Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 1422
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). OF 2025
(@ SLP(CRL.) NO(S). 14226/2025)
JEYASINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
TAMIL NADU
Respondent(s)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Nagamuthu
for the appellant and learned counsel, Mr. V. Krishnamurthy,
Senior Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State.
3. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that
the appellant, who is accused No. 1 in the present case, was
employed as a Forester in the Kottagudi Division, Theni
District, Tamil Nadu. He was also entrusted with the
additional charge of the Mandal Division.
4. A trekking organisation under the name “Chennai
Trekking Club” led by accused No. 3, Peter Van Geit, had,
along with other members of the said Club (accused Nos. 4
to 7), in commemoration of Women’s Day, organised a group
Signature Not Verified
of 27 individuals for a trekking expedition from
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2025.12.12
16:23:44 IST
Reason:
Kolukkumalai to Kurangani.
1
4.1 On the morning of 10.03.2018, the trekking group
assembled at Theni and reached Kolukkumalai at approximately
6:30 p.m., where they stayed the night at the Kolukkumalai
Tea Estate and celebrated Women’s Day. The following day,
i.e., on 11.03.2018, except for three individuals who
refrained from continuing the trek due to foot injuries, the
remaining group, led by the Chennai Trekking Club, commenced
the journey from Kolukkumalai towards Kurangani. Upon
reaching Othamara in the southern part of Kurangani, at
around 2:00 p.m., the entire Kurangani region was engulfed
in a forest fire. In an attempt to escape the fire, some
members of the trekking group fell into a nearby ditch,
sustained burn injuries, and subsequently succumbed to death
due to smoke inhalation. Other members, who were trapped in
the fire, were admitted to various hospitals and later died
on different dates due to burn injuries.
4.2 As per the prosecution, on the same day, i.e.,
10.03.2018, accused No.2, namely Prabhu, who is also the
complainant in the present case, brought another trekking
group of 11 people from Erode. On the morning of 10.03.2018,
while on their way to Kurangani, the said trekking group
purchased trekking passes from Kurangani to Top Station and
back for Rs. 200 per person at the Forest Department Check
Post in Mundal. Thereafter, appellant/accused No.1
instructed one Ranjith, who was familiar with the area, to
accompany the trekking group to Kurangini. Upon reaching
2
Kolukkumalai, they met the trekking group led by the Chennai
Trekking Club and stayed overnight at the Kolukkumalai tea
estate. The next morning, i.e., on 11.03.2018, both the
trekking groups left for Kurangani. While on their way,
information was received that a forest fire was spreading
and in order to escape the forest fire, Ranjith guided the
group to the restricted forest area. By that time, the forest
fire had completely engulfed the area, due to which nine
people had died, and the remaining were injured.
5. It is alleged that upon the instruction of
appellant, trekking passes were bought for Rs. 200 each by
the said group and payment of the same was received by the
appellant. Subsequently, accused No. 2, with the appellant’s
knowledge, guided the trekking group through a prohibited
forest area, thereby exposing them to the foreseeable risk
of a forest fire on the hill, which later spread due to the
wind and resulted in the death of several persons.
6. Based on the aforesaid facts, a complaint was submitted
by accused No.2, which came to be registered with Police
Station Kurangani, Theni District as FIR No. 18 of 2018
dated 12.03.2018, under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”).
7. After the initial investigation, by way of an alteration
report, under Section 174 the case of the CrPC was altered
into Sections 336, 337, 338 and 304 (Part II) of the Indian
3
Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and Section 21(d) of the Tamil
Nadu Forest Act, 1882.
8. On completion of the investigation, a charge sheet
bearing FR-79/2018 was filed on 20.06.2018 against three
persons, adding the appellant as accused no. 1 and 2 others,
namely Prabhu (accused No.2) and Peter Van Geit (accused
No.3) under Sections 338, 304 (Part II), 326 and 304A of the
IPC.
9. Subsequently, a criminal case bearing S.C. No. 70 of 2019
was committed to the Principal Sessions Court and was later
made over to the Additional District Court (FTC), Theni
(hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”).
10. Thereafter, accused No. 3 had filed a petition bearing
Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 3591 of 2019 under Section 482 of the
CrPC before the High Court. However, the High Court, by
order dated 30.08.2022, dismissed the quashing petition.
Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, accused No.3 approached
this Court by filing SLP(Crl) No. 3226 of 2023 (now Criminal
Appeal No. 369 of 2024). This Court, by order dated
23.01.2024, allowed the appeal and consequently quashed the
proceedings as against accused No.3 in S.C. No. 70 of 2019
with the following observations:
“We have perused in detail the First Information
Report dated 12.03.2018 as well as the charge-sheet
filed on 20.06.2018. The charges as against the
appellant herein are only under Sections 304 A and
338 IPC. Section 304 A deals with causing death by
negligence and Section 338 deals with causing
4
grievous hurt by an act endangering life or personal
safety of others. The said sections read as under:
304A. Causing death by negligence— Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both.
338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering
life or personal safety of others— Whoever causes
grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so
rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or
the personal safety of others, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
We fail to understand as to how these Sections
could have been invoked against the appellant herein
inasmuch as admittedly the persons who were part of
the trekking expedition died owing to a forest fire
which is an instance of vis major. No negligence
could have been attributed to the appellant herein
who only facilitated the organization of the
trekking expedition. As already noted, the
organizers as well as the appellant herein and even
the members of the trekking expedition were totally
unaware of the forest fire as such. Accidentally
they were engulfed in the forest fire and they died
by sheer accident and not owing to any negligence or
any criminal intent attributable to the appellant
herein. The appellant herein had no role whatsoever
in causing the death of the trekkers who died due to
a forest fire which is a natural cause.
On that short ground alone, we find that the
invocation of Sections 304 A and 338 IPC as against
the appellant herein was wholly unwarranted. The
High Court ought to have quashed the FIR, the charge
sheet as well as proceedings in SC No.70/2019.”
5
11. Meanwhile, the appellant had also filed a discharge
petition bearing M.P. No. 1 of 2024 in S.C. No. 70 of 2019
before the trial court. The trial court, by order dated
28.10.2024, dismissed the said petition on the ground that
a prima facie case was made out against the appellant and
strong material was available against him in the police
report.
12. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a revision petition
bearing Crl. R.C. (MD) No. 1286 of 2024 before the High
Court. By the impugned order dated 03.06.2025, the High
Court dismissed the revision petition. While referring to
this Court’s judgment dated 23.01.2024 in Criminal Appeal
No. 369 of 2024 whereby the proceedings in S.C. No. 70 of
2019 against accused No.3 were quashed, the High Court
observed that the said decision to quash the case against
accused No.3 was specific to the lack of negligence
attributed to him under Sections 338 and 304A of the IPC,
and as such the said ruling did not imply that the entire
case herein should be quashed due to the incident being an
instance of vis major . Furthermore, the High Court, while
taking note of the fact that accused No.3 had invoked the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC, whereas the
appellant herein had invoked Section 227 of the CrPC
claiming discharge, held that both the said actions were
distinct and the nature and scope of enquiry in both the
cases were entirely different. The High Court therefore
6
found force in the contention raised on behalf of the
prosecution that the Supreme Court’s decision to quash the
case against accused No.3 did not automatically entitle the
appellant to discharge inasmuch as serious charges under
Sections 304 (Part II) and 326 of the IPC were framed against
him, thereby distinguishing his case from that of the case
of accused No.3. Upon consideration of the statements of
witnesses recorded under Section 161(3) of the CrPC, the
High Court held that a specific role was alleged against the
appellant as well as his watcher Ranjith. Taking note of the
statements of the prosecution witnesses with respect to the
appellant’s role, the deployment of Ranjith to accompany the
trekking group from Erode led by accused No.2 and the fact
that the appellant received the trekking fees in his
personal account, the High Court held that there was
sufficient material available to proceed against the
appellant. While holding that the trial court dismissed the
discharge petition preferred by the appellant without
considering the grounds, the High Court, however, observed
that the same by itself could not be a ground to set aside
the order of the trial court. According to the High Court
when there was sufficient material available to proceed
against the appellant in the present case.
13. Being aggrieved, the appellant is here before this
Court.
7
14. During the course of arguments, Sri Nagamuthu, learned
senior counsel brought to our notice the order dated
23.01.2024 passed in the case of Peter Van Geit vs. The
State Rep. by Inspector of Police & Anr. in Criminal Appeal
No. 369 of 2024 who was accused No.3 in S.C. No.70 of 2019.
He contended that in the said order, this Court quashed the
First Information Report dated 12.03.2018 as well as the
chargesheet filed on 20.06.2018 under Sections 304A and 338
of the IPC insofar as the appellant therein was concerned.
But, in the instant case, insofar as the appellant herein
is concerned who was only discharging his duties as a Forest
Ranger in Kottagudi Forest Division and was also holding
additional charge of the Mandal Division, the chargesheet
has invoked Sections 304 Part II and 338, 326 and 304A of
the IPC even though the said provisions do not arise at all,
and hence the very invocation of the said provisions is
erroneous.
15. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent–
State, however, contended that the High Court has rightly
upheld the order of the Sessions Court in dismissing the
application filed for seeking discharge and that there is
no merit in this Appeal.
16. We, however, find force in the arguments of the
learned senior counsel for the appellant. We are also
persuaded to follow our earlier order dated 23.01.2024 as
the reasoning therein would squarely apply in the instant
8
case also. Although Sections 304A and 338 of the IPC are
invoked with regard to Peter Van Geit (supra), accused No.3
therein, the observations made therein squarely apply in
this case also. Also, Sections 304 Part II and Section 326
read as under:
“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.— Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder shall be
punished with [imprisonment for life], or
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death, or of causing such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death;
or with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, or with
fine, or with both, if the act is done with
the knowledge that it is likely to cause death,
but without any intention to cause death, or
to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death.
326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by
dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in
the case provided for by section 335,
voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of
any instrument for shooting, stabbing or
cutting, or any instrument which, used as a
weapon of offence, is likely to cause death,
or by means of fire or any heated substance,
or by means of any poison or any corrosive
substance, or by means of any explosive
substance, or by means of any substance which
it is deleterious to the human body to inhale,
to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or
by means of any animal, shall be punished with
1 [imprisonment for life], or with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine.”
9
We have perused the ingredients of the said
Section(s). It applies only when there is commission of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder and when the said
Act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause
death but without any intention to cause death or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
In the instant case, we have held that the death
occurred owing to a forest fire which is in the nature of a
vis majeure, therefore, the said Section does not apply to
the facts of the case.
Moreover, Section 326 deals with voluntary causing
grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. We fail to
understand as to how the said Section applies in the instant
case as we reiterate that the deaths occurred in the instant
case owing to the forest fire.
We have also observed in Special Criminal No.3226 of
2023 (now Criminal Appeal No.369 of 2024) that Sections 304A
and 338 also did not apply to the appellant – accused No.3
therein.
In the circumstances, we find that the Sessions Court
as well as the High Court ought to have discharged the
appellant herein rather than holding that the appellant –
accused had to face the trial merely because he was employed
as a Forester in Kottagudi Division, Theni District, Tamil
Nadu.
10
17. Consequently, the application filed by the appellant
herein seeking discharge is allowed by setting aside the
impugned orders of the High Court as well as the Sessions
Court. The appellant is discharged from the offences alleged
against him.
18. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
………………………………………………………J.
(B.V.NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………………………………J.
(R.MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 18, 2025
11
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 1422
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). OF 2025
(@ SLP(CRL.) NO(S). 14226/2025)
JEYASINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
TAMIL NADU
Respondent(s)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Nagamuthu
for the appellant and learned counsel, Mr. V. Krishnamurthy,
Senior Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State.
3. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that
the appellant, who is accused No. 1 in the present case, was
employed as a Forester in the Kottagudi Division, Theni
District, Tamil Nadu. He was also entrusted with the
additional charge of the Mandal Division.
4. A trekking organisation under the name “Chennai
Trekking Club” led by accused No. 3, Peter Van Geit, had,
along with other members of the said Club (accused Nos. 4
to 7), in commemoration of Women’s Day, organised a group
Signature Not Verified
of 27 individuals for a trekking expedition from
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2025.12.12
16:23:44 IST
Reason:
Kolukkumalai to Kurangani.
1
4.1 On the morning of 10.03.2018, the trekking group
assembled at Theni and reached Kolukkumalai at approximately
6:30 p.m., where they stayed the night at the Kolukkumalai
Tea Estate and celebrated Women’s Day. The following day,
i.e., on 11.03.2018, except for three individuals who
refrained from continuing the trek due to foot injuries, the
remaining group, led by the Chennai Trekking Club, commenced
the journey from Kolukkumalai towards Kurangani. Upon
reaching Othamara in the southern part of Kurangani, at
around 2:00 p.m., the entire Kurangani region was engulfed
in a forest fire. In an attempt to escape the fire, some
members of the trekking group fell into a nearby ditch,
sustained burn injuries, and subsequently succumbed to death
due to smoke inhalation. Other members, who were trapped in
the fire, were admitted to various hospitals and later died
on different dates due to burn injuries.
4.2 As per the prosecution, on the same day, i.e.,
10.03.2018, accused No.2, namely Prabhu, who is also the
complainant in the present case, brought another trekking
group of 11 people from Erode. On the morning of 10.03.2018,
while on their way to Kurangani, the said trekking group
purchased trekking passes from Kurangani to Top Station and
back for Rs. 200 per person at the Forest Department Check
Post in Mundal. Thereafter, appellant/accused No.1
instructed one Ranjith, who was familiar with the area, to
accompany the trekking group to Kurangini. Upon reaching
2
Kolukkumalai, they met the trekking group led by the Chennai
Trekking Club and stayed overnight at the Kolukkumalai tea
estate. The next morning, i.e., on 11.03.2018, both the
trekking groups left for Kurangani. While on their way,
information was received that a forest fire was spreading
and in order to escape the forest fire, Ranjith guided the
group to the restricted forest area. By that time, the forest
fire had completely engulfed the area, due to which nine
people had died, and the remaining were injured.
5. It is alleged that upon the instruction of
appellant, trekking passes were bought for Rs. 200 each by
the said group and payment of the same was received by the
appellant. Subsequently, accused No. 2, with the appellant’s
knowledge, guided the trekking group through a prohibited
forest area, thereby exposing them to the foreseeable risk
of a forest fire on the hill, which later spread due to the
wind and resulted in the death of several persons.
6. Based on the aforesaid facts, a complaint was submitted
by accused No.2, which came to be registered with Police
Station Kurangani, Theni District as FIR No. 18 of 2018
dated 12.03.2018, under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”).
7. After the initial investigation, by way of an alteration
report, under Section 174 the case of the CrPC was altered
into Sections 336, 337, 338 and 304 (Part II) of the Indian
3
Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and Section 21(d) of the Tamil
Nadu Forest Act, 1882.
8. On completion of the investigation, a charge sheet
bearing FR-79/2018 was filed on 20.06.2018 against three
persons, adding the appellant as accused no. 1 and 2 others,
namely Prabhu (accused No.2) and Peter Van Geit (accused
No.3) under Sections 338, 304 (Part II), 326 and 304A of the
IPC.
9. Subsequently, a criminal case bearing S.C. No. 70 of 2019
was committed to the Principal Sessions Court and was later
made over to the Additional District Court (FTC), Theni
(hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”).
10. Thereafter, accused No. 3 had filed a petition bearing
Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 3591 of 2019 under Section 482 of the
CrPC before the High Court. However, the High Court, by
order dated 30.08.2022, dismissed the quashing petition.
Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, accused No.3 approached
this Court by filing SLP(Crl) No. 3226 of 2023 (now Criminal
Appeal No. 369 of 2024). This Court, by order dated
23.01.2024, allowed the appeal and consequently quashed the
proceedings as against accused No.3 in S.C. No. 70 of 2019
with the following observations:
“We have perused in detail the First Information
Report dated 12.03.2018 as well as the charge-sheet
filed on 20.06.2018. The charges as against the
appellant herein are only under Sections 304 A and
338 IPC. Section 304 A deals with causing death by
negligence and Section 338 deals with causing
4
grievous hurt by an act endangering life or personal
safety of others. The said sections read as under:
304A. Causing death by negligence— Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both.
338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering
life or personal safety of others— Whoever causes
grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so
rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or
the personal safety of others, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
We fail to understand as to how these Sections
could have been invoked against the appellant herein
inasmuch as admittedly the persons who were part of
the trekking expedition died owing to a forest fire
which is an instance of vis major. No negligence
could have been attributed to the appellant herein
who only facilitated the organization of the
trekking expedition. As already noted, the
organizers as well as the appellant herein and even
the members of the trekking expedition were totally
unaware of the forest fire as such. Accidentally
they were engulfed in the forest fire and they died
by sheer accident and not owing to any negligence or
any criminal intent attributable to the appellant
herein. The appellant herein had no role whatsoever
in causing the death of the trekkers who died due to
a forest fire which is a natural cause.
On that short ground alone, we find that the
invocation of Sections 304 A and 338 IPC as against
the appellant herein was wholly unwarranted. The
High Court ought to have quashed the FIR, the charge
sheet as well as proceedings in SC No.70/2019.”
5
11. Meanwhile, the appellant had also filed a discharge
petition bearing M.P. No. 1 of 2024 in S.C. No. 70 of 2019
before the trial court. The trial court, by order dated
28.10.2024, dismissed the said petition on the ground that
a prima facie case was made out against the appellant and
strong material was available against him in the police
report.
12. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a revision petition
bearing Crl. R.C. (MD) No. 1286 of 2024 before the High
Court. By the impugned order dated 03.06.2025, the High
Court dismissed the revision petition. While referring to
this Court’s judgment dated 23.01.2024 in Criminal Appeal
No. 369 of 2024 whereby the proceedings in S.C. No. 70 of
2019 against accused No.3 were quashed, the High Court
observed that the said decision to quash the case against
accused No.3 was specific to the lack of negligence
attributed to him under Sections 338 and 304A of the IPC,
and as such the said ruling did not imply that the entire
case herein should be quashed due to the incident being an
instance of vis major . Furthermore, the High Court, while
taking note of the fact that accused No.3 had invoked the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC, whereas the
appellant herein had invoked Section 227 of the CrPC
claiming discharge, held that both the said actions were
distinct and the nature and scope of enquiry in both the
cases were entirely different. The High Court therefore
6
found force in the contention raised on behalf of the
prosecution that the Supreme Court’s decision to quash the
case against accused No.3 did not automatically entitle the
appellant to discharge inasmuch as serious charges under
Sections 304 (Part II) and 326 of the IPC were framed against
him, thereby distinguishing his case from that of the case
of accused No.3. Upon consideration of the statements of
witnesses recorded under Section 161(3) of the CrPC, the
High Court held that a specific role was alleged against the
appellant as well as his watcher Ranjith. Taking note of the
statements of the prosecution witnesses with respect to the
appellant’s role, the deployment of Ranjith to accompany the
trekking group from Erode led by accused No.2 and the fact
that the appellant received the trekking fees in his
personal account, the High Court held that there was
sufficient material available to proceed against the
appellant. While holding that the trial court dismissed the
discharge petition preferred by the appellant without
considering the grounds, the High Court, however, observed
that the same by itself could not be a ground to set aside
the order of the trial court. According to the High Court
when there was sufficient material available to proceed
against the appellant in the present case.
13. Being aggrieved, the appellant is here before this
Court.
7
14. During the course of arguments, Sri Nagamuthu, learned
senior counsel brought to our notice the order dated
23.01.2024 passed in the case of Peter Van Geit vs. The
State Rep. by Inspector of Police & Anr. in Criminal Appeal
No. 369 of 2024 who was accused No.3 in S.C. No.70 of 2019.
He contended that in the said order, this Court quashed the
First Information Report dated 12.03.2018 as well as the
chargesheet filed on 20.06.2018 under Sections 304A and 338
of the IPC insofar as the appellant therein was concerned.
But, in the instant case, insofar as the appellant herein
is concerned who was only discharging his duties as a Forest
Ranger in Kottagudi Forest Division and was also holding
additional charge of the Mandal Division, the chargesheet
has invoked Sections 304 Part II and 338, 326 and 304A of
the IPC even though the said provisions do not arise at all,
and hence the very invocation of the said provisions is
erroneous.
15. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent–
State, however, contended that the High Court has rightly
upheld the order of the Sessions Court in dismissing the
application filed for seeking discharge and that there is
no merit in this Appeal.
16. We, however, find force in the arguments of the
learned senior counsel for the appellant. We are also
persuaded to follow our earlier order dated 23.01.2024 as
the reasoning therein would squarely apply in the instant
8
case also. Although Sections 304A and 338 of the IPC are
invoked with regard to Peter Van Geit (supra), accused No.3
therein, the observations made therein squarely apply in
this case also. Also, Sections 304 Part II and Section 326
read as under:
“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.— Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder shall be
punished with [imprisonment for life], or
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death, or of causing such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death;
or with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, or with
fine, or with both, if the act is done with
the knowledge that it is likely to cause death,
but without any intention to cause death, or
to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death.
326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by
dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in
the case provided for by section 335,
voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of
any instrument for shooting, stabbing or
cutting, or any instrument which, used as a
weapon of offence, is likely to cause death,
or by means of fire or any heated substance,
or by means of any poison or any corrosive
substance, or by means of any explosive
substance, or by means of any substance which
it is deleterious to the human body to inhale,
to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or
by means of any animal, shall be punished with
1 [imprisonment for life], or with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine.”
9
We have perused the ingredients of the said
Section(s). It applies only when there is commission of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder and when the said
Act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause
death but without any intention to cause death or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
In the instant case, we have held that the death
occurred owing to a forest fire which is in the nature of a
vis majeure, therefore, the said Section does not apply to
the facts of the case.
Moreover, Section 326 deals with voluntary causing
grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. We fail to
understand as to how the said Section applies in the instant
case as we reiterate that the deaths occurred in the instant
case owing to the forest fire.
We have also observed in Special Criminal No.3226 of
2023 (now Criminal Appeal No.369 of 2024) that Sections 304A
and 338 also did not apply to the appellant – accused No.3
therein.
In the circumstances, we find that the Sessions Court
as well as the High Court ought to have discharged the
appellant herein rather than holding that the appellant –
accused had to face the trial merely because he was employed
as a Forester in Kottagudi Division, Theni District, Tamil
Nadu.
10
17. Consequently, the application filed by the appellant
herein seeking discharge is allowed by setting aside the
impugned orders of the High Court as well as the Sessions
Court. The appellant is discharged from the offences alleged
against him.
18. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
………………………………………………………J.
(B.V.NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………………………………J.
(R.MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 18, 2025
11