Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10581 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 23918 OF 2012)
MANOHARAN …APPELLANT
Vs.
SIVARAJAN & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
JUDGMENT
V.Gopala Gowda J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the appellant
questioning the correctness of the judgment and
final Order dated 21.03.2012 passed by the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in RFA No. 678 of 2011
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urging various facts and legal contentions in
justification of his claim.
| vant fa<br>ase of | cts are<br>the ap |
|---|
find out whether the appellant is entitled for the
relief as prayed in this appeal.
The appellant approached the respondent no. 1 -
a money lender, for a loan of
2,20,000/-. The
respondent no. 1 agreed to give him the loan in
return of execution of a sale deed with respect to 3
cents of land in re-survey No. 111/13-1 in Block No.
12 of Maranalloor village by the appellant in his
JUDGMENT
favour. It was agreed upon between the parties that
the respondent no. 1 will reconvey the property in
favour of the appellant on repayment of the loan.
The appellant accordingly executed sale deed No. 575
of 2001 at sub Registrar’s office at Ooruttambalam
with respect to 3 cents of land in Re-survey
No.111/13-1 in Block no.12 of Maranalloor village in
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favour of respondent no.1. The respondent no. 1
executed an agreement of re-conveyance deed in
favour of the appellant regarding the above
| y on the | same d |
|---|
4. The learned senior counsel, Mr. Basanth R.
appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that the
appellant approached the respondent no.1 several
times with money for re-conveying the property in
favour of the appellant as was agreed upon between
them but the respondent no. 1 evaded from doing so.
5. It is also the case of the appellant that
respondent no.1, instead of issuing a deed of re-
JUDGMENT
conveyance, sold the property to Respondent nos. 2
and 3 without the knowledge of the appellant. The
appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent no.1
requesting him to appear before the sub Registrar’s
office for the execution of re-conveyance deed
regarding the plaint schedule property to which the
respondent no. 1 did not oblige. The appellant then
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filed a suit being OS No. 141/2007 before the Court
of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara for mandatory injunction,
for declaration of the sale deed executed by
| favou | r of Re |
|---|
as null and void, for execution of re-conveyance deed
in his favour and also for consequential reliefs. The
suit was valued at
3,03,967/- and the court fee was
th
28,797/-. The appellant paid 1/10 of the
valued at
court fee i.e.,
2880/- at the time of filing the
suit. The Court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara granted
injunction in favour of the appellant restraining the
respondents from carrying out new construction
activities including the parts of the plaint schedule
JUDGMENT
property until further orders.
6. The court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara heard the
application for extension of time sought by the
appellant for paying the balance court fee. However,
the application was rejected and the file was closed
by the learned sub Judge. The appellant then filed
Regular First Appeal No. 678 of 2011 along with an
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application for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal. The High Court dismissed the application for
condonation of delay on the ground that the delay in
| was not | expla |
|---|
and consequently, dismissed the Regular First Appeal
filed by the appellant. The High Court’s opinion
that the appellant has not given any ground for
delay in filing the Regular First Appeal is not
sustainable since the appellant has categorically
claimed that he was not aware of the rejection of
the suit of the appellant for delayed payment of
court fee by the learned sub Judge.
7. In the light of the facts and circumstances of
JUDGMENT
the case, the following points would arise for our
consideration:
1.Whether the learned sub Judge was justified
in rejecting the suit for non- payment of
court fee?
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2.Was the appellant entitled to condonation
of delay for non- payment of court fee by
the learned sub Judge?
| e Hig | h Cour |
|---|
rejecting the application for condonation
of delay filed by the appellant against the
decision of the learned sub judge who
rejected the suit of the appellant for non-
payment of court fee?
4.What Order?
Answer to Point no. 1
8. Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code
JUDGMENT
prescribes a discretionary power which empowers the
Court to allow a party to make up the deficiency of
court fee payable on plaint, appeals, applications,
review of judgment etc. This Section also empowers
the Court to retrospectively validate insufficiency
of stamp duties etc. It is also a usual practice
that the Court provides an opportunity to the party
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to pay court fee within a stipulated time on failure
of which the Court dismisses the appeal. In the
present case, the appellant filed an application for
| e for r | emittin |
|---|
fee which was rejected by the learned sub Judge. It
is the claim of the appellant that he was unable to
pay the requisite amount of court fee due to
financial difficulties. It is the usual practice of
the court to use this discretion in favour of the
litigating parties unless there are manifest grounds
of mala fide. The Court, while extending the time
for or exempting from the payment of court fee, must
ensure bona fide of such discretionary power.
JUDGMENT
Concealment of material fact while filing
application for extension of date for payment of
court fee can be a ground for dismissal. However, in
the present case, no opportunity was given by the
learned sub Judge for payment of court fee by the
appellant which he was unable to pay due to
financial constraints. Hence, the decision of the
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learned sub Judge is wrong and is liable to be set
aside and accordingly set aside.
Answer to Point no.2
9. In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar
1
Prasad Singh & Anr. , it was held that power to
condone the delay in approaching the Court has been
conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing the
cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the case
read as under:
“11. Power to condone the delay in
approaching the Court has been conferred
upon the Courts to enable them to do
substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on merits. This Court
in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
v. Mst. Katiji (1987)ILLJ 500 SC held that
the expression 'sufficient cause' employed
by the legislature in the Limitation Act
is adequately elastic to enable the Courts
to apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice-that
being the life purpose for the existence
of the institution of Courts. It was
further observed that a liberal approach
JUDGMENT
1
(2000) 9 SCC 94
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is adopted on principle as it is realised
that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand
to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result
in a meritorious matter being thrown
out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this
when delay is condoned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the
parties.
3. 'Every day's delay must be
explained' does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be made. Why
not every hour's delay, every second's
delay? The doctrine must be applied in
a rational common sense pragmatic
manner.
4. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot
claim to have vested right in injustice
being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
JUDGMENT
5. There is no presumption that delay
is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does
not stand to benefit by resorting to
delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power
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| to legalize injustice on technical<br>grounds but because it is capable of<br>removing injustice and is expected to<br>do so. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| XXX XXX XXX | |||
| 12. After referring to the various<br>judgments reported in New India Insurance<br>Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [1976] 2 SCR 266,<br>Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram (1918)ILR<br>45 P.C. 94, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal<br>Kumari [1969]1 SCR 1006, Concord of India<br>Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [1979]<br>118 ITR 507(SC), Lala Mata Din v. A.<br>Narayanan [1970] 2 SCR 90, State of<br>Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe 1981 (Supp)SCC 72,<br>Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982)3 SCC 366a,<br>O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh AIR 1984<br>SC 1744, Collector, Land Acquisition<br>v. Katiji (1987) ILLJ 500 SC, Prabha<br>v. Ram Parkash Kalra 1987 Supp(1)SCC 399,<br>G. Ramegowda, Major v. Sp. Land<br>Acquisition Officer [1988] 3 SCR 198,<br>Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society<br>Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 730,<br>Binod BiharJi USinDghG vM. EUniNonT of India AIR<br>1993 SC 1245, Shakambari & Co. v. Union of<br>India AIR 1992 SC 2090, Ram Kishan v. U.P.<br>SRTC 1994 Supp(2)SCC 507 and Warlu<br>v. Gangotribai AIR 1994 SC 466, this Court<br>in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani<br>2002(143) ELT 249(SC) held ; |
‘……The expression 'sufficient cause'
should, therefore, be considered with
pragmatism in justice-oriented process
approach rather than the technical
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| detention of sufficient case for<br>explaining every day's delay. The factors<br>which are peculiar to and characteristic<br>of the functioning of pragmatic approach<br>injustice oriented process. The Court<br>should decide the matters on merits unless<br>the case is hopelessly without merit. No<br>separate standards to determine the cause<br>laid by the State vis-a-vis private<br>litigant could be laid to prove strict<br>standards of sufficient cause. The<br>Government at appropriate level should<br>constitute legal cells to examine the<br>cases whether any legal principles are<br>involved for decision by the Courts or<br>whether cases require adjustment and<br>should authorize the officers to take a<br>decision to give appropriate permission<br>for settlement. In the event of decision<br>to file the appeal needed prompt action<br>should be pursued by the officer<br>responsible to file the appeal and he<br>should be made personally responsible for<br>lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot<br>be put on the same footing as an<br>individual. The individual would always be<br>JUDGMENT<br>quick in taking the decision whether he<br>would pursue the remedy by way of an<br>appeal or application since he is a person<br>legally injured while State is an<br>impersonal machinery working through its<br>officers or servants.’ | |
|---|---|
| To the same effect is the judgment of this<br>Court in Special Tehsildar, Land<br>Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma AIR<br>1996 SC 2750. | |
| 13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab<br>(1995)6 SCC 614 this Court under the |
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| peculiar circumstances of the case<br>condoned the delay in approaching this<br>Court of about 31 years. In N.<br>Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy<br>2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that<br>the purpose of Limitation Act was not to<br>destroy the rights. It is founded on<br>public policy fixing a life span for the<br>legal remedy for the general welfare. The<br>primary function of a Court is to<br>adjudicate disputes between the parties<br>and to advance substantial justice. The<br>time limit fixed for approaching the Court<br>in different situations is not because on<br>the expiry of such time a bad cause would<br>transform into a good cause. The object of<br>providing legal remedy is to repair the<br>damage caused by reason of legal injury.<br>If the explanation given does not smack<br>mala fides or is not shown to have been<br>put forth as a part of a dilatory<br>strategy, the Court must show utmost<br>consideration to the suitor. In this<br>context it was observed in 2008(228) ELT<br>162(SC) :<br>It is aJxiUomaDtiGc MthaEt NconTdonation of<br>delay is a matter of discretion of<br>the Court. Section 5 of the<br>Limitation Act does not say that<br>such discretion can be exercised<br>only if the delay is within a<br>certain limit. Length of delay is<br>no matter, acceptability of the<br>explanation is the only criterion.<br>Sometimes delay of the shortest<br>range may be uncontainable due to a<br>want of acceptable explanation<br>whereas in certain other cases,<br>delay of a very long range can be | peculiar circumstances of the case<br>condoned the delay in approaching this<br>Court of about 31 years. In N.<br>Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy<br>2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that<br>the purpose of Limitation Act was not to<br>destroy the rights. It is founded on<br>public policy fixing a life span for the<br>legal remedy for the general welfare. The<br>primary function of a Court is to<br>adjudicate disputes between the parties<br>and to advance substantial justice. The<br>time limit fixed for approaching the Court<br>in different situations is not because on<br>the expiry of such time a bad cause would<br>transform into a good cause. The object of<br>providing legal remedy is to repair the<br>damage caused by reason of legal injury.<br>If the explanation given does not smack<br>mala fides or is not shown to have been<br>put forth as a part of a dilatory<br>strategy, the Court must show utmost<br>consideration to the suitor. In this<br>context it was observed in 2008(228) ELT<br>162(SC) : | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| It is aJxiUomaDtiGc MthaEt NconTdonation of<br>delay is a matter of discretion of<br>the Court. Section 5 of the<br>Limitation Act does not say that<br>such discretion can be exercised<br>only if the delay is within a<br>certain limit. Length of delay is<br>no matter, acceptability of the<br>explanation is the only criterion.<br>Sometimes delay of the shortest<br>range may be uncontainable due to a<br>want of acceptable explanation<br>whereas in certain other cases,<br>delay of a very long range can be |
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condoned as the explanation thereof
is satisfactory. Once the Court
accepts the explanation as
sufficient, it is the result of
positive exercise of discretion and
normally the superior Court should
not disturb such finding, much less
in revisional jurisdiction, unless
the exercise of discretion was on
wholly untenable grounds or
arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
different matter when the first
Court refuses to condone the delay.
In such cases, the superior Court
would be free to consider the cause
shown for the delay afresh and it
is open to such superior Court to
come to its own finding even
untrammelled by the conclusion of
the lower Court.”
10. In the case in hand, it is clear from the
evidence on record that the appellant could not pay
JUDGMENT
court fee due to financial difficulty because of
which his suit got rejected. It is also pertinent to
note that the appellant had moved the Court claiming
his substantive right to his property. The appellant
faced with the situation like this, did not deserve
the dismissal of the original suit by the Court for
non- payment of court fee. He rather deserved more
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compassionate attention from the Court of sub Judge
in the light of the directive principle laid down in
Article 39A of the Constitution of India which is
| e to di | strict |
|---|
duty of the courts to see that justice is meted out
to people irrespective of their socio economic and
cultural rights or gender identity.
11. Further, Section 12(h) of the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987 provides that every person who
has to file or defend a case shall be entitled to
legal services under this Act if that person is:
“in receipt of annual income less than
rupees nine thousand or such other higher
amount as may be prescribed by the State
Government if the case is before a court
other than the Supreme Court, and less
than rupees twelve thousand or such other
higher amount as may be prescribed by the
Central Government, if the case is before
the Supreme Court”
JUDGMENT
Further, Section 12 of the Kerala State Legal
Services Authorities Rules, 1998 states that:
“12. Any person whose annual income from
all sources does not exceed Rupees Twelve
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Thousand shall be entitled to legal
services under clause (h) of Section 12 of
the Act”.
Therefore, subject to the submission of an
affidavit of his income, the court fee of the
appellant could have been waivered or provided by
the District Legal Services Authority, instead of
rejection of the suit.
12. Further, in the case of State of Maharashtra V.
2
Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and Others , it has been held
that :
| “ | 17. …… we have to consider the combined | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| effect of Article 21 and Article 39A | of the | ||||||||
| Constitution of India. The right to free | |||||||||
| JUDGMENT<br>legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed | |||||||||
| fundamental rights under | Article 21 | of the | |||||||
| Constitution. The preamble to the | |||||||||
| Constitution of India assures 'justice, | |||||||||
| social, economic and political'. | Article | ||||||||
| 39A | of the Constitution provides 'equal | ||||||||
| justice' and 'free legal aid'. The State | |||||||||
| shall secure that the operation of the | |||||||||
| legal system promotes justice. It means | |||||||||
| justice according to law. In a democratic | |||||||||
| polity, governed by rule of law, it should | |||||||||
| be the main concern of the State, to have a | |||||||||
| proper legal system | . Article 39A | mandates |
| 2 | (1995) 5 SCC 730 |
|---|
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| that the State shall provide free legal aid | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| by | suitable legislation or schemes or in | |||||
| any other way to ensure that opportunities | ||||||
| for securing justice are not denied to any | ||||||
| citizen by reason of economic or other | ||||||
| disabilities. | The principles contained | |||||
| in | Article 39A | are fundamental and cast a | ||||
| duty on the State to secure that the | ||||||
| operation of the legal system promotes | ||||||
| justice, on the basis of equal | ||||||
| opportunities and further mandates to | ||||||
| provide free legal aid in any way-by | ||||||
| legislation or otherwise, so that justice | ||||||
| is not denied to any citizen by reason of | ||||||
| economic or other disabilities. The crucial | ||||||
| words are (the obligation of the State)<br>to provide free legal aid 'by suitable | ||||||
| legislation or by sc<br>way', so that oppor | hemes' of 'in any other<br>tunities for securing | |||||
| justice are not den | ied to any citizen by | |||||
| reason of economic | ||||||
| (Emphasis supplied)… |
13. Further, Article 39A of the Constitution of
JUDGMENT
India provides for holistic approach in imparting
justice to the litigating parties. It not only
includes providing free legal aid via appointment of
counsel for the litigants, but also includes
ensuring that justice is not denied to litigating
parties due to financial difficulties. Therefore, in
the light of the legal principle laid down by this
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Court, the appellant deserved waiver of court fee so
that he could contest his claim on merit which
involved his substantive right. The Court of sub
Judge erred in rejecting the case of the appellant
due to non- payment of court fee. Hence, we set
aside the findings and the decision of the Court of
sub Judge and condone the delay of the appellant in
non-payment of court fee which resulted in rejection
of his suit.
Answer to Point no. 3
14. Having answered Point nos. 1 and 2 in favour of
the appellant, we are inclined to answer point no. 3
JUDGMENT
as well in his favour.
In the case of Muneesh Devi v. U.P. Power
3
Corporation Ltd. and Ors . , it was held as under:
| “ | 15. In the application filed by her for |
|---|---|
| condonation of delay, the Appellant made | |
| copious references to the civil suit, the | |
| writ petition and the special leave |
3
2013 (9) SCALE 640
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| petition filed by her and the fact that | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the complaint filed by her was admitted | ||||||
| after considering the issue of limitation. | ||||||
| She also pleaded that the cause for | ||||||
| claiming compensation was continuing. The | ||||||
| National Commission completely ignored the | ||||||
| fact that the Appellant is not well | ||||||
| educated and she had throughout relied | ||||||
| upon the legal advice tendered to her. She | ||||||
| first filed civil suit which, as mentioned | ||||||
| above, was dismissed due to non payment of | ||||||
| deficient court fees. She then filed writ | ||||||
| petition before the High Court and special | ||||||
| leave petition before this Court for issue | ||||||
| of a mandamus to the Respondents to pay | ||||||
| the amount of compensation, but did not<br>succeed. It can reasonably be presumed | ||||||
| that substantial t<br>availing these reme | ime was consumed in<br>dies. It was neither | |||||
| the pleaded case of | Respondent No. 1 nor | |||||
| any material was | produced before the | |||||
| National Commission | to show that in | |||||
| pursuing remedies before the judicial | ||||||
| forums, the Appellant had not acted bona | ||||||
| fide. Therefore, it was an eminently fit | ||||||
| case for exercise of power under | ||||||
| Section | JU<br>24-A(2) | DGMENT<br>of the Act. Unfortunately, | ||||
| the National Commission rejected the | ||||||
| Appellant's prayer for condonation of | ||||||
| delay on a totally flimsy ground that she | ||||||
| had not been able to substantiate the | ||||||
| assertion about her having made | ||||||
| representation to the Respondents for | ||||||
| grant of compensatio | n.” |
15. In the case in hand, the High Court, vide its
impugned judgment dated 21.03.2012 held that the
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appellant has not provided sufficient grounds for
delay in filing the appeal. This decision of the
High Court is unsustainable in law. The appellant
| y stat | ed tha |
|---|
advocate’s office at Neyyattinkara on 24.05.2011 to
enquire about the status of the suit. His advocate
informed him that the learned sub Judge has rejected
the suit on 11.8.2008 for non-payment of balance
court fee. The advocate claimed that he has informed
the same to the appellant through a postal card but
the appellant claims that the same has not reached
him and he was under the impression that his
application for extension of time for payment of
JUDGMENT
court fee will be allowed by the learned sub Judge.
He further claimed that he had applied for
procurement of the certified copy of the decision of
the learned sub Judge on the same day.
16. The learned senior counsel Mr. K.P. Kylasantha
Pillay, appearing on behalf of the respondents
alleged that the appeal of the appellant before this
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court is based on wrong and frivolous grounds. The
material produced by them in support of their
contention is totally based on the merit of the
| are not | decidi |
|---|
case, the material produced by the respondents in
support of their contention becomes irrelevant. We
have condoned the delay in paying the court fee by
the appellant while answering point nos. 1 and 2. We
see no reason in rejecting the application filed by
the appellant for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal before the High Court as well.
17. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court is not sustainable
JUDGMENT
and is liable to be set aside as per the principle
laid down by this Court in as much the High Court
erred in rejecting the application for condonation
of delay filed by the appellant. We accordingly,
condone the delay in filing the appeal in the High
Court as well.
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Answer to Point no. 4
18. In view of the reasons assigned while answering
| d 3 in<br>passed | favour<br>by th |
|---|
aside and the application filed by the appellant for
condonation of delay is allowed. Therefore, we allow
the appeal by setting aside the judgments and decree
of both the trial court and the High Court and
remand the case back to the trial court for payment
of court fee within 8 weeks. If for any reason, it
is not possible for the appellant to pay the court
fee, in such event, he is at liberty to approach the
jurisdictional district legal service authority and
JUDGMENT
Taluk Legal Services Committee seeking for grant of
legal aid for sanction of court fee amount payable
on the suit before the trial court. If such
application is filed, the same shall be considered
by such committee and the same shall be facilitated
to the appellant to get the right of the appellant
adjudicated by the trial court by securing equal
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justice as provided under Article 39A of the
Constitution of India read with the provision of
Section 12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act
| tion of | Keral |
|---|
direct the trial court to adjudicate on the rights
of the parties on merit and dispose of the matter as
expeditiously as possible.
19. The appeal is allowed in terms of the
observations and directions given as above to the
trial court. There will be no order as to costs.
………………………………………………………………………J.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
JUDGMENT
………………………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
New Delhi,
November 25, 2013
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