Himanshu Sharma vs. The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 20-02-2024

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           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 2024 INSC 139 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).             OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 786 of 2024) HIMANSHU SHARMA ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH      ..RESPONDENT(S) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).             OF 2024            (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 2032 of 2024) O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. The instant appeals are directed against the orders of even th date,   i.e.,   12   December,   2023   passed   by   the   learned   Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case Nos. 43154 of 2023 and 43149 of 2023, whereby the bail granted to the appellants was cancelled Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Deepak Singh Date: 2024.02.23 09:56:27 IST Reason: on applications filed by the State under Section 439(2) of Code of 1 Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter   being   referred   to   as ‘CrPC’). 3. The appellants herein were arrested in connection with the FIR being Crime No. 21/2022 registered at P.S. Dinara District, Shivpuri for offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 470 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1960 (hereinafter being referred to as ‘IPC’) and Section 25/27 of the Arms Act. 4. Learned Single Judge sitting at Gwalior Bench of High Court of   Madhya   Pradesh   accepted   the   bail   applications   being Miscellaneous Criminal Case Nos. 42299/2022 and 44360/2022 preferred by the appellants under Section 439 CrPC vide orders th th dated 8  September, 2022 and 14  November, 2022. 5. It may be stated here that the appellants herein were not apprehended at the time of registration of the FIR and were not named therein.   They were implicated in the case solely on the basis   of   confessional   statements   made   by   the   co­accused persons.  Charge­sheet had been filed by the time the appellants th were granted bail by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 8 th September, 2022 and 14  September, 2022. 2 6.  The State preferred applications under Section 439(2) CrPC seeking   cancellation   of   regular   bail   granted   to   the   appellants herein. 7. Surprisingly, the applications for cancellation of bail came to be listed before learned Single Judge of the Gwalior Bench of High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh(other   than   the   learned   Single Judge who had granted bail who had granted bail to the accused) who accepted the same vide impugned orders of the same date, th i.e. 12  December, 2023 adverting to the merits of the case and by observing that the independent role of the accused may vary but collectively their role appears to be challenging and has wider ramifications in respect of national security and cyber crime.  The Aadhar cards and some copies recovered from the accused could be   used   in   NDPS   offences,   terrorism   related   activities,   cyber frauds, kidnapping, ransom purposes and for offences of grievous denominations.   8. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge after referring to the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of  Abdul Basit @ Raju   and   Others   v.   Mohd.   Abdul   Kadir   Chaudhary   and 1 ,   cancelled   the   bail   granted   to   the   appellants   by   a Another 1 (2014)10 SCC 754 3 coordinate Single Bench of the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in the following manner:­ “ Police is required to investigate thoroughly and therefore, when 7. they   intend   to   further   investigate   the   case,   those   accused   are required to cooperate in this regard. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, bail application is required to be recalled and present accused is required to go in custody again. 8. So far as judgment relied upon by the petitioner is concerned in the judgment of Abdul Basit (supra) itself if new adverse facts come to the knowledge of the Court, then Court can certainly look into it for cancellation of bail. Here facts which brought to the notice of this Court are such glaring in nature that Court finds it a suitable case for cancellation of bail. Two accused persons are still absconding, this is the one aspect which is also noted by the Court. 9.  In the cumulative analysis, application for cancellation of bail preferred   by   the   State   Government   is   hereby   allowed   and respondent/accused is directed to surrender before the trial court immediately within  fifteen days  from the date of passing of this order.   In   case,   respondent/accused   did   not   surrender   before himself before the trial Court then trial Court is free to secure his presence in accordance with law.” 9. The accused are in appeal against the above orders. 10. Having heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   after   going   through   the th impugned   orders  dated  12   December,   2023  and   so  also the th th orders   granting   bail   dated   8   September,   2022   and   14 September, 2022, we are of the firm opinion that the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh   in   cancelling   the   bail   granted   to   the   appellants   by another Single Judge of the same High Court and that too, by 4 examining the merits of the allegations was totally uncalled for and tantamounts to judicial impropriety/indiscipline.  11. While   cancelling   the   bail   granted   to   the   appellants,   the learned Single Judge referred to this Court’s judgment in the case of  (supra).   However, we are compelled   to note Abdul Basit  that the  ratio of   the  above  judgment favours  the  case  of  the appellants.   That apart, the judgment deals with the powers of the High Court to review its own order within the limited scope of Section   362   CrPC.   Relevant   observations   from   the   above judgment are reproduced below :­     “14.  Under Chapter XXXIII, Section 439(1) empowers the High Court as well as the Court of Session to direct any accused person to be released on bail. Section 439(2) empowers the High Court to direct any person who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Code be arrested and committed to custody i.e., the power to cancel the bail granted to an accused person. Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, ( i ) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, ( ii ) interferes with the course of investigation,   ( iii )   attempts   to   tamper   with   evidence   or witnesses,   ( iv )   threatens   witnesses   or   indulges   in   similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, ( v ) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, ( vi ) attempts to make   himself   scarce   by   going   underground   or   becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, ( vii ) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. Where bail has been granted under   the   proviso   to   Section   167(2)   for   the   default   of   the prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days after the defect is cured by the filing of a charge­sheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non­bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. However, in the 5
last­mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds<br>indeed. (Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar [(1986) 4 SCC 481)
15. The scope of this power to the High Court under Section<br>439(2) has been considered by this Court in Gurcharan Singh<br>v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1978) 1 SCC 118]
16.In Gurcharan Singh case [(1978) 1 SCC 118] this Court has<br>succinctly explained the provision regarding cancellation of<br>bail under the Code, culled out the differences from the Code<br>of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short “the old Code”) and<br>elucidated the position of law vis­à­vis powers of the courts<br>granting and cancelling the bail. This Court observed as<br>under:
“16. Section 439 of the new Code confers special<br>powers on the High Court or Court of Session<br>regarding bail. This was also the position under<br>Section 498 CrPC of the old Code. That is to say,<br>even if a Magistrate refuses to grant bail to an<br>accused person, the High Court or the Court of<br>Session may order for grant of bail in appropriate<br>cases. Similarly, under Section 439(2) of the new<br>Code, the High Court or the Court of Session may<br>direct any person who has been released on bail to<br>be arrested and committed to custody. In the old<br>Code, Section 498(2) was worded in somewhat<br>different language when it said that a High Court or<br>Court of Session may cause any person who has<br>been admitted to bail under sub­section (1) to be<br>arrested and may commit him to custody. In other<br>words, under Section 498(2) of the old Code, a<br>person who had been admitted to bail by the High<br>Court could be committed to custody only by the<br>High Court. Similarly, if a person was admitted to<br>bail by a Court of Session, it was only the Court of<br>Session that could commit him to custody. This<br>restriction upon the power of entertainment of an<br>application for committing a person, already<br>admitted to bail, to custody, is lifted in the new Code<br>under Section 439(2). Under Section 439(2) of the<br>new Code a High Court may commit a person<br>released on bail under Chapter XXXIII by any court<br>including the Court of Session to custody, if it thinks<br>appropriate to do so. It must, however, be made<br>clear that a Court of Session cannot cancel a bail
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which has already been granted by the High Court<br>unless new circumstances arise during the progress<br>of the trial after an accused person has been<br>admitted to bail by the High Court. If, however, a<br>Court of Session had admitted an accused person to<br>bail, the State has two options. It may move the<br>Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have<br>arisen which were not earlier known to the State and<br>necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may<br>as well approach the High Court being the superior<br>court under Section 439(2) to commit the accused to<br>custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by<br>the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and<br>there are no new circumstances that have cropped up<br>except those already existed, it is futile for the State<br>to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent<br>in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the<br>bail. This position follows from the subordinate<br>position of the Court of Session vis­à­vis the High<br>Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. In this context, it is profitable to render reliance upon the<br>decision of this Court in Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC<br>338]. In the said case, this Court held (SCC p. 345, para 11)<br>that the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or<br>perverse order is absolutely different from cancelling an order<br>of bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted<br>himself or because of some supervening circumstances<br>warranting such cancellation. In Narendra K. Amin v. State of<br>Gujarat [(2008) 13 SCC 584] , the three­Judge Bench of this<br>Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and further drawn<br>the distinction between the two in respect of relief available in<br>review or appeal. In this case, the High Court had cancelled<br>the bail granted to the appellant in exercise of power under<br>Section 439(2) of the Code. In appeal, it was contended before<br>this Court that the High Court had erred by not appreciating<br>the distinction between the parameters for grant of bail and<br>cancellation of bail. The Bench while affirming the principle<br>laid down in Puran case [(2001) 6 SCC 338] has observed that<br>when irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration<br>by the court granting order of bail, the same makes the said<br>order vulnerable and subject to scrutiny by the appellate court<br>and that no review would lie under Section 362 of the Code. In<br>essence, this Court has opined that if the order of grant of bail<br>is perverse, the same can be set at naught only by the
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superior court and has left no room for a review by the same<br>court.
18. Reverberating the aforesaid principle, this Court in the<br>recent decision in Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. [(2013) 16 SCC<br>797] has observed that:
“19. … There is also a distinction between the concept<br>of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse<br>order and cancellation of an order of bail on the<br>ground that the accused has misconducted himself<br>or certain supervening circumstances warrant such<br>cancellation. If the order granting bail is a perverse<br>one or passed on irrelevant materials, it can be<br>annulled by the superior court.”
19. Therefore, the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal<br>or perverse order is different from the concept of cancellation<br>of a bail on the ground of accused's misconduct or new<br>adverse facts having surfaced after the grant of bail which<br>require such cancellation and a perusal of the aforesaid<br>decisions would present before us that an order granting bail<br>can only be set aside on grounds of being illegal or contrary to<br>law by the court superior to the court which granted the bail<br>and not by the same court.
20. In the instant case, the respondents herein had filed the<br>criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court seeking<br>cancellation of bail on grounds that the bail was obtained by<br>the petitioners herein by gross misrepresentation of facts,<br>misleading the court and indulging in fraud. Thus, the<br>petition challenged the legality of the grant of bail and<br>required the bail order to be set aside on ground of it being<br>perverse in law. Such determination would entail eventual<br>cancellation of bail. The circumstances brought on record did<br>not reflect any situation where the bail was misused by the<br>petitioner­accused. Therefore, the High Court could not have<br>entertained the said petition and cancelled the bail on<br>grounds of it being perverse in law.
21. It is an accepted principle of law that when a matter has<br>been finally disposed of by a court, the court is, in the absence<br>of a direct statutory provision, functus officio and cannot<br>entertain a fresh prayer for relief in the matter unless and<br>until the previous order of final disposal has been set aside or<br>modified to that extent. It is also settled law that the judgment
8 and   order   granting   bail   cannot   be   reviewed   by   the   court passing   such   judgment   and   order   in   the   absence   of   any express provision in the Code for the same. Section 362 of the Code operates as a bar to any alteration or review of the cases disposed of by the court. The singular exception to the said statutory bar is correction of clerical or arithmetical error by the court.” 12. Law is well settled by a catena of judgments rendered by this   Court   that   the   considerations   for   grant   of   bail   and cancellation thereof  are  entirely  different.     Bail granted  to an accused can only be cancelled if the Court is satisfied that after being released on bail, (a) the accused has misused the liberty granted to him; (b) flouted the conditions of bail order; (c ) that the   bail   was   granted   in   ignorance   of   statutory   provisions restricting the powers of the Court to grant bail; (d) or that the bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud.  In the present case, none of these situations existed. 13. We   fail   to   understand   how   the   application   seeking cancellation of bail came to be listed before a Single Judge other than   the   learned   Single   Judge   who   had   granted   bail   to   the appellants. 14. Under   normal   circumstances,   the   application   for cancellation of bail filed on merits as opposed to violation of the conditions of the bail order should have been placed before the 9 same learned Single Judge who had granted bail to the accused. The learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned orders th dated   12   December,   2023   has   virtually   reviewed   the   orders th granting bail to the appellants dated 8   September, 2022 and th 14  September, 2022 by another Single Judge of the same High Court.  We feel that such exercise of jurisdiction tantamounted to gross impropriety. 15. It may further be noted that the learned Single Judge while cancelling   the   bail   granted   to   the   appellants   did   not   even consider   the   fact   that   charges   had   been   framed   against   the th appellants on 28  May, 2022 and the trial had commenced and thus there could not have been any requirement of the appellants for further investigation as observed in para 7 of the impugned order.  This Court is informed that by now, seven witnesses have been   examined   at   the   trial.     Thus,   we   are   of   the   considered th opinion that the impugned orders dated 12   December, 2023 whereby the bail granted to the appellants by the learned Single th Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh vide orders dated 8 th September, 2022 and 14   September, 2022 was cancelled, are grossly illegal and do not stand to scrutiny. Resultantly, the same are hereby quashed and set aside. 10 16. The appeals are accordingly allowed. 17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. …………………………J. (B.R. GAVAI) ………………………….J. (SANDEEP MEHTA) New Delhi; th 20  February, 2024 11