ANJANA MITTAL vs. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED THROUGH MANAGER

1                   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5937  OF 2019 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO. 30953 OF 2018] ANJANA MITTAL              …..APPELLANT VERSUS OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION  LIMITED                  ……RESPONDENT WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5938    OF 2019 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO. 548 OF 2019] OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION  LIMITED                                …..APPELLANT VERSUS ANJANA MITTAL                       ……RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T VINEET SARAN, J. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by INDU MARWAH Date: 2019.07.31 12:27:54 IST Reason:       Leave granted. 2 2. Special Leave Petition (c) No.30953 of 2018 is treated as a lead petition.   3. This case has a chequered history. The appellant was appointed   as   a   temporary   Assistant   Grade­III   in   the respondent­Corporation in the year 1983. Up to the year 1986, she     worked   on   the   said   post   and   had   taken   normal permissible leaves.  However, from the year 1987 to 1993 she was   absent   for   1968   days   in   those   seven   years.   The   said absence was  ex­post facto  sanctioned as medical leave. In the meantime,   on   06.01.1990,   the   appellant   was   promoted   as temporary Assistant Grade­II. Then   on  01.12.1992, Medical Board was constituted by the Corporation which found that the   period   of   leave   granted   on   the   basis   of   many   of   the medical   certificates   submitted   by   the   appellant   was disproportionate to  the severity  of  the ailments.    Then on 26.05.1994, a notice was issued to the appellant requiring her to show cause as to why action under Regulation 24 of the 3 Terms and Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulation, 1975 (for short “1975 Regulation”) relating to termination of services   of   a   temporary   employee   be   not   taken   by   the respondent­Corporation   on   her   continued   absence.     In response   thereto,   the   appellant   submitted   her   reply   on 01.06.1994.     Then   on  01.07.1994,   holding   her   reply   to   be unsatisfactory,   the   respondent­Corporation   terminated   her services w.e.f. 01.12.1993. 4. Challenging the said order dated 01.07.1994 passed by the respondent­Corporation, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.6742 of 2001 before the Allahabad High Court, which was subsequently   transferred   to   the   Uttarakhand   High   Court   at Nainital.   By the judgment and order dated 26.08.2004, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant and upheld the validity of the termination order.  Against the said order, Special Appeal No. 55 of 2004 was filed before the Division Bench of the High Court,  which was dismissed on 4 29.06.2006 on the ground of maintainability, holding that the appellant was a Workman and the case would be one of an Industrial   dispute.     Consequently,   on   22.10.2008,   the appellant   made   a   reference   of   the   dispute   to   the   Central Government Industrial Tribunal­cum­Labour Court (for short “Labour Court”).  The said dispute was registered as Industrial Dispute No. 53 of 2009 with the Labour Court, New Delhi.  The reference was to the effect as to whether the action of the management of   the                           respondent­Corporation to terminate the services of appellant, was legal and justified. The reference was decided by the Labour Court on 07.08.2018, whereby it was held that the termination of the appellant by the respondent­Corporation was illegal and void.  It was also held   that   the   appellant   had   worked   in   the   respondent­ Corporation for more than eleven years and thus could not be treated   as   temporary   employee,   as   such   the   provisions   of Regulation 24 of 1975 Regulation were not attracted and thus 5 the   respondent­Corporation   was   directed   to   reinstate   the appellant with full back wages and all consequential benefits. 5. Challenging   the   said   order,   the   respondent­ Corporation filed a Writ Petition No.3015 of 2017 before the High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   at   Nainital,  which   was   partly allowed to the extent that termination of the appellant was held to be illegal, but instead of full back wages,  the appellant was found entitled to back wages only to the extent of 30% with all other consequential benefits in terms of the Award of the Labour Court.  6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has filed this   Special   Leave   Petition   No.   30953   of   2018.     The respondent­Corporation has also filed a separate Special Leave Petition No. 548 of 2019. 7. The facts,  as stated above,  are not disputed by the parties.  Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appellant, before her 6 termination, had worked with the respondent­Corporation for more than eleven years and thus she could not be treated as a temporary employee especially when in the year 1990 she was promoted   from   the  post  of  Assistant  Grade­III  to   Assistant Grade­II.   It has thus been contended that Regulation 24 of the   1975   Regulation   relating   to   services   of   temporary employee could not be applicable to the present case and has rightly been held to be so.  It has also been contended that the period of absence of      the appellant from the year 1987 to 1993,   though   on   the   higher   side,   was   duly   ex­post   facto sanctioned as leave  by the respondent­ Corporation and as such the same could not be the ground for termination. He has   also   emphasized   the   fact   that   during   this   period,   the appellant   was   in   fact   also   promoted   in   the   year   1990   as Assistant   Grade­II.    Mr.   Patwalia   has   contended   that   the impugned termination order was wholly unjustified and has rightly been set aside by the Tribunal after granting full back wages and consequential benefits.  He has submitted that the 7 order of the High Court, insofar as it provides for only 30% of back wages instead of 100% back wages, is wholly unjustified and no such deduction in back wages was warranted in the facts of the present case. 8. Per   contra,   Shri   J.P.   Cama,  learned   Senior   Counsel appearing   for   the   respondent­Corporation   vehemently submitted   that in the facts of the present case, where the appellant admittedly remained absent for 1968 days between 1987   to   1993   (seven   years),   the   termination   order   of   the appellant   was   fully   justified   and   since   the   appellant   was  a temporary employee, the Regulation 24 of 1975 Regulation would be attracted.  He has contended that the appointment letter of the appellant was as temporary Assistant Grade­III and   even   promotion   order   dated   06.01.1990   categorically states that the same was also as temporary Assistant Grade­ II. He has contended that the Medical Board constituted on 01.12.1992 has clearly found that she had taken excessive 8 leave   on   basis   of   medical   certificates   submitted   by   the appellant and as such,  after a show cause notice was issued and   her   reply   not   having   been   found   satisfactory,   she  was rightly terminated w.e.f. 01.12.1993.  It has been vehemently urged   that   when   the   appellant   had   remained   absent   for   a substantial period during the period of seven years 1987 to 1993, the question of reinstatement would not arise,  as the respondent­Corporation cannot be saddled to take work from an employee who does not work and at best, if the termination order is not to be sustained, she could be awarded any lump sum amount in lieu of back wages, and also as compensation in place of reinstatement.   The counsel for both the parties have   submitted   that   the   appellant   would,  in   any   case,   be retiring in May, 2020.   9.      Having heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties at length and on perusal of record, we are of the view that the High   Court   has   rightly   held   that   the   termination   of   the 9 appellant in terms of Regulation 24 of the 1975 Regulations, treating   the   appellant   as   a   temporary   employee,  was   not justified in law and thus could not be sustained, as she had been in employment for over eleven years.  The delay of over 14 years in making the reference has been condoned by the High Court holding that she was agitating her rights as she had   approached   the   High   Court   by   filing   the   writ   petition against her termination.  This aspect shall be dealt by us at a later stage. 10. The   finding   of   the   High   Court,  that   in   a   case   of termination   formal   domestic   enquiry   is   not   required   is misconceived, is also correct, as the order of termination has serious   civil   consequences   to   an   employee,  and   thus   such termination should not be without following the process of law and holding an inquiry.  In our view, the High Court has also rightly held that since the period of absence was regularized by the Management by converting the same as period of leave, 10 and   as       such   the   same   could   not   be   the   ground   for termination. 11. The last question which the High Court has decided is with regard to the payment of back wages.  It has been held that instead of full back wages, the appellant would be entitled to only 30% back wages, along with all consequential benefits as has been awarded by the Labour Court.  In our opinion, this issue requires consideration of this Court.   Admittedly, the appellant continued to remain absent for long periods between the years 1987 to 1993.   There is no dispute about the fact that during this period of seven years, the appellant remained absent for 1968 days, which comes to an average of over 281 days   per   year.     In   effect,   in   this   seven   years   period,   she remained   absent   for   nearly   5.4   years.     This   would   clearly indicate that the appellant was a habitual absentee.  Even if it is taken that the appellant was not temporary but deemed to be permanent, yet an employee who remained absent from 11 duty for such long periods,  averaging to over 281 days in a year, continuously for seven years,  would not be entitled to any substantial back wages. The Medical Board constituted by the Corporation also found that the period of leave granted on the basis of many of the medical certificates submitted by the appellant was disproportionate to the severity of the ailments. 12. We say so also because, by choosing a wrong forum of filing a writ petition, the appellant had spent more than fourteen years in approaching the correct forum,  which was the     Labour Court.     The   appellant   ought   to   have   known   that   she   was   a workman and would be covered under the Industrial Disputes Act, but   had   initially   chosen   not   to   approach   the   Labour   Court. Challenging the termination order which was passed in the year 1994, she approached the Labour Court only in the year 2008, which was after fourteen years. We have also to take into account that the appellant remained on leave during seven years preceding her termination for an average period of 281 days in a year.  Even though the said absence was converted as leave (which was   ex­ 12 post facto  granted in her favour) yet the fact remains that she was a   habitual   absentee,  which   would   be   a   material   fact   while considering the question of payment of back wages to her. 13. Though, we are not interfering with the setting aside of the termination order, but in the facts and circumstances of this case, in our considered view,  the ends of justice would be met if the appellant   is   paid   10%   back   wages,   along   with   the   benefit   of reinstatement and all other consequential benefits.  It is, however, made  clear,  that considering  the  conduct  of  the  appellant, the respondent­Corporation would not be obliged to take work from her, and in lieu thereof she may be paid her salary from this date till the date of her superannuation, which according to the learned counsel for the parties would be in May 2020.  We make it clear that the appellant may be treated as reinstated but may not be required to work in the Organisation of respondent­Corporation.  15. With   the   aforesaid   modifications   in   the   impugned judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   dated   14.06.2018,   we dispose of both the appeals. No order as to costs. 13 ………………………..J.            [Uday Umesh Lalit] ………………….…….J.               [Vineet Saran]  New Delhi  Dated: July 30, 2019