CEMENT WORKERS MANDAL vs. GLOBAL CEMENTS LTD(HMP CEMENTS LTD.)

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 14-02-2019

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5360 OF 2010 Cement Workers’ Mandal           ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Global Cements Ltd  (HMP Cements Ltd.) & Ors.        …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1.  This appeal is filed against the final judgment and   order   dated   27.04.2007   passed   by   the   High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No.1020 of 2006 in Civil Application No.770 of   2005   whereby  the   Division  Bench  of   the  High Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2019.02.15 17:58:08 IST Reason: Court allowed the said Letters Patent Appeal filed by respondent No.1 herein holding that the High Court 1 had   no   territorial   jurisdiction   to   entertain   the Special Civil Application (in short, “SCA”) filed by the   appellant   herein   which   was   entertained   and allowed by the Single Judge.  2. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short legal question. 3. Respondent No.1 herein is a Limited Company having its registered office at Calcutta.  Respondent No.1 was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of cement.  They have a cement factory at Porbandar in the State of Gujarat. 4. The   appellant   is   a   Union   of   workers.   These workers were working, at all relevant time, in the cement   factory   of   respondent   No.1   at   Porbandar. According to the appellant­Union, as many as 500 workers, who are the members of it, were working at the relevant time in the said cement factory. 2 5. Respondent No.1, however, closed the cement factory   somewhere   in   the   year   1998   for   myriad reasons without paying the wages to its workers.   6. A   dispute,   therefore,   arose   between   the appellant­Union   and   Respondent   No.1­Company (employer)   regarding   the   non­payment   of outstanding   wages   payable   to   the   workers.   The appellant­ Union, therefore, approached the Labour Court   at   Junagadh   (Gujarat)   and   filed   Recovery Application No.86/98 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the recovery of the outstanding wages payable to the workers against Respondent No.1. 7. By order dated 12.04.1999, the Labour Court allowed   the   application   and   directed   Respondent No.1­Company to pay a sum of Rs.81,50,744/­ with a   cost   of   Rs.50,000/­   to   the   workers.   This   was followed   by   issuance   of   recovery   certificate   dated 04.09.2000   for   Rs.60,35,379/­   by   the   Collector, Junagadh   as   arrears   of   land   revenue.     The   said certificate, however, has remained unexecuted.  3 8. It appears that Respondent No.2 ­ Indian Bank had   given   business   loan   to   Respondent   No.1­ Company, which they failed to repay to the Indian Bank.   The Indian Bank (R­2), therefore,   filed a claim petition before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short   “the   DRT)   at   Calcutta   against   Respondent No.1­Company   for   recovery   of   their   unpaid   loan amount with interest. 9. By order dated 04.03.2003, the DRT allowed the   claim   petition   and   ordered   for   sale   of   the properties of Respondent No.1­Company after giving due publicity.  The DRT also appointed one Receiver to   take   appropriate   steps   in   this   regard.   The Receiver informed the appellant­Union accordingly. 10. It   is   with   these   background   facts,   the appellant­Union   filed   a   petition   (Special   Civil Application No.12212 of 2004) in the High Court of Gujarat   at   Ahmadabad   out   of   which   this   appeal arises.     The   SCA   was   filed   against   the   Indian Bank(respondent   No.2   herein)   and   the 4 Company(respondent No.1 herein).   The appellant claimed the following reliefs in their SCA: “A. To issue an order, direction in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ,   order   or   direction,   directing   the respondent   No.1   Indian   Bank,   Kolkata,   to deposit the 50% amount of the sale proceeds of   the   Porbandar   H.M.P.   Cement   with   the District Collector, Porbandar, and the District Collector be directed to pay by account payee cheque   to   each   of   the   workmen proportionately towards the part­payment of the   legal   dues   to   the   individual   workman concerned; ALTERNATIVELY. B. To issue direction to the respondent No.1 Indian Bank to pay 50% of the amount to the petitioner union who shall directly pay to the workmen   by   account   payee   cheque   either under   the   supervision   of   District   Collector, Porbandar or Assistant Labour Commissioner, Porbandar. C. To declare and hold the impugned action of   the   Debt   Recovery   Tribunal,   Kolkata,   in transferring   the   entire   sale   proceed   to respondent   No.1,   Indian   Bank,   without retaining   the   amount   of   workers’   due,   as illegal and without authority of law. D. To suspend the operation, implementation and   execution   of   the   order   of   the   Debt Recovery   Tribunal   insofar   as   the   Debt Recovery Tribunal directs: “It is being further ordered that in the case of default on the part of the defendants in adhering to any of   the   terms   and   condition hereinabove stated, the certificate 5 of   recovery   so   issued,   shall automatically   be   altered   for   the total applicant’s claim as filed on July 2002 and the applicant being granted   the   liberty  to  appropriate the   entire   money   lying   with   the present   learned   transferring Tribunal   in   O.A.   No.142   of   1998 after receiving the said sum from the learned Receiver and it is also being   ordered   that   the   learned Receiver is hereby being ordered to stand discharged….” E. To grant such other and further relief as the Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 11. The respondent Nos.1 & 2, i.e., Company and the Indian Bank on entering their appearance in the SCA raised a preliminary objection before the writ court   contending   that   the   SCA   filed   by   the appellant­Union   is   not   maintainable   in   the   High Court  of   Gujarat at  Ahmedabad   inasmuch  as   no part of the cause of action in relation to the subject matter of the SCA has arisen in the State of Gujarat which entitled the appellant­Union to file the SCA in the Gujarat High Court.  6 12. In other words, the objection was that having regard   to   the   nature   of   reliefs   claimed   by   the petitioner (appellant herein) in the SCA, no part of cause of action could be said to have arisen in the State of Gujarat, which would empower the Gujarat High Court to entertain the SCA for its disposal on merits.  On the other hand, it was contended that it is clear that the entire cause of action between the parties has accrued in the State of Calcutta where the company's registered office is located and where the DRT had also entertained the claim petition filed by the Indian Bank(respondent No.2 herein) against the   Company   (respondent   No.1   herein)   and   had passed the orders in the said claim petition. 13. The   respondent   Nos.   1   &   2,   therefore, contended   that   the   said   SCA   was   liable   to   be dismissed   as   being   not   maintainable   for   want   of territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court. 14. The Single Judge by order dated 26.10.2005 overruled the preliminary objection and held that 7 the   Gujarat   High   Court   has   the   territorial jurisdiction to entertain the SCA.  15. Respondent No.1 (Company) felt aggrieved and filed   the   LPA   before   the   Division   Bench.   By impugned   order,   the   Division   Bench   allowed   the LPA, set aside the order of the Single Judge and dismissed the SCA. The Division Bench held that the   Gujarat   High   Court   has   no   territorial jurisdiction   to   entertain   the   SCA   in   question because no part of the cause of action has accrued to file such petition(SCA) in the Gujarat High Court. 16. In other words, the Division Bench was of the view   that   having   regard   to   the   nature   of   reliefs claimed in the SCA, the Gujarat High Court cannot be held to have territorial jurisdiction to entertain such petition for grant of the reliefs claimed therein. 17. It is against this order of the Division Bench, the Union (petitioner in SCA) felt aggrieved and has filed the present appeal in this Court after obtaining the special leave to appeal. 8 18. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for consideration in this appeal, is whether the Division Bench was justified in holding that the SCA filed by the   appellant   was   not   maintainable   for   want   of territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court. 19. Heard Ms. Anushree Prashit Kapadia, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Gautam Awasthi, learned counsel for the respondents. 20. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside   the   impugned   order   of   the   Division   Bench restore the order of the Single Judge.       21. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench erred   in   not   noticing   Article   226(2)   of   the Constitution   of   India   while   deciding   the   question arising in this case.  22. In other words, the question as to whether the Gujarat   High   Court   has   territorial   jurisdiction   to entertain   the   appellant's   petition(SCA)   or   not, 9 should   have   been   decided   keeping   in   view   the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution read with Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short,  “CPC”). 23. Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 20 of CPC read as under:  “  Article 226 of the Constitution 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs (1)  Notwithstanding   anything   in   Article   32 every   High   Court   shall   have   powers, throughout   the   territories   in   relation   to which   it   exercises   jurisdiction,   to   issue   to any   person   or   authority,   including   in appropriate   cases,   any   Government,   within those territories directions, orders or writs, including   writs   in   the   nature   of   habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and   certiorari,   or   any   of   them,   for   the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2)  The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions,   orders   or   writs   to   any Government, authority or person may also be exercised   by   any   High   Court   exercising jurisdiction   in   relation   to   the   territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding   that   the   seat   of   such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 10 (3)  Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings   relating   to,   a   petition   under clause (1), without­ (a)  furnishing   to   such   party   copies   of such   petition   and   all   documents   in support   of   the   plea   for   such   interim order; and (b)  giving such party an opportunity of being heard,  makes an application to the High Court for   the   vacation   of   such   order   and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in  whose  favour  such  order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks   from   the   date   on   which   it   is received or from the date on which the copy   of   such   application   is   so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not   so   disposed   of,   the   interim  order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated (4)  The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power   conferred   on   the   Supreme   Court   by clause (2) of Article 32.” “  Section 20 of  CPC 20.   Other suits to be instituted where defendants   reside   or   cause   of   action arises­  Subject to the limitations aforesaid, 11 every suit shall be instituted in Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction­ (a)   the   defendant,   or   each   of   the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of   the   suit,   actually   and   voluntarily resides,   or   carries   on   business,   or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit actually and voluntarily   resides,   or   carries   on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave   of   the   Court   is   given,   or   the defendants who do not reside, or carry on   business,   or   personally   work   for gain,   as   aforesaid,   acquiesce   in   such institution; or (c)   the   cause   of   action,   wholly   or   in part, arises. Explanation ­ A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.” 24. Article   226(2)   of   the   Constitution,   in   clear terms, empowers the High Court (let us say   “A” High   Court)   to   entertain   the   writ   petition   if   the cause of action to file such writ petition against the respondents   of   the   said   writ   petition   has   arisen 12 wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of “A”  High Court.  25. Clause (2) further empowers a High Court to issue any order, directions or writ as provided in clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution in such writ   petition   notwithstanding   that   seat   of   such Government   or   the   Authority   or   the   residence   of such person against whom the writ petition is filed does not fall within the territories of the “A” High Court  but  falls   in   the   territories   of   the   “B”  High Court. 26. Coming to the facts of this case, we find from the   averments   of   the   petition(SCA)   that   firstly, Respondent   No.1­Company   has   its   factory   at Porbandar,   which   is   a   part   of   State   of   Gujarat; Second, the Labour Court, Junagadh, which is also a part of State of Gujarat, entertained the dispute between the appellant­Union and respondent No.1­ Company and passed a recovery order; and Third, one   of   the   reliefs   claimed   in   the   petition(SCA) 13 pertains   to   non­payment   of   outstanding   wages payable   to   the   workers   by   respondent   No.1­ Company.  27. In the light of these three reasons, we are of the   view  that  the   part  of   the   cause   of   action  as contemplated in Article 226 (2) of the Constitution has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court for filing the  petition(SCA) to claim appropriate reliefs in relation to such dispute against respondent No.1­Company.  28. In our considered opinion, the expression “ the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises ”  occurring in Article 226(2) of the Constitution has to be read in the context of Section 20(c) of CPC which deals with filing of the suit within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.  29. Indeed, the question as to whether the cause of action for filing the petition, wholly or in part, arose in the context of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court is required to be decided keeping in view 14 the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution read with the provisions of Section 20 of CPC.  30. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the appellant's petition(SCA) was maintainable in the Gujarat High Court inasmuch as   the   part   of   the   cause   of   action   to   file   such petition   did   accrue   to   the   appellant   herein (petitioner) within the territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court.  31. In these circumstances, the SCA was required to be decided on merits by the Gujarat High Court. 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds   and   is   hereby   allowed.   The   impugned order of  the Division Bench is set aside and the order of the Single Judge is restored to the extent it decides  that the  petition(SCA) as  maintainable  in the Gujarat High Court. 33. The case is accordingly remanded to the Single Judge (Writ Court) for deciding the petition(SCA) on merits strictly in accordance with law uninfluenced 15 by any of the observations made by the Division Bench   and   this   Court   because   this   Court   has decided only the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court and not beyond it. 34. Since the petition(SCA) is old, we request the Single   Judge   to   decide   it   preferably   within   six months.      …………………………………J.       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                                                    ....…..................................J.              [DINESH MAHESHWARI] New Delhi; February 14, 2019.                16