Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
2023 INSC 936
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 489-490 OF 2019
NAVEEN @ AJAY …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
These appeals would call in question, the impugned
Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 24.12.2018 passed
by the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in
Criminal Reference No. 03 of 2018 and Criminal Appeal No.
Signature Not Verified
3830 of 2018 upholding the conviction of the appellant under
Digitally signed by
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2023.10.19
16:46:29 IST
Reason:
Sections 363, 366-A, 376(A), 376(2)(i), 376(2)(j), 376(2)(k),
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376(2)(m), 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code , and Section
5(m), 5(i) read with Section 6 of Protection of Children from
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Sexual Offences Act 2012 , and confirming the sentence of
death imposed on the appellant by the Fifth Additional Sessions
Judge, Indore (MP) in Sessions Trial No. 87 of 2018 arising out
of Crime No. 50 of 2018 dated 20.04.2018, registered at P.S.
Sarafa, Indore, Madhya Pradesh.
2. The appellant has been convicted and sentenced for
committing rape and murder of 3 months old girl child. The
appellant was tried for the afore-mentioned offences on the
allegation that complainant-Sunil and his wife were engaged in
the business of selling balloons and they were residing at
Rajawada, Indore (MP). On 20.04.2018, complainant-Sunil
along with his family members were sleeping at a platform near
Rajawada, at about 03:00 a.m., his daughter (deceased) aged
about three months and four days started weeping on which
her mother Sonubai fed milk, thereafter, the deceased slept. At
about 05:00 a.m. when complainant-Sunil and his family
members woke up, they did not find the deceased at the place
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(for short, ‘IPC’)
2
(for short, ‘POCSO’)
3
where she was sleeping. Despite search, they could not find
her. Thereafter, Sunil lodged a missing report of his daughter
at Police Station, Sarafa, Indore registered as Crime No. 50 of
2018 (Ex.P-7). At about 13.27 hours, one Mr. Deepak Jain
(PW-5) informed the Police Station MG Road, Indore (MP) that
one dead body of a girl of about three months old has been
found at Shreenath Palace Society, Indore. MERG intimation
was recorded under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal
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Procedure, 1973 . On coming to know about the discovery of a
dead body, Sunil went to the spot and identified the deceased
as his daughter. Postmortem of the dead body was conducted,
and the Report thereof was submitted by Dr. Poonam Mathur
(PW-20) vide Ex. P-53. After completing the investigation
including collection of evidence from CCTV footage, recovery of
incriminating articles, chemical analysis report etc., the charge-
sheet was filed on 27.04.2018. The DNA report was produced
later during the trial.
3. On the basis of evidence brought on record during the
course of trial, wherein the prosecution examined 29 witnesses
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(for short, ‘Cr.P.C.)
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and also proved 78 documents including expert
opinion/chemical report/FSL report, the Trial Court convicted
the appellant for the subject offences against which the
appellant preferred appeal before the High Court. The Sessions
Court also sent reference to the High Court under Section 396
Cr.P.C. for confirmation of death sentence. The High Court has
confirmed the death sentence and resultantly the Criminal
Appeal preferred by the appellant has also been dismissed by
the impugned Judgment.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. They have
advanced lengthy arguments and have taken us through the
entire evidence on record. However, considering the nature of
the order, we propose to pass, we are not referring to the
details of the evidence on record.
5. At the outset, learned senior counsel Mr. B.H. Marlappalle
assisted by Mr. Rajat Mittal, Advocate-on-Record for the
appellant argued that the entire trial for such serious offences
has been completed within a span of 15 days i.e. from 27th
April, 2018 (when the charge-sheet was filed) to 12th May,
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2018 (when the Judgment was delivered by the Sessions
Court). Referring to the order-sheet recorded by the trial court
from 27th April, 2018 to 12th May, 2018, learned senior
counsel would submit that the appellant has not been afforded
a fair trial depriving him of his valuable legal rights. It is also
argued that the DNA report (Ex.P-72) has not been proved in
accordance with law. The forensic experts were not examined
during the trial, nor the report was put to the accused for
admission or otherwise.
6. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent-State, while
supporting the impugned Judgment of the High Court, would
submit that the appellant having not raised any objection
regarding hasty completion of trial or denial of a fair trial, it is
not open for the appellant to argue, at this stage, that the trial
has not been conducted properly and fairly. He would submit
that in view of clinching evidence against the appellant which
are scientific in nature, the Sessions Court and the High Court
as well, have not committed any illegality in convicting and
sentencing the appellant.
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7. To appreciate the arguments regarding denial of fair trial,
we have gone through the complete order-sheet recorded by
the trial court from 27th April, 2018 to 12th May, 2018. The
gist whereof is reproduced hereunder: -
27.04.2018
➢ Charge-sheet filed.
➢ Cognizance taken.
➢ Charge-sheet supplied to the accused. He requested for
appointment of an advocate through legal aid.
➢ Advocate from legal aid appointed on the same day.
➢ The case was posted on the same day, after some time,
for arguments on charge.
➢ Later on, the case was posted for next day for hearing
arguments on charge.
28.04.2018
➢ Arguments on charge heard, charges framed.
➢ Accused was asked as to whether he admits any
documents as required under Section 294 of Cr.P.C. to
which the accused refused to admit any document.
➢ District Public Prosecution Officer was directed to submit
trial program today itself.
➢ Prosecution submitted trial program for examining 34
witnesses.
01.05.2018
➢ PW Nos. 1 to 4 examined.
➢ The prosecution was directed to keep its remaining
witnesses present (summons not issued).
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02.05.2018
➢ PW Nos. 5 to 10 examined.
➢ The prosecution was directed to keep its remaining
witnesses present (summons not issued).
03.05.2018
➢ PW Nos. 11 to 15 examined.
➢ Two witnesses discharged without examination.
➢ The prosecution was directed to keep its remaining
witnesses present (summons not issued).
04.05.2018
➢ PW Nos. 16 to 20 examined.
➢ FSL report received from State Forensic Science
Laboratory, Sagar, Viscera Report of deceased received
from the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory,
Jhumarghat, Rau, Indore and DNA report received from
the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Government of M.P.
produced by the prosecution.
➢ The prosecution was directed to keep its remaining
witnesses present through summons tomorrow.
05.05.2018
➢ PW Nos. 21 to 25 examined.
➢ No other witnesses were presented.
➢ Remaining Witnesses were directed to be called through
summons.
➢ Witness-Sunil was directed to be called from the District
Jail, Dhar through production warrant (this witness was
never examined).
➢ The case fixed for 07.05.2023 for remaining witnesses.
07.05.2018
➢ PW No. 26 examined.
➢ The prosecution was directed to keep its remaining
witnesses present tomorrow.
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08.05.2018
➢ PW Nos. 27 to 29 examined.
➢ The prosecution closed its evidence.
➢ The case was posted for accused examination under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. tomorrow.
09.05.2018
➢ The accused examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
➢ The accused requested to provide an opportunity to
produce defence witness on his behalf.
➢ He was directed to keep the defence witness present
tomorrow.
10.05.2018
➢ Defence witness was not present.
➢ Defence closed.
➢ Parties were directed for final arguments today itself (after
recess).
➢ Final arguments heard.
➢ The case was posted for Judgment on 12.05.2018.
12.05.2018
➢ Judgment pronounced.
➢ The accused and his advocate heard on the question of
sentence.
➢ The case posted after some time for hearing the accused
on sentence (order-sheet does not record that copy of the
Judgement supplied to the accused).
➢ After some time, sentence pronounced.
➢ Copy of the Judgment provided to the accused.
8. A close reading and scrutiny of the order-sheet recorded
by the Trial Court, as stated above in brief, would manifest that
the accused was not provided an opportunity to engage a
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counsel of his choice and instead his submission was recorded
that he desires to be defended by a counsel appointed through
legal aid. From the very beginning, the trial proceeded on day-
to-day basis except on Saturday and Sunday and all the
witnesses examined by the prosecution were produced without
issuing summons. One witness-Sunil was directed to be
produced from District Jail, Dhar through production warrant.
However, this witness was never examined nor there is any
indication that this witness has been given up. It is this witness
(Sunil) who was named as a suspect in the FIR. Non-
examination of this witness has therefore left a crucial gap in
the prosecution case. It is significant to note that the FSL
report, Viscera report and DNA report were not submitted along
with the charge-sheet. The same were presented before the
Trial Court on 04.05.2018. The accused was never asked as to
whether he admits the documents, as required under Section
294 of Cr.P.C.. Neither any witnesses were called to prove
these reports. After the prosecution case was closed on
08.05.2018, the accused examination was conducted on the
very next day i.e. on 09.05.2018 and thereafter on the next
day i.e. on 10.05.2018, the case was fixed for examination of
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defence witness. It requires special notice that the accused
was in jail and was not defended by a counsel of his choice but
by a legal aid counsel. He was not in a position to present the
witness himself, yet he was directed to keep his witnesses
present on the next day i.e. on 10.05.2018. On this date, he
could not produce his witnesses, therefore, his defence was
closed, and the case was posted for final arguments after
recess.
9. In a case of this nature, the trial was conducted on day-
to-day basis and the order-sheet does not record that copies of
statement of witnesses were supplied to the accused or his
counsel, it is not known as to whether the defence counsel was
supplied all the requisite material basing which he could have
advanced his final arguments.
10. The Order-sheet would thus clearly indicate that the trial
was conducted in a hurried manner without providing ample
and proper opportunity to the defence counsel, who was
engaged through legal aid, to prepare himself effectively. It is
also to be noted that copies of DNA Report, FSL Report and
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Viscera Report were presented before the Court during the
course of trial on 04.05.2018.
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11. In the matter of Bashira vs. State of U.P. , almost
similar situation, like in the present case arose, when the trial
was conducted in 13 days. Dealing with submissions made by
the accused counsel apropos lack of sufficient opportunity to
defend the accused, this Court held in paragraph 8 and 9 as
follows: -
“8. There is nothing on the record to show that,
after his appointment as counsel for the
appellant, Sri Shukla was given sufficient time
to prepare the defence. The order- sheet
maintained by the Judge seems to indicate
that, as soon as the counsel was appointed, the
charge was read out to the accused and, after
his plea had been recorded, examination of
witnesses began. The counsel, of course, did
his best to cross-examine the witnesses to the
extent it was possible for him to do in the very
short time available to him. It is true that the
record, also does not contain any note that the
counsel asked for more time to prepare the
defence, but that, in our opinion, is immaterial.
The Rule casts a duty on the court itself to
grant sufficient time to the counsel for this -
purpose and the record should show that the
Rule was complied with by granting him time
which the court considered sufficient in the
4
AIR 1968 SC 1313
12
circumstances of the case. In this case, the
record seems to show that the trial was
proceeded with immediately after appointing
the amicus curiae counsel and that, in fact, if
any time at all was granted, it was nominal. In
these circumstances, it must be held that there
was no compliance with the requirements of
this Rule.
9. In this connection, we may refer to the
decisions of two of the High Courts where a
similar situation arose. In Re: Alla Nageswara
Rao, Petitioner(1) reference was made to Rule
228 of the Madras Criminal Rules of Practice
which. provided for engaging a pleader at the
cost of the State to defend an accused person
in a case where a sentence of death could be
passed. It was held by Subba Rao, Chief Justice
as he then was, speaking for the Bench, that:-
" a mere formal compliance with this
Rule will not carry out the object
underlying the rule. A sufficient time
should be given to the advocate
engaged on behalf of the accused to
prepare his case and conduct it on
behalf of his client. We are satisfied
that the time given was insufficient
and, in the circumstances, no real
opportunity was given to the accused to
defend himself."
This view was expressed on the basis of the
fact found that the advocate had been engaged
for the accused two hours prior to the trial. In
Mathai Thommen v. State the Kerala High
Court was dealing with a sessions trial in which
the counsel was engaged to defend the accused
nd
on 02 August, 1958, when the trial was
th
posted to begin on 04 August, 1958, showing
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that barely more than a day was allowed to the
counsel to get prepared and obtain instructions
from the accused. Commenting on the
procedure adopted by the Sessions Court, the
High Court finally expressed its opinion by
saying:
“Practices like this would reduce to a
farce the engagement of counsel under
Rule 21 of the Criminal Rules of Practice
which has been made for the purpose of
effectively carrying out the duty cast on
courts of law to see that no one is
deprived of life and liberty without a fair
and reasonable opportunity being
afforded to him to prove his innocence.
We consider that in cases like this
counsel should be engaged at least some
10 to 15 days before the trial and should
also be furnished with copies of the
records.”
In our opinion, no hard and fast rule can be laid
down as to the time which must elapse
between the appointment of the counsel and
the beginning of the trial; but, on the
circumstances of each case, the Court of
Session must ensure that the time granted to
the counsel is sufficient to prepare for the
defence. In the present case, when the counsel
was appointed just before the trial started, it is
clear that there was failure to comply with the
requirements of the rule of procedure in this
behalf.”
12. In Bashira (supra) , this Court concluded that the
conviction of the appellant in a trial held in violation of Rule and
the award of death sentence will result in the deprivation of his
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life in breach of the procedure established by law. Holding
further that, the conviction is void because of an error in the
procedure adopted at the trial, it was directed that the accused
shall be tried afresh, and the matter be remitted back to the
Sessions Court.
13. The issue concerning importance of a fair trial was
considered by this Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh &
5
Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (known as ‘ Best Bakery
Case’) wherein this Court made the following observations in
paragraphs 38 to 40:-
“38. A criminal trial is a judicial examination of
the issues in the case and its purpose is to
arrive at a judgment on an issue as to a fact or
relevant facts which may lead to the discovery
of the fact issue and obtain proof of such facts
at which the prosecution and the accused have
arrived by their pleadings; the controlling
question being the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Since the object is to mete out justice
and to convict the guilty and protect the
innocent, the trial should be a search for the
truth and not a bout over technicalities and
must be conducted under such rules as will
protect the innocent, and punish the guilty. The
proof of charge which has to be beyond
5
(2004) 4 SCC 158
15
reasonable doubt must depend upon judicial
evaluation of the totality of the evidence, oral
and circumstantial, and not by an isolated
scrutiny.
39. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the
accused or the prosecution violates even
minimum standards of due process of law. It is
inherent in the concept of due process of law,
that condemnation should be rendered only
after the trial in which the hearing is a real one,
not sham or a mere farce and pretence. Since
the fair hearing requires an opportunity to
preserve the process, it may be vitiated and
violated by an overhasty, stage-managed,
tailored and partisan trial.
40. The fair trial for a criminal offence consists
not only in technical observance of the frame
and forms of law, but also in recognition and
just application of its principles in substance, to
find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of
justice.”
( Emphasis supplied )
| 14. In the case of Anokhilal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,6 | ||
| this Court, after referring to Best Bakery (supra) on the issue, | ||
| has held in paragraphs 21 to 23 as follows: - | ||
| “21. In the present case, the Amicus Curiae, | ||
| was appointed on 19.02.2013, and on the same | ||
| date, the counsel was called upon to defend the | ||
| accused at the stage of framing of charges. | ||
| One can say with certainty that the Amicus | ||
| Curiae did not have sufficient time to go |
6
(2019) 20 SCC 196
16
through even the basic documents, nor the
advantage of any discussion or interaction with
the accused, and time to reflect over the
matter. Thus, even before the Amicus Curiae
could come to grips of the matter, the charges
were framed.
22. The provisions concerned viz. Sections 227
and 228 of the Code contemplate framing of
charge upon consideration of the record of the
case and the documents submitted herewith,
and after ‘hearing the submissions of the
accused and the prosecution in that behalf’. If
the hearing for the purposes of these provisions
is to be meaningful, and not just a routine
affair, the right under the said provisions stood
denied to the appellant.
23. In our considered view, the Trial Court on
its own, ought to have adjourned the matter for
some time so that the Amicus Curiae could
have had the advantage of sufficient time to
prepare the matter. The approach adopted by
the Trial Court, in our view, may have
expedited the conduct of trial, but did not
further the cause of justice. Not only were the
charges framed the same day as stated above,
but the trial itself was conducted within a
fortnight thereafter. In the process, the
assistance that the appellant was entitled to in
the form of legal aid, could not be real and
meaningful.”
This Court, in Anokhilal (supra), also set aside the
conviction and sentenced imposed by the Trial Court and the
High Court and directed for de novo trial. This Court also laid
down certain norms in matters where the accused is
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| represented by a counsel appointed through legal aid. The | ||
|---|---|---|
| norms, as stated in paragraph 31 of the said judgment are | ||
| reproduced hereunder: - | ||
| “31.1 In all cases there is a possibility of life | ||
| sentence or death sentence, learned Advocates who | ||
| have put in minimum of 10 years’ practice at the | ||
| Bar alone be considered to be appointed as Amicus | ||
| Curiae or through legal services to represent an | ||
| accused. | ||
| 31.2 In all matters dealt with by the High Court | ||
| concerning confirmation of death sentence, Senior | ||
| Advocates of the Court must first be considered to | ||
| be appointed as Amicus Curiae. | ||
| 31.3 Whenever any learned counsel is appointed | ||
| as Amicus Curiae, some reasonable time may be | ||
| provided to enable the counsel to prepare the | ||
| matter. There cannot be any hard and fast rule in | ||
| that behalf. However, a minimum of seven days’ | ||
| time may normally be considered to be appropriate | ||
| and adequate. | ||
| 31.4 Any learned counsel, who is appointed as | ||
| Amicus Curiae on behalf of the accused must | ||
| normally be granted to have meetings and | ||
| discussion with the concerned accused. Such | ||
| interactions may prove to be helpful as was noticed | ||
| in Imtiyaz Ramzan Khan.” | ||
| 15. In Best Bakery (supra), this Court has observed that the | ||
| principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas of | ||
| the law. It is reflected in numerous rules and practices. It is a |
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constant, ongoing development process continually adapting to
new and changing circumstances, and exigencies of the
situation – peculiar at times and related to the nature of crime,
persons involved – directly or operating behind social impact
and societal needs and even so many powerful balancing
factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal
justice system. The concept of fair trial entails familiar
triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim, and the
society.
16. It was further observed that there can be no analytical,
all-comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the concept of a
fair trial, and it may have to be determined in seemingly infinite
variety of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind viz.
whether something that was done or said either before or at
the trial deprived the quality of fairness to a degree where a
miscarriage of justice has resulted. Each one has an inbuilt
right to be dealt with fairly in a criminal trial. Denial of a fair
trial is as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and
the society. Fair trial obviously would mean a trial before an
impartial judge, a fair prosecutor, and the atmosphere of
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judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or prejudice
for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is
being tried is eliminated. It is inherent in the concept of due
process of law, that condemnation should be rendered only
after the trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a
mere farce and pretence. Since fair hearing requires an
opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and
violated by an overhasty, stage-managed, tailored and partisan
trial. It is thus settled that a hasty trial in which proper and
sufficient opportunity has not been provided to the accused to
defend himself/herself would vitiate the trial as being
meaningless & stage-managed. It is in violation of the principle
of judicial calm.
17. The principle of “judicial calm” in the context of a fair
trial needs to be elaborated for its observance in letter and
spirit. In our view, in the hallowed halls of justice, the essence
of a fair and impartial trial lies in the steadfast embrace of
judicial calm. It is incumbent upon a judge to exude an aura of
tranquillity, offering a sanctuary of reason and measured
deliberation. In the halls of justice, the gavel strikes not in
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haste, but in a deliberate cadence ensuring every voice, every
piece of evidence, is accorded its due weight. The expanse of
judicial calm serves not only as a pillar of constitutional
integrity, but as the very bedrock upon which trust in a legal
system is forged. It is a beacon that illuminates the path
towards a verdict untainted by haste or prejudice, thus
upholding the sanctity of justice for all.
18. The issue concerning evidentiary value of DNA report has
been considered by this Court in a recent Judgment reported in
the case of Rahul v. State of Delhi, Ministry of Home
7
Affairs & Anr. wherein the following has been held in
Paragraphs 36 and 38 as under: -
“36. The learned Amicus Curiae has also
assailed the forensic evidence i.e. the report
regarding the DNA profiling dated 18-4-2012
(Ext. P-23/1) giving incriminating findings. She
vehemently submitted that apart from the fact
that the collection of the samples sent for
examination itself was very doubtful, the said
forensic evidence was neither scientifically nor
legally proved and could not have been used as
a circumstance against the appellant-accused.
The Court finds substance in the said
submissions made by the Amicus Curiae. The
7
(2023) 1 SCC 83
21
DNA evidence is in the nature of opinion
evidence as envisaged under Section 45 and
like any other opinion evidence, its probative
value varies from case to case.
38. It is true that PW 23 Dr B.K. Mohapatra,
Senior Scientific Officer (Biology) of CFSL, New
Delhi had stepped into the witness box and his
report regarding DNA profiling was exhibited as
Ext. PW 23/A, however mere exhibiting a
document, would not prove its contents. The
record shows that all the samples relating to
the accused and relating to the deceased were
seized by the investigating officer on 14-2-2012
and 16-2-2012; and they were sent to CFSL for
examination on 27-2-2012. During this period,
they remained in the malkhana of the police
station. Under the circumstances, the possibility
of tampering with the samples collected also
could not be ruled out. Neither the trial court
nor the High Court has examined the
underlying basis of the findings in the DNA
reports nor have they examined the fact
whether the techniques were reliably applied by
the expert. In the absence of such evidence on
record, all the reports with regard to the DNA
profiling become highly vulnerable, more
particularly when the collection and sealing of
the samples sent for examination were also not
free from suspicion.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8
19. In the case of Manoj & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. , it was
held that if DNA evidence is not properly documented,
collected, packaged, and preserved, it will not meet the legal
8
(2023) 2 SCC 353
22
and scientific requirements for admissibility in a court of law.
Because extremely small samples of DNA can be used as
evidence, greater attention to contamination issues is
necessary while locating, collecting, and preserving DNA
evidence as it can be contaminated when DNA from another
source gets mixed with DNA relevant to the case. This can
happen even when someone sneezes or coughs over the
evidence or touches his/her mouth, nose, or other part of the
face and then touches the area that may contain the DNA to be
tested. The exhibits having biological specimen, which can
establish link among victim(s), suspect(s), scene of crime for
solving the case should be identified, preserved, packed, and
sent for DNA Profiling.
20. In the case of Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph Vs.
9
State of Maharashtra , the following has been held in
paragraph 18 as under:-
“18. Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is a
molecule that encodes the genetic information
in all living organisms. DNA genotype can be
9
(2014) 4 SCC 69
23
| obtained from any biological material such as | |
|---|---|
| bone, blood, semen, saliva, hair, skin, etc. | |
| Now, for several years, DNA profile has also | |
| shown a tremendous impact on forensic | |
| investigation. Generally, when DNA profile of a | |
| sample found at the scene of crime matches | |
| with the DNA profile of the suspect, it can | |
| generally be concluded that both the samples | |
| have the same biological origin. DNA profile is | |
| valid and reliable, but variance in a particular | |
| result depends on the quality control and | |
| quality procedure in the laboratory.” | |
| (Emphasis supplied) |
21. In the case at hand, the prosecution is based on
circumstantial evidence in which the prosecution has to prove
each link in the chain of circumstantial evidence and the
important chains in the link are DNA report, FSL report and
Viscera report. When the reports were challenged by the
accused before the High Court, it was brushed aside by
observing that even if the authors of the reports were not
called for evidence, in terms of Section 293 Cr.P.C., the reports
are not open to question as the defence had an opportunity to
cross-examine the authors of the reports during the trial. In
our considered view, the High Court was not correct in saying
that the defence had an opportunity to cross-examine the
experts. The trial has been conducted on day-to-day basis
24
wherein the accused, who was in jail and defended by a
counsel from legal aid, was compelled by the Trial Court to
produce defence witness of his own in one day. It was
impossible for the accused himself to produce Dr. Anil Kumar
Singh and Dr. Kamlesh Kaitholiya, the authors of the Reports
(Ex.P-72), in one day because the said experts are government
servants and could not have attended the Court at the request
of an accused in jail. The Trial Court treated the accused as if
he is carrying a magic wand which is available to produce
highly qualified experts, who are government servants, on a
phone call. There was no opportunity, in the real sense, to the
appellant to cross-examine the experts.
22. For all the afore-stated reasons, we are of the considered
view that the Trial Court conducted the trial in a hurried
manner without giving proper opportunity to the accused to
defend himself. Therefore, the Judgment of conviction and
sentence passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the
trial court for de novo trial by affording proper opportunity to
the appellant to defend himself. The trial court and the District
25
Legal Services Authority, Indore, are directed to provide
assistance of a senior counsel to the appellant to contest the
trial on his behalf.
23. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
….…….………………………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
…..…………….………………………………J.
(PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA)
…....….………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 19, 2023.