S Mohan vs. Secretary To The Chancellor, Puducherry Technological University

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 30-01-2026

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Full Judgment Text

2026 INSC 100
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 54-55 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C.) No. 4593-4594 of 2024)



DR. S. MOHAN ….APPELLANT(S)


VERSUS


THE SECRETARY TO THE
CHANCELLOR, PUDUCHERRY
TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY,
PUDUCHERRY & ORS ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.

1. Heard.
1
2. The appellant, Dr. S. Mohan , has approached
this Court by way of the instant appeals with special
leave, under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RASHI GUPTA
Date: 2026.01.30
17:01:52 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant”.
1


2
1950 , for assailing the common judgment and order
th
dated 19 December, 2023, passed by the High Court
3
of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition Nos. 28147
of 2022 and 4174 of 2023, whereby the High Court
allowed the two separate writ petitions filed by the
Petitioners therein, i.e. , respondent No. 2 in Civil
Appeal No. 54 of 2025 and respondent No. 1 in Civil
Appeal No. 55 of 2025, and set aside the appointment
of the appellant as the Vice-Chancellor of the
4
Puducherry Technological University . However, the
High Court, in order to avoid a vacuum, permitted the
appellant to continue in office until a duly selected
incumbent assumes charge in accordance with law
th
or until 30 June, 2024, whichever was earlier. The
th
said common judgment and order dated 19

2
Hereinafter, referred to as “Constitution”.
3
Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
4
Hereinafter, referred to as “the University”.
2


December, 2023, is the subject matter of challenge in
these appeals by special leave.
3. While entertaining the special leave petitions,
th
this Court vide order dated 26 February, 2024
issued notice and stayed the operation of the
th
impugned judgment and order dated 19 December,
2023 and as a consequence, the appellant continues
to hold the post of the Vice-Chancellor. His tenure of
five years ends in December, 2026.
BRIEF FACTS
4. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and
essential for disposal of these appeals are noted
hereinbelow.
5. The Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory
of Puducherry, in exercise of its legislative powers
under Article 246 read with Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution, enacted the Puducherry Technological
3


5
University Act, 2019 , which received the assent of
st
the Hon’ble President on 31 March, 2020, thereby
establishing the Puducherry Technological University
under Section 3 of the PTU Act.
6. According to Section 14 of the PTU Act, the Vice-
Chancellor shall be a whole-time officer of the
University and shall be a person of academic
eminence, competence, integrity, moral standing,
and institutional commitment, to be appointed in
accordance with the qualifications and norms
prescribed in the Statutes. The appointment shall be
made from a panel of three names recommended by
the Search-cum-Selection Committee constituted
under Section 14(5), and such panel shall not include
the name of any member of the said Committee. The
identification of candidates for inclusion in the panel
shall be carried out by the Search-cum-Selection

5
Hereinafter, referred to as “PTU Act”.
4


Committee through a public notification, or by
nomination, or through a talent-search process, or by
a combination thereof. The members of the Search-
cum-Selection Committee shall be persons of
eminence in the fields of Engineering, Technology,
Management, and Advanced Sciences, and shall not,
in any manner, be connected with the University.
7. Section 14(5) of the PTU Act lays down the
composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee
referred to above, and the same is reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:
“(5) For the purpose of sub-section (2), the
Search Committee shall consist of following
members to recommend the names for the
appointment as Vice-Chancellor, namely:-
(a) A nominee of the Chancellor, who shall
be a person of eminence in the field of
Engineering/Technology, not below the
rank of Vice-Chancellor/Professor
…Convener
(b) A nominee of the Government
…Member
(c) A nominee of Board
of the Governors …Member
For the appointment of First Vice-
Chancellor, Secretary to Government
(Higher and Technical Education),
5


Government of Puducherry shall be the
member in place of the nominee of Board of
the Governors.”

8. In accordance with the above statutory
mandate, a Search-cum-Selection Committee was
duly constituted under Section 14(5) of the PTU Act
by the Hon’ble Lieutenant Governor of Puducherry for
the purpose of selection of the Vice-Chancellor of the
th
University, vide G.O.M. No. 3 dated 20 January,
2021. The Committee comprised of Prof. V. Ramgopal
Rao, Director, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi,
as the Convenor, while Dr. V. Jagadeesh Kumar,
Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering,
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, and the
Secretary to Government (Higher & Technical
Education), Government of Puducherry, were
nominated as Members.
9. Pursuant to its constitution, the aforesaid
Search-cum-Selection Committee issued a public
6


nd
advertisement on 22 February, 2021, inviting
applications and nominations from distinguished
academicians in the field of Engineering and
Technology possessing the highest level of
competence, integrity, moral stature and
institutional commitment for appointment to the post
of Vice-Chancellor of the University.
10. In response to the said advertisement, several
applications and nominations were received from
eminent academicians. After conducting a
comprehensive and objective assessment, the
Search-cum-Selection Committee finalized a panel of
eligible candidates and submitted its
recommendations to the Hon’ble Lieutenant
Governor for consideration.
11. Acting upon the recommendations of the duly
constituted Search-cum-Selection Committee, the
Hon’ble Lieutenant Governor of the Puducherry
7


appointed the appellant, Dr. S. Mohan, as the first
Vice-Chancellor of the University vide order dated
th
17 December, 2021. The appointment was made for
a tenure of five years from the date on which Dr.
Mohan entered upon office, or until he attained the
age of 70 years, whichever is earlier, in strict
conformity with the mandate of the PTU Act and the
statutory framework governing such appointments.
12. Aggrieved with the appointment of the appellant
as the Vice-Chancellor of the University, respondent
No. 2–Palaniappa instituted Writ Petition No. 28147
of 2022 before the High Court seeking to challenge
the appellant’s appointment as the Vice-Chancellor.
In parallel, respondent No. 1–Mourouga Pragash filed
Writ Petition No. 4174 of 2023, laying a broader
challenge to the statutory framework itself, assailing
Section 14(5) and its proviso as unconstitutional,
void, and non-est . Both the writ petitions, though
8


distinct in form, effectively sought to challenge the
duly concluded selection process and the
appointment made pursuant thereto of the appellant
as the Vice-Chancellor of the University.
13. It was contended before the High Court that the
constitution of the Search-cum-Selection Committee
st
for the appointment of the 1 Vice-Chancellor of the
University was not in conformity with Regulation 7.3
of the UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications
for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic
Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for
the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education,
6
2018 , as it did not include a nominee of the
Chairman, UGC. It was further urged that the
inclusion of the Secretary (Higher & Technical
Education), Government of Puducherry, in the
Search-cum-Selection Committee contravened the

6
Hereinafter, referred to as “UGC Regulations, 2018”.
9


same Regulation, since he was connected with the
University in the capacity of Pro-Chancellor and had
earlier served as a member of the Governing Body of
the erstwhile Puducherry Engineering College,
thereby giving rise to a conflict of interest. The said
Regulation 7.3 is reproduced herein below for ready
reference:-
“7.3. VICE CHANCELLOR:
i. A person possessing the highest level of
competence, integrity, morals and
institutional commitment is to be appointed
as Vice-Chancellor. The person to be
appointed as a Vice-Chancellor should be a
distinguished academician, with a
minimum of ten years' of experience as
Professor in a University or ten years' of
experience in a reputed research and I or
academic administrative organisation with
proof of having demonstrated academic
leadership.
ii. The selection for the post of Vice-Chancellor
should be through proper identification by
a Panel of 3-5 persons by a Search-cum-
Selection-Committee, through a public
notification or nomination or a talent
search process or a combination thereof.
The members of such Search-cum-
Selection Committee shall be persons' of
eminence in the sphere of higher education
and shall not be connected in any manner
with the University concerned or its
colleges. While preparing the panel, the
10


Search cum-Selection Committee shall give
proper weightage to the academic
excellence, exposure to the higher
education system in the country and
abroad, and adequate experience in
academic and administrative governance,
to be given in writing along with the panel
to be submitted to the Visitor/Chancellor.
One member of the Search cum- Selection
Committee shall be nominated by the
Chairman, University Grants Commission,
for selection of Vice Chancellors of State,
Private and Deemed to be Universities.

iii. The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the
Vice Chancellor out of the Panel of names
recommended by the Search-cum-Selection
Committee.
iv. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor
shall form part of the service period of the
incumbent making him/her eligible for all
service related benefits.”

14. The High Court, while considering the
contentions regarding the constitution of the Search-
cum-Selection Committee, traversed into the broader
issue of the vires of Section 14(5) of the PTU Act. It
examined the question of Presidential assent under
Article 254(2) of the Constitution and observed that
as provided under Article 254(2), where a State
legislation is inconsistent with a Central legislation in
a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, it can
11


only prevail if it has been reserved for consideration
of the Hon’ble President and has received such
assent. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the
Kaiser-I-Hind
Constitution Bench of this Court in
Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. National Textile
7
Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Others ,
which held that such assent requires conscious
consideration of the repugnancy and express
approval by the Hon’ble President. Viewed from this
perspective, the High Court found that the
Government of Puducherry had not produced any
material to demonstrate that the Hon’ble President’s
assent had been obtained for Section 14(5) of the PTU
Act, particularly with context to its inconsistency
with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018,
which mandates inclusion of a nominee of the
Chairman, University Grants Commission in the

7
(2002) 8 SCC 182.
12


Search-cum-Selection Committee for appointment of
the Vice-Chancellor.
15. Relying on the pronouncements in Dr. Preeti
8 9
Srivastava v. State of M.P. Praneeth K. v. UGC
, ,
10
and Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat ,
the High Court concluded that any action or decision
by a University inconsistent with the binding
provisions of the UGC Regulations is legally
untenable and invalid to the extent of such
inconsistency.
16. After applying the ratio of above judicial
pronouncements, the High Court struck down
Section 14(5) of the PTU Act as being ultra vires the
UGC Regulations, 2018 and consequently invalidated
the appointment of the appellant as Vice-Chancellor
of the University. Nonetheless, to ensure continuity

8
(1999) 7 SCC 120.
9
(2021) 14 SCC 241.
10
(2022) 5 SCC 179.
13


of administration and prevent a leadership vacuum,
the High Court allowed the appellant to remain in
office until a duly appointed successor assumed
th
charge in accordance with law, or until 30 June,
2024, whichever occurs earlier.
th
17. The said judgment and order dated 19
December, 2023 passed by the High Court is the
subject matter of challenge in these appeals by
special leave.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
18. Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant, vehemently and fervently
contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to
the settled principles of statutory interpretation and
inconsistent with the factual situation obtaining from
record.
19. To buttress the above contentions, learned
senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that
14


reliance placed by the High Court upon Kaiser-i-
Hind (supra) is fundamentally flawed. It was argued
that where the Hon’ble President accords general
assent, such assent operates for all purposes, and
validates the State legislation in its entirety. It is only
where the Hon’ble President grants specific or limited
assent, expressly confined to a particular provision or
subject matter, that the operation of the assent
becomes correspondingly restricted.
20. It was submitted that in the present case, it is
nobody’s case that the assent obtained for the State
legislation was a limited or qualified assent. The
assent of the Hon’ble President to the PTU Act is a
general assent, and therefore attracts the principles
laid down by the Constitution Bench in Rajiv Sarin
11
& Another v. State of Uttarakhand & Others ,
which squarely governs the issue.

11
(2011) 8 SCC 708.
15


21. It was further submitted that the respondents’
argument, that any deviation from the UGC
Regulations, 2018 would make the statute ultra vires
ipso facto is misplaced, inasmuch as the UGC
Regulations, 2018, even if traceable to Entry 66 of
List I, cannot extend beyond the prescription of
standards in higher education. Learned senior
counsel submitted that the Constitution Bench
12
decisions in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore ,
13
Modern Dental College v. State of M.P. and T.N.
14
Medical Officers’ Association v. Union of India ,
have consistently held that Entry 66 of List I is
confined to prescribing standards in higher
education and does not extend to administrative or
governance matters of universities, which fall under
Entry 25 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the

12
(1964) 6 SCR 368.
13
(2016) 7 SCC 353.
14
(2021) 6 SCC 568.
16


Constitution. The said rulings clearly establish that
the composition of a Search-cum-Selection
Committee to select a Vice-Chancellor is not a
standard under Entry 66 of List I.
22. It was further submitted that the reliance
placed by the High Court upon Gambhirdhan
(supra) , is unfounded as the said judgment deals with
entirely different set of facts. The Vice-Chancellor
appointed in the said case did not satisfy the
mandatory eligibility criteria under the UGC
Regulations, 2010, and the Search-cum-Selection
Committee itself had diluted the University Grants
15
Commission mandated qualifications. Further, the
University in that case was receiving substantial
Central financial assistance; had adopted the UGC
Scheme; and the Search-cum-Selection Committee
was not constituted as per the relevant UGC

15
Hereinafter, referred to as “UGC”.
17


Regulations. Most significantly, Gambhirdhan
(supra) was decided not on the basis of Entry 66 of
List I, but squarely on principles of repugnancy
under Article 254 of the Constitution, in a situation
where no Presidential assent existed at all. In
contrast, the present case involves an enactment
protected by Presidential assent under Article 254(2)
of the Constitution, coupled with the admitted
position that the University has neither adopted the
UGC Regulations, 2018 nor receives UGC grants.
23. It was submitted that in the present case, there
is no dispute regarding the appellant’s qualifications
and credentials. There is no allegation regarding
integrity of the appellant or regarding the
performance of duties as a Vice-Chancellor pursuant
to the selection in the year 2021. It was thus
submitted that even if this Court were to affirm the
judgment of the High Court, this is a fit case wherein
18


the appellant should be allowed to complete his
tenure as the Vice-Chancellor which is coming to an
end in December, 2026.
24.
On these grounds, learned counsel for the
appellant, implored the Court to set aside the
impugned judgment and allow the appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
25. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondents
opposed the submissions of the appellant and argued
that the legislative field in respect of coordination and
determination of standards in higher education is
exclusively occupied by the Parliament under Entry
66 of List I. Since Parliament has exercised this power
through the enactment of the University Grants
16
Commission Act, 1956 , the Legislature of the Union
Territory stood denuded of competence to legislate on
any matter covered by Entry 66 of List I. It was

16
Hereinafter, referred to as “UGC Act”.
19


submitted that, in such a situation, the PTU Act is
ultra vires , not only on the ground of repugnancy
under Article 254, but also because the Legislature of
Union Territory lacked the legislative competence to
enact it in the first place.
26. It was further submitted that Entry 66 of List I
cannot be construed in the narrow and restrictive
manner as argued by the appellant. Reliance was
placed on Gujarat University, Ahmedabad v.
17
Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar , wherein a six-
Judge Bench of this Court held beyond the pale of
doubt that the power under Entry 66 of List I extends
not merely to evaluating standards but also to
preventing and removing disparities in such
standards. The Court emphasised that the power of
coordination necessarily includes the power to take
all steps required to ensure uniformity and prevent

17
1962 SCC OnLine SC 146.
20


any impediment to national educational standards.
The Constitution Bench described this power as
absolute and unconditional, warranting full effect
according to its plain terms.
27. It was further submitted that this Court in
18
University of Delhi v. Raj Singh , has provided
that norms for the appointment of Lecturers in a
University fall within the ambit of Entry 66 of List I of
the Constitution. The said rationale applies a fortiori
to the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, as the
standards and norms prescribed by the UGC for such
appointment directly determine the standards of
education in a university, an institution of higher
education or research.
28. Lastly, it was argued that even assuming,
arguendo , that the power to frame regulations
regarding the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor is

18
1994 Supp. (3) SCC 516.
21


traceable to Entry 25 of List III, the PTU Act remains
invalid. The Presidential assent to the PTU Act was
granted without reference to the purpose for which it
was sought, unlike the general assent under Article
254 considered in Gram Panchayat, Jamalpur v.
19
Malwinder Singh , as relied upon in Rajiv Sarin
(supra), which is effective for all purposes. In the
present case, the assent was not under Article 254 at
all, and therefore, the reasoning in Rajiv Sarin
(supra) does not assist the appellant.
29. Learned counsel appearing for the UGC
submitted that the UGC Regulations are mandatory
in nature and have statutory force. It was contended
that the said Regulations cannot be diluted,
disregarded or overlooked at any stage of the process
of appointment, and that all Universities, whether

19
(1985) 3 SCC 661.
22


Central or State, are bound to act in strict conformity
with the same.
30. In light of the submissions made hereinabove,
learned counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned judgment and urged that the appeals be
dismissed as devoid of merit.
ANALYSIS
31. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have
gone through the impugned judgment and the
statutory provisions and the other material placed on
record.
32. The case of the writ petitioners before the High
Court was that, although the procedure prescribed
under the PTU Act for constituting the Search-cum-
Selection Committee for appointment of the Vice-
Chancellor of the University may have been followed
but the same was not in accordance with the UGC
23


Regulations, 2018. The relevant extracts from the
discussion made by the High Court for declaring
Section 14(5) of the PTU Act ultra vires on the ground
of being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC
Regulations, 2018 and thereby quashing and setting
aside the appointment of the appellant are as below:-
“10. Though elaborate submissions have been
made by both sides on repugnancy in terms of
Article 254 of the Constitution arising out of
inconsistency of Section 14(5) of the PT Act with
Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, in
view of the legal position having been settled by
the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Dr.Preeti Srivastava -vs- State
of M.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 120], it would not be
necessary to delve into it, except to notice the
relevant passage from that ruling, which reads
as follows:-
“35. The legislative competence of
Parliament and the legislatures of the
States to make laws under Article 246
is regulated by the VIIth Schedule to
the Constitution. In the VIIth Schedule
as originally in force, Entry 11 of List II
gave to the State an exclusive power to
legislate on “education including
universities, subject to the provisions
of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I
and Entry 25 of List III”.

Entry 11 of List II was deleted and Entry 25 of
List III was amended with effect from 3-1-1976
as a result of the Constitution 42nd Amendment
24


Act of 1976. The present Entry 25 in the
Concurrent List is as follows:
“25. Education, including technical
education, medical education and
universities, subject to the provisions
of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I;
vocational and technical training of
labour.”
Entry 25 is subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List
I. Entry 66 of List I is as follows:

“66. Coordination and determination of
standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific
and technical institutions.”

Both the Union as well as the States have the
power to legislate on education including
medical education, subject, inter alia, to
Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying
down standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and
technical institutions as also coordination of
such standards. A State has, therefore, the
right to control education including medical
education so long as the field is not occupied
by any Union legislation. Secondly, the State
cannot, while controlling education in the
State, impinge on standards in institutions
for higher education. Because this is
exclusively within the purview of the Union
Government. Therefore, while prescribing the
criteria for admission to the institutions for
higher education including higher medical
education, the State cannot adversely affect
the standards laid down by the Union of India
under Entry 66 of List I. Secondly, while
considering the cases on the subject it is also
necessary to remember that from 1977,
education, including, inter alia, medical and
university education, is now in the Concurrent
25


List so that the Union can legislate on admission
criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be
able to legislate in this field, except as provided
in Article 254.

It would be beneficial here to extract Article 254
of the Constitution, which reads as follows:-

“254. Inconsistency between laws
made by Parliament and laws made by
the Legislatures of States.— (1) If any
provision of a law made by the
Legislature of a State is repugnant to
any provision of a law made by
Parliament which Parliament is
competent to enact, or to any provision
of an existing law with respect to one of
the matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List, then, subject to the
provisions of clause (2), the law made
by Parliament, whether passed before
or after the law made by the Legislature
of such State, or, as the case may be,
the existing law, shall prevail and the
law made by the Legislature of the
State shall, to the extent of the
repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the
Legislature of a State with respect to
one of the matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List contains any provision
repugnant to the provisions of an
earlier law made by Parliament or an
existing law with respect to that
matter, then, the law so made by the
Legislature of such State shall, if it has
been reserved for the consideration of
the President and has received his
assent, prevail in that State:

26


Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent
Parliament from enacting at any time any law
with respect to the same matter including a law
adding to, amending, varying or repealing the
law so made by the Legislature of the State.

The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. -vs-
National Textile Corporation [(2002) 8 SCC 182]
has authoritatively explicated the law in that
regard as follows:-

“65. ....
2. (a) Article 254(2) contemplates
“reservation for consideration of the
President” and also “assent”.
Reservation for consideration is not an
empty formality. Pointed attention of
the President is required to be drawn
to the repugnancy between the earlier
law made by Parliament and the
contemplated State legislation and the
reasons for having such law despite the
enactment by Parliament.
(b) The word “assent” used in clause (2)
of Article 254 would in context mean
express agreement of mind to what is
proposed by the State.
(c) In case where it is not indicated that
“assent” is qua a particular law made
by Parliament, then it is open to the
Court to call for the proposals made by
the State for the consideration of the
President before obtaining assent.”

Viewed from this perspective, the Government of
Puducherry has not placed any material before
the Court to show that the assent of the
President has been obtained for the PTU Act with
specific reference to the inconsistency of Section
14(5) of the PTU Act with Regulation 7.3 of the
27


UGC Regulations, 2018 that requires a nominee
of the Chairman of the UGC to constitute the
'Search Committee' for the appointment of the
Vice-Chancellor of PT University.
[Emphasis supplied]
33. A plain reading of the aforesaid extract shows
that the High Court held that both the Union as well
as the States possess the power to legislate on subject
of education, however, the State’s competence to
regulate on matters relating to education, including
medical and university education, is restricted to the
fields not occupied by the Union legislation.
Furthermore, the State cannot, while exercising
control over education within its jurisdiction, impinge
upon the standards prescribed for institutions of
higher education, which remain exclusively within
the competence of the Union.
34. The High Court further held that, while
prescribing the criterion for admission to the
institutions of higher education, the State cannot
28


adversely affect the standards laid down by the
Union, in exercise of its legislative power under Entry
66 in List I. Furthermore, since the year 1977,
medical and university education have been included
in the Concurrent List and hence, the Union can
legislate on admission criterion also. In such a
scenario, the State is precluded from enacting
legislation in this field except in accordance with
Article 254, which governs repugnancy between
Union and State laws.
35. Moreover, while referring to Article 254, the
High Court observed that the Government of
Puducherry did not place any material before the
Court to show that assent of the Hon’ble President
had been obtained for the PTU Act with specific
reference to the inconsistency between Section 14(5)
of the PTU Act and Regulation 7.3 of the UGC
Regulations, 2018, which unequivocally requires that
29


one of the members of the Search-cum-Selection
Committee for appointment of Vice-Chancellor must
be a nominee of the Chairman, UGC.
36.
Before proceeding to examine the merits of the
controversy raised in the present appeals, it is
necessary and appropriate to advert to the
constitutional scheme governing the distribution of
legislative powers under Article 246 of the
Constitution, since the determination of the source,
extent, and limits of legislative competence
constitutes the essential backdrop against which the
validity of the appointment of the appellant as the
Vice-Chancellor must be assessed.
37. The scheme of legislative distribution under the
Constitution is delineated in Article 246 read with the
Seventh Schedule. Parliament is vested with the
power to legislate on matters enumerated in List I of
the Seventh Schedule, whereas the State Legislatures
30


are competent to enact laws on subjects falling within
List II. In respect of matters placed in List III,
legislative competence is shared by both Parliament
and the State Legislatures, subject to the
constitutional mechanism governing overlap and
inconsistency. The controversy involved in the
present appeals, according to the appellant, relates
to a subject traceable to Entry 25 of List III, which
therefore assumes relevance for its proper
determination and is reproduced hereinbelow for
ready reference:-
“25. Education, including technical education,
medical education and universities, subject to
the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of
List I ; vocational and technical training of
labour” [Emphasis Supplied]

38. A plain reading of Entry 25 of List III indicates
that while the State Legislature is competent to enact
laws on the subject of education, such legislative
power is expressly circumscribed by Entries 63 to 66
31


of List I, and in particular, Entry 66 thereof, which
confers exclusive authority upon the Parliament to
legislate with respect to the coordination and
determination of standards in institutions for higher
education. The said Entry reads as below: -
“66. Co-ordination and determination of
standards in institutions for higher education or
research and scientific and technical
institutions.”

20
39. As noted above , this Court in Dr. Preeti
Srivastava (Supra) held that both the Union and the
States have legislative competence over education,
including medical education, subject to Entry 66 of
List I, which exclusively vests Parliament with the
power to determine standards in higher education.
While the State may regulate education so long as the
field is unoccupied, it cannot, in doing so, impinge

20
Supra paragraph No. 28.
32


upon or dilute the standards prescribed by the Union
under Entry 66 of List I.
40. The UGC Regulations, 2018 trace their source
to Entry 66 of List I, inasmuch as the said
Regulations have been framed by the UGC in exercise
of the powers conferred under Section 26(1)(e) and
26(1)(g) read with Section 14 of the UGC Act, which
itself has been enacted by the Parliament in exercise
of its exclusive legislative competence under Entry 66
of List I of the Constitution.
41. On that anvil, the PTU Act was required to
operate in strict conformity with Regulation 7.3 of the
UGC Regulations, 2018, which lays down a
mandatory framework for appointment of a Vice-
Chancellor and, inter alia , stipulates that the Search-
cum-Selection Committee must necessarily include
one nominee of the Chairman, UGC. The inclusion of
a UGC nominee being an integral component of the
33


standards prescribed for appointments in higher
education, any deviation therefrom strikes at the root
of the scheme envisaged under the Regulations. In
the present case, it is undisputed that the Search-
cum-Selection Committee was constituted without
the inclusion of the nominee of the Chairman, UGC,
in clear disregard of Regulation 7.3 of the UGC
Regulations, 2018. Consequently, Section 14(5) of
the PTU Act, to the extent it prescribes a composition
of the Search-cum-Selection Committee contrary to
the mandate of the UGC Regulations, 2018, has to be
declared ultra vires the UGC Regulations, 2018,
which have been framed under a Central enactment
traceable to Entry 66 of List I, which occupies the
field and therefore, possess overriding effect.
42. Moreover, Regulation 7.3(ii) of the UGC
Regulations, 2018 mandates that members of the
Search-cum-Selection Committee shall not be
34


connected in any manner with the concerned
University or its affiliated colleges. However, proviso
to Section 14(5) of the PTU Act includes the Secretary
to the Government (Higher & Technical Education) as
a member of the Search-cum-Selection Committee for
st
appointment of the 1 Vice-Chancellor. The Secretary
to the Government (Higher & Technical Education) in
the capacity of Pro-Chancellor and as a former
member of the Governing Body of the erstwhile
Puducherry Engineering College, stands directly
connected with the University, thereby giving rise to
a clear conflict of interest and placing the said
provision in direct contravention of the UGC
Regulations, 2018.
43. The aforesaid deviations from the mandatory
requirements of the UGC Regulations, 2018 not only
vitiate the constitution of the Search-cum-Selection
Committee but also strike at the statutory framework
35


governing appointments to the office of Vice-
Chancellor, thereby rendering such appointments
legally vulnerable.
44.
As also noted by the High Court, this Court in
Gambhirdan (supra) , while setting aside the
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of Sardar Patel
University, held that the UGC Regulations, being
subordinate legislation framed under the UGC Act
and laid before Parliament as statutorily mandated,
form an integral part of the Central enactment and
that any appointment made in derogation thereof
amounts to a violation of statutory provisions and is
consequently unsustainable in law, warranting
judicial interference. This Court held as follows in
Gambhirdan (Supra) :-
“49. Therefore, when the appointment of
Respondent 4 is found to be contrary to the UGC
Regulations, 2018 and the UGC Regulations are
having the statutory force, we are of the opinion
that this is a fit case to issue a writ of quo
warranto and to quash and set aside the
36


appointment of Respondent 4 as the Vice-
Chancellor of the SP University.
50. It cannot be disputed that the UGC
Regulations are enacted by the UGC in exercise
of powers under Sections 26(1)(e) and 26(1)(g) of
the UGC Act, 1956. Even as per the UGC Act
every rule and regulation made under the said
Act, shall be laid before each House of
Parliament. Therefore, being a subordinate
legislation, UGC Regulations becomes part of the
Act. In case of any conflict between the State
legislation and the Central legislation, Central
legislation shall prevail by applying the
rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in
Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject
“education” is in the Concurrent List (List III) of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Therefore, any appointment as a Vice-Chancellor
contrary to the provisions of the UGC
Regulations can be said to be in violation of the
statutory provisions, warranting a writ of quo
warranto.”

45. The legislative provisions under consideration
trace their source to different entries in the Seventh
Schedule, with the UGC Act and the UGC
Regulations, 2018 framed thereunder being referable
to Entry 66 of List I, while the PTU Act is traceable to
Entry 25 of List III. The two enactments, therefore, do
not operate within the same legislative field, but are
37


founded on distinct heads of legislative competence
allocated under the Constitution of India.
46. In that view of the matter, the factual matrix
does not give rise to any occasion to examine the
issue of repugnancy under Article 254 of the
Constitution of India, since the doctrine of
repugnancy and the concomitant requirement of
Presidential assent are attracted only where both the
Central and State legislations operate within the
Concurrent List. Undeniably, in the present case, the
Central legislation occupies a field exclusively
reserved for the Parliament under List I, and
consequently the question of testing or determining
repugnancy, or of curing the same by recourse to
Article 254(2), does not arise at all.
47. This Court in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
21
v. State of Bihar , categorically ruled that the

21
(1983) 4 SCC 45.
38


doctrine of repugnancy and provision of Article 254
of the Constitution are attracted only when both
legislations operate within the Concurrent List. The
Court observed as follows:
69. We fail to comprehend the basis for the
submission put forward on behalf of the
appellants that there is repugnancy between
sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act which is
relatable to Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule and para 21 of the Control Order
issued by the Central Government under sub-
section (1) of Section 3 of the Essential
Commodities Act relatable to Entry 33 of List III
and therefore sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the
Act which is a law made by the State legislature
is void under Article 254(1). The question of
repugnancy under Article 254(1) between a
law made by Parliament and a law made by
the State legislature arises only in case both
the legislations occupy the same field with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in
the Concurrent List, and there is direct
conflict between the two laws. It is only
when both these requirements are fulfilled
that the State law will, to the extent of
repugnancy, become void. Article 254(1) has
no application to cases of repugnancy due to
overlapping found between List II on the one
hand and Lists I and III on the other. If such
overlapping exists in any particular case, the
State law will be ultra vires because of the non
obstante clause in Article 246(1) read with the
opening words “subject to” in Article 246(3). In
such a case, the State law will fail not because
of repugnance to the Union law but due to want
of legislative competence. It is no doubt true

39


that the expression “a law made by Parliament
which Parliament is competent to enact” in
Article 254(1) is susceptible of a construction
that repugnance between a State law and a law
made by Parliament may take place outside the
concurrent sphere because Parliament is
competent to enact law with respect to subjects
included in List III as well as “List I”. But if
Article 254(1) is read as a whole, it will be seen
that it is expressly made subject to clause (2)
which makes reference to repugnancy in the
field of Concurrent List — in other words, if
clause (2) is to be the guide in the determination
of scope of clause (1), the repugnancy between
Union and State law must be taken to refer only
to the Concurrent field. Article 254(1) speaks of
a State law being repugnant to (a) a law made
by Parliament or (b) an existing law. There was
a controversy at one time as to whether the
succeeding words “with respect to one of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List”
govern both (a) and (b) or (b) alone. It is now
settled that the words “with respect to” qualify
both the clauses in Article 254(1) viz, a law
made by Parliament which Parliament is
competent to enact as well as any provision of
an existing law. The underlying principle is that
the question of repugnancy arises only when
both the legislatures are competent to legislate
in the same field i.e. with respect to one of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List.
Hence, Article 254(1) cannot apply unless both
the Union and the State laws relate to a subject
specified in the Concurrent List, and they
occupy the same field.”


48. Thus, in view of the constitutional scheme and
the analysis undertaken hereinabove, no occasion
40


arises for this Court to embark upon an examination
of any perceived or alleged conflict of views in the
decisions in Kaiser-i-Hind (supra) and Rajiv Sarin
(supra) concerning the requirement of Presidential
assent under Article 254 of the Constitution, the said
provision being inapplicable to the present
controversy.
49. Upon an exhaustive examination of the material
placed on record and a careful consideration of the
submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties, we are of the considered view that the
findings recorded and the conclusions arrived at by
the High Court in the impugned judgment do not
suffer from any legal infirmity, perversity, or
jurisdictional error warranting interference by this
Court.
50. Having affirmed the impugned judgment insofar
as it holds the constitution of the Search-cum-
41


Selection Committee to be illegal, we are now called
upon to decide as to whether the grave consequences
of removal from the post of the Vice-Chancellor
should befall the appellant before us. We may note
that there is not even a whisper of an allegation by
the writ petitioners before the High Court impugning
the qualifications, integrity or administrative acumen
of the appellant, who has been continuing to
administer the affairs of the University without any
complaint from December, 2021. The High Court
itself, whilst ruling against the appellant, granted
th
him a lease of life till 30 June, 2024. This Court,
while entertaining the appeals, stayed the operation
of the impugned judgment, thereby protecting the
appellant from the damning consequences of removal
from the office, which could have proved unduly
harsh and stigmatic to the career of an academician.
42


51. Therefore, having regard to the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case, particularly the facts
that (i) the appellant was found meritorious and was
duly selected by the Search-cum-Selection
Committee with due regard to his qualifications and
credentials; (ii) that he has continuously and without
any demur, discharged the functions of the Vice-
Chancellor of the University for the past four years;
(iii) that his tenure is due to expire in December,
2026, this Court is of the considered view that an
immediate cessation of his tenure may result in grave
stigma to the appellant and so also avoidable
disruption in the academic and administrative
functioning of the University.
52. In the absence of any material on record to show
that the appellant was, in any manner, disqualified
to hold the office of Vice-Chancellor and bearing in
mind that the process of selection of a new Vice-
43


Chancellor by adhering to Clause 7.3 of the UGC
Regulations, 2018 is likely to consume some time ,
we, in order to do complete justice, exercise our
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,
and direct that the appellant shall continue to
hold the post of Vice-Chancellor till the end of his
normal tenure or till a new Vice-Chancellor is
selected in accordance with law, whichever is
earlier. We further provide that the appellant
shall be entitled to participate in the selection
process, if any, undertaken for fresh selection to
the post of Vice-Chancellor of the University,
without being prejudiced by the impugned
judgment.
53. At the cost of repetition, it is clarified that the
Legislature of the Union Territory of Puducherry
remains fully empowered and at liberty to take such
appropriate and necessary steps, including
44


amendment or modification of the existing statutory
framework, as may be required to bring the
provisions of the PTU Act in conformity with the UGC
Regulations, 2018, in accordance with law.
54. The appeals are accordingly disposed of in the
above terms.
55. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)

….……………………J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)


NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 30, 2026.

45