Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAZAKALI KHURESHI SANDHI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF GUJARAT
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/1997
BENCH:
G.T. NANAVATI, S.P. KURDUKAR
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.P. KURDUKAR, J.
This appeal under Section 19 of the Terrorists and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short ‘the
TADA’) is filed by the appellant challenging the legality
and correctness of the judgment and order of conviction and
sentence passed by the Designated Judge, Jam Nagar on June
19, 1996 for various offences punishable under Sections 302,
307, 225, 333 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Briefly stated the prosecution case is as under:-
On March 22, 1992, the Custom Officers intercepted a
ship called Safina-Al-Burhani and upon search thereof
recovered five belts of gold biscuits of foreign origin.
During interrogation, Abbas Hasan Subhaniya, the tandel of
the said ship, disclosed that Harun Jusab Bhaya (A-8) and
for that a team of Custom Inspectors along with three sepoys
went to Khambhalia in a jeep which was driven by Chuni Lal
Barad (PW 46). The Custom Officers came to the office of
Brother & Brother Transport at Khambhalia where they spotted
A-8 and informed him that he was being arrested in
connection with the smuggling of gold. A-8 then started
running away but the Custom Officers chased and apprehended
him. When A-8 was being taken to Jam Nagar in a jeep for
further investigation, he became violent and tried to escape
from the grip of the Custom Officers who, therefore, stopped
the jeep near Shrijee Hotel with a view to tie him with a
rope which they fetched from the nearby shop of Puncturwala.
When A-8 was being tied with a rope, according to the
prosecution, suddenly a truck bearing Registration No. GTE-
7461 came from Khambhalia side and dashed against the jeep
of the Custom Officers. As a result of this dash, the Custom
Officers who were standing near the jeep fell down. Mr.
Jacob (PW 2) and Mahendrasinh Rayjada, a sepoy sustained the
injuries. The said truck immediately took a turn and again
dashed against the jeep and in this process, A-8 could
succeed in escaping himself from the clutches of the Custom
Officers. A-8 then boarded another truck which was parked
nearby and fled away. According to the prosecution,
appellant who was the driver of the truck intentionally
dashed his truck against the jeep whereby two person,
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namely, Mahindersinh Rayjada, a sepoy died on the sport and
Somaji Thakor, another sepoy died in the hospital. The
appellant then fled away.
3. The Custom Inspector Mr. P.N. Desai (PW 1) then took a
lift on the motor cycle of Jadeja and reached the factory of
Meera Tiles and gave telephone calls to the Customs Office
and also informed the police station at Khambhalia about the
incident. He then came back to the place of incident. In the
meantime, police officers reached the place of incident and
thereafter the injured were removed to the hospital. At
about 8.30 p.m., an FIR was lodged by Mr. P.N. Desai (PW 1)
in the police station. After completing the investigation, a
charge sheet for offences punishable under Sections 147,
302/149, 307/149, 332, 333/149 of the Indian Penal Code as
also under Section 3(a) of the Demolition of Public Property
Act and under Sections 3 and 4 of TADA came to be submitted
in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Khambhalia
against the appellant and seven other accused persons. The
case was then committed for trial to the Designated Court
for the aforesaid offences.
4. The appellant and other seven accused persons denied
the charges and claimed to be tried. According to them, they
have been falsely implicated in the present crime.
5. The prosecution in support of its case adduced the
evidence of four eye witnesses, namely, Mr. P.N. Desai (PW
1), Jacob (PW 2), Bharat Trivedi (PW 3) and Chuni Lal Barad
(PW 46). In addition to the above evidence, the prosecution
also placed reliance upon the medical evidence to prove the
cause of deaths of Mahindersinh Rayjada and Somaji Thakor.
The evidence relating to the Test Identification Parade was
also produced at the trial. The appellant, however, did not
lead any evidence in support of his defence.
6. The Designated Judge, Jamnagar, after careful scrutiny
of oral and documentary evidence on record by his judgment
and order dated June 19, 1996 convicted the appellant under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.
30,000/-; in default to undergo further sentence of RI for
two years. In addition to this, the appellant was convicted
under Section 307, 225, 332 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code
and was sentenced to suffer RI for various terms in addition
to the payment of fine. Harun Jasub Bhaya, original accused
No. 8, however, was convicted under Section 224 of the
Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer RI for two
years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-; in default of
payment of fine to suffer further RI for a period of six
months. In this appeal, we are however not concerned with
the conviction and sentence of A-8. Rest of the accused
persons were, however, acquitted of all the charges. The
appellant aggrieved by this order of conviction and sentence
has filed this appeal to this Court under Section 19 of the
TADA.
7. At the outset, it may be stated that it is not and
cannot be disputed that two sepoys of Custom Department,
namely, Mahindersinh and Somaji Thakor died in the incident
in question. Both of them were crushed to death because of
the dash given by the truck bearing registration No. GTE-
7461. It is, therefore, needless to refer to the medical
evidence on record. In addition to these two unnatural
deaths, P.N. Desai (PW 1) and Jacob (PW 2) were also injured
in the same incident. No sustainable arguments were advanced
before us to the contrary and we, therefore, see no reason
to confirm the finding of the learned trial court that
Mahinersinh Rayjada and Somaji Thakor met with unnatural
deaths and P.N. Desai (PW 1) and Jacob (PW 2) sustained
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injuries in the same incident.
8. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant
is that there is no satisfactory material on record to
establish the identity of the appellant being the driver of
the truck bearing registration No. GTE-7461. In order to
establish the identity, the prosecution relied upon the
evidence of four witnesses, namely, P.N. Desai (PW 1), Jacob
(PW 2), Bharat Trivedi (PW 3) and Chuni Lal Barad (PW 46).
The learned trial judge, however did not accept the evidence
of Jacob (PW 2) and Chuni Lal (PW 6) as dependable to prove
the identity of the appellant being the driver of the said
truck. However, in our considered view, the evidence of P.N.
Desai (PW 1) and Bharat Trivedi (PW 3) is totally unblemish
and credible one to establish the identity of the appellant
being the driver of the said truck. P.N. Desai (PW 1) in his
evidence has stated that he has seen the appellant 4 to 5
times before the incident in the B & B Transport Company. He
came to know the name of the appellant six months before
this incident. He was introduced by senior Custom Officers
for preventive purpose. When the jeep was standing near
Shrijee Parotha House, they were not aware that any truck
was coming from behind. When the truck came and dashed
against them, they all fell down and the head of
Mahindersinh was crushed. The truck thereafter went ahead
and dashed against the electric poll and thereafter it came
in reverse. Seeing this incident, Somaji who was sitting in
the jeep, got down and ran towards the road side. At that
time, the truck took a turn and came in speed and dashed
against Somaji. On both these occasions, he saw the
appellant being the driver of the truck from a distance of
80-100 feet. The defence although cross-examined the witness
at great length but there is hardly any material brought out
during cross-examination which could discredit his
testimony. We have carefully gone through the evidence of
this witness and we see no hesitation to accept his evidence
being credible one. The identity of the appellant being the
driver of the truck is fully established. The material on
record also proves that the appellant was the associate of
Harun Jusab Bhaya (A-8). The manner in which the incident
took place leaves no manner of doubt that the appellant
purposely and intentionally dashed against these Custom
Officers wherein Mahindersinh was crushed to death. The
appellant on the second time also brought the truck in speed
after taking a turn and dashed against Somaji who sustained
injuries and lateron died in the hospital. In view of these
circumstance, we have no manner of doubt that the appellant
has intentionally caused the deaths of Mahindersinh Rayjada
and Somaji Thakor.
9. The FIR was lodged by P.N. Desai (PW 1) within a few
hours wherein the name of the appellant being the driver of
the truck No. GTE-7461 was mentioned. The FIR also made a
mention of all details about the incident and it fully
corroborates the evidence of P.N. Desai (PW 1). The evidence
of P.N. Desai (PW 1) finds corroboration from that of Bharat
Trivedi (PW 3) who has also sustained minor injuries during
the incident in question. He asserted that he was standing
at a distance of 60 to 70 feet when the truck dashed against
Mahindersinh Rayjada. He had seen the appellant driving the
truck in a great speed. We have gone through his evidence
carefully and we find that his evidence suffers from no
infirmity as regards the identity of the appellant. The
learned Advocate for the appellant despite his efforts could
not persuade us to disbelieve the evidence of these two
witnesses. The trial court, in our opinion, has rightly
believed the evidence of these two witnesses. The evidence
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of both these witnesses has clearly established that the
appellant has intentionally caused the deaths of
Mahindersinh and Somaji Thakor. The conviction of the
appellant passed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
therefore, does not suffer from any infirmity. The learned
Advocate for the appellant was unable to point out any error
in the impugned judgment as regards the convictions of the
appellant passed on other counts. Thus, this appeal is
devoid of any merit.
10. For the foregoing conclusions, we see no merit in this
appeal and the same is dismissed.