019, whereby a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
answered Criminal Reference No. 1 of 2014. By the said reference, the
learned Additional District & Sessions Judge – II, North-West District,
1
Rohini Courts, Delhi , had referred three questions of law to the High
Court of Delhi for its decision, under Section 395(2) of the Code of
2
Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The questions read as under: -
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2026.01.06
17:09:37 IST
Reason:
1
For short, ‘Additional Sessions Judge’
2
For short, ‘CrPC’
1
‘a. Whether in a case of inducement, allurement and cheating
of large number of investors/depositors in pursuance to a
criminal conspiracy, each deposit by an investor constitutes a
separate and individual transaction or all such transactions can
be amalgamated and clubbed into a single FIR by showing one
investor as complainant and others as witnesses?
b. If in case the Hon'ble Court concludes that each deposit has
to be treated as separate transaction, then how many such
transactions can be amalgamated into one charge sheet?
(Note: - As per the provisions of Section 219 CrPC and as
observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Narinderjit
Singh Sahni & anr. vs. Union of India & ors., only three
transactions in a particular year can be clubbed in a single
charge sheet).
c. Whether under the given circumstances the concept of
maximum punishment of seven years for a single offence can
be pressed into service by the accused by clubbing and
amalgamating all the transactions into one FIR with maximum
punishment of seven years?
(Note: - If this is done, this would be in violation of concept of
Proportionality of Punishment as provided in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs.
Union of India & ors., it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that this cannot be done but in case if we go
by the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court in the case of
State vs. Ramesh Chand Kapoor this is possible. Hence, this
aspect requires an authoritative pronouncement by a larger
Bench).’
3. The Division Bench answered the questions as follows: -
‘…. Thus, our answer to Question (a) is that in a case of
inducement, allurement and cheating of large number of
investors/depositors in pursuance to a criminal conspiracy,
each deposit by an investor constitutes a separate and
2
individual transaction. All such transactions cannot be
amalgamated and clubbed into a single FIR by showing one
investor as the complainant and others as witnesses. In
respect of each such transaction, it is imperative for the State
to register a separate FIR if the complainant discloses
commission of a cognizable offence.
…. Thus, our answer to question (b) is that in respect of each
FIR, a separate final report (and wherever necessary
supplementary/further charge sheet(s)) have to be filed, and
there is no question of amalgamation of the final reports that
may be filed in respect of different FIRs. The amalgamation,
strictly in terms of Section 219 Cr.P.C., would be considered by
the Court/ Magistrate at the stage of framing of charge, since
Section 219(1) mandates that where the requirements set out
in the said Section are met, the accused "may be charged with,
and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding
three".
…. In our view, the aforesaid question [ sic , (c)] does not survive
in view of the answer to question (a) and (b). It would be for
the Trial Court to consider the sentence to which the convict
may be subjected as per law, keeping in view the well settled
principles of sentencing. In this regard, we may only refer to
Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. which, inter alia , provides that when
a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the
Court, may subject to the provisions of Section 71 IPC,
sentence him for such offences to the several punishments
prescribed therefore which such Court is competent to inflict. It
further provides that such punishments, which consist of
imprisonment, would commence one after the expiration of the
other, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run
concurrently. The limitation on the quantum of sentence is
prescribed by sub-section 2 of Section 31 of the Cr.P.C., but
the same would apply in respect of convictions at one trial of
two or more offences. However, where the trials are multiple,
which result into multiple convictions, the proviso to Section 31
(2) would have no application.’
3
4. The State filed the present appeal assailing these answers. By order
dated 25.11.2019, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned
judgment. Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel, was requested to assist
the Court as an amicus curiae . Despite service of notice, Khimji Bhai
Jadeja, the respondent, did not enter appearance before this Court.
5. The reference by the learned Additional Sessions Judge arose in
the context of FIR No. 89 of 2009 registered on 01.06.2009 by the
Economic Offences Wing of the Delhi Police under Sections 420 and
3
120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , at the behest of one Rajesh Kumar.
His complaint was that Ashok Jadeja and his accomplices, one of whom
was Khimji Bhai Jadeja, the respondent herein, had falsely represented
that Ashok Jadeja was blessed with the divine power of Sikotar Mata to
triple money in a few days. A large number of people were stated to have
been induced to invest their monies and were ultimately duped. During
the investigation into this complaint, it was found that altogether 1,852
victims had been cheated of their monies, to the tune of ₹ 46.40 crores.
The other 1851 complaints were clubbed with FIR No. 89 of 2009 and
those complainants were made witnesses by treating their complaints as
statements. On 09.02.2014, the Delhi Police filed a charge sheet against
15 persons. Six more supplementary charge sheets came to be filed
3
For short, ‘IPC’
4
between 2014 and 2025. Meanwhile, when Khimji Bhai Jadeja, the
respondent herein, filed a petition in 2014 seeking bail, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge framed the aforestated three questions of law,
vide order dated 14.03.2014, and referred them to the High Court for
appropriate decision under Section 395(2) CrPC, leading to that reference
being answered by way of the impugned judgment.
6. The Division Bench of the High Court was of the opinion that
registering a single FIR and treating the other complainants as witnesses
would result in deprivation of the rights of such complainants to pursue
their individual complaints. The Bench conceded that they could, at the
most, be treated as witnesses to establish the criminal conspiracy, but
treating them only as witnesses would deprive them of the right to file
protest petitions in the event a closure report was filed by the police in the
sole FIR that was registered or if the Magistrate concerned did not accept
the final report and discharged the accused. It was on this basis that the
Division Bench answered question (a) by concluding that such complaints
could not be amalgamated into one FIR by treating all such complainants
as witnesses therein. Apropos question (b), the Bench opined that the
police could not club separate offences investigated under separate FIRs
into one final report and that a separate final report had to be filed in
relation to each FIR. Referring to Section 219 CrPC, the Bench opined
that amalgamation thereunder could be considered by the Magistrate
5
concerned at the stage of framing of charges, upto a maximum of three.
As regards question (c), the Bench opined that it would be for the Trial
Court to consider the sentence that could be imposed on a convicted
accused in accordance with the well-settled principles of sentencing and
the legal provisions relevant thereto.
7. The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the
appellant-State, would contend that a conspiracy to procure deposits from
several persons so as to dupe them would be a ‘single transaction’,
irrespective of the number of people defrauded and each such transaction
ought not to be treated as a separate offence, requiring an individual FIR
to be registered therefor. She would argue that clubbing of FIRs is
permissible in law and that requiring individual FIRs to be registered in a
case of this nature would be cumbersome and wholly unnecessary. She
would point out that the statute provides for charges being consolidated
against multiple persons for multiple offences, if such offences form part
of the same transaction. Reliance is placed upon State of Andhra
4
Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another , wherein this
Court observed thus: “where several acts committed by a person show a
unity of purpose or design, that would be a strong circumstance to indicate
that those acts form part of the same transaction.” She would argue that
4
AIR 1963 SC 1850 = (1964) 3 SCR 297
6
the acts of the accused persons in the case on hand also constitute a
‘single transaction’, justifying the clubbing of all the complaints with the
first FIR. Lastly, she would assert that requiring registration of individual
FIRs for each such complaint would lead to multiplicity of proceedings,
which would be violative of public policy, and would also increase the
burden upon the prosecution as well as the judiciary.
8. Mr. R. Basant, learned amicus curiae , made detailed submissions
on all aspects of the matter. He would state that the reference itself was
premature, as the investigation was still pending and the police were yet
to determine whether all the alleged acts of cheating were part of the same
transaction, falling within the ambit of Section 220(1) CrPC and Section
223(a) and (d) CrPC. He would further state that, perusal of the allegations
in FIR No. 89 of 2009 manifests that a single conspiracy was alleged and,
therefore, the course adopted by the Delhi Police in registering one single
FIR was appropriate. He would point out that even if multiple FIRs had
been registered, consolidation of such FIRs is permissible in law, as was
pointed out by this Court time and again. He would submit that no
exception could be taken to the registration of one FIR and treating the
complaints of the other victims as part of the investigation in the said FIR.
Referring to the charge sheets filed by the Delhi Police in the present case,
the learned amicus would point out that general allegations were made
therein that a criminal conspiracy was hatched, thereby attracting Section
7
120B IPC. In summation, he would submit that the answers by the Division
Bench of the High Court to questions (a) and (b) are incorrect. He would
assert that, as to whether consolidation of charges can be effected or not
is a question that would arise for consideration only at the stage of framing
of charges and if the alleged offences formed part of the same transaction,
whatever be the number of complainants, such consolidation is
permissible under the provisions of the statute and, if not, separate
charges would have to be framed, subject to Section 219 CrPC.
9. The issue, therefore, boils down to whether or not the offences
allegedly committed against the 1,852 complainants were part of the
‘same transaction’. We may first note the case law that has developed
over time on the issue of consolidation of FIRs. In S. Swamirathnam vs.
5
State of Madras , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention
of the accused that there was misjoinder of charges as several
conspiracies, distinct from each other, had been lumped together and tried
at one trial. The Bench observed that the charges, as framed, disclosed
one single conspiracy spread over several years and the only object of
the conspiracy was to cheat members of the public. Per the Bench, the
mere fact that others joined in the conspiracy in the course of those years
or the fact that several incidents of cheating took place pursuant to the
5
AIR 1957 SC 340 = (1956) 2 SCC 144
8
conspiracy did not change the conspiracy or split it up into several
conspiracies. It was held that the instances of cheating were in pursuance
of one conspiracy and were, therefore, parts of the same transaction.
10. In Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala and others vs. Union of India and
6
another , this Court dealt with the question as to what is meant by ‘every
distinct offence’. It was held that ‘distinct’ meant ‘not identical’ and two
offences would be distinct if they are not, in any way, inter-related. It was
further held that if there is some inter-relation, there would be no
distinctness and it would depend upon the circumstances of the case in
which the offences were committed whether there be separate charges
for those offences or not.
11. In Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao ( supra ), a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court observed that, what is to be ascertained under Section 235(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (equivalent to Section 218(1) CrPC),
was whether the offences arise out of acts so connected together as to
form the same transaction. It was noted that ‘same transaction’ is not
defined anywhere in the 1898 Code and it was held that whether
transactions can be regarded as the same transaction would necessarily
depend upon the particular facts of each case. The Bench noted that the
general thought is that, where there is proximity of time or place or unity
6
AIR 1963 SC 1620 = 1963 Supp (2) SCR 338
9
of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts,
it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. The
Bench, however, cautioned that it is not necessary that every one of these
elements should co-exist for transactions to be regarded as the same
transaction and elaborated that if several acts committed by a person
show a unity of purpose or design, then it may be a strong circumstance
to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. Noting that a
transaction may consist of an isolated act or a series of acts, the Bench
held that such series of acts must, of necessity, be connected with one
another and if some of them stand out independently, they would not form
part of the same transaction but would constitute a different transaction. It
was concluded that the ‘same transaction’ means a transaction consisting
either of a single act or of a series of connected acts.
12. In State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation vs.
7
Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad , this Court observed that even if the
modus operandi is the same, it would not make it a single offence when
the offences are separate. This Court held that, if a conspiracy is furthered
into several distinct offences, there have to be separate trials. Illustrating
the point, it was observed there may be a situation where, in furtherance
of a general conspiracy, offences take place in different parts of the
7
(2017) 8 SCC 1
10
country, leading to several persons being killed at different times and, in
such a situation, each trial would have to be held separately so that the
accused are punished separately for each offence committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It was pointed out if there is only one trial
for such a conspiracy, in spite of separate offences being committed, it
would enable the accused to go scot-free, despite committing a number
of offences, which is not the intendment of law.
8
13. In Amish Devgan vs. Union of India and others , seven FIRs
came to be registered in the States of Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Telangana
and Uttar Pradesh in relation to a television telecast, which formed the
basis for the offences alleged. Applying the law laid down in T.T. Antony
9
vs. State of Kerala and others , which was followed thereafter in Arnab
10
Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India and others , this Court directed
the clubbing of the FIRs. It was observed that, when the subject matter of
the FIRs is the same incident or occurrence or is in regard to incidents,
which are two or more parts of the same transaction, then a separate and
second FIR need not be proceeded with. It was observed that, in terms of
the law laid down in T.T. Antony ( supra ), the subsequent FIRs would be
treated as statements under Section 161 CrPC. It was held that it would
8
(2021) 1 SCC 1
9
(2001) 6 SCC 181
10
(2020) 14 SCC 12
11
be open to the other complainants to file protest petitions in case a closure
report was filed by the police. It was observed that upon filing of such
protest petitions, the Magistrate is obliged to consider the contentions
urged; even reject the closure report and take cognizance of the offence
as, otherwise, such complainants would face difficulty in contesting the
closure report, even if there is enough material to make out a case of
commission of the offence.
11
14. In Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India and others , this
Court again followed the exposition in Amish Devgan ( supra ) and
deemed it appropriate to exercise power under Article 142 of the
Constitution to direct clubbing of all the FIRs in different States so that
they could proceed together to a single trial, as far as possible. This
measure was adopted with the consent of all the concerned States.
15. In T.T. Antony ( supra ), this Court observed that there can be no
second FIR in relation to the same cognizable offence and, consequently,
there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence
or incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. It was
observed that, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or any
incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering
11
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1936
12
the FIR in the Station House Diary, the officer in charge of the police
station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in
the FIR, but also any other connected offences that may be found to have
been committed. In this regard, it was specifically observed as under:
‘18 . …….. All other information made orally or in writing after
the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable
offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first
information report and entered in the station house diary by the
police officer or such other cognizable offence as may come to
his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling
under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can
properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house
diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same
cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC.’
12
16. In Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka and others , following the
ratio decidendi in Amish Devgan ( supra ), this Court exercised power
under Article 142 of the Constitution and consolidated six FIRs registered
in the State to be tried together, as multiplicity of proceedings would not
be in the larger public interest or in the interest of the State. Again, in
13
Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab and others , this Court
observed that it is now fairly well settled that multiplicity of proceedings
would not be in the larger public interest and the correct course of action
would be to merge the later FIRs with the earliest FIR with the State’s
12
(2023) 14 SCC 801
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1164
13
consent. On the same lines, in Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar and
14
others , this Court noted that 81 FIRs were registered and directed the
first FIR to be treated as the main FIR and all other FIRs to be treated as
statements under Section 161 CrPC. Earlier, in Satinder Singh Bhasin
15
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
followed the principle enunciated in Amish Devgan ( supra ) and clubbed,
with consent, the 118 FIRs relating to the Bike Bot scheme registered
across the State of Uttar Pradesh and one FIR registered by the Economic
Offences Wing, New Delhi, by exercising power under Article 142 of the
Constitution. Before that, in Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana and
16
others , the very same 3-Judge Bench took note of multiple FIRs in
connection with a network marketing scheme in as many as 12 States and
directed the clubbing of all the FIRs, which could thereafter proceed to
one trial as far as possible, duly noting that all the States concerned voiced
no objection to such course of action.
17. However, in Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi and
17
others , this Court refused to consolidate the FIRs registered against the
petitioner therein in different States, not only under the provisions of the
IPC but also invoking respective State enactments for which Special
14
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1728
15
(2023) 14 SCC 805
16
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1935
17
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1851
14
Courts were designated to try the offences thereunder, on the ground that
clubbing of such FIRs would mean that the jurisdiction of such Special
Courts would be taken away and a special jurisdiction would be conferred
on that one Court where the FIRs were clubbed to try offences arising
under different State enactments.
18. We must also refer to Narinderjit Singh Sahni and another vs.
18
Union of India and others , a decision that weighed heavily with the
High Court in answering the reference. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court dealt with a case involving 250 FIRs registered throughout the
country. The argument before this Court was that they constituted a single
offence or, in the alternative, an offence which could only have been
committed in the course of the same transaction. Dealing with this
argument, the Bench observed that the fact situation did not permit any
credence being given to the submission that the FIRs pertained to a single
offence. It was held that each individual deposit agreement had to be
treated as a separate and individual transaction brought about by the
allurement of the financial companies, since the parties were different, the
amount of deposit was different as also the period for which the deposit
was made. The Bench, therefore, observed that all the characteristics of
independent transactions were there and it did not see any compelling
18
(2002) 2 SCC 210
15
reason to hold otherwise. However, we may note, with all due respect, that
there was no in-depth analysis of statutory provisions or case law in the
context of commission of offences in the course of the same transaction,
whereby persons accused of multiple offences committed in the course of
that same transaction could be charged and tried together. In any event,
the development of law on the point, referred to hereinabove, including
later decisions of 3-Judge Benches, is indicative of the legal position
prevailing as on date. The above referred judgments sum up the legal
position adequately and we see no purpose in burdening this decision with
more case law on the point.
19. We may note that Section 218(1) CrPC requires a distinct and
separate charge for every distinct offence and each such separate charge
should be tried separately. Sections 219 to 223 CrPC constitute
exceptions to this general rule and stipulate the circumstances in which
deviation therefrom can be made. Under Section 219 CrPC, three such
offences committed during a year can be the subject matter of a single
trial [now, five such offences, under Section 242 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)]. Under Sections 220(1) CrPC and
223(a) and (d) CrPC, consolidated charges can be framed against several
accused persons in relation to several offences, if such offences are
committed during the course of the same transaction. It would, therefore,
turn upon the offences forming part of the ‘same transaction’.
16
20. As already noted hereinabove, precedential law has laid down triple
tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide when separate
actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ – 1) unity of
purpose and design; 2) proximity of time and place; and 3) continuity of
action. These tests may be applied to ascertain whether a series of acts
form part of the same transaction or not. It is not necessary at the present
stage to consider whether consolidation of charges under Section 220(1)
CrPC should be resorted to, as that would depend upon the opinion of the
Magistrate on the strength of the findings recorded during the
investigation. If it is opined that all the incidents partake of the same
transaction, there can be one trial under Section 220(1) CrPC and Section
223(a) and (d) CrPC. If, however, it is concluded that there are several
transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, there
have to be separate trials for each offence, subject to Section 219 CrPC/
Section 242 BNSS, which allows the Trial Court to try three/five offences
of the same kind committed within a year. Once all the incidents are taken
to be part of the same transaction and amalgamated into one FIR, the
punishment would follow accordingly as per law.
21. We agree with the learned amicus that the reference by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge was premature, as the stage had not arisen for
her to have entertained any doubt so as to raise the questions of law that
she did for the decision of the High Court. The investigation was still
17
ongoing and it could not have been ascertained at that stage as to whether
the alleged offences formed part and parcel of the same transaction. Even
otherwise, consolidation of FIRs is permissible in law but that would have
also depended upon the conclusions to be arrived at after the
investigation. However, as on date, as many as six supplementary
chargesheets have been filed during the pendency of this case, in addition
to the main chargesheet that was filed in the year 2014. We find that the
end result of the investigation undertaken is that an offence under Section
120B IPC has been alleged, i.e., a criminal conspiracy. Therefore, as a
conspiracy is alleged, leading to multiple acts of cheating against different
individuals, the course adopted by the Delhi Police in registering one FIR
and treating the complaints received from 1851 other complainants as
statements under Section 161 CrPC, was the correct course of action to
have been adopted at that stage.
22. The inference to be drawn from the chargesheets, as filed, is left to
the Magistrate concerned to consider, so as to ascertain whether the
various acts of cheating attributed to the accused persons constitute part
of the ‘same transaction’, thereby bringing them within the ambit of
Section 220(1) CrPC and Section 223 (a) & (d) CrPC. If the offences
formed part of the same transaction, the Magistrate would be entitled to
charge and try them together, as enabled by the aforestated provisions,
as it would be in the larger public interest to do so. Further, in such an
18
event, as pointed out in Amish Devgan ( supra ), the complainants, who
would then be treated as witnesses in relation to the FIR which was first
registered, would be entitled to file protest petitions in the event of a
closure report being filed or if the Magistrate is inclined to discharge the
accused, and the Magistrate concerned is bound to consider the same on
merits. Coming to the aspect of sentencing, the provisions of Section 71
IPC along with Sections 31 and 325 CrPC would have to be adhered to,
depending upon the established facts and findings in the case.
23. Viewed thus, we set aside the answers on questions (a) & (b)
by the Division Bench of the High Court. The judgment dated 08.07.2019
passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Reference No. 1 of 2014 is,
accordingly, set aside to that extent.
The appeal is allowed in the aforestated terms.
Before, we part with the case, we would like to place on record our
appreciation and gratitude for the able and erudite assistance rendered
by Mr. R Basant, learned amicus curiae .
……………………...J
[SANJAY KUMAR]
.……………………...J
[ALOK ARADHE]
January 6, 2026
New Delhi.
19