Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1457 OF 2021
Mohd Zahid ..Appellant(S)
VERSUS
State through NCB ..Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 31.03.2017 passed by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 879 of
2002, by which the High Court has dismissed the said
appeal preferred by the appellant herein original accused
and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the
Signature Not Verified
learned Trial Court, convicting the appellant for the offence
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan
Date: 2021.12.07
17:13:08 IST
Reason:
under Section 29 read with Section 21(c) of the Narcotics
1
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter
referred to as the NDPS Act) and sentencing him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment (RI) for a period of 15 years with a
fine of Rs.1,50,000/ for the aforesaid offence in view of the
provisions of Section 31(ii) of the NDPS Act, the original
accused has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as
under:
2.1 That the appellant herein – original accused faced the trial in
connection with FIR No.134/1999 for the offence under
Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act, PS Customs,
Amritsar, Punjab for recovery of 4 kg of heroin. He was
sentenced to undergo 12 years RI by the Amritsar Court. One
another FIR was also filed against the appellant herein –
original accused being FIR No.43/1999 at New Delhi for
recovery of 750 grams of heroin from Delhi. In the second
case also by judgment and order dated 30.01.2002, he was
held guilty for the offence under Section 29 read with Section
21(c) of the NDPS Act. The learned Trial Court at Delhi
imposed the sentence of 10 years RI (minimum sentence),
2
however, in view of the provisions of Section 31 (ii) of the
NDPS Act, which provides for an enhanced punishment for
offences after previous conviction, and considering the fact
that earlier appellant was convicted for the offence under the
NDPS Act in a case arising out of the FIR No.134/1999, the
learned Trial Court awarded minimum sentence of 15 years
RI. No specific order was passed by the learned Trial Court at
Delhi in the trial arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (subsequent
trial) that the sentence imposed of 15 years RI would run
concurrently or consecutively.
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and
order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court at Delhi
in a case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (second/subsequent
case), the appellant – original accused preferred the appeal
before the High Court. Before the High Court, it was mainly
submitted on behalf of the appellant – accused that as the
appellant – accused had already undergone 12 years
sentence in a case arising out of FIR No.134/1999, he
cannot be punished twice and that in a case arising out of
FIR No.43/1999 he has already undergone sentence of 6
3
years and 2 months, a lenient view may be taken and the
sentences imposed in both the cases/trials, one arising out
of FIR No.134/1999 (Amritsar Case) and another arising out
of FIR No.43/1999 (New Delhi Case) shall be held to run
concurrently. By the impugned judgment and order the High
Court has not accepted the above and has dismissed the
appeal. Hence, the accused has preferred the present appeal.
4. Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, in her short written submissions, has stated that
the appellant is a foreign national, resident of Lahore,
Pakistan and has been behind bars for the last nearly 22
years as he was arrested on 15.06.1999 in respect of FIR No.
134 of 1999 by the Police Station, Customs, Punjab and he
was charged for the offences under Sections 21 and 23 of
NDPS Act, 1985, for import of 4kg heroin and was convicted
by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar,
dated 08.12.2000.
Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned
counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was
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under trial for the period from 17.09.1999 to 14.02.2002 and
for the second offence the said period has not been taken
into consideration. It was submitted that if the sentences are
to run consecutively and if the aforesaid period is also taken
into consideration, then the number of years that the
appellant has to be behind bars, would have to be reduced.
4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
appellant was 30 years of age when he was convicted and
presently, he is 52 years old. His conduct in jail is good and
there is no adverse remark made against him by the Jail
Superintendent. Hence, the two sentences which the
appellant is now undergoing, may be held to run
concurrently under Section 427 Cr.P.C.
4.2 It is submitted that the appellant – accused has already
completed 12 years RI in FIR No.134/1999 and if the
sentences imposed, in both the cases – arising out of FIR
No.134/1999 registered at Amritsar and arising out of FIR
No.43/1999 registered at New Delhi, are not held to run
concurrently and the appellant – accused is to undergo
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sentences consecutively, in that case the appellant is
required to undergo in all 27 years of imprisonment. It is
submitted that therefore the sentences imposed in both the
cases are to be held to run concurrently.
4.3 It is submitted that as such in the case arising out of FIR
No.43/1999, the Delhi Court while imposing the sentence of
15 years RI has not passed any order whether the sentences
in both the cases to run concurrently or not. It is submitted
that therefore the appellant should be given benefit of
Section 427 of Cr.PC.
5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Akaanksha
Kaul, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State –
respondent. Heavy reliance is placed on Section 427 of
Cr.PC. It is submitted that in the present case the accused
faced two separate trials for separate offences and not arising
out of the same transaction and therefore the sentences
imposed in both the cases are to run consecutive only.
5.1 It is submitted that general rule is that sentences imposed in
two separate trials in separate offences will run consecutively
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where there are two different transactions; different crime
numbers and cases have been decided by different
judgments. It is submitted that exceptions are cases falling
under proviso to Section 427(1) of Cr.PC; falling under
Section 427(2) of Cr.PC or when the court directs sentences
shall run consecutively.
5.2 It is submitted that even the power conferred on the court
under Section 427 of Cr.PC to order concurrent sentence is
discretionary, but the discretion ought to be exercised having
regard to the nature of the offence committed and the facts
situation in which the question arises.
5.3 It is submitted that in the present case, the sentencing court
did not direct the sentences to run concurrently. It is
submitted that in the present case appellant – accused faced
two separate trials for two separate offences and for two
different transactions (not arising out of the same
transaction) and therefore the submissions on behalf of the
appellant that the sentences imposed in both the cases to
run concurrently has no substance and cannot be granted.
7
5.4 In support of her above submissions, she has relied upon the
following decisions of this court: Mohd. Akhtar Hussain
alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti Vs. Assistant Collector of
Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad & Anr. (1988) 4 SCC
183;
Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh &
Anr . (1991) 4 SCC 304; V.K. Bansal Vs. State of Haryana &
Anr. (2013) 7 SCC 211; Neera Yadav Vs. Central Bureau of
(2017) 8 SCC 757;
Investigation Vicky @ Vikas Vs. State
(NCT of Delhi) (2020) 11 SCC 540; Gurdev Singh Vs. State
of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558; Sharad Hiru Kolambe Vs.
State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 718 and Rajpal
Vs. Om Prakash & Anr. (2019) 17 SCC 809.
5.5 It is further submitted that in the present case, the appellant
– accused as such is a habitual offender. In connection with
FIR No.134/1999, he was convicted for the offence under
Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act for having in
possession/recovery of 4 kg of heroin and in another case
arising out of FIR No.43/1999, he has been convicted for the
8
recovery of 750 grams of heroin. It is submitted that
therefore the appellant – accused is not entitled to any
leniency as prayed.
6. Making the above submissions and relying upon the
decisions of this court, it is prayed to dismiss the present
appeal.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length.
8. The short question which is posed for the consideration of
this Court is, whether, the sentences imposed against the
appellant – accused by two different courts in two different
trials but against the same accused/person should run
concurrently as submitted on behalf of the appellant –
accused or consecutively.
8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present
case, the appellant – accused has been convicted by two
different courts in two different trials for the offences with
respect to the different transactions. In one case, he has
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been sentenced to undergo 12 years RI for the offence under
Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act by Amritsar
Court and in another case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 he
has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI for the offence
under Section 29 read with Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act by
Delhi Court. In one case he has been convicted for having in
possession of 4 kg of heroin and in another case for having
750 grams of heroin. It is also required to be noted that
judgments have been delivered in both the cases one after
another and in the subsequent judgment and order of
conviction and sentence by the Delhi court there is no
specific order passed by the learned Trial Court (Court at
Delhi) that the sentences to run concurrently. In view of the
above facts, the question posed for the present appeal is
required to be considered.
8.2 While considering the issue in the present appeal Section
427 of Cr.PC is required to be referred to which reads as
under:
427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another
offence.
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(1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment
or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of
the imprisonment to which he has been previously
sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent
sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence: Provided that where a person who has been
sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122
in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such
sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence
committed prior to the making of such order, the latter
sentence shall commence immediately.
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for
life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with
such previous sentence.
Therefore on a fair reading of Section 427 of Cr.PC, when a
person who is already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment
or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of
the imprisonment to which he has been previously
sentenced. Meaning thereby the sentences in both the
conviction shall run consecutively. However, there is an
exception to that, namely unless the Court directs that the
subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such
previous sentence. There is one another exception. As per
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Subsection (2) of Section 427 of Cr.PC when a person
already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is
sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a
term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall
run concurrently with such previous sentence. Therefore, in
aforesaid two cases only the subsequent sentence shall run
concurrently with previous sentence. Otherwise the
subsequent sentence shall run consecutively and the
imprisonment in subsequent sentence shall commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been
previously sentenced.
8.3 At this stage, few decisions of this court on whether the
subsequent sentence should run concurrently or
consecutively are required to be referred to.
8.3.1 In the case of , it is
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (Supra)
observed and held that if the transaction relating to
offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two
offences are quite different in that case the subsequent
sentence should run consecutively.
12
In the case of , this Court
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain
observed that the broad expanse of discretion left by
legislation to sentencing Courts should not be narrowed
only to the seriousness of the offence. No single
consideration can definitively determine the proper
sentence. In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the court
must consider, and sometimes reject, many factors. The
court must ‘recognise, learn to control and exclude’ many
diverse data. It is a balancing act and tortuous process to
ensure reasoned sentence. In consecutive sentences, in
particular, the Court cannot afford to be blind to
imprisonment which the accused is already undergoing.
is a case which arose under
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain
Gold (Control) Act, 1968 involving a Pakistani national, the
sentence in the first case was imprisonment for 7 years
and fine of Rs. 10 lakhs awarded by the court of Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad in CC No. 1674 of
1982. Upon appeal, the High Court confirmed the sentence
but reduced the fine to Rs. 5 lakhs. The special leave
petition filed by the appellant therein was dismissed by
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this Court and the conviction and sentence became final.
When the appellant was under judicial custody in the
aforesaid case, there was further investigation with regard
to his smuggling activities. It revealed widespread racket of
smuggling gold and silver in collusion with several
persons. The appellant therein was again prosecuted along
with 18 others under Section 135 of the Customs Act,
1962. The appellant therein was convicted and sentenced
for 4 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. Two
lakhs and default sentence in case of nonpayment of fine.
Thereafter, the State as well as the appellant therein
approached the High Court. The High Court accepted the
State’s appeal and it enhanced the sentence from 4 years
to 7 years and made it consecutive. Consequently, the
High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant. The
result was that he had to serve in all 14 years
imprisonment which he had challenged before this Court.
Ultimately, this Court restored the sentence imposed by
the Trial Court and set aside the sentence enhanced by the
High Court by allowing the appeal.
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8.3.2 In the case of Ranjit Singh (Supra) in paragraph 8, it is
observed and held as under:
“8. Subsection (1) of Section 427 CrPC provides for the
situation when a person already undergoing a sentence
of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction
to imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words,
subsection (1) of Section 427 CrPC deals with an
offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term
is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed
term or for life. In such a situation, the first sentence,
being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is
known when the subsequent conviction is made. Sub
section (1) says that in such a situation, the date of
expiry of the first sentence which the offender is
undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent
sentence would commence at the expiration of the first
term of imprisonment unless the court directs the
subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the
previous sentence. Obviously, in cases covered by sub
section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term, the
subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed
to run concurrently. Subsection (2), on the other hand,
provides for an offender “already undergoing sentence of
imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well
settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak
Godse [ Ranjit Singh v. U.T. of Chandigarh , (1984) 1 SCC
31 following Mithu v. State of Punjab , (1983) 2 SCC 277
and reiterated in Maru Ram [(1981) 1 SCC 107 that
imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of
the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is
commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This
being so at the stage of sentencing by the court on a
subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of
imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner
and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent
sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running
consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub
section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri
Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence
of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as a
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sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless
commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a
person having only one life span, the sentence on a
subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or
imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the
earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since
extending the life span of the offender or for that matter
anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious
situation which is stated in subsection (2) of Section 427
since the general rule enunciated in subsection (1)
thereof is that without the court's direction the
subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but
consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of
the court is needed to make the subsequent sentence
run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided
for in subsection (2) which has been enacted to avoid
any possible controversy based on subsection (1) if there
be no express direction of the court to that effect. Sub
section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general
rule enacted in subsection (1) of Section 427 that a
sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry
of the first sentence unless the court directs it to run
concurrently. The meaning and purpose of subsections
(1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub
section (2) is, therefore, clear.”
8.3.3 In the case of V.K. Bansal (Supra) after relying upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Akhtar (Supra)
in paragraph 10 it is observed and held as under:
“10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the
nature of power available to the Court under Section
427(1) of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a
general rule to be followed except in three situations: one
falling under the proviso to subsection (1) to Section
427; the second falling under subsection (2) thereof; and
the third where the court directs that the sentences shall
run concurrently. It is manifest from Section 427(1) that
the Court has the power and the discretion to issue a
direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred
upon the Court the discretionary power shall have to be
exercised along the judicial lines and not in a
mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to
lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of
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exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut
and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of
issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of
Section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be
issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of
the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation
in which the question of concurrent running of the
sentences arises.”
8.3.4 In the case of Neera Yadav (Supra) while
interpreting/considering Section 427 of Cr.PC it is
observed and held that Section 427 of Cr.PC deals with
sentence passed on an offender who is already sentenced
for another offence and the power conferred on the Court
under Section 427 to order concurrent sentence is
discretionary. It is further observed that the policy of the
legislature is that normally the sentencing should be done
consecutively. It is further observed that only in
appropriate cases, considering the facts of the case, the
court can make the sentence concurrently with an earlier
sentence imposed. It is further observed that the discretion
exercised by the sentencing court to direct the concurrency
will have to be exercised on sound principles and not on
whims. Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a
given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or
offences committed. It is further observed and held in the
17
said decision that it is well settled that where there are
different transactions, different crime numbers and the
cases have been decided by the different judgments,
concurrent sentences cannot be awarded under Section
427 of Cr.PC. It is further observed that however, the
general rule that there cannot be concurrency of sentences
if conviction relates to two different transactions, can be
changed by an order of the court.
8.3.5 In the case of Sharad Hiru Kolambe (Supra) , it is observed
and held that unless the court directs that the punishment
for such two or more offences at same trial should run
concurrently, the normal principle is that the punishments
would commence one after the expiration of the other.
Similarly, in a case where a person already undergoing a
sentence is later imposed sentence in respect of offence
tried at subsequent trial, the general rule is that the
subsequent sentence imposed run consecutively unless
there is a specific order passed by the court while imposing
any subsequent sentence, exercising discretion conferred
under Section 427 of Cr.PC that in the facts and
18
circumstances the subsequent sentence should run
concurrently, the sentence imposed in both the cases shall
run consecutively.
8.3.6 In the case of Gulam Mohammad Malik Vs. State of
Gujarat and Anr. (2018) 14 SCC 473 , this Court
considered two appeals. One from the judgment of the
High Court of Gujarat and the other from the High Court of
Bombay in respect of the same appellant. In both cases,
the appellant was charged for the offences under Section
8(c), 20(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985. Insofar as the
case filed in Gujarat was concerned, registered as NDPS
Case No. 1 of 2002, the appellant was convicted and
directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years
and to pay fine of Rs. 1 lakh and in default to undergo
further rigorous imprisonment for one year in case the fine
was not paid. Appellant therein preferred an appeal
challenging the aforesaid conviction and sentence before
the High Court which dismissed his appeal. In fact, the
appeal by the State for enhancement of sentence was
dismissed.
19
In the second case, the appellant therein was tried by
the Special Judge for NDPS, Court of Sessions, Greater
Bombay in Special Case No. 60 of 2002, culminating in the
conviction and sentence of appellant therein under Section
8(c), 20(b)(ii) read with Section 31A of the NDPS Act and
was sentenced to death. Death reference had been sent for
confirmation before the High Court. The appellant therein
had also filed an appeal against the aforesaid conviction
and sentence in the High Court of Bombay. The High Court
rejected the Confirmation Case no. 2 of 2008, filed by the
State by not affirming the death sentence and dismissed
the appeal of the appellant and the death sentence was
converted into thirty years rigorous imprisonment and a
fine of Rs.3 lakhs. The matter pertaining to the conversion
of the death sentence was considered before this Court and
on considering Section 31 of the NDPS Act on the facts of
the said case, it was held that the appellant therein had to
be given maximum punishment and thereafter multiplier
of one and a half times applied. Minimum term of
imprisonment prescribed under Section 31 is 10 years, on
20
that reckoning, when it is enhanced by one and a half
times, the minimum sentence comes to 15 years.
Ultimately, sentence ordered by this Court was rigorous
imprisonment of 16 years. The Court also had in mind that
the appellant therein was 65 years of age and suffering
from various ailments. It was also ordered that the
sentence would run concurrently and so far as with regard
to both the cases, fine of Rs. 1 lakh which was imposed by
the Trial Court in Gujarat was concerned, the same would
remain. As far as fine of Rs. 3 lakhs in Bombay case was
concerned, the same was reduced from Rs. 3 lakhs to Rs. 2
lakhs. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed.
9. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the
principles of law that emerge are as under:
(i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment, such subsequent
term of imprisonment would normally
commence at the expiration of the
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imprisonment to which he was previously
sentenced;
(ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would
commence at the expiration of the first term of
imprisonment unless the court directs the
subsequent sentence to run concurrently with
the previous sentence;
(iii) the general rule is that where there are different
transactions, different crime numbers and cases
have been decided by the different judgments,
concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under
Section 427 of Cr.PC;
under Section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the
(iv)
power and discretion to issue a direction that all
the subsequent sentences run concurrently
with the previous sentence, however discretion
has to be exercised judiciously depending upon
the nature of the offence or the offences
committed and the facts in situation. However,
22
there must be a specific direction or order by
the court that the subsequent sentence to run
concurrently with the previous sentence.
10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions and the principles of law enumerated hereinabove
to the facts of the case on hand, the submissions on behalf
of the appellant – accused that his subsequent sentence to
run concurrently with the previous sentence is to be rejected
outright. In the present case the appellant has been
convicted with respect to two different transactions, there are
different crime numbers and the cases have been decided by
the different judgments. Therefore, the appellant is not
entitled to any benefit of concurrent sentence under Section
427 of Cr.PC. As observed hereinabove, there is no specific
order or direction issued by the court while imposing the
subsequent sentence that the subsequent sentence to run
concurrently with the previous sentence.
23
11. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove under Section 427
(1) of Cr.PC, the Court has the power and discretion to issue
a direction that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently
with the previous sentence in that case also, the discretion
has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the nature of
offence or the offences committed. In the present case the
appellant – accused has been convicted for the offences
under the NDPS Act. He has been convicted in one case for
recovery of 4 kg heroin and sentenced to undergo 12 years RI
and in another case there is a recovery of 750 grams of
heroin and considering the Section 31 (ii) of the NDPS Act,
he has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI. No leniency
should be shown to an accused who is found to be guilty for
the offence under the NDPS Act. Those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instruments in causing death
or in inflicting death blow to a number of innocent
young victims who are vulnerable. Such accused causes
deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society. They are
hazard to the society. Such organized activities of clandestine
smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
24
substances have a deadly impact on the society as a whole.
Therefore, while awarding the sentence or punishment in
case of NDPS Act, the interest of the society as a whole is
required to be taken into consideration. Therefore, even while
applying discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC, the
discretion shall not be in favour of the accused who is found
to be indulging in illegal trafficking in the narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances. As observed hereinabove, even
while exercising discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC to run
subsequent sentence concurrently with the previous
sentence, the discretion is to be exercised judiciously and
depending upon the offence/offences committed. Therefore,
considering the offences under the NDPS Act which are very
serious in nature and against the society at large, no
discretion shall be exercised in favour of such accused who
is indulging into the offence under the NDPS Act.
12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
submissions on behalf of the appellant – accused to direct
the subsequent sentence in case arising out of FIR
No.43/1999 to run concurrently with the previous sentence
25
arising out of FIR No.134/1999 is hereby rejected. In view of
the above and for the reasons stated above the present
appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
December 07, 2021
26