AWADHESH KUMAR vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 08-11-2019

Preview image for AWADHESH KUMAR vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Full Judgment Text

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COUR OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1670 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1299 of 2016] Awadhesh Kumar .. Appellant Versus State of U.P. & Anr. .. Respondents J U D G M E N T M. R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted.  2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order dated 18.12.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad at Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 2517 of 2009 by which the High Court has been pleased to allow the appeal preferred by the original accused partly and has converted the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ARJUN BISHT Part I IPC, the original complainant has preferred this appeal.  Date: 2019.11.08 16:10:48 IST Reason: 2 3. Brief   facts   of   the   case   of   the   prosecution   was   that   the complainant   Awadesh   Kumar   lodged   an   FIR   at   Police   Station Khiri, District Lakhimpur Kheri on 11.07.2006 at 18:45 hours alleging   therein   that   on   11.07.2006   at   about   5:30   p.m.   his mother Smt. Lajjawati was making complaint to Ravinder Verma (original accused No. 1 ­ respondent No. 2 herein) regarding bad behaviour of his nephew Vishun Kumar.   At that time, Sudhir @ Ramaudh,   Rakesh,   Vishun   Kumar   were   also   present   there. When   the   mother   of   the   complainant   was   making   complaint, meanwhile all the above named four persons started quarrelling with   his   mother.   In   the   meanwhile,   the   brother   of   the complainant   Anoop   Kumar   and   his   father   Ram   Lakhan   also reached there. Then all the four accused persons were asked by these persons to go away from there. Feeling annoyed by this conduct of the complainant side, Vishnu Kumar, Rakesh Kumar and   Sudhir   @   Ramaudh   exhorted   Ravinder   to   fire   at   the deceased, Ravinder, with his country­made pistol fired on the complainant’s mother. The complainant along with other persons took his injured mother to police station and lodged the FIR.  4. That, initially the case was registered under Section 307, 504, 506/34 IPC, however, subsequently on the death of Smt. 3 Lajjawati on 11.07.2006, the case was converted into one under Section 302 IPC. After investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge­sheet against all the four named accused persons, including respondent No. 2 herein.  All of them were tried by the learned   Court   of   Sessions   for   the   offence   punishable   under Section 302 IPC.  The learned Trial Court convicted respondent No. 2 herein (Ravinder) as the specific role of fire on the deceased was attributed to him.     The learned Trial Court acquitted the other   three   accused   persons.   The   Respondent   No.2   herein (original   accused   no.1)   feeling   dissatisfied   with   the   order   of conviction   passed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   convicting   him, preferred   Criminal   Appeal   before   the   High   Court.   By   the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has modified the conviction   from   that   of   punishable   under   Section   302   IPC   to Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment   for   ten   years   with   a   fine   of   20,000/­.   Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court modifying the conviction from Section 302 IPC to 304 Part I IPC, the original complainant has preferred the present appeal.  4 5. Learned   Advocate   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   ­   original complainant has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed a grave error in modifying the conviction from that of Section 302 IPC to that of under Section 304 Part I IPC.    6. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant that, as such, the accused fired   on   the   deceased   from   a   close   range,   due   to   which   the deceased   sustained   serious   injuries   and   ultimately   died   and, therefore, the case would fall under clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC.   It is submitted that, therefore, when the case falls under Clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC, the act of the accused would be culpable homicide amounting to murder.     Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant has submitted that the High Court has materially erred in holding that the offence committed by the accused Ravinder would come within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC by observing that it was not a planned crime and there was no prior intention and it took place   in   the   heat   of   passion   on   the   spur   of   moment.     It   is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC would be attracted only when there is a fight or quarrel which requires 5 mutual   provocation   and   blows   by   both   sides   in   which   the offender does not take undue advantage.   In support of his above submission, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of   (2014) 10 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shivshankar SCC 366.  It is submitted that, in the present case, there was no blow by the complainant side of the deceased.   The complainant side and the deceased did not have any weapon.   The accused came   with   a   country­made   firearm   after   there   was   some altercation/exchange of words by his cousin with the deceased. It   is   submitted   that   therefore   the   case   would   not   fall   under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.  It is submitted that therefore the High Court has materially erred in converting the conviction from the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC.     7. Learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   original accused No. 1 – respondent No. 2 herein has made strenuous efforts to support the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court ultimately convicting the accused for the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC.   It is submitted by the learned Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   respondent   No.   2   –   original 6 accused No. 1 that the High Court has rightly observed that it was not a planned crime and there was no prior intention and it took place in the heat of passion on the spur of moment.  It is submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of respondent   No.   2   that   therefore   the   High   Court   has   rightly observed that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC would be attracted and,   therefore,   the   High   Court   has   rightly   converted   the conviction from that of Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC. 7.1 Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has taken us through the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court   while   acquitting   the   other   three   accused   and   has submitted that while acquitting the other three accused persons, the learned Trial Court has clearly observed that there was no prior   intention   to   commit   the   murder   with   pre­planning   and rather the incident took place all of a sudden, when Lajjawati went to complain to Ravinder.   It is submitted that the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court has gone unchallenged.    It is submitted that, therefore, the case would fall under Exception 4  to  Section   300   IPC   and   therefore   also   the   High   Court   has 7 rightly converted the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC.    8. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the respective parties at length.   We have also gone through and considered the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court. 8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the learned Trial Court convicted respondent No. 2 herein – original accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.  By the impugned   judgment  and   order,   the   High   Court  converted   the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC on the grounds that: (i) it was not a planned crime; (ii) there was no prior intention; and (iii) it took place in the heat of passion on the spur of moment. Therefore, as per the High Court, the case would fall under Exception   4   to   Section   300   IPC.     However,   considering   the material/evidence on record and considering the deposition of the   original   complainant   and   considering   the   case   of   the prosecution proved, the incident in question that took place half an hour after there was abusive language used by the cousin of 8 original   accused   No.   1   –   Ravinder   with   the   deceased.     That, thereafter, respondent No. 2 herein – original accused No. 1 came with others with a country­made firearm and at that time the deceased made a grievance with respect to the abusive language used by Vishun Kumar (cousin of original accused No. 1) and, at that time,   respondent  No.   2   – original  accused   No.  1   started abusing.  At that time, the deceased and others told them not to use abusive words in future and told them to go away.  At that time, respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 told the deceased and others not to challenge him and he told that “Do you not know that I have been convicted, now I do not have any kind of fear”.  Thereafter, Ravinder – respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 fired from the close range.  None of the persons from the complainant   side,   including   the   deceased,   was   having   any weapon.  There was no further grave and sudden provocation by the deceased which led to the accused to fire on the deceased and, that too, from a very close range.   8.2 As   observed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Shivshankar (supra),  intention is a matter of inference and when death is as a result of intentional firing, intention to cause death is patent unless the case falls under any of the exceptions.   It is further 9 observed   and   held   that   Exception   4   to   Section   300   IPC   is attracted only when there is a fight or quarrel which requires mutual   provocation   and   blows   by   both   sides   in   which   the
offender does not take undue advantage.
8.3In the case ofBhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of
Maharashtra(1978) 3 SCC 330, in paragraph 6, this Court has
observed and held as under:
“6............. It is true that some of the conditions
for the applicability of Exception 4 toSection
300exist here, but not all. The quarrel had broken
out suddenly, but there was no sudden fight between
the deceased and the appellant. 'Fight' postulates a
bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged.
The deceased was unarmed. He did not cause any
injury to the appellant or his companions.
Furthermore, no less than three fatal injuries were
inflicted by the appellant with an axe, which is a
formidable weapon on the unarmed victim. Appellant
is therefore, not entitled to the benefit of Exception 4,
either.”
8.4The above observations fully support the view that the
present case falls under Section 302 IPC.   
8.5Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
High   Court   has   materially   erred   in   applying   Exception   4   to Section 300 IPC by holding that it was not a planned crime and there was no prior intention and it took place in the heat of passion on the spur of moment. 10
8.6Considering the material/evidence on record discussed
hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the case falls under Clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC and, therefore, the Trial Court was right in convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, more particularly, when the accused fired from a country­made firearm on the deceased from a close range. By   the   accused   firing   from   a   close   range,   the   accused   was supposed   to   know   that  it  is   so  imminently   dangerous   that  it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.   9. Now,  so far as the submission on  behalf  of  the accused relying upon some of the observations made by the Trial Court while   acquitting   the   other   three   accused   is   concerned,   it   is required to be noted that those observations were made by the learned Trial Court while considering the common intention of the other accused and therefore benefit of such observations would not be available to original accused No. 1 when it has come on record and it has been proved that it was the original accused No. 1 who fired at the deceased and, that too, from a very close range. 10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present   appeal   succeeds.     The   impugned   judgment   and   order 11 passed by the High Court modifying the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC is hereby quashed and set aside.   The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court convicting the respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is hereby restored.  Now, respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 to surrender before the concerned Court to undergo the sentence as imposed by the learned Trial Court, within a period of three months from today.  ........................................J. (ARUN MISHRA) ........................................J. (M. R. SHAH) ........................................J. (S. RAVINDRA BHAT) New Delhi, November 08, 2019.