Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ALLAHABAD BANK OFFICERS ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ALLAHABAD BANK AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/05/1996
BENCH:
NANAVATI G.T. (J)
BENCH:
NANAVATI G.T. (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 2030 1996 SCC (4) 504
JT 1996 (5) 275 1996 SCALE (4)150
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
NANAVATI, J.
Appellant No.2, Dayal Dass Khanna, joined the Allahabad
Bank (Respondent No.1) as a Clerk on 24.7.1946. He was
promoted as an Officer on 15.9.1967 and his further
promotions from Scale I to Scale II and from Scale II to
Scale III in the Officer’s Cadre were on 1.1.1976 and
1.10.1977 respectively. On 15.8.1979 was elected as a
General Secretary of Allahabad Bank Officers Association
(Appellant No.1), a registered trade union duly recognised
by the Bank. In November 1982 he was considered for further
promotion from Scale III to Scale IV but was denied
promotion because he was found lacking in potential. In
March 1984 a Special Committee was constituted under
Regulation 19 of the Allahabad Bank (Officers) Service
Regulations, 1979 to reivew the cases of 20 Officers,
including Appellant No.2, for recommending whether they
should be retired earlier or allowed to serve till the age
of superannuation. The Committee unanimously recommended
compulsory retirement of Appellant No.2 and the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Bank agreeing with the said
recommendation passed an order on May 18, 1984 for
compulsorily retiring Appellant No.2. By an order of the
same date passed by the Bank Appellant No.2 was retired with
effect from 24.5.1984.
The appellants challenged that order by filing a writ
petition in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. It was challenged
mainly on the ground that it casts a stigma on the character
and dignity of Appellant No.2 and, therefore, in reality it
is an order of punishment which could have been passed under
the Allahabad Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and
Appeal) Regulations, 1976 after holding a regular
departmental enquiry and as no such enquiry was held it is
illegal and void. The order was also challenged on the
ground that it was arbitrary and mala fide. The High Court
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rejected all the contentions and dismissed the writ
petition.
In view of the findings recorded by the High Court and
the reasons given in support thereof the learned counsel for
the appellants has rightly not pressed the other contentions
which were raised before the High Court and, therefore, the
only question which we have to consider in this appeal is
whether the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on
Appellant No.2. The learned counsel submitted that the High
Court has committed an error in holding that it does not. It
is not in dispute that the letter dated May 18, 1984 is the
only order of compulsory retirement served upon appellant
no. 2. The material part of it reads as under:
rt. We will refer to those decisions only which are relevant
and useful for deciding this appeal.
"In terms of the first proviso
of Regulation 19.1 of Allahabad
Bank Officers’ Service Regulation,
1979 followed by the guidelines of
Government of India, Ministry of
Finance, Banking Division, on the
said Regulation, a Special
Committee in terms of Rule 2 of the
aforesaid Regulation was
constituted fore the review of our
case fore your retirement from the
Bank’s service or otherwise. The
special committee unanimously
recommended fore your retirement
from Bank’s service. Accordingly,
the Chairman and Managing Director,
who is the Competent Authority in
this respect has passed the
following order:
"I agree, particularly,
on the views expressed
regarding his want of
application to Bank’s work and
lack of potential. He has also
been found not dependable.
Hence retire him immediately
as recommended".
The Bank, therefore, retires
you from its service with effect
from 24th May, 1984. Please
handover charge to Shri C.L.
Malhotra as at the close of
business on 23rd May, 1984 on which
date you stand relieved from bank’s
service."
It was submitted by the learned counsel that recitals
in the impugned order that there was "want of application to
Bank’s work and lack of potential" and "He has also been
found not dependable" are stigmatic as they cast aspersions
on the conduct, character and integrity of Appellant No.2.
The High Court rejected this contention by observing that
"According to us, this casts no stigma, but only assesses
the work of petitioner No.2 for determining his compulsory
retirement." It was submitted that this view of the High
Court is wrong as it did not apply the right test for
finding out whether those statements are stigmatic or not.
It was further submitted that whoever reads the order of
compulsory retirement would consider that there is something
wrong with the conduct of appellant No.2 or his capacity to
work. Therefore, the High Court should have held that though
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the impugned order purports to be an order of compulsory
retirement it is really an order of punishment. In support
of his submission the learned counsel relied upon several
decisions of this Court. We will refer to those decisions
only which are relevant and useful for deciding this appeal.
The power to compulsorily retire a Government servant
is one of the facets of doctrine of pleasure incorporated in
Article 310 of the Constitution. The object of compulsory
retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain
efficiency and initiative in the service and also to
dispense with the services of those whose integrity is
doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration.
Generally speaking, Service Rules provide for compulsory
retirement of a Government servant on his completing certain
number of years of service or attaining the prescribed age.
His service record is reviewed at that stage and a decision
is taken whether he should be compulsorily retired or
continued further in service. There is no levelling of a
charge or imputation requiring an explanation from the
Government servant. While misconduct and inefficiency are
factors that enter into the account where the order is one
of the dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this
difference that while in the case of retirement they merely
furnish the background and the enquiry, if held - and there
is no duty to hold an enquiry - is only for the satisfaction
of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of
dismissal or removal they form the very basis on which the
order is made, as pointed out by this Court in Shyamlal vs.
S.M. Doshi AIR 1957 SC 892. Thus, by its very nature the
power to compulsorily retire a Government servant is
distinct and separate from the power to punish him by way of
removal, dismissal etc. for misconduct. A Government servant
who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the
benefit that he has earned during service. Thus, compulsory
retirement differs both from dismissal and removal as it
involves no penal consequences. Though compulsory retirement
deprives a Government servant of the chance of serving and
getting his pay till he attains the age of superannuation
and thereafter to get pension that cannot be regarded in the
eye of law as punishment as pointed out in the case of
Shyamlal (supra) and Union of India vs. M.E. Reddy 1980 (2)
SCC 15. Thus, compulsory retirement differs from dismissal
and removal both in its nature and incidence or effects.
Therefore, compulsory retirement is not considered prima
facie and per se a punishment and does not attract the
provisions of Article 311. This Court in a series of
decisions starting with Shyamlal’s case (supra) has held
that compulsory retirement is neither a punishment nor a
stigma; and, that can now well be regarded as settled legal
position. But, if any stigma is attached to the order of
compulsory retirement then it may be treated as an order of
punishment in reality. So also, if a formal enquiry is made
on an allegation of misconduct and a finding holding him
guilty is recorded and thereafter the order of compulsory
retirement is passed then such an order even when it does
not contain any allegation or a stigmatic statement may be
regarded as an order of punishment, attracting provisions of
Article 311. The reason is that the court would infer in
such cases that the real intention of the Government was not
to compulsorily retire its employee but to punish him.
In this case, there was no completion of a formal
enquiry against Appellant No.2 before passing the order of
compulsory retirement nor he has been deprived of the
service benefits already earned by him while in service.
Therefore, what is to be considered is whether any stigma is
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attached to the order of compulsory retirement. In other
words what has to be seen is whether the order contains any
charge or imputation against Appellant No.2 with respect to
his character suggesting moral turpitude or unsatisfactory
conduct.
It will, therefore, be necessary to first consider what
is meant by stigma and also the cases wherein the orders
have been regarded as stigmatic. Stigma, according to the
dictionary meaning, is something that detracts from the
character or reputation of a person, a mark, sign etc.
indicating that something is not considered normal or
standard. It is a blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute,
imputation, mark of disgrace or shame and mark or label
indicating deviation from a norm. In the context of an order
of termination or compulsory retirement of a Government
servant stigma would mean a statement in the order
indicating his misconduct or lack of integrity.
In Chandu Lal Management of M/s Pan American World
Airways Inc. 1985 (2) SCC 727 services of the workman were
terminated on the ground of "loss of confidence in him". It
was held that the order attached a stigma on the workman as
want of confidence indicated an adverse facet in his
character, namely, that he had failed to behave upto the
expected standard of conduct. In other words, it amounted to
a dereliction on the part of the workman.
In Kamal Kishore Lakshman vs. Management of M/s Pan
American World Airways Inc. and others 1987 (1) SCC 146 this
Court reiterated the view taken in Chandu Lal’s case
(supra). In Jagdish Prasad vs. Sachiv, Zila Ganna Committee,
Muzaffarnagar and another 1986(2) SCC 338 this Court held
that as the order of termination was passed on charges of
concealment of the fact that the employee was removed from
his earlier service on charge of corruption and was,
therefore, not suitable for employment, it did cast a stigma
on his service career. In Jagdish Mitter vs. Union of India
AIR 1964 SC 449 the order of discharge stated that the
employee was found undesirable to be retained in Government
service. This Court held that it did cast a stigma on the
employee and, therefore, it was not a mere order of
discharge but an order of dismissal.
In State of U.P. vs. Madan Mohan Nagar AIR 1967 SC 1260
this Court quoted the following observations from Jagdish
Mitter’s case and held that the same test must apply in the
case of compulsory retirement also:
"No doubt the order purports
to be one of discharge and as such
can be referred to the power of the
authority to terminate the
temporary appointment with one
month’s notice. But it seems to us
that when the order refers to the
fact that the appellant was found
undesirable to be retained in
Government service, it expressly
casts a stigma on the appellant and
in that sense must be held to be an
order of dismissal and not a mere
order of discharge."
"It seems that anyone who
reads the order in a reasonable
way, would naturally conclude that
the appellant was found to be
undesirable, and that must
necessarily import an element of
punishment which is the basis of
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the order and is its integral part.
When an authority wants to
terminate the services of a
temporary servant, it can pass a
simple order of discharge without
casting or attaching any stigma to
his character. As soon as it is
shown that the order purports to
cast an aspersion on the temporary
servant, it would be idle to
suggest that the order is a simple
order of discharge. The test in
such cases must be: does the order
cast aspersion or attach stigma to
the officer when it purports to
discharge him? If the answer to
this question is in the
affirmative, then notwithstanding
the form of the order, the
termination of service must be
held, in substance, to amount to
dismissal." "
In Madan Mohan’s case (supra),intheorderit was stated:
‘he has outlived his utility’; and these words were
considered as stigmatic as they indicated that the employee
had incapacitated himself from holding the post and any
person who read that order would have immediately considered
that there was something wrong with him or his capacity to
work. This decision was heavily relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellant and on its basis he submitted that
if the order of compulsory retirement contains any statement
adversely reflecting upon the capacity to work then such a
statement should be regarded as stigmatic.
In The State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das AIR 1961 SC
177 a Probationer was discharged from service "for
unsatisfactory work and conduct" in the manner provided by
Rule 55-B of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal), Rules. The High Court held that the order of
discharge amounted to imposing punishment, because the
respondent had been "visited with evil consequences leaving
an indelible stigma on his affecting his future career".
This Court did not construe that order as stigmatic and by
way of punishment.
In Union of India vs. R.S. Dhaba 1969(3) SCC 603, in
the order of reversion it was stated that the officer "....
having been found unsuitable after trial to hold the post of
Income Tax Officer, Class II is hereby reverted....". This
Court held that there was nothing in the order to show that
a stigma was attached to the respondent. It was pointed out
that the only reason in the order was that he was found
unsuitable to hold the post and there was no imputation on
the integrity of the respondent. Construing that order this
Court observed that the order did not contain any express
words of stigma attributed to the conduct of the employee
and, therefore, it could not be held that the order of
reversion was made by way of punishment.
In Hari Singh Mann vs. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2263
service of a Probationary Deputy Superintendent of Police
was terminated by an order, the relevant part of which read
as under:
"The President of India is
pleased to dispense with the
service of ..... having considered
him unfit for appointment to the
State Police Service...."
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The case was governed by the Punjab Police Service
Rules, 1959. This Court referred to Rule 8(b) which states
that the services of a member recruited by direct
appointment may be dispensed with by the Government on his
failing to pass the final examination at the end of his
period of training, or on his being reported on during or at
the end of his period of probation, as unfit for
appointment. It also referred to Rule 9 which requires that
the Probationer should be apprised of the grounds on the
basis of which termination of his service is proposed and to
give him an opportunity to show cause against the proposal.
This Court then held as under:
"It is obvious that at the
time of confirmation fitness is a
matter to be considered. The order
terminating the services is
unfitness for appointment at the
time of confirmation, it is not
passed on the ground of any
turpitude like misconduct or
inefficiency. To hold that the
words "unfit to be appointed" are a
stigma would rob the authorities of
the power to judge fitness for work
or suitability to the post at the
time of confirmation. Termination
of services on account of
inadequacy for the job or for any
temperamental or other defect not
involving moral turpitude is not a
stigma which can be called
discharge by punishment."
In State of Gujarat vs. Akhilesh C. Bhargav AIR 1987 SC
2135 a Probationary I.P.S. Officer was discharged from
service under clause (bb) of Rule 12 of the Indian Police
Service (Probation) Rules, 1954. It was contended that the
reference to Rule 12(bb) brought into the otherwise
innocuous order stigma in sufficient measure warranting a
proceeding of the nature contemplated under Article 311(2)
of the Constitution. This Court referred to the Constitution
Bench decision in Ram Narayan Das’s case (supra) wherein
this Court has held that in the case of a probationer
observation like ‘unsatisfactory work and conduct’ would not
amount to attaching stigma to the order, and following the
same rejected the contention that reference to Rule 12(bb)
in the order made it stigmatic.
The above discussion of case law makes it clear that if
the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on the
Government servant in the sense that it contains a statement
casting aspersion on his conduct or character, then the
court will treat that order as an order of punishment,
attracting provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
The reason is that as a charge or imputation is made the
condition for passing the order the court would infer
therefrom that the real intention of the Government was to
punish the Government servant on the basis of that charge or
imputation and not to exercise the power of compulsory
retirement. But mere reference to the rule, even if it
mentions grounds for compulsory retirement, cannot be
regarded as sufficient for treating the order of compulsory
retirement as an order of punishment. In such a case, the
order can be said to have been passed in terms of the rule
and, therefore, a different intention cannot be inferred. So
also, if the statement in the order refers only to the
assessment of his work and does not at the same time cast an
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aspersion on the conduct or character of the Government
servant, then it will not be proper to hold that the order
of compulsory retirement is in reality an order of
punishment. Whether the statement in the order is stigmatic
or not will have to be judged by adopting the test of how a
reasonable person would read or understand it.
In this case the order was passed by the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Bank. It is contained in the Bank’s
letter dated May 18, 1984 addressed to Appellant No.2. The
letter first refers to constitution of a Special Committee
as required by the Service Regulations and consideration of
the case of Appellant No.2 by it. Then it mentions that the
Special Committee unanimously recommended compulsory
retirement of Appellant No.2. Thereafter it quotes the order
passed by the Chairman and Managing Director. Lastly, it is
stated that pursuant to the said order of the Chairman and
Managing Director the Bank has retired Appellant No.2 from
service with effect from 24.5.1984. What the Chairman and
the Managing Director has stated in his order is that he was
agreeing with the views expressed by the Special Committee
regarding his want of application to Bank’s work and lack of
potential and his dependability. He has further stated that
he was retiring Appellant No.2 as per the recommendation of
the Special Committee.
According to Regulation 19, the Bank can, on review by
the Special Committee retire an officer employee on or at
any time after the completion of 55 years of age or on or at
any time after the completion of 30 years of total service
as an officer employee or otherwise, whichever is earlier.
Under the said Regulation the Bank is required to constitute
a Special Committee consisting of not less than three
members, to review, whether an officer-employee should be
retired. Moreover, no order of retirement can be made unless
the Special Committee recommends in writing to competent
authority the retirement of the officer-employee. In the
said letter the Bank has tried to convey to Appellant No.2
that the order of compulsory retirement has been passed in
terms of Regulation 19. The order passed by the Chairman and
Managing Director merely states that he has agreed with the
view of the Special Committee and has, therefore, thought it
fit to accept its recommendation also. The Special Committee
was not examining any allegation against Appellant No.2 in
the nature of misconduct but had considered his service
record and expressed its opinion with respect to the
assessment of his work. Therefore, it can be said without
any doubt that the remarks want of application to Bank’s
work", "lack of potential" and "found not dependable" have
been made in relation to his work and not for any other
purpose. Even the dependability which is referred to is also
in connection with the Bank’s work. Any person reading the
letter or the order of compulsory retirement would not be
led to believe that there was something wrong with Appellant
No.2 as regards his conduct or character. They would only
indicate that he had ceased to be useful to the Bank in his
capacity as a Manager. Therefore, no inference can be drawn
from the said statements that they cast a stigma on
Appellant No.2 and that the real intention of the Bank was
to punish him for some act of misconduct or lack of
integrity. Whether the order of compulsory retirement
attaches a stigma to the employee or not would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. In the context of
the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be said
that by including the aforesaid statements in the order of
compulsory retirement any stigma has been attached to it.
The view taken by the High Court in this behalf appears to
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be correct.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No. order as to
costs.