Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. vs. M/S Heg Limited

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1362
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1099 OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) D. NO. 24362 OF 2025)




JAI BALAJI INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS. ...PETITIONER(S)

Versus

M/S HEG LTD. ...RESPONDENT(S)


WITH


TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1100 OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) D. NO. 24506 OF 2025)


TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1101 OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) D. NO. 24500 OF 2025)


TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1102 OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) D. NO. 24493 OF 2025)






Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.11.28
14:38:01 IST
Reason:
J U D G M E N T

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following
parts:
INDEX

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ............................................................................. 3
B. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ....................................................... 6
C. ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 6
(i) Position of law as regards jurisdiction of courts prior to the
Amendment Act, 2015 ............................................................................ 7
a. Analysis of the observations of this Court in Bhaskaran .................... 7
b. Analysis of the observations of this Court in Harman
Electronics .......................................................................................... 13
c. Analysis of the observations of this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh
Rathod ................................................................................................ 18
(ii) Position of law as regards jurisdiction of courts after the enactment
of the Amendment Act, 2015................................................................ 27
a. Meaning of the expressions “ delivered for collection through an
account ” and “ presentation for payment otherwise through an
account ” .............................................................................................. 30
b. Meaning of the expression “ maintains an account ” under Section
142(2) .................................................................................................. 35
c. Conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation
thereto ................................................................................................. 38
(iii) Determination of the issues framed .................................................... 57
a. Whether the MM, Kolkata has the jurisdiction to try the
complaint? ........................................................................................... 57
b. Whether a case of transfer of the complaint from the court of JMFC,
Bhopal to MM, Kolkata is made out?................................................. 58
D. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 60





T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 1 of 60

1. Since the issues raised in all the captioned transfer petitions are the same,
those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by
this common judgment and order.
2. For the sake of convenience, the Transfer Petition (Criminal) Diary No.
24362 of 2024 is treated as the lead matter.
3. This transfer petition filed under Section 446 of the Bhartiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, “BNSS”) read with Order XXXIX of
the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is at the instance of a private limited
company through its directors, praying for transfer of the Complaint Case
No. RCT 2501046/2017 titled as "M/s HEG Limited vs Jai Balaji Industries
Ltd. & Ors” pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal
to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata. The transfer is prayed for
on the ground that this Court, in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (2014) 9 SCC 129 had held that cases where the
trial had reached the stage of summoning, appearance of accused, and the
recording of evidence had commenced as per Section 145(2) Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the “ Act, 1881 ”), those should continue in
the same court where the trial was ongoing.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 2 of 60

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The petitioner no. 1 herein (Jai Balaji Industries Ltd.) is the original accused
no. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the “ accused company ”), while the other
petitioners are the directors of the accused company. The respondent (M/s
HEG Limited), is the original complainant (hereinafter referred to as the
“ complainant company ” or “ complainant ”).
5. A cheque for the amount of Rs. 19,94,996/- was drawn by the accused
company through its directors, against an invoice generated by the
complainant company, dated 23.03.2014. The cheque was drawn by the
accused on the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Kolkata and the same was
deposited by the complainant on 19.06.2014 in its account maintained with
the State Bank of India, Bhopal branch.
6. The cheque referred to above came to be dishonoured due to insufficiency
of funds on 20.06.2025 pursuant to which, the complainant issued the
statutory notice dated 11.07.2014 to all the accused persons through
registered speed post A/D, demanding that the sum of Rs. 19,94,996/- be
paid within a period of 15 days as prescribed under Section 138 of the Act,
1881 in lieu of the dishonoured cheque. The said notice was delivered on
14.07.2014.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 3 of 60

7. The accused company replied vide the letter dated 26.07.2014 which was
received by the complainant on 30.07.2014, wherein all the accused persons
took the defence that the said cheque had been issued as a ‘Security Deposit’
and not in discharge of any enforceable debt. As a result, the complainant
company filed the Complaint Case No. 406978 of 2014 in the court of the
Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata (the “ MM, Kolkata ”) on 16.08.2014. The
same was registered on 29.01.2015 and summons were issued to the accused
company and other accused persons on 29.01.2015. Consequently, the MM,
Kolkata proceeded to frame charge to which the accused persons pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried. On 27.04.2015, the affidavit of evidence-
in-chief of the complainant company’s officer was taken on record by the
MM, Kolkata.
8. While the case was pending before the MM, Kolkata, the Government
enacted the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 (the
“ Amendment Act, 2015 ”) on 26.12.2015. In accordance with the terms of
the amendment to the Act, 1881, more particularly, Section 142 thereof, the
territorial jurisdiction for prosecution and trial of cases registered under
Section 138 was stipulated to be at the place where the payee or holder
maintains his bank account. In this case, the payee, i.e., the complainant
company maintained its bank account with the State Bank of India, Bhopal
branch.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 4 of 60

9. Upon request made by the complainant company, the MM, Kolkata returned
the complaint to the respondent vide order dated 28.07.2016 observing that
it lacked the jurisdiction to conduct trial for the case in hand and allowed the
complainant to present the matter before the court of competent jurisdiction.
10. In such circumstances referred to above, the complainant company got the
complaint for dishonour of cheque registered in the court of the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Bhopal (the “ JMFC, Bhopal ”) bearing Complaint
Case No. RCT 1501046 of 2017. The accused company raised an objection
as regards the territorial jurisdiction of the JMFC, Bhopal to try the offence
relying on the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the “ Act,
1973 ”). Besides according to the accused persons, the MM, Kolkata could
not have returned the complaint once the recording of evidence as per
Section 145(2) had already commenced. However, the said objections were
rejected by the JMFC, Bhopal. The same was then challenged by the accused
persons vide Criminal Revision before the Sessions Court, Bhopal which is
still pending adjudication.
11. Be that as it may, the question before us is not one relating to the merits of
the claims of the parties herein. What is discernible is the fact that the cheque
so issued was dishonoured, and the sum for which such cheque was drawn
was not made good by the accused despite a statutory notice. This



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 5 of 60

conspectus of facts has enabled the complainant to prosecute the accused
and the sole controversy before us is as to which court has the territorial
jurisdiction to try the accused persons for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act, 1881.
B. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone
through the materials on record, the following two questions fall for our
consideration:
i. Whether after the enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015, the court
within whose local jurisdiction the drawee bank is situated, has the
jurisdiction to try a complaint under Section 138?
ii. Whether after the enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015, a complaint
under Section 138 of the Act, 1881 can be transferred to the court
within whose local jurisdiction the drawee bank is situated, if the
recording of evidence under Section 145 has already commenced in the
said court?
C. ANALYSIS
13. Before adverting to the conspectus of facts before us, we must discuss or
rather clarify the position of law as regards jurisdiction of courts to entertain
complaints under Section 138 of the Act, 1881 especially after the



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 6 of 60

introduction of Sections 142(2) and 142A respectively by the Amendment
Act, 2015. For that, we must look into few judgments of this Court to better
understand the legal backdrop in which the present dispute has arisen.
(i) Position of law as regards jurisdiction of courts prior to the
Amendment Act, 2015
14. Prior to the enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015, the issue relating to
territorial jurisdiction was quite complex. With a view to dispel any doubt
and lend clarity, this Court, in several of its judgments, had addressed the
issue of jurisdiction.
a. Analysis of the observations of this Court in Bhaskaran
15. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan , reported in (1999) 7 SCC
510 , this Court addressed itself on the issue of territorial jurisdiction in
detail.
16. In the said case, the cheque was issued by the accused at Adoor, Kerala and
the same was presented by the complainant at the bank in Kayamkulam,
Kerala, for encashment. The drawee bank dishonoured the cheque due to
funds being insufficient in the account of the accused. Consequently, the
complainant therein issued the statutory notice as required under Section 138
of the Act, 1881 but the same remained unclaimed and not delivered to the
accused as the addressee (the accused) was not found at the address



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 7 of 60

mentioned in the notice. The complainant proceeded to file the complaint
before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Adoor (“JMFC,
Adoor”).
17. The accused questioned the jurisdiction of the JMFC, Adoor on the ground
that the cheque was dishonoured at the bank situated in Kayamkulam where
the complainant had presented the cheque for encashment and therefore,
there was no occasion for the complainant to file a case at Adoor. The JMFC,
Adoor accepted the said submission canvassed by the accused and held that
he had no territorial jurisdiction to try the case as the cheque was
dishonoured in a different district of Kerala. On the other hand, the High
Court set aside the trial court’s judgment and held that since the cheque was
issued at Adoor, i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of the JMFC, Adoor,
he was competent to conduct the trial in respect of the complaint.
18. This Court took the view that the JMFC, Adoor had erroneously held that
the trial of the complaint was outside its jurisdiction. It was observed that
although Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the “ CrPC ”)
lays down the rule that every offence must be tried by a court within whose
jurisdiction it was committed, yet this rule was not invariable. Situations that
may present uncertainty as regards the question of jurisdiction are accounted



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 8 of 60

for by the CrPC, more particularly Section 178 thereof. Section 178 reads
thus:
“178. Place of inquiry or trial.
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an
offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area
and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be
committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local
areas,
it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction
over any of such local areas.”
19. The plain reading of Section 178(d) referred to above clarifies that when it
is not possible to answer the question of jurisdiction with certainty due to
several acts having been done in different local areas, the offence could be
tried in a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
20. This Court highlighted that the offence under Section 138 is a consequence
of the dishonour of cheque but such dishonour by itself does not result in the
offence unless and until the following acts are established:
(i) Drawing of the cheque,
(ii) Presentation of the cheque to the bank,

(iii) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank,



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 9 of 60

(iv) Issuing notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding
payment of the cheque amount,
(v) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of
the notice.
21. This Court held that the complainant may choose to lodge his complaint in
any court exercising jurisdiction over the localities where the aforesaid acts
may have been done. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced
below:
“11. We fail to comprehend as to how the trial court could
have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under
Section 177 of the Code “every offence shall ordinarily be
enquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it
was committed”. The locality where the Bank (which
dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as
the sole criterion to determine the place of offence. It must be
remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be
completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains
completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque
to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days
mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the
Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as
the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque.
A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of
factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides
or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where
either of them carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix
up any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the
offence under Section 138 of the Act.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 10 of 60

12. Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried
by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not
an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177
itself has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using
the precautionary word “ordinarily” to indicate that the rule
is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code
suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among
different localities, the offence would have been committed
the trial can be had in a court having jurisdiction over any of
those localities. The provision has further widened the scope
by stating that in case where the offence was committed
partly in one local area and partly in another local area the
court in either of the localities can exercise jurisdiction to try
the case. Further again, Section 179 of the Code stretches its
scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus:
“179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence
ensues.—When an act is an offence by reason of anything
which has been done and of a consequence which has
ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done
or such consequence has ensued.”
13. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne
in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction
of the courts to try the offence was sought to be determined.
14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be
completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts.
The following are the acts which are components of the said
offence: (1) drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation of the
cheque to the bank, (3) returning the cheque unpaid by the
drawee bank, (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the
cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure
of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt
of the notice.
15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have
been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 11 of 60

of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But
a concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the
completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. In
this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is
useful. It is extracted below:
“178. (a)-(c) *
(d) where the offence consists of several acts done in
different local areas,
it may be enquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”
16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five
different localities any one of the courts exercising
jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the
place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In
other words, the complainant can choose any one of those
courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas
within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts
was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so
expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question
regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. The decision in Bhaskaran (supra) took into account or rather highlighted
that Section 138 would get attracted upon commission of multifarious acts.
Such acts may not always share local areas and might have been done in
different jurisdictions. It was recognized that the special nature of the
offence contained in the said section gave rise to jurisdictional ambiguity
which was hindering the complainants’ litigations to recover their money.
To remedy the mischief that was being perpetuated by the absence of a
specific jurisdiction, this Court held that the amplitude of the offence under



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 12 of 60

Section 138 was so wide as to confer jurisdiction on all the courts in whose
territorial jurisdiction any of the five acts as mentioned above, might have
been committed.
b. Analysis of the observations of this Court in Harman Electronics
23. In Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd. ,
reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720 , the cheque was issued by the drawer in
Chandigarh and was presented by the complainant in Chandigarh itself. The
complainant sent the statutory notice under Section 138 from Delhi which
was admittedly served on the drawer in Chandigarh. Upon non-clearance of
dues, the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 before the
Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi (the “ ASJ, Delhi ”).
24. It was the grievance of the accused therein that although most of the acts
required to constitute an offence under Section 138 were committed in
Chandigarh, yet the complainant had filed the complaint in the court at New
Delhi only on the strength of the fact that the statutory notice was issued in
Delhi. The accused therein had contended that this by itself would amount
to absurdity if the complaint was entertained in Delhi.
25. The ASJ, Delhi held that the court in Delhi had the territorial jurisdiction to
conduct trial in respect of the complaint as the statutory notice was sent by
the complainant from Delhi. The High Court of Delhi affirmed the decision



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 13 of 60

of the ASJ, Delhi saying that this Court’s judgment in Bhaskaran (supra)
had clarified that if five different acts constituting the offence under Section
138 were found to have been done in five different localities, any one of the
courts exercising jurisdiction in one of such five areas could become the
place of trial. The High Court held that the issuance of statutory notice being
one of the acts mandatory for the completion of an offence under Section
138, the court in Delhi exercising territorial jurisdiction over the place from
which the statutory notice was issued, would have the jurisdiction to try the
complaint.
26. The question that fell for the consideration of this Court was whether the
sending of notice from Delhi, by itself would give rise to a cause of action
for taking cognizance under Section 138.
27. This Court held that the cause of action for proceeding against an accused
person under Section 138 would arise not from the mere sending of the
statutory notice but rather from its receipt by the accused person. The object
behind sending of notice was considered by this Court and it was observed
that it is only upon receipt of the notice that an accused person may elect to
either pay the amount due and payable within a period of 15 days or not to
pay the same. Therefore, issuance of notice by itself would not give rise to



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 14 of 60

a cause of action. The service of notice is imperative as it is only when the
communication thereof is complete that the cause of action arises.
28. This Court also noted that allowing multitudinous courts the jurisdiction to
try a single complaint would enable or rather place a complainant in the
position to misuse the law and cause harassment to the accused.
29. In light of such considerations, this Court held that though the statutory
notice was sent from Delhi, yet its receipt was recorded in Chandigarh. As
the cause of action accrued in Chandigarh, it was held that the court in Delhi
had no jurisdiction to try the matter. The relevant portions of the judgment
are reproduced below:
“ 12. The complaint petition does not show that the cheque
was presented at Delhi. It is absolutely silent in that regard.
The facility for collection of the cheque admittedly was
available at Chandigarh and the said facility was availed of.
The certificate dated 24-6-2003, which was not produced
before the learned court taking cognizance, even if taken into
consideration does not show that the cheque was presented
at the Delhi branch of Citibank. We, therefore, have no other
option but to presume that the cheque was presented at
Chandigarh. Indisputably, the dishonour of the cheque also
took place at Chandigarh. The only question, therefore,
which arises for consideration is that as to whether sending
of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action
for taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
13. It is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the
ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another
thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 15 of 60

an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the
accused had committed an offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients thereof are
required to be proved. What would constitute an offence is
stated in the main provision. The proviso appended thereto,
however, imposes certain further conditions which are
required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can
be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid
down in provisos (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act are intended to be applied in
favour of the accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt
of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action
for filing a complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice
that the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the
amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138
therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not
by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of
the notice would.
---xxx---
17. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
determines the jurisdiction of a court trying the matter. The
court ordinarily will have the jurisdiction only where the
offence has been committed. The provisions of Sections 178
and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are exceptions to
Section 177. These provisions presuppose that all offences
are local. Therefore, the place where an offence has been
committed plays an important role. It is one thing to say that
a presumption is raised that notice is served but it is another
thing to say that service of notice may not be held to be of any
significance or may be held to be wholly unnecessary. (…)
---xxx---
19. Presumption raised in support of service of notice would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Its
application is on the question of law or the fact obtaining.
Presumption has to be raised not on the hypothesis or
surmises but if the foundational facts are laid down therefor.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 16 of 60

Only because presumption of service of notice is possible to
be raised at the trial, the same by itself may not be a ground
to hold that the distinction between giving of notice and
service of notice ceases to exist.
20. Indisputably all statutes deserve their strict application,
but while doing so the cardinal principles therefor cannot be
lost sight of. A court derives a jurisdiction only when the
cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. The same cannot
be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the
part of the accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind
between the ingredient of an offence and commission of a
part of the offence. While issuance of a notice by the holder
of a negotiable instrument is necessary, service thereof is
also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and failure
on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within
a period of 15 days thereafter, the commission of an offence
completes. Giving of notice, therefore, cannot have any
precedent over the service. It is only from that view of the
matter that in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy
Traders & Agencies Ltd. [(2001) 6 SCC 463 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 1163 : AIR 2001 SC 676] emphasis has been laid on
service of notice.
21. We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the fact
that a banking institution holding several cheques signed by
the same borrower can not only present the cheque for its
encashment at four different places but also may serve
notices from four different places so as to enable it to file four
complaint cases at four different places. This only causes
grave harassment to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary
in a case of this nature to strike a balance between the right
of the complainant and the right of an accused vis-à-vis the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ”
(Emphasis supplied)



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 17 of 60

30. This Court, while applying the principles relating to jurisdiction as laid down
in Bhaskaran (supra) , explained the legal effect of the act of sending the
statutory notice under Section 138 for the purpose of determining the
jurisdiction to try a complaint thereunder. It was recognized that conferring
jurisdiction on the locality from where the notice was sent would give
unfettered powers to a complainant to set jurisdiction at a particular location
that may be inconvenient or cause undue hardship to the accused person.
Thus, the dictum in Harman Electronics (supra) curtailed the wide
jurisdictional empowerment expounded in Bhaskaran (supra) to some
extent.
c. Analysis of the observations of this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh
Rathod
31. This Court, in its landmark decision in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) , was
faced with the conundrum of jurisdictional ambiguity for trial of offence
under Section 138 of the Act, 1881 posed by the differing interpretations
thereof expounded in Bhaskaran (supra) , Harman Electronics (supra) and
Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals respectively and several other
judgments.
32. A three-Judge Bench recognized the position of law in this regard as settled
by Bhaskaran (supra) , as well as the limits placed on wide jurisdiction by
Harman Electronics (supra) . While analysing these decisions, this Court



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 18 of 60

observed that Bhaskaran (supra) adopted a liberal approach influenced by
a curial compassion towards the unpaid payee. It was also noted that such
approach was prone to abuse and had resulted in miscarriage of justice over
the years.
33. This Court was of the view that for the purpose of determining jurisdiction,
the commission of crime ought to be distinguished from its prosecution. It
was held that though the five concomitants of Section 138 enabled
prosecution of the offence thereunder, yet the offence itself came to be
committed as soon as the cheque was dishonoured by the drawee bank. As
a natural consequence, only the court exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the offence, i.e., the dishonour of cheque, was committed,
was clothed with the power to try a complaint in respect of such offence.
The relevant portions of the judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) are
reproduced below:
“ 10. It is axiomatic that when a court interprets any statutory
provision, its opinion must apply to and be determinate in all
factual and legal permutations and situations. We think that
the dictum in Ishar Alloy [Shri Ishar Alloy Steels
Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 609 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 582] is very relevant and conclusive to the discussion
in hand. It also justifies emphasis that Ishar Alloy [Shri Ishar
Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 609 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 582] is the only case before us which was
decided by a three-Judge Bench and, therefore, was binding
on all smaller Benches. We ingeminate that it is the drawee



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 19 of 60

Bank and not the complainant's bank which is postulated in
the so-called second constituent of Section 138 of the NI Act,
and it is this postulate that spurs us towards the conclusion
that we have arrived at in the present appeals. There is also
a discussion of Harman [Harman Electronics (P)
Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 720
: (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 332 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 610] to
reiterate that the offence under Section 138 is complete only
when the five factors are present. It is our considered view,
which we shall expound upon, that the offence in the
contemplation of Section 138 of the NI Act is the dishonour
of the cheque alone, and it is the concatenation of the five
concomitants of that section that enable the prosecution of
the offence in contradistinction to the completion/commission
of the offence.
11. We have also painstakingly perused Escorts Ltd. [Escorts
Ltd. v. Rama Mukherjee, (2014) 2 SCC 255 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Civ) 789 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 808] which was also decided
by the Nishant [Nishant Aggarwal v. Kailash Kumar
Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 72 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 627 : (2013)
3 SCC (Cri) 189] two-Judge Bench. Previous decisions were
considered, eventually leading to the conclusion that since
the cheque concerned had been presented for encashment at
New Delhi, its Metropolitan Magistrate possessed territorial
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the subject complaint
under Section 138 of the NI Act. Importantly, in a subsequent
order, in FIL Industries Ltd. v. Imtiyaz Ahmed Bhat [(2014)
2 SCC 266 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 800 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)
58] passed on 12-8-2013, it was decided that the place from
where the statutory notice had emanated would not of its own
have the consequence of vesting jurisdiction upon that place.
Accordingly, it bears repetition that the ratio
in Bhaskaran [K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan,
(1999) 7 SCC 510 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] has been
drastically diluted in that the situs of the notice, one of the so-
called five ingredients of Section 138, has now been held not



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 20 of 60

to clothe that court with territorial competency. The
conflicting or incongruent opinions need to be resolved.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. The aforesaid exposition stands fortified by the plain language of Section
138 of the Act, 1881. The primary part of the Section delineates the return
of a cheque unpaid by the person who issued such cheque as an offence.
However, the conditions stipulated in the proviso to the Section indicate that
though the offence may come into existence upon dishonour of cheque, the
consequences arising therefrom would be kept in abeyance till the time the
concomitants contained in the provisory portion of the Section are also
completed. In other words, the ingredients contained in the provisory portion
of Section 138 are necessarily to be fulfilled to successfully initiate
prosecution in respect of the offence of dishonour of cheque which is
committed when the cheque is returned unpaid by the drawee bank. The
relevant paragraphs of the judgment read thus:
“ 18. Section 138 of the NI Act is structured in two parts—the
primary and the provisory. It must be kept in mind that the
legislature does not ordain with one hand and immediately
negate it with the other. The proviso often carves out a minor
detraction or diminution of the main provision of which it is
an appendix or addendum or auxiliary. Black's Law
Dictionary states in the context of a proviso that it is
“[a] limitation or exception to a grant made or authority
conferred, the effect of which is to declare that the one



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 21 of 60

shall not operate, or the other be exercised, unless in the
case provided.
A clause or part of a clause in a statute, the office of which is
either to except something from the enacting clause, or to
qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible
ground of misinterpretation of its extent”.
It should also be kept in perspective that a proviso or a
condition are synonymous. In our perception in the case in
hand the contents of the proviso place conditions on the
operation of the main provision, while it does (sic not) form
a constituent of the crime itself, it modulates or regulates the
crime in circumstances where, unless its provisions are
complied with, the already committed crime remains
impervious to prosecution. The proviso to Section 138 of the
NI Act features three factors which are additionally required
for prosecution to be successful. In this aspect Section 142
correctly employs the term “cause of action” as compliance
with the three factors contained in the proviso are essential
for the cognizance of the offence, even though they are not
part of the action constituting the crime. To this extent we
respectfully concur with Bhaskaran [K.
Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 :
1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] in that the concatenation of all these
concomitants, constituents or ingredients of Section 138 of
the NI Act, is essential for the successful initiation or launch
of the prosecution. We, however, are of the view that so far
as the offence itself the proviso has no role to play.
Accordingly a reading of Section 138 of the NI Act in
conjunction with Section 177 CrPC leaves no manner of
doubt that the return of the cheque by the drawee bank alone
constitutes the commission of the offence and indicates the
place where the offence is committed.

19. In this analysis we hold that the place, situs or venue of
judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be
restricted to where the drawee bank is located. The law



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 22 of 60

should not be warped for commercial exigencies. As it is
Section 138 of the NI Act has introduced a deeming fiction of
culpability, even though, Section 420 is still available in case
the payee finds it advantageous or convenient to proceed
under that provision. An interpretation should not be
imparted to Section 138 which will render it as a device of
harassment i.e. by sending notices from a place which has no
causal connection with the transaction itself, and/or by
presenting the cheque(s) at any of the banks where the payee
may have an account. In our discernment, it is also now
manifest that traders and businessmen have become reckless
and incautious in extending credit where they would
heretofore have been extremely hesitant, solely because of the
availability of redress by way of criminal proceedings. It is
always open to the creditor to insist that the cheques in
question be made payable at a place of the creditor's
convenience. Today's reality is that every Magistracy is
inundated with prosecutions under Section 138 of the NI Act,
so much so that the burden is becoming unbearable and
detrimental to the disposal of other equally pressing
litigation. We think that courts are not required to twist the
law to give relief to incautious or impetuous persons; beyond
Section 138 of the NI Act. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
35. It was further observed in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) that the infusion of
the concept of ‘cause of action’ in criminal proceedings as done by
Bhaskaran (supra) perpetuated ambiguity relating to jurisdiction by
allowing filing of a complaint under Section 138 at multiple venues. This
Court held that the interpretation of Sections 177 and 178 of the CrPC
respectively, set forth in the said judgment ran counter to the approach of



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 23 of 60

simplifying law. It was observed that Section 178 despite being an exception
to Section 177 which informs about criminal jurisdiction ordinarily, did not
envisage the concept of ‘cause of action’ as being a consideration germane
for determining territorial jurisdiction in criminal trials. Therefore, the plain
meaning obtained from Sections 177 and 178 respectively ought not to be
warped for commercial exigencies and the logical conclusion flowing
therefrom can only be that territorial jurisdiction was anchored at the place
where the offence was committed. The relevant portions of the judgment are
reproduced below:
“ 16.1. Unlike civil actions, where the plaintiff has the burden
of filing and proving its case, the responsibility of
investigating a crime, marshalling evidence and witnesses,
rests with the State. Therefore, while the convenience of the
defendant in a civil action may be relevant, the convenience
of the so-called complainant/victim has little or no role to
play in criminal prosecution. Keeping in perspective the
presence of the word “ordinarily” in Section 177 CrPC, we
hasten to adumbrate that the exceptions to it are contained in
CrPC itself, that is, in the contents of the succeeding Section
178. CrPC also contains an explication of “complaint” as
any allegation to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action
in respect of the commission of an offence; not being a police
report. Prosecution ensues from a complaint or police report
for the purpose of determining the culpability of a person
accused of the commission of a crime; and unlike a civil
action or suit is carried out (or “prosecuted”) by the State or
its nominated agency. The principal definition of
“prosecution” imparted by Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn.
is



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 24 of 60

“[a] criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried
on by due course of law, before a competent tribunal, for
the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of a
person charged with crime”.
These reflections are necessary because Section 142(b) of the
NI Act contains the words, “the cause of action arises under
clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138”, resulting arguably,
but in our opinion irrelevantly, to the blind borrowing of
essentially civil law attributes onto criminal proceedings.

16.2. We reiterate that Section 178 admits of no debate that
in criminal prosecution, the concept of “cause of action”,
being the bundle of facts required to be proved in a suit and
accordingly also being relevant for the place of suing, is not
pertinent or germane for determining territorial jurisdiction
of criminal trials. Section 178 CrPC explicitly states that
every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a
court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
Section 179 is of similar tenor. We are also unable to locate
any provision of the NI Act which indicates or enumerates the
extraordinary circumstances which would justify a departure
from the stipulation that the place where the offence is
committed is where the prosecution has to be conducted. In
fact, since cognizance of the offence is subject to the
five Bhaskaran [K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan,
(1999) 7 SCC 510 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] components or
concomitants the concatenation of which ripens the already
committed offence under Section 138 of the NI Act into a
prosecutable offence, the employment of the phrase “cause
of action” in Section 142 of the NI Act is apposite for taking
cognizance, but inappropriate and irrelevant for determining
commission of the subject offence. There are myriad
examples of the commission of a crime the prosecution of
which is dependent on extraneous contingencies such as
obtainment of sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Similar situation is



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 25 of 60

statutorily created by Section 19 of the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986; Section 11 of the Central Sales Tax
Act, 1956; Section 279 of the Income Tax Act; Sections 132
and 308 CrPC; Section 137 of the Customs Act, etc. It would
be idle to contend that the offence comes into existence only
on the grant of permission for prosecution, or that this
permission constitutes an integral part of the offence itself. It
would also be futile to argue that the place where the
permission is granted would provide the venue for the trial.
If sanction is not granted the offence does not vanish.
Equally, if sanction is granted from a place other than where
the crime is committed, it is the latter which will remain the
place for its prosecution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. It is abundantly clear from the aforesaid that in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) ,
this Court viewed the question of jurisdiction strictly from the lens of
‘territoriality of offences’. In other words, the payee cannot select the
jurisdiction for trial of an offence under Section 138 by presentation of the
cheque at a location of his choosing. Though the presentation of cheque at
any branch of the payee’s bank is permitted by the Act, 1881 for the purposes
of commercial convenience, yet it cannot be said that such act of
presentation confers jurisdiction on the court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the said bank branch may be situated.
37. Since an offence under Section 138 could be said to be committed upon
dishonour of cheque by the drawee bank, it was held that such offence would
be localised at the place where the drawee bank is situated. Therefore, only



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 26 of 60

the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the drawee bank is situated, is
empowered to proceed against an accused person under Section 138.
(ii) Position of law as regards jurisdiction of courts after the
enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015
38. The exposition of law in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) resulted in several
representations from the commercial sector to the government, registering
protests against the accused-centric interpretation of the jurisdictional issue
adopted by this Court. Such representations were considered by the
Parliament and the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 was
enacted by the Parliament to inter alia , clarify the issue of jurisdiction to try
the offence under Section 138.
39. The Amendment Act, 2015 introduced sub-section (2) to Section 142 of the
Act, 1881. The amended Section 142 reads thus:
“ 142. Cognizance of offences.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable
under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made
by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course
of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on
which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the
proviso to section 138:



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 27 of 60

Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by
the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant
satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making
a complaint within such period;
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence
punishable under section 138.

(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and
tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,--
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an
account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in
due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is
situated; or
(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or
holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the
branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the
account, is situated.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of clause (a), where a
cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank
of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall
be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank
in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may
be, maintains the account. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
40. A bare textual reading of the amended Section 142 indicates that the
jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 138 has been specified in two
circumstances: first , when the cheque is delivered for collection through an
account, and secondly , when the cheque is presented for payment otherwise
through an account. It is also worth noting that the Explanation to Section
142(2)(a) further clarifies the question of jurisdiction by taking into account



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 28 of 60

the realities of negotiating by way of cheques and the technological
advancement in the field. However, this Court as well as the High Courts
have been divided over the conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) and the
Explanation thereto.
41. We find it necessary to resolve this controversy and eliminate divergent
positions in this regard, and for that we must understand the true import of
the amendments made to Section 142. In such view of the matter, it is
apposite to consider the following definitions:
• “Drawer” refers to the maker of a bill of exchange or cheque [See:
Section 7 of the Act, 1881].
• “Drawee” refers to the person who is directed to pay the amount
specified in the bill of exchange or cheque made by the drawer [See:
Section 7 of the Act, 1881].
• “Payee” refers to the person named in the instrument, to whom or to
whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid [See:
Section 7 of the Act, 1881].
The relevant provision reads thus:
“ 7. "Drawer".-- The maker of a bill of exchange or cheque
is called the drawer; the person thereby directed to pay is
called the drawee.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 29 of 60

"Drawee in case of need". -- When in the Bill or in any
indorsement thereon the name of any person is given in
addition to the drawee to be resorted to in case of need
such person is called a "drawee in case of need".
"Acceptor". -- After the drawee of a bill has signed his
assent upon the bill, or, if there are more parts thereof than
one, upon one of such parts, and delivered the same, or
given notice of such signing to the holder or to some person
on his behalf, he is called the "acceptor".
"Acceptor for honour". -- When a bill of exchange has been
noted or protested for non-acceptance or for better
security,] and any person accepts it supra protest for
honour of the drawer or of any one of the indorsers, such
person is called an "acceptor for honour".
"Payee". -- The person named in the instrument, to whom
or to whose order the money is by the instrument directed
to be paid, is called the "payee".”
(Emphasis supplied)

a. Meaning of the expressions “ delivered for collection through an
account ” and “ presentation for payment otherwise through an account ”
42. The expression “ delivered for collection through an account ” is an integral
part of Section 142(2)(a) and distinguishes it from the provision in Section
142(2)(b) which comes into operation when a cheque is “ presented for
payment otherwise through an account ”. We find it apposite to clarify that
the expressions “delivered for collection” and “presented for payment”
respectively, are distinct. They operate in separate stages of discharging a
liability by way of a cheque.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 30 of 60

43. The word “delivery” is defined in Section 46 of the Act, 1881 and reads thus:
“ 46. Delivery.
The making, acceptance or indorsement of a promissory note,
bill of exchange or cheque is completed by delivery, actual or
constructive.
As between parties standing in immediate relation, delivery
to be effectual must be made by the party making, accepting
or indorsing the instrument, or by a person authorised by him
in that behalf.
As between such parties and any holder of the instrument
other than a holder in due course, it may be shown that the
instrument was delivered conditionally or for a special
purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring
absolutely the property therein.
A promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable to
bearer is negotiable by the delivery thereof.
A promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable to
order is negotiable by the holder by indorsement and delivery
thereof. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. What is discernible from the aforesaid is that the “making” of a cheque is
complete only upon delivery of the same by the drawer. The act of
“delivery” thus, creates a relationship between the drawer and the payee
Such relationship is what describes the entitlement of the payee to the
amount of money for which the cheque is drawn and enables the payee to
encash the same.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 31 of 60

45. Upon perusal of Section 142(2)(a), we are of the considered opinion that the
terms “delivered” and “for collection through an account” are to be read in
such a manner that the latter describes the nature of delivery. The plain
reading of Section 46 supports this line of argument as the definition
contained therein indicates that the making of the cheque is complete upon
the act of delivery. Therefore, the nature of the cheque becomes crystallized
as an account payee cheque once the drawer delivers it to the payee who
further delivers it to the bank in which he maintains his account. Once the
cheque is delivered by the payee to his bank, the “making” of the cheque is
said to be complete. The inclusion of the expression “for collection through
an account” in Section 142(2)(a) is only to indicate the intention of the
drawer to “make” the cheque in such a manner that it can only result in a
transaction between the bank accounts of the drawer and the payee.
46. Presentment, on the other hand, is the stage that immediately succeeds
“delivery”. The expression “presentment for payment” is defined under
Section 64 of the Act, 1881. It stipulates that a cheque must be presented for
payment to the maker of such cheque (the drawer) or the person to whom
directions are given to pay the amount specified in the cheque (the drawee).
Such presentment must be by or on behalf of the payee. The relevant
provision reads thus:
“ 64. Presentment for payment.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 32 of 60

(1) Promissory notes, bills of exchange and cheques must
be presented for payment to the maker, acceptor or
drawee thereof respectively, by or on behalf of the
holder as hereinafter provided. In default of such
presentment, the other parties thereto are not liable
thereon to such holder.
Where authorized by agreement or usage, a presentment
through the post office by means of a registered letter is
sufficient.
Exception.--Where a promissory note is payable on
demand and is not payable at a specified place, no
presentment is necessary in order to charge the maker
thereof.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 6, where
an electronic image of a truncated cheque is presented
for payment, the drawee bank is entitled to demand any
further information regarding the truncated cheque
from the bank holding the truncated cheque in case of
any reasonable suspicion about the genuineness of the
apparent tenor of instrument, and if the suspicion is that
of any fraud, forgery, tampering or destruction of the
instrument, it is entitled to further demand the
presentment of the truncated cheque itself for
verification:
Provided that the truncated cheque so demanded by the
drawee bank shall be retained by it, if the payment is
made accordingly.”
(Emphasis supplied)




T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 33 of 60

47. Therefore, presentment creates a relationship between the drawee bank and
the payee (in case of an account bearer cheque) or the payee’s bank (in case
of an account payee cheque).
48. We may with a view to obviate any confusion, clarify at the threshold that
presentment under Section 64 of the Act, 1881 and presenting of cheque by
the payee to his bank are two distinct acts. The presentation of cheque by a
payee to the payee’s bank is included in the concept of “delivery” defined
under Section 46 of the Act, 1881. It is nothing but an extension of delivery
in the case of non-transferable account payee cheques. The jurisdiction in
such cases has been anchored by Section 142(2)(a) at the place where branch
of the bank in which the payee maintains an account is situated. The sketch
below explains the concepts of “delivery” and “presentment”:




T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 34 of 60

b. Meaning of the expression “ maintains an account ” under Section 142(2)
49. Having discussed the bifurcation created by the legislature for the purposes
of determining jurisdiction as regards any dispute pertaining to account
payee cheques and account bearer cheques respectively, we may now
explain the meaning of the expression “ the branch of the bank where the
payee or holder in due course, as the case maybe, maintains the account” .
50. This Court in Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna , reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3833 , had the occasion to provide an exhaustive explanation for
the expression “maintains an account” as it appears in Section 138 of the
Act, 1881. The issue therein was whether it was permissible for a third party
to draw a cheque on the bank account of the company of which he was a
director, to discharge his individual liability. This Court observed that the
expression “on an account maintained by him with a banker” describes an
intrinsic relationship between an account holder and the bank in which he
holds such account. Such relationship could not be altered by a delegation
of authority. Therefore, even though a person may draw a cheque on the
bank account of another person, it is not possible to hold such a person who
draws the cheque, liable for the offence under Section 138 as he is not the
one who maintains the account with the bank. The relevant portion of the
judgment in Bijoy Kumar Moni (supra) is reproduced below:



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 35 of 60

“ 45. It is of vital importance to understand the import of the
expression “on an account maintained by him with a banker”
used in Section 138 of the NI Act. The expression, in our
considered opinion, describes the relationship between the
account holder and the banker. This relationship is
fundamental to the application of Section 138. The act of
maintaining an account is exclusively tied to the account
holder and does not extend to any third party whom the
account holder may authorize to manage the account on its
behalf. Therefore, any delegation of authority to manage the
account does not alter the intrinsic relationship existing
between the account holder and the banker as envisaged
under the NI Act. Corporate persons like companies, which
are mere legal entities and have no soul, mind or limb to work
physically, discharge their functions through some human
agency recognised under the law to work. Therefore, if some
function is discharged by such human agency for and on
behalf of the company it would be an act of the company and
not attributable to such human agent. One such instance of
discharge of functions could be the authority to manage the
bank accounts of the company, issue and sign cheques on its
behalf, etc. which may be delegated to an authorised
signatory. However, such authorisation would not render the
authorised signatory as the maker of those cheques. It is the
company alone which would continue to be the maker of these
cheques, and thus also the drawer within the meaning of
Section 7 of the NI Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
51. It is abundantly clear from the aforesaid exposition that when a person
maintains an account with a bank, he establishes a relationship with such
bank for the management of his money. The scheme of the Act, 1881 leaves



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 36 of 60

no manner of doubt in our minds that such relationship forms the
substructure of all transactions in respect of the account so maintained.
52. Having clarified the meaning of the expression “maintains an account”, we
may proceed to determine the precise details of the relationship between a
person and the bank in which he maintains an account. A bare perusal of
Section 138 indicates that for an offence to be made out thereunder, a person
must draw a cheque on an account maintained by him with a bank. There is
no further stipulation as regards the nature of such account or requirement
of any other details of the bank that may be relevant for the purpose of
adjudication. Therefore, what Section 138 describes by use of the expression
“on an account maintained by him with a banker” is a simpliciter
relationship between a person and his banker.
53. Sub-section (2) of Section 142 adopts a similar language, to indicate the
same relationship as described in Section 138. However, it does so with a
slight modification. The expressions “ the branch of the bank where the
payee or holder in due course, as the case maybe, maintains the account”
or alternatively “ the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains
the account ” include the word “branch”. This indicates that the payee or
drawer, by maintaining the account in a particular branch of the bank, share
a relationship not with the bank as a whole but with the specific branch



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 37 of 60

thereof (we may refer to this specific branch as the “home branch” for ease
of exposition). Therefore, the inclusion of “branch” in Sections 142(2)(a)
and (b) places an additional condition for determining the place where the
payee or drawer maintains the account. This additional condition is placed
on the relationship between a person and his banker, in order to decide the
question of jurisdiction and streamline the process of adjudication. In other
words, for deciding jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to establish whether a
person maintains an account in a particular bank. It is necessary to also
ascertain the specific branch of the bank in which he maintains the account
to completely and unambiguously decide the said question.
c. Conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation thereto
54. It is limpid from the aforesaid discussion that the necessary corollary of
including ‘branch’ as a factor that shapes the relationship between the
payee/drawer and their bank, is that a complaint under Section 138 would
be triable only by the court in whose local jurisdiction the branch of the bank
where the payee/drawer maintain their account, is situated.
55. Before we explain the Section 142(2)(a), we deem it fit to briefly discuss
Section 142(2)(b). In the case of account bearer cheques governed by
Section 142(2)(b), the provision of jurisdiction by way of the Amendment
Act, 2015 is partially reinforced by the position of law expounded in



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 38 of 60

Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) . Section 142(2)(b) confers jurisdiction on the
court within whose local area the drawee bank is situated and upon
presentation, the cheque comes to be dishonoured. It is, however, worth
noting that since the introduction of ‘payable at par’ cheques, the
encashment of cheques can happen at any branch of the drawee bank. It is
not necessary that the branch which is honouring or dishonouring the cheque
may be that particular branch in which the drawer maintains the account.
Therefore, the technological advancements in the banking sector have made
it so that the offence of dishonour of cheque can be committed at any branch
of the drawee bank. In such a case, if the law as explained in Dashrath
Rupsingh (supra) is applied strictly then the jurisdiction would be fixed at
the branch of the drawee bank where the cheque was actually dishonoured.
Such branch may not necessarily be the branch in which the drawer
maintains an account. Having taken into account this possibility, we
recognize that the Amendment Act, 2015 has worded Section 142(2)(b) in
such a manner that even if a cheque is dishonoured elsewhere, the
jurisdiction for trial of the complaint under Section 138 would lie with the
court within whose local jurisdiction the branch of the drawee bank in which
the drawer maintains the account, is situated.
56. The legislature has adopted a similar route under Section 142(2)(a) to
determine jurisdiction in cases pertaining to the dishonour of account payee



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 39 of 60

cheques. The distinction between Section 142(2)(a) and (b) respectively is
not only limited to the nature of the cheque sought to be encashed but also
the stage at which jurisdictional ambiguity may arise, i.e., at the stage of
delivery or presentment in the case of account payee cheque and account
bearer cheque respectively. In the case of an account payee cheque, the
jurisdictional uncertainty may arise in the first stage of delivery itself. As
discussed in the aforesaid, “delivery” is continued by the payee to also
include delivery of the cheque to the payee’s bank. In such a case, the act of
making of the cheque is influenced by the payee allowing him to deliver the
cheque for collection at any branch of the bank in which he maintains an
account.
57. If the aforesaid be so and the jurisdiction is to be decided on the basis of the
place where the cheque was delivered to the bank of the payee, the same
would lead to conferring unbridled power to the payee in deciding
jurisdiction which may be misused for the purposes of forum shopping. We
are cognizant of the fact that the dictum in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra)
sought to minimize such abuse of law that arose from the wide ambit of
jurisdiction specified in Bhaskaran (supra) . While a bare perusal of the
amended Section 142 and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amendment Act, 2015 shows that the Parliament has made a departure from
the offence-centric understanding of jurisdiction in Dashrath Rupsingh



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 40 of 60

(supra) , yet we find it difficult to accept that the legislature would relegate
the position of law back to a situation that would facilitate its manipulation.
58. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the Explanation to Section 142(2)(a).
A bare textual reading of the provision indicates that the Explanation creates
a legal fiction that a cheque, when delivered for collection through an
account, at ‘any branch’ of the bank in which the payee maintains the
account, would be deemed to have been delivered to the particular branch of
the bank in which the payee maintains his account, i.e., the home branch of
the payee. Therefore, by way of Explanation, the legislature ensures
convenience of transaction by recognizing that a payee may deliver a cheque
at ‘any branch’ of his bank. However, in a situation where such cheque
comes to be dishonoured, it would be deemed that the cheque was delivered
at the home branch so as to empower the court, within whose local territorial
jurisdiction the said branch falls, to try the complaint in this regard.
59. We may advert to the following illustrative table to lend further clarity to
the aforesaid exposition:





T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 41 of 60

60. This Court had the occasion to apply the principles of jurisdiction laid down
in Section 142(2)(a) for the first time in Bridgestone India (P) Ltd. v.
Inderpal Singh , reported in (2016) 2 SCC 75 wherein it was observed that
the legal position declared in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) has been



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 42 of 60

overturned by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance,
2015 whereby Section 142 was amended such that the jurisdiction would be
fixed at the place where the cheque is delivered for collection, i.e., the branch
of the bank in which the payee maintains an account. The relevant portions
of the judgment in Bridgestone (supra) are reproduced below:
“ 11. In order to overcome the legal position declared by this
Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod case [Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129
: (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 676 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 673] , the
learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to
the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance”). A perusal
of Section 1(2) thereof reveals that the Ordinance would be
deemed to have come into force with effect from 15-6-2015.
It is, therefore, pointed out to us that the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 is in
force. Our attention was then invited to Section 3 thereof,
whereby, the original Section 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, came to be amended, and also, Section
4 thereof, whereby, Section 142-A was inserted into the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
---xxx---
13. A perusal of the amended Section 142(2), extracted
above, leaves no room for any doubt, specially in view of the
Explanation thereunder, that with reference to an offence
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e. the
branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course,
where the drawee maintains an account, would be
determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction. ”
(Emphasis supplied)



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 43 of 60

61. We are of the considered view that the paraphrasing of Section 142(2)(a) as
done in Bridgestone (supra) bears some relevance and requires explanation.
This Court applied the provision as intended by the language of Section
142(2)(a), however, in the process of exposition, rephrased the same and the
Explanation thereto in a manner that gives primacy to the expression “for
collection” without indicating the complete context in which it occurs in the
provision. A perusal of Section 142(2)(a) reflects that the expression “for
collection through an account” is employed by the legislature to identify the
nature of the cheque as an account payee cheque. Therefore, the use of the
phrase “delivered for collection” with incomplete context in Bridgestone
(supra) gave rise to a cleavage of opinion. This is evident from this Court’s
decision in Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd. , reported in (2023) 19 SCC
404 .
62. In Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) , the petitioner therein had prayed for transfer
of the two complaints filed in Nagpur to Delhi, as the complaint in respect
of other four cheques, between the same parties, were registered before the
competent court in Delhi. This Court, on a conjoint reading of the Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 2015 and Para 13 of
Bridgestone (supra) respectively, held that the jurisdiction to try an offence
under Section 138 will lie with a court within whose local jurisdiction the
cheque has been delivered for collection i.e., through an account in the



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 44 of 60

branch of the bank where the payee maintains an account. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced below:
“ 12. Perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons in
Amendment Act 26 of 2015 makes it amply clear that
insertion of Sections 142(2) and 142-A in the 1881 Act was a
direct consequence of the judgment of this Court in Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod [Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 676 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 673] . Therefore, the use of the
phrase:“shall be inquired into and tried only by a court
within whose local jurisdiction …” in Section 142(2) of the
1881 Act is contextual to the ratio laid down in Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod [Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 676 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 673] to the contrary, whereby territorial
jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 138 of the 1881
Act vested in the court having jurisdiction over the drawee
bank and not the complainant's bank where he had presented
the cheque. Section 142(2) now makes it clear that the
jurisdiction to try such an offence would vest only in the court
within whose jurisdiction the branch of the Bank where the
cheque was delivered for collection, through the account of
the payee or holder in due course, is situated. The newly
inserted Section 142-A further clarifies this position by
validating the transfer of pending cases to the courts
conferred with such jurisdiction after the amendment.
13. The later decision of this Court in Bridgestone India (P)
Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh [Bridgestone India (P)
Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh, (2016) 2 SCC 75 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ)
588 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 472] affirmed the legal position
obtaining after the amendment of the 1881 Act and endorsed
that Section 142(2)(a) of the 1881 Act vests jurisdiction for
initiating proceedings for an offence under Section 138 in the
court where the cheque is delivered for collection i.e. through



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 45 of 60

an account in the branch of the bank where the payee or
holder in due course maintains an account. This Court also
affirmed that Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod [Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129
: (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 676 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 673] would
not non-suit the company insofar as territorial jurisdiction
for initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the 1881 Act
was concerned.”
(Emphasis supplied)
63. We also find it apposite to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Amendment Act, 2015. The same reads thus:
“ Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015
Prefatory Note—Statement of Objects and Reasons.—

(…) 3. The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 1st August,
2014, in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, held that the territorial
jurisdiction for dishonour of cheques is restricted to the court
within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed,
which in the present context is where the cheque is
dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn. The Supreme
Court has directed that only those cases where, post the
summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the
recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in
Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will
proceeding continue at that place. All other complaints
(including those where the accused/respondent has not been
properly served) shall be returned to the complainant for
filing in the proper court, in consonance with exposition of
the law, as determined by the Supreme Court.

4. Pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court,
representations have been made to the Government by



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 46 of 60

various stakeholders, including industry associations and
financial institutions, expressing concerns about the wide
impact this judgment would have on the business interests as
it will offer undue protection to defaulters at the expense of
the aggrieved complainant; will give a complete go-by to the
practice/concept of ‘Payable at Par cheques’ and would
ignore the current realities of cheque clearing with the
introduction of CTS (Cheque Truncation System) where
cheque clearance happens only through scanned image in
electronic form and cheques are not physically required to be
presented to the issuing branch (drawee bank branch) but are
settled between the service branches of the drawee and payee
banks; will give rise to multiplicity of cases covering several
cheques drawn on bank(s) at different places; and adhering
to it is impracticable for a single window agency with
customers spread all over India.

5. To address the difficulties faced by the payee or the lender
of the money in filing the case under Section 138 of the said
Act, because of which, large number of cases are stuck, the
jurisdiction for offence under Section 138 has been clearly
defined. The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2015
provides for the following, namely—
(i) filing of cases only by a court within whose local
jurisdiction the bank branch of the payee, where the payee
presents the cheque for payment, is situated;
(ii) stipulating that where a complaint has been filed against
the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under
the new scheme of jurisdiction, all subsequent complaints
arising out of Section 138 of the said Act against the same
drawer shall be filed before the same court, irrespective of
whether those cheques were presented for payment within the
territorial jurisdiction of that court;
(iii) stipulating that if more than one prosecution is filed
against the same drawer of cheques before different courts,
upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 47 of 60

court, the court shall transfer the case to the court having
jurisdiction as per the new scheme of jurisdiction; and
(iv) amending Explanation I under Section 6 of the said Act
relating to the meaning of expression “a cheque in the
electronic form”, as the said meaning is found to be deficient
because it presumes drawing of a physical cheque, which is
not the objective in preparing “a cheque in the electronic
form” and inserting a new Explanation III in the said section
giving reference of the expressions contained in the
Information Technology Act, 2000. (…)”
(Emphasis supplied)

64. What has been conveyed by this Court in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) is that
the account which the payee maintains in a particular branch of the bank,
serves only as a conduit for the payee to deliver the cheque at any branch of
the bank, for subsequent presentment to the drawee bank. In other words,
the payee is only required to maintain an account in a branch of the bank,
for the said bank to present the cheque to the drawee bank from any of its
branches. Therefore, the act of “maintaining an account in a branch” is to
enable the primary action of “delivery for collection”. Accordingly, the
jurisdiction must lie at the place where the primary action was performed,
i.e., the branch of the payee’s bank where the cheque was actually delivered
for collection, is situated.
65. The reasoning adopted in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) may find some support
in the literal reading of Para 5(i) of the aforesaid Statement of Objects and



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 48 of 60

Reasons which states that cases would be filed in the court having
jurisdiction over the branch of the bank in which the payee presents the
cheque for payment. It is apposite to note that, on the face of it, the language
used in the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not synonymous with the
language of Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation thereto. Therefore, in our
considered view, Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) could not have derived support
from the Statement of Objects and Reasons.
66. We say so because no value could have been attached to the language
adopted in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the purpose of
discerning the true meaning and effect of a substantive provision occurring
in the statute book. This principle of interpretation has been settled by this
Court in Devadoss v. Veera Makali Amman Koil Athalur , reported in
(1998) 9 SCC 286 wherein it was observed thus:
“ 21. The question arises naturally whether the court can
refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons mentioned in a
bill when it is placed before the legislature and even if it is
permissible, to what extent the court can make use of the
same. On this aspect, the law is well settled. In Narain
Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain [(1985) 1 SCC 1] it was
stated that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a legislative bill could not be used to
determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive
provisions of a statute, it was permissible to refer to the same
for the purpose of understanding the background, the
antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 49 of 60

relation to the statute and the evil which the statute sought to
remedy.”
(Emphasis supplied)
67. Further, we must also closely scrutinize the reliance placed by Yogesh
Upadhyay (supra) on the phrasing of Section 142(2)(a) in Bridgestone
(supra) . We say so because the application of Section 142(2)(a) in
Bridgestone (supra) , in no manner, supports how the provision was applied
in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) . Though the judgment in Yogesh Upadhyay
(supra) does not mention where the branch of the bank was situated in which
the payee maintained an account, was situated, yet it is discernible from the
decision that this Court gave primacy to the place where the cheque was
“delivered for collection” when it upheld the correctness of institution of
complaints in Nagpur.
68. In our considered view, the interpretation of jurisdiction under Section
142(2)(a) in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) is not borne out of the statutory
scheme of the Act, 1881. A perusal of the judgment shows that it did not
take into account the deeming fiction put forth in the Explanation to Section
142(2)(a) that delivery of a cheque at any branch of the payee’s bank will be
deemed to have been delivered at the branch of the bank in which the payee
maintains the account, i.e., the home branch of the payee. Even though, this
Court in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) does not go so far as to discuss the



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 50 of 60

meaning and import of the Explanation, yet we may attempt to harmoniously
read the language of the Explanation with the reasons provided in the said
judgment in the interests of gauging the correct position of law.
69. Therefore, in arguendo , we may look at the Explanation from one another
angle. The language used in the Explanation may also create a legal fiction
that would enable ‘any branch’ of the payee’s bank to be deemed as ‘the
branch in which the payee maintains an account’ (the “ home branch ”). This
construction of the Explanation would mean that by virtue of Section
142(2)(a), the court within whose local jurisdiction the home branch is
situated, has an inherent power to try a complaint under Section 138 filed by
the payee. However, the payee delivered the cheque for collection at another
branch instead of the home branch. According to the dictum as laid in
Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) , primacy has to be accorded to the action of the
payee in “delivery of the cheque for collection” for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction. The only understanding that we can obtain from
the aforesaid is that the court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the home
branch will have to share the inherent powers that it possesses under Section
142(2)(a), with the court in whose jurisdiction such other branch is situated,
in which the payee delivered the cheque for collection.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 51 of 60

70. Having undertaken the academic exercise of understanding the ways in
which the Explanation may be read, we do not have any qualms in saying
that the aforesaid construction of Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation
thereto does not appeal to us. We say so for the following two reasons:
(i) First , the understanding of the Explanation in such a manner leads to
distorting of the plain language of Section 142(2)(a). This Court, in
Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) observed that “the legislature does not
ordain with one hand and immediately negate it with the other ”. We
find the said principle to be of much significance especially while
reading explanations attached to the provisions that seek to clarify the
operation of such provision. In our considered view, an explanation
cannot be raised to such a high pedestal that the provision which it
intends to clarify becomes a mere supporting device.
(ii) Secondly , a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the
Amendment Act, 2015 indicates that the legislature intended to change
the process of determination of jurisdiction for trial of complaints under
Section 138. The inclusion of Section 142(2) in the Act, 1881, which
is a special legislation, meant that the jurisdictional vacuum was filled.
The natural consequence of such amendment was that there remained
no requirement of approaching the issue of jurisdiction from an
ordinary criminal perspective as provided in the CrPC, as was done in



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 52 of 60

Dashrath Rupsingh (supra). However, the Statement of Objects and
Reasons gives no indication that the said judgment made erroneous
observations about the misuse of the wide ambit of jurisdiction by
complainants to the inconvenience of the accused persons. In our
considered view, it could not have been the intention of the Parliament
to let abuse of law go unchecked. It is for this reason that the judgment
in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) does not impress us. If we accept the
construction placed on Section 142(2)(a) by the decision in Yogesh
Upadhyay (supra) , we will be allowing a payee to manipulate the
question of jurisdiction in his favour by letting him decide where he
wants to deliver the cheque for collection. We are of the firm opinion
that the legislature could not have intended to let misuse perpetuate in
such a manner.
71. We find it apposite to also look into the decision rendered in Shri Sendhur
Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. , reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 508 wherein this Court placed reliance on both Bridgestone
(supra) as well as Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) respectively. The phraseology
employed in Sendhur Agro (supra) suggests that this Court was in
agreement with the law expounded in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) in respect
of “delivery for collection”. However, upon a closer examination, it is clear
that this Court understood the term “delivered” and “for collection through



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 53 of 60

an account” in a disjunct manner which is not in consonance with how
Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) perceived Section 142(2)(a). It was observed that
presentation of a cheque to the drawee bank will be “through the account”
of the payee and that such place would be determinative for the purpose of
identifying jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the judgment in Sendhur
Agro (supra) is reproduced below:
“ 61. It is clear on a reading of Section 142(2)(a) and the
Explanation thereto that, for the purposes of clause (a),
where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of
the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the
cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch
of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the
case may be, maintains the account.

62. A conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) along with the
explanation thereof, makes the position emphatically clear
that, when a cheque is delivered or issued to a person with
liberty to present the cheque for collection at any branch of
the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case
may be, maintains the account then, the cheque shall be
deemed to have been delivered or issued to the branch of the
bank, in which, the payee or holder in due course, as the case
may be, maintains the account, and the court of the place
where such cheque was presented for collection, will have the
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint alleging the
commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act. In that view of the position of law, the word
‘delivered’ used in Section 142(2)(a) of the N.I. Act has no
significance. What is of significance is the expression ‘for
collection through an account’. That is to say, delivery of the
cheque takes place where the cheque was issued and
presentation of the cheque will be through the account of the



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 54 of 60

payee or holder in due course, and the said place is decisive
to determine the question of jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
72. What is discernible from the aforesaid exposition is that this Court
considered the requirement of “maintaining of the account” implicit in “for
collection through an account”. In other words, once it is identified that the
cheque in question is an account payee cheque, the delivery must be to such
branch in which the payee maintains the account as it is this branch of the
bank that will receive the funds in the account maintained by the payee, from
the drawee bank which will debit the drawer’s account to send such amount.
However, the necessity of delivery of an account payee cheque to the home
branch is only legal and not commercial. It is to address commercial
exigencies that the legislature enacted the Explanation to Section 142(2)(a).
The deeming fiction in the Explanation ensures that even if a cheque is
delivered to a branch other than the home branch for commercial
convenience, it shall be considered to have been delivered to the home
branch for the legal purpose of determining jurisdiction. This understanding
is also apparent from this Court’s recent judgment in Prakash Chimanlal
Sheth v. Jagruti Keyur Rajpopat , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1511 .
73. The aforesaid comparison may be better illustrated through the following
diagram depicted hereunder:



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 55 of 60

T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 56 of 60

74. The above diagrammatic representation shows that each judgment has
considered specific phrases together or disjunct from each other due to
which there have been variations in understanding of the provision in
Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation thereto.
75. In such view of the matter, we are constrained to observe that the position
of law expounded in Yogesh Upadhyay (supra) is per incuriam .
(iii) Determination of the issues framed
a. Whether the MM, Kolkata has the jurisdiction to try the
complaint?
76. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is as clear as a noon day that the
jurisdiction to try a complaint filed under Section 138 in respect of a cheque
delivered for collection through an account, i.e., an account payee cheque,
is vested in the court within whose local jurisdiction the branch of the bank
in which the payee maintains the account, i.e., the payee’s home branch, is
situated. Therefore, we find no force in the petitioner’s argument that as per
the relevant provisions of the CrPC, the jurisdiction to try the complaint



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 57 of 60

under Section 138 is vested in the court within whose local bounds the
drawee bank is situated where the cheque was dishonoured. We say so
because the enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015 and the introduction of
Section 142(2) thereby, being a special legislation, occupies the field over a
general procedural legislation viz. CrPC. Thus, the MM, Kolkata does not
have jurisdiction to try the case.
b. Whether a case of transfer of the complaint from the court of
JMFC, Bhopal to MM, Kolkata is made out?
77. The petitioner, who is the accused company in the complaint instituted by
the respondent-complainant, has prayed for transfer of the complaint on the
ground that the MM, Kolkata, before returning the complaint, had already
reached the stage of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) of the Act,
1881.
78. It is apposite to note that Section 142A of the Act, 1881 provides for transfer
of pending cases under Section 138, to the court having jurisdiction in terms
of Section 142(2). We are aware that the jurisdiction to try the complaint in
the instant case lied exclusively with the JMFC, Bhopal. If the matter had
remained pending at the stage prior to the recording of evidence, there would
have been no difficulty in accepting the deemed transfer of the complaint
under Section 142A(1) to the court of JMFC, Bhopal from the court of MM,
Kolkata. However, much water has floated under the bridge. We were



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 58 of 60

informed that the court of MM, Kolkata returned the complaint when it had
already reached the stage of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) of
the Act, 1881. In such view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion
that allowing the parties to contest the complaint afresh before the JMFC,
Bhopal would amount to a procedural impropriety that may prove to be
detrimental to the case of the accused.
79. In Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) , this Court, with a view to obviate and
eradicate legal complications, had allowed the category of complaint cases
in which proceedings had reached the stage of recording evidence under
Section 145(2), to remain in the court where they were pending, despite such
courts not being vested with jurisdiction in terms of the judgment. The
relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:
“ 22. (…) To obviate and eradicate any legal complications,
the category of complaint cases where proceedings have
gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed
to have been transferred by us from the court ordinarily
possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the
court where it is presently pending.”
80. In light of the observations in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra) and to meet the
ends of justice, we are of the view that the instant case be transferred to the
jurisdiction of MM, Kolkata and the proceedings be resumed from the stage
before the order of return of complaint dated 28.07.2016.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 59 of 60

D. CONCLUSION
81. Having regard to the pleadings in the memorandum of the transfer petition,
we have reached the conclusion that a case has been made out for transfer
of the proceedings in question.
82. In the result, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. All other
connected transfer petitions are also disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
83. The Registry shall forward one copy each of this judgment to all the High
Courts.
84. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

…………………………………J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)



………………………………….J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)

New Delhi.
th
28 November, 2025.



T.P. (Crl.) D. No. 24362 of 2025 Page 60 of 60