Full Judgment Text
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
rd
Date of decision: 23 JANUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ I.A. 1707/2020 & I.A. 7844/2022
IN
O.M.P. (COMM) 338/2020
NHPC LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Maninder Acharya, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath, Mr. Nakul
Sachdeva, Mr. Shrinkhala Tiwari,
Harshit Singh and Mr. Abhinandan
Sharma, Advocates
versus
CHAIRMAN-CUM-MANAGING DIRECTOR, M/S PATEL-L&T
CONSORTIUM-PARBATI HE PROJECT STAGE-III
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Amitesh Chand Mishra, Mr.
Prashant Kumar Mishra, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
I.A. 1707/2020 & I.A. 7844/2022
1. The present Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 ( hereinafter referred to as „ the Arbitration Act ‟ ) has
been filed challenging the Award dated 18.04.2017 ( hereinafter referred to
as the „ Impugned Award ‟) passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
2. I.A. 1707/2020 has been filed by the Petitioner under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 ( hereinafter referred to as „ the Limitation Act’ )
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
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seeking condonation of delay of 2 years, 5 months and 18 days in filing the
present Petition on the ground that the Petitioner was bonafidely pursuing its
remedy in a Court was ultimately held by the Apex Court as one not having
the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a Petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act.
3. I.A. 7844/2022 has been filed by the Respondent under Section 3 of
the Limitation Act for rejection of the present Petition on the ground that it
is time-barred.
4. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the case, are as follows:-
a. It is stated that the Petitioner invited bids for Construction of
Diversion cum Spilway Tunnel including Gates & Hoists.
Rockfill Dam, Intake Structures and part Head Race Tunnel for
Parbati Hydroelectric Project Stage-III, which is located in Kullu
district of Himachal Pradesh.
b. It is stated that the Respondent submitted its bid and it was
declared as the successful bidder, and subsequently a Contract
dated 25.01.2006 ( hereinafter referred to as the „ Contract ‟) was
signed between the parties.
c. It is stated that disputes arose between the parties and the
Respondent invoked the Arbitration Clause under the Contract
by sending a Notice dated 05.08.2012 under Section 21 of the
Arbitration Act, wherein the Respondent also appointed its
nominee Arbitrator.
d. It is stated that vide its reply dated 08.09.2012, the Petitioner
herein also appointed its nominee Arbitrator and both the
nominee Arbitrators appointed the presiding Arbitrator.
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
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e. The Arbitral Tribunal passed the Award dated 02.03.2017,
directing the Petitioner herein to pay Rs.29,41,00,000/-, inclusive
of pre-award interest from 01.02.2013 till the date of passing of
the Impugned Award, along with future interest on the total
amount @ 10% p.a. from the date of the Impugned Award till the
date of payment.
f. It is stated that an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the
Arbitration Act was filed seeking certain corrections in the
Impugned Award and vide Order dated 18.04.2017, the Arbitral
Tribunal passed the corrected order, thereby rectifying certain
computational errors in the Impugned Award dated 02.03.2017
to the extent that the Petitioner was directed to pay
Rs.29,15,00,00/-, inclusive of pre-award interest of
Rs.9,84,68,055/- from 01.02.2013 till the date of passing of the
Impugned Award and future interest @ 10 % p.a. from the date
of passing of the Impugned Award till the date of actual
payment.
g. Aggrieved by the Impugned Award, the Petitioner herein filed a
Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the
District Court at Faridabad in view of Clause 67.3 of the
Contract of Conditions of Particular Application ( hereinafter
referred to as „ the COPA’ ) which states that Courts at New
Delhi/Faridabad will be the competent Courts for the purpose of
matters arising out of the Contract.
h. In the said Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the
Respondent herein filed an Application under Order VII Rule 11
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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of the CPC, read with Sections 2(1) (e) (i) and Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act, challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the
District Court at Faridabad.
i. It is stated that while the matter was pending before the District
Court at Faridabad, the State of Haryana, vide a notification,
transferred all the commercial matters to the Commercial Court,
Gurugram, Haryana. Accordingly, the Petition under Section 34
of the Arbitration Act was also transferred to the Commercial
Court, Gurugram, Haryana. The Commercial Court, Gurugram,
Haryana, vide Order dated 23.01.2018 allowed the application
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC filed by the Respondent on
the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
j. In the meantime, the Respondent herein also filed a Petition,
being OMP(ENF.)(COMM) No. 59/2018, before this Court
seeking execution of the Impugned Award dated 18.04.2017.
k. The Order dated 23.01.2018, passed by the Commercial Court,
Gurugram, Haryana, was challenged by the Petitioner by filing
an Appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Vide
Order dated 12.09.2018, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
allowed the said Appeal, holding that the Commercial Court at
Gurugram had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Petition
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
l. It is stated that the said Order dated 12.09.2015 was challenged
by the Respondent by filing a Special Leave Petition (SLP)
before the Apex Court, which was allowed and converted to
Civil Appeal No.9307/2019. In the said Appeal, reported as BGS
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
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SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234, the Apex
Court Vide Judgment dated 10.12.2019, set aside the Order
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, by holding that
this Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a Petition
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
m. It is stated that on receiving the certified copy of the Judgment
dated 10.12.2019 passed by the Apex Court, the Petitioner
sought return of the Petition filed before the Commercial Court
at Gurugram and after return of the said Petition, the Petitioner
filed the present Petition before this Court on 06.01.2020, i.e.,
post its re-opening after the Winter Vacations.
5. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that in view of
Clause 67.3 of the COPA, the Petitioner was under the impression that the
challenge to the Impugned Award could be made before the Court of
competent jurisdiction at Faridabad, Haryana. She further states that the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana by its Order dated 12.09.2018 held that
the Court at Gurugram, Haryana, has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain
the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and, therefore, it cannot
be said that the Petitioner was not pursuing its remedy bonafidely. She
further contends that after the Judgment of the Apex Court, the Petitioner
had to move an Application before the Commercial Court at Gurugram for
return of the Petition, modify the same according to the prescribed format of
this Court and only then file the same before this Court, which took the
Petitioner 25 days and, therefore, the delay of 25 days ought to be condoned.
She places reliance on the Judgment passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in NHPC Ltd. v. BGS-SGS-Soma JV, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2368,
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SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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where this Court had extended the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act to one of the parties therein.
6. Per contra , learned Counsel for the Respondent vehemently contends
that despite knowing fully well that the Courts at Faridaband did not have
the jurisdiction to entertain the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act, it cannot be said that the Petitioner was pursuing the case bonafidely .
He also states that the present Petition was filed only on 24.01.2020 and,
therefore, in any event it was filed beyond the time specified under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act and, therefore, it cannot be entertained. He states
that a reading of the Judgment passed by the Apex Court in BGS SGS Soma
JV v. NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234, shows that the Petitioner
deliberately filed the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before
a Court not having the jurisdiction and, therefore, the present Petition ought
not be entertained.
7. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
8. Though in the counter affidavit, the learned Counsel of the
Respondent takes a stand that the present Petition was filed only on
24.01.2020, however, on obtaining the filing log report of the case, this
Court has verified that the present Petition was filed on 06.01.2020 at 02:41
PM and not 24.01.2020. Therefore, taking the date of the Judgment passed
by the Apex Court as the date for calculating the 30 days period, the present
Petition was filed well within limitation.
9. A perusal of the material on record shows that on taking 18.04.2017
(being the date of passing of the Impugned Award) as terminus quo for
calculating the limitation period to challenge the Impugned Award, the
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
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Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was filed before the Court at
th
Faridabad on the 87 day. Thereafter, the Apex Court finally decided the
territorial jurisdiction on 10.12.2019, while the present Petition came to be
th
filed on 06.01.2020, i.e. on the 25 day.
10. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act prescribes the time within which
the application for setting aside an award has to be made. Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act reads as under:
“ Section 34. Application for setting aside arbitral
awards.
*
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had received the
arbitral award or, if a request had been made under
section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it
may entertain the application within a further period of
thirty days, but not thereafter. ”
11. A perusal of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act shows that an
application for setting aside the award can be made within three months of
receiving the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33,
then from the date on which that request under section 33 had been disposed
of by the Arbitral Tribunal. Applying the same, this Court observes that the
Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act filed by the Petitioner
before the Court at Faridabad, was filed within the limitation of three
months.
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
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12. The questions which, therefore, arise for consideration before this
Court are as to whether the Petitioner was bonafidely pursuing the case in a
Court which was not having the jurisdiction to entertain such a Petition and
if the answer to that question is in affirmative, then whether the delay of 25
days from the date of the Judgment passed by the Apex Court, in
approaching this Court ought to be condoned or not.
13. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
“ Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona
fide in court without jurisdiction.
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit
the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same
matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a
court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause
of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any
application, the time during which the applicant has
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the same
relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect
of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable
to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of
Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in
relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted
by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such
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SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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permission is granted on the ground that the first suit
must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the
court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil
proceeding was pending, the day on which that
proceeding was instituted and the day on which it
ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall
be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of
jurisdiction.”
14. It is now a settled proposition of law that Section 14 of the Limitation
Act is applicable to arbitration proceedings. The Apex Court in Consolidated
Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169 , while explaining
the phrases “ due diligence ” and “ good faith ” has succinctly laid down the
factors that would entitle a party to get the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act and the same reads as under:
“ 22 . The policy of the section is to afford protection to
a litigant against the bar of limitation when he
institutes a proceeding which by reason of some
technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is
dismissed. While considering the provisions of Section
14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to
be adopted and the provisions will have to be
interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather
than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in
mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the
invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
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to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases
of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On
reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the
legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a
certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity.
Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to
sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying
the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation
should not affect a person honestly doing his best to
get his case tried on merits but failing because the
court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be
applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of
the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not
only to a case in which a litigant brings his
application in the court, that is, a court having no
jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings
the suit or the application in the wrong court in
consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic of) law or
defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of
the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that
the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to
its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a
remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded.
23 . At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain
whether there is any express provision in the Act of
1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of
the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the
Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no provision
in the said Act which excludes the applicability of the
provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an
application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act.
On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to
arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under
Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the
award whereas the proceeding referred to under
Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43
incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the
proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the
proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of
Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court
orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period
between the commencement of the arbitration and the
date of the order of the court shall be excluded in
computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act,
1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with
respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period
between the commencement of the arbitration
proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has
to be excluded in computing the period of limitation
provided for any proceedings with respect to the
dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not
be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to an application
submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, more
particularly where no provision is to be found in the
Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section
14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under
Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers
under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the
court only if the aggrieved party makes an application.
The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be
exercised suo motu. The total period of four months
within which an application, for setting aside an
arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long.
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be unduly
oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14
of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because
cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved
party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith,
is unable to make an application within a period of
four months. From the scheme and language of Section
34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the legislature to
exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation
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Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section
14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh
period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion
of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative
intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be
applicable to an application submitted under Section
34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral
award.
24 . We may notice that in similar circumstances the
Division Bench of this Court in State of Goa v. Western
Builders [(2006) 6 SCC 239] has taken a similar view.
As observed earlier the intention of the legislature in
enacting Section 14 of the Act is to give relief to a
litigant who had approached the wrong forum. No
canon of construction of a statute is more firmly
established than this that the purpose of interpretation
is to give effect to the intention underlying the statute.
The interpretation of Section 14 has to be liberal. The
language of beneficial provision contained in Section
14 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally so
as to suppress the mischief and advance its object.
Therefore, it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of
the Limitation Act are applicable to an application
submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for
setting aside an arbitral award. ” (emphasis supplied)
15. A perusal of the above Judgment shows that benefit of Section 14 of
the Limitation Act is available in the proceedings under the Arbitration Act
as well. The said Judgment has been followed with approval by the Apex
Court in M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 .
16. In NHPC Ltd. v. BGS-SGS-Soma JV, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2368, a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court extended the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act to one of the parties therein, by observing as under:
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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“ 26. In the light of the aforesaid, I have no hesitation in
holding that the petitioner would undoubtedly be
entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, provided it satisfies this Court that it was
diligently and in good faith pursuing the proceedings
before the Gurugram Court, the Punjab High Court
and the Supreme Court. Arguing against the extension
of such benefit, the respondent has vehemently urged
that the petitioner's actions were neither bonafide nor
diligent as the petitioner, despite knowing that only the
courts at Delhi had the requisite jurisdiction over this
dispute, willfully chose to pursue proceedings in the
wrong courts. The respondent has further urged that
this was only confirmed by the Supreme Court on
10.12.2019 in paragraphs 16 to 19 of its decision while
holding that the petitioner's appeal under Section 37 of
the Act before the Punjab High Court was wholly
misconceived. I am unable to agree with this
contention of the respondent. Assessing whether an
action was carried out in good faith and was with due
diligence, cannot be carried out in abstract and would
depend on a careful and thorough analysis of the facts
of each case. The principles guiding the application of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act have been succinctly
set down by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 49 and
50 of its decision M.P. Steel (supra), which reads as
under:—
49. The language of Section 14, construed in the
light of the object for which the provision has
been made, lends itself to such an
interpretation. The object of Section 14 is that if
its conditions are otherwise met, the
plaintiff/applicant should be put in the same
position as he was when he started an abortive
proceeding. What is necessary is the absence of
negligence or inaction. So long as the plaintiff or
applicant is bona fide pursuing a legal remedy
which turns out to be abortive, the time beginning
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from the date of the cause of action of an
appellate proceeding is to be excluded if such
appellate proceeding is from an order in an
original proceeding instituted without jurisdiction
or which has not resulted in an order on the
merits of the case. If this were not so, anomalous
results would follow. Take the case of a plaintiff
or applicant who has succeeded at the first stage
of what turns out to be an abortive proceeding.
Assume that, on a given state of facts, a
defendant-appellant or other appellant takes six
months more than the prescribed period for filing
an appeal. The delay in filing the appeal is
condoned. Under Explanation (b) of Section 14,
the plaintiff or the applicant resisting such an
appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a
proceeding. If the six month period together with
the original period for filing the appeal is not to
be excluded under Section 14, the
plaintiff/applicant would not get a hearing on
merits for no fault of his, as he in the example
given is not the appellant. Clearly therefore, in
such a case, the entire period of nine months
ought to be excluded. If this is so for an appellate
proceeding, it ought to be so for an original
proceeding as well with this difference that the
time already taken to file the original proceeding
i.e. the time prior to institution of the original
proceeding cannot be excluded. Take a case
where the limitation period for the original
proceeding is six months. The plaintiff/applicant
files such a proceeding on the ninetieth day i.e.
after three months are over. The said proceeding
turns out to be abortive after it has gone through
a chequered career in the appeal courts. The
same plaintiff/applicant now files a fresh
proceeding before a court of first instance having
the necessary jurisdiction. So long as the said
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SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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proceeding is filed within the remaining three
month period, Section 14 will apply to exclude the
entire time taken starting from the ninety-first day
till the final appeal is ultimately dismissed. This
example also goes to show that the expression
“the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding” needs to be construed in a manner
which advances the object sought to be achieved,
thereby advancing the cause of justice.
50. Section 14 has been interpreted by this Court
extremely liberally inasmuch as it is a provision
which furthers the cause of justice . Thus,
in Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills
Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 458], this Court held : (SCC
p. 464, para 14)
14. “… In the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel, filing of civil writ petition
claiming money relief cannot be said to be a
proceeding instituted in good faith and
secondly, dismissal of writ petition on the
ground that it was not an appropriate
remedy for seeking money relief cannot be
said to be „defect of jurisdiction or other
cause of a like nature‟ within the meaning of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true
that the writ petition was not dismissed by
the High Court on the ground of defect of
jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is wide in its application,
inasmuch as it is not confined in its
applicability only to cases of defect of
jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases
where the prior proceedings have failed on
account of other causes of like nature. The
expression „other cause of like nature‟ came
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up for the consideration of this Court
in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh
Oberoi [(1975) 4 SCC 628] and it was held
that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide
enough to cover such cases where the defects
are not merely jurisdictional strictly so
called but others more or less neighbours to
such deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal
or factual, which inhibits entertainment or
consideration by the court of the dispute on
the merits comes within the scope of the
section and a liberal touch must inform the
interpretation of the Limitation Act which
deprives the remedy of one who has a
right .”
Applying the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, I
find no reason to deny the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act to the petitioner.
27. When the facts of the present case are considered
in the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in M.P. Steel (supra), I find that the petitioner,
while filing the original petition in the Faridabad
Court and its appeal before the Punjab High Court and
while opposing the respondent's appeal in the Supreme
Court, has remained mindful of the limitation periods
applicable in every proceeding. It has duly prosecuted
the proceedings at every stage; in fact, it is undisputed
that both the original petition as also the appeal before
the Punjab High Court were filed within the prescribed
period of limitation. Its decision to approach the
Faridabad Court was informed by the decision
in BALCO and it was not until the Supreme Court
clarified the position of law by its decision dated
10.12.2020 that only the Courts at Delhi are clothed
with the territorial jurisdiction to deal with the
petitioner's objections, that there was any clarity
regarding jurisdiction. I cannot ignore another
significant fact that a competent court of law, i.e., the
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Punjab and Haryana High Court, had found merit in
the petitioner's plea regarding the Gurugram Court's
jurisdiction to entertain its petition. Even while
approaching the High Court by way of an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act, which the Supreme Court
held as not being tenable, the petitioner had been
guided by the decision of a Division Bench of this
Court in Antrix Corporation Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia
Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 4 Arb LR 66 (Delhi). This is material
in establishing that the petitioner does, in fact, satisfy
the twin test to qualify for the benefit of Section 14 as
set down by the Supreme Court in Surya
Chakra (supra) as it acted diligently and in good faith
when it filed the original petition. The mere fact that
the petitioner did not seek return of its petition from the
Gurugram Court after 28.09.2018 - when the Supreme
Court granted interim stay, or after 06.11.2019 - when
the respondent agreed not to raise the plea of
limitation if the petition were to be presented within
four weeks, cannot be a valid ground to hold that the
petitioner's actions were lacking bonafide, for the
petitioner was justifiably prosecuting and awaiting the
final adjudication of the respondent's appeal before the
Supreme Court. In these circumstances, the
respondent's plea in this regard is liable to be rejected.
I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the
petitioner is entitled to be granted benefit under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
28. In this regard, I have also considered the
respondent's reliance on the decision in Pawan
Goel (supra) and find it inapplicable to the facts of the
present case as the appellant therein pursued its
appeal filed before this Court, which lacked
jurisdiction, and continued to do so even after it was
pointed out that as per the dictum of the Supreme
Court in a case bearing similar facts, the appeal was
required to be filed before the Punjab & Haryana High
Court. The appellant therein, while continuing to
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
20:31:27
O.M.P. (COMM) 338/2020 Page 17 of 19
oppose this arguments, did not even carry the
prosecution to completion and instead withdrew its
appeal after some time with liberty to approach the
court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the conduct of
the appellant in Pawan Goel (supra) was neither
bonafide and diligent nor did the facts deal with the
issue of exclusion of time spent in
pursuing appellate proceedings arising out of the
orders of the court lacking jurisdiction .”
(emphasis supplied)
17. This Court is in agreement with the view taken by the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in NHPC Ltd. v. BGS-SGS-Soma JV (supra). As such,
it cannot be said that the Petitioner herein was not pursuing the case
bonafidely and with due diligence before the Courts at Gurugram. In fact,
the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner is supported
by the Judgment passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which
affirmed that the Court at Gurugram had the territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It was the
Apex Court later on which cleared the air by authoritatively holding that
neither Faridabad nor Gurugram will have the jurisdiction and only this
Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain a Petition under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act.
18. The present Petition has been filed within 30 days of passing of the
Judgment by the Apex Court and this Court cannot shut its eyes to the fact
that the Petitioner had to move an Application before the Commercial Court
at Gurugram for return of the Petition, modify the same according to the
prescribed format of this Court and only then file the same before this Court,
which took 25 days. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that the
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Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
20:31:27
O.M.P. (COMM) 338/2020 Page 18 of 19
Petitioner was not active in pursuing the matter.
19. Since the Petitioner has approached this Court within 30 days of the
Order of the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner is
entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
20. Accordingly, I.A. 1707/2020 is allowed, while I.A. 7844/2022 is
dismissed.
O.M.P. (COMM) 338/2020 & I.A. 1706/2020, I.A. 2145/2023
21. List on 07.07.2026.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
JANUARY 23, 2026
Rahul
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.01.2026
20:31:27
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