Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MAHENDRA RAGHUNATHDAS GUPTA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
VISHVANATH BHIKAJI MOGUL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This appeal by special leave arises form the judgment
of the Bombay High Court, made on July 17, 1996 in writ
petition No. 1814 of 1996.
The admitted facts are that one Jagmohandas was the
original lenant and the appellant is his brother. The
landlords were Jayabai G. Ashar, Bachubhai alias Brijkuvar
Bhagwandas, Krishnakuamar alias Krishnadas Bhagwandas and
Harikrishna c. Shantabai alias Malabai. After the demise of
his brother, the appellant became the tenant and paid the
rent to the landlords. On March 10, 1981, the landlords
wrote a letter directing the appellant to pay rent jointly
to one Shivajibhai Patel and one Ratilal Patel w.e.f
November 1, 1980. The appellant acted upon the letter and
sent to the aforesaid two persons on may 6, 1981 the rents
payable from November 1, 1980 to April 30, 1980. The said
cheque was returned to the appellant as being not
acceptable. Subsequently, he was in the dark as to whom the
rent was to be paid. It would appear that the landlords
earlier to their letter dated march 10, 1981 had entered
into an agreement with the respondent on September 27, 1980
and pursuant thereto, to the sale deed came to be executed
and registered on July 10 , 1984 in favour of the
respondents but no attornment was made.
For the first time, Shri N.G. Gaikwad, Advocate, Nasik
on instructions of respondent No. 1 sent a notice dated
September 29, 1986 to the appellant to pay the arrears of
rents from November 1,1982 to the respondents. The appellant
on receipt thereof has sent on October 15, 1986 the rent in
the form of a cheque for Rs. 2, 952/- in the name of Shri
Gaikwad, which was rejected by him and thereafter the suit
for ejectment came to be filed. The defence taken by the
appellant is that he paid the rent within 30 days form the
dated of the receipt of the notice demanding the payment of
rent and, therefore, he was not in default. The question,
Therefore, is: whether the appellant has committed any
default in the payment of the rent? Section 12(3) (a) of the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947 envisages thus:
"12.(1) A landlord shall not be
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entitled to the recovery of
possession of any premises so long
as the tenants pays, or is ready
and willing to pay, the amount of
the standard rent and permitted
increases, if any and observes and
performs the other conditions of
the tenancy, in so far as they are
consistent with provisions of this
Act.
(2) No suit for recovery of
possession shall be instituted by a
landlord against tenant on the
ground of non-payment of the
standard rent or permitted
increases due, until the expiration
of one month next after notice in
writing of the demands of the
standard rent or permitted
increases has been served upon the
tenant in the manner provided in
section 106 of the Transfer of
property Act, 10882.
(3) (a) Where the rent is payment
is payable by the month and there
is no dispute regarding the amount
of standard rent or permitted
increases, if such rent or
increases are in arrears for a
period of Six months or more and
the tenant neglects to make payment
thereof until the expiration of the
period of one Month after notice
referred to in sub-decree for
eviction in any such suit for
recovery of possession."
A reading thereof would indicate that the landlord
shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of
demised premises as lo g as the tenant pays or is ready and
willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted
increases, if any, and observes and performs the other
conditions of tenancy in so far as they are consistent with
the Act. Where the rent is payable by every month and if
there is no dispute regarding the amount of there standard
rent or permitted increases, If such rent or increases are
in arrears for a period of six months or more and the
tenants neglects to make payment thereof until the expiry of
the period of one month after the notice referred to in sub-
section (2) postulates that no suit for recovery of
possession shall be instituted by a landlord against tenant
on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or
permitted increases due, until the expiry of one month next
after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent
or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in
the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act.
Thus, it could be seen two conditions must be
satisfied for eviction a tenant on the ground of default in
the payment of rent or permitted increases. Firstly, there
must be a default in the payment of rent. The default may
continue for six months or more. Secondly, before filing a
petition for eviction, a notice in writing under section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act shall be given to the tenant
giving one month’s time. Then, It shows that tenant was not
ready and willing to pay rent, if he neglects to pay the
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rent within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the
notice, on expiry of one month next after notice in writing
an d the payment of the standard rent or the permitted
increases has been served upon the tenant, the landlord is
entitled to file the suit for ejectment. In such event, the
court is empowered to order eviction.
The question is: whether the appellant was in arrears
in the payment of the rent? After the receipt of the notice
when he tendered the rent to the advocate whether he has
committed default. Here is the case where the previous
landlords, admittedly, had not given any notice to the
appellant informing him of the sale of the property to the
respondents at any time before the notice issued except for
the first time through the advocate intimating to the
appellant of the purchase so made on July 6, 1984; nor a
copy of the sale deed was given to him. When at the instance
of the original landlords the tenant sent rent to
Shivajibhai Patel and Ratilal Patel, it was refused by them.
Under these circumstances, the appellant was in the dark as
to whether the respondents were really landlords of the
appellant. When the notice, under these circumstances, came
to be given by the advocate, on behalf of the appellant,
necessarily as a prudent man , the appellant, instead of
taking a risk, had sent the amount in the name of the
advocate refused to receive it. When the advocate had sent
the notice on behalf of the respondent, obviously he acted
as an agent on behalf of the respondent, We may in this
connection refer to section 106 of the Transfer of property
Act. Requirement of the notice under this section is that
it must be in writing signed by the lawyer on behalf of his
client landlord would meet the requirement of section 106 of
the Act. Then under clause (1) of section 106 of the
Transfer of property Act a lessee is bound to pay or
tender, at the or his agent in this behalf. In the present
case, the lawyer has acted as agent in this behalf. In the
present case, the lawyer has acted as agent of the
landlords. It is corrected That the lawyer Gaikwad did
indicate in his notice that the rent be sent to one of the
landlords who had purchased the premises and when the tenant
sent the rent by means of cheque in the name of the lawyer
he returned the same setting that he was not the rent
collector for his clients. The tenant thereupon sent a
fresh cheque of the entire amount of the rent in the name of
the landlord indicated in the notice. Respondent No.1
refused to accept the cheque and when the amount of rent
again tendered by money order, it was once again refused by
the respondent. It is well settled that a transferee of the
landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the
transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy.
The section does not require the transfer of the right of
the landlord can take effect only if the tenant’s attorns to
him. Validity of the transfer of the landlord’s rights.
Since section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the
transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for
ejectment.
Attornment would, however, be desirable as it means
the acknowledgement of relation of a tenant to a new
landlord. It also implies continuity of tenancy.
Two things arise for consideration (1) if the tenant
was justified in sending the rent to the lawyer in spite of
his notice to send the rent to his client and (2) if the
tender of rent by cheque is a valid tender. Taking the
second point first merely because the tenant has made
payment of rent by cheque, it cannot be assumed that the
tenant was not ready or willing to pay arrears of rent. As
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expression "ready and wiling to pay arrears of rent" in sub-
section (1) of section 12 of the Act does not mean that when
rent is paid only by cash then it can only be said the
tenant is ready and willing to pay the rent. Tendering of
rent by cheque is legal. In K. Saraswathy vs. Somasundaram
[(1989) 4 SCC 527 = AIR 1989 SC 1553], The court held that
the payment by cheque is an ordinary incident of present-day
life, whether commercial or private, and unless it is
specifically mentioned that payment must be in cash payment
by cheque shall be taken to be due payment if the cheque is
subsequently encashed in the ordinary course..
On the first point, though it was mentioned in the
notice that rent be sent to the landlord meaning thereby
that the lawyer was not authorised to receive the payment of
rent but in the light of the above facts, necessarily, as a
prudent man, the appellant, instead of taking a risk to
send the rent to third party, chose to send the arrears of
the rent in the name of the advocate, who issued notice.
Under these circumstances, tendering the amount within 30
days to the agent on behalf of the principal, is a legal
tender of the amount of arrears of rent. Thereby , by
operation of sub-section (3) (a) of section 12, the
appellant has tendered the amount. Thereby, he has not
committed any default in the payment of rent on account of
which he is not liable to be ejected from the demised
premises. The respondent man by issuing a notice at the
earliest to the appellant calling upon him to pay the rent
to him. Instead, he waited for two years obviously to
created a condition of default and then got the notice
issued. His conduct is not worth reckoning.
Considering the whole aspect of the matter, it cannot
be said that tenant was not ready and willing to pay arrears
of rent or that he neglected to make payment thereof in
terms of the notice.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the
High court as well as the courts below stand set aside.