JAYANT vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.824­825  OF 2020 (Arising from SLP(Criminal) Nos.2640­2641/2020) Jayant Etc. …Appellants Versus The State of Madhya Pradesh …Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.826  OF 2020       (Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.4549/2020) State of Madhya Pradesh …Appellant Versus Jayant …Respondent J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Leave granted. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ARJUN BISHT Date: 2020.12.03 17:03:03 IST Reason: 2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned common judgment and order dated 11.05.2020 passed by the 1 High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in M.Cr.C No. 49338/2019 and M.Cr.C. No. 49972/2019, the original petitioner as   well   as   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   have   preferred   the present appeals. By the impugned common judgment and order, the High Court   has   dismissed   the   aforesaid   applications   filed   under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the respective FIRs for the offences under Sections 379 and 414, IPC, Sections 4/21 of the Mines & Minerals   (Development   &   Regulation)   Act,   1957   (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MMDR Act’) and under Rule 18 of the M.P. Minerals   (Prevention   of   illegal   Mining,   Transportation   and Storage) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2006 Rules’). 3. The facts in nutshell are as under: On a surprise inspection, the respective Mining Inspectors checked the tractor/trolleys of the private appellants along with the minor mineral (sand/storage/yellow soil etc.) loaded in them. They handed over the tractor/trolleys to the concerned police stations   to   keep   them   in   safe   custody.     Finding   the   private appellants   indulged   in   illegal   mining/transportation   of   minor mineral, the mining Inspectors prepared their respective cases under Rule 53 of the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996 2 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1996 Rules’) and submitted them before the Mining Officers with a proposal of compounding the same for the amount calculated according to the concerned 1996 Rules.   The  concerned   Mining   Officers   submitted   those   cases before the Collector, who approved the proposal.   The violators accepted the decision and deposited the amounts determined by the Collector for compounding the cases.   Their tractor/trolleys along   with   the   minerals,   which   were   illegally excavated/transported, were released. 3.1 That   after   some   time,   a   news   was   published   in   a   daily newspaper   –   Bhaskar   on   8.9.2019   with   respect   to   illegal excavation/transportation of mineral sand from Chambal, Shivna and   Retam   and   other   Tributary   rivers   flow   from   District Mandsuar and in surrounding places.  It was revealed that due to illegal transportation of  the  minerals and  without payment of royalty, revenue loss is occurring.   It was reported that illegal mining, storage and transportation of mineral sand was being carried out at large scale.  Similar kind of information was also subsequently published on 3.10.2019 in the daily newspaper – Bhaskar in Mandsuar edition.  It was also reported that despite the offences under Sections 379 and 414, IPC and the offences 3 under the MMDR Act and the 2006 Rules were found attracted, necessary legal action has not been taken and the violators were permitted to go on compounding the offence under Rule 53 of the 1996   Rules.     The   learned   Judicial   Magistrate,   First   Class, Mandsuar   took   note   of   the   aforesaid   information   and   having taken note of the decision of this Court in the case of  State (NCT

under the IPC and offences under the MMDR Act are distinct and different and it is permissible to lodge/initiate the proceedings for the offences under the IPC as well as under the MMDR Act, the learned Magistrate in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156(3),   Cr.P.C.   (suo   motu)   directed   to   register   criminal   case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for initiation of investigation and for submitting of report after due investigation is conducted.   The learned Magistrate also directed the concerned In­charge/SHOs of the concerned police stations to register the first information report and a copy of the first information report be sent to the learned Magistrate as per the provisions of Section 157, Cr.P.C. 

Magistrate, the In­charge/SHOs of the concerned police stations lodged   separate   FIRs   for   the   aforesaid   offences   for   illegal 4 mining/transportation   of   sand,   particulars   of   which   are   as under:

3.3 That   thereafter   the   private   appellants   and   others approached   the   High   Court   to   quash   the   aforesaid   FIRs 5 registered against them for illegal mining/transportation of sand by submitting the applications under Section 482, Cr.P.C.  It was mainly contended on behalf of the private appellants and other violators that in view of Bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act, the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing to register the FIRs is unsustainable and deserves to the quashed and set aside.  It was also contended on behalf of the private appellants and other violators that once there was compounding of offence in exercise of powers under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules and the violators   paid   the   amount   determined   by   permitting   them   to compound the offence, thereafter the Magistrate was not justified in directing to initiate fresh proceedings which would be hit by the   principle   of   “double   jeopardy”.     That   by   the   impugned common judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed all the aforesaid applications relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of  Sanjay (supra) . 4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in refusing to quash the FIRs filed against the private appellants and   other   violators,   the   original   petitioners   –   violators   have preferred the present appeals.   Though, before the High Court, 6 the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya   Pradesh   supported   the   order   passed   by   the   learned Magistrate   directing   to   register/lodge   FIRs,   the   State   has preferred   a   separate   special   leave   petition   challenging   the impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court confirming the order passed by the learned Magistrate.  It is very surprising   that   despite   supporting   the   order   passed   by   the learned Magistrate before the High Court, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the special leave petition, which shall be dealt with hereinbelow. 5. Shri Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the private appellants has made following submissions: i) initiation   of   criminal   proceedings   and   filing   of   respective FIRs against the private appellants which have been filed/lodged pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate   in exercise   of   powers   under   Section   156(3),   Cr.P.C.   are   hit   by Section 22 and 23A of the MMDR Act, as well as, Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules; ii) on a plain reading of Section 22, cognizance of the offence can   be   taken   by   the   Magistrate   only   if   there   is   a   written complaint in that regard by the Mining Officer/authorised officer. 7 In the present case, admittedly, there is no written complaint made by the Mining Officer/authorised officer; iii) MMDR Act does not contemplate the taking of suo motu cognizance   by   the   Magistrate.     The   Magistrate   does   not   have jurisdiction   under   the   MMDR   Act   to   direct   the   Mining Officer/police officer in­charge to register FIR under the penal provisions of the MMDR Act.   Heavy reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of  Sanjay (Supra) , as well as, in the case of  Kanwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 1920 of 2019, decided on December 18, 2019; iv) Section   23A   of   the   MMDR   Act   contemplates   the compounding of offence under the MMDR Act.   Therefore, the Rules   made   under   the   MMDR   Act   contain   provisions   for compounding of offence.  Sub­section 2 of Section 23A places a bar on proceedings or further proceedings, when the offences have been compounded under sub­section (1).   Therefore, once the proceedings have been compounded under the Act or Rules made thereunder, no further proceedings can lie.  In the present case, the offences under the MMDR Act as against the private appellants were permitted to be compounded by the competent authority. 8 5.1 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appals and quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the private appellants for the offences under Sections 379 and 414, IPC and Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh has supported the private appellants – violators and has submitted   that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate directing to lodge/register FIRs for the offences under Sections 379   and   414,   IPC   and   Sections   4/21   of   the   MMDR   Act   is unsustainable, though and as observed hereinabove, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh supported the order passed by the learned Magistrate before the High Court. One of the grounds stated in the memo of appeal is that the order passed by the learned Magistrate, confirmed by the High Court, impinges/affects the powers of the authorised person to compound the offence under Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules. 7. Before submissions made on behalf of the respective parties are considered, the decision of this Court in the case of  Sanjay  dealing with the provisions of the MMDR Act in which this (supra) 9 Court considered in detail the policy and object of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, is required to be referred to. 7.1 The   question   which   arose   for   consideration   before   this Court was, whether the provisions contained in Sections 21, 22 and   other   Sections   of   the   MMDR   Act   operate   as   bar   against prosecution of a person who has been charged with allegation which constitutes offences under Sections 379/414 and other provisions of the Penal Code (IPC).   The question which arose was,   whether   the   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   explicitly   or impliedly exclude the provisions of the Penal Code (IPC) when the act of an accused is an offence both under the Penal Code and under the provisions of the MMDR Act.  This Court considered in detail   the   policy,   object   and   purpose   of   the   MMDR   Act   in paragraphs 32 to 39, which read as under: “32.   The policy and object of the Mines and Minerals Act and Rules   have   a   long   history   and   are   the   result   of   an   increasing awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious ecological imbalance and to stop the damages being caused to the nature. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that adverse and destructive environmental impact of sand mining has been discussed in the UNEP   Global   Environmental   Alert   Service   Report.   As   per   the contents of the Report, lack of proper scientific methodology for river sand mining has led to indiscriminate sand mining, while weak   governance  and  corruption  have   led  to  widespread   illegal mining. While referring to the proposition in India, it was stated that sand trading is a lucrative business, and there is evidence of illegal trading such as the case of the influential mafias in our country. 10 33.  The mining of aggregates in rivers has led to severe damage to rivers, including pollution and changes in levels of PH. Removing sediment from rivers causes the river to cut its channel through the bed of the valley floor, or channel incision, both upstream and downstream of the extraction site. This leads to coarsening of bed material and lateral channel instability. It can change the riverbed itself. The removal of more than 12 million tonnes of sand a year from Vembanad Lake catchment in India has led to the lowering of the riverbed by 7 to 15 cm a year. Incision can also cause the alluvial aquifer to drain to a lower level, resulting in a loss of aquifer storage. It can also increase flood frequency and intensity by reducing flood regulation capacity. However, lowering the water table is most threatening to water supply exacerbating drought occurrence and severity as tributaries of major rivers dry up when sand mining reaches certain thresholds. Illegal sand mining also causes   erosion.   Damming   and   mining   have   reduced   sediment delivery from rivers to many coastal areas, leading to accelerated beach erosion.   The Report also dealt with the astonishing  impact of sand 34. mining on the economy. It states that tourism may be affected through beach erosion. Fishing, both traditional and commercial, can be affected through destruction of benthic fauna. Agriculture could   be   affected   through   loss   of   agricultural   land   from   river erosion and the lowering of the water table. The insurance sector is affected through exacerbation of the impact of extreme events such as floods, droughts and storm surges through decreased protection of beach fronts. The erosion of coastal areas and beaches affects houses   and   infrastructure.   A   decrease   in   bed   load   or   channel shortening can cause downstream erosion including bank erosion and  the undercutting or  undermining   of engineering  structures such as bridges, side protection walls and structures for water supply.  Sand is often removed from beaches to build hotels, roads and 35. other tourism­related infrastructure. In some locations, continued construction is likely to lead to an unsustainable situation and destruction  of   the  main  natural  attraction  for   visitors—beaches themselves. Mining from, within or near a riverbed has a direct impact on the stream’s physical characteristics, such as channel geometry,   bed   elevation,   substratum   composition   and   stability, instream roughness of the bed, flow velocity, discharge capacity, sediment   transportation   capacity,   turbidity,   temperature,   etc. Alteration   or   modification   of   the   above   attributes   may   cause hazardous impact on ecological equilibrium of riverine regime. This may also cause adverse impact on instream biota and riparian habitats.   This   disturbance   may   also   cause   changes   in   channel configuration and flow paths. 11 36.  In  M. Palanisamy  v.  State of T.N(2012) 4 CTC 1 , the amended provisions   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Mines   and   Minerals   Concession Rules, 1959 was challenged on the ground that the said Rules for the   purpose   of   preventing   and   restricting   illegal   mining, transportation   and   storage   of   minerals   are   ultra   vires constitutional   provisions   and   the   provisions   of   the   Mines   and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. Upholding the vires of the Rules, the Division Bench (one of us, Eqbal, J. as he then was) of the Madras High Court, elaborately discussed the object of restriction put in the illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals including sand and after considering various reports observed thus: (CTC pp. 24­25, paras 21 & 23­24) “ 21 .   In   order   to   appreciate   the   issue   involved   in   these   writ petitions, we may have to look at the larger picture — the impact of indiscriminate, uninterrupted sand quarrying on the already brittle ecological set­up of ours. According to expert reports, for thousands   of   years,   sand   and   gravel   have   been   used   in  the construction of roads and buildings. Today, demand for sand and gravel continues to increase. Mining operators, instead of working   in   conjunction   with   cognizant   resource   agencies   to ensure that sand mining is conducted in a responsible manner, are engaged in full­time profiteering. Excessive in­stream sand and gravel mining from riverbeds and like resources causes the degradation   of   rivers.   In­stream   mining   lowers   the   stream bottom, which leads to bank erosion. Depletion of sand in the stream­bed   and   along   coastal  areas   causes   the   deepening   of rivers   and   estuaries   and   enlargement   of   river   mouths   and coastal inlets. It also leads to saline water intrusion from the nearby sea. The effect of mining is compounded by the effect of sea level rise. Any volume of sand exported from stream­beds and coastal areas is a loss to the system. Excessive in­stream sand   mining   is   a   threat   to   bridges,   river   banks   and   nearby structures. Sand mining also affects the adjoining groundwater system and the uses that local people make of the river. Further, according to researches, in­stream sand mining results in the destruction of aquatic and riparian habitat through wholesale changes in the channel morphology. The ill effects include bed degradation,   bed   coarsening,   lowered   water   tables   near   the stream­bed   and   channel   instability.   These   physical   impacts cause degradation of riparian and aquatic biota and may lead to the   undermining   of   bridges   and   other   structures.   Continued extraction   of   sand   from   riverbeds   may   also   cause   the   entire stream­bed to degrade to the depth of excavation. * 23 . The most  important  effects of  in­stream  sand  mining  on aquatic habitats are bed degradation and sedimentation, which can have substantial negative effects on aquatic life. The stability 12 of   sand­bed   and   gravel­bed   streams   depends   on   a   delicate balance between stream flow, the sediments supplied from the watershed and the channel form.  Mining­induced  changes  in sediment supply and channel form disrupt the channel and the habitat   development   processes.   Furthermore,   movement   of unstable   substrates   results   in   downstream   sedimentation   of habitats.   The   affected   distance   depends   on   the   intensity   of mining, particle sizes, stream flows, and channel morphology. 24 . Apart from threatening bridges, sand mining transforms the riverbeds into large and deep pits; as a result, the groundwater table   drops   leaving   the   drinking   water   wells   on   the embankments   of   these   rivers   dry.   Bed   degradation   from   in­ stream   mining   lowers   the   elevation   of   stream   flow   and   the floodplain water table, which in turn, can eliminate water table­ dependent   woody   vegetation   in   riparian   areas   and   decrease wetted periods in riparian wetlands. So far as locations close to the sea are concerned, saline water may intrude into the fresh waterbody.” 37.  In  Centre for Public Interest Litigation  v.  Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 1 , this Court, while observing that the natural resources are the public property and national assets, held as under: (SCC p. 53, para 75) “ . The State is empowered to distribute natural resources. 75 However,   as   they   constitute   public   property/national   asset, while distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural resources.   In   Article   39( b )   of   the   Constitution   it   has   been provided   that   the   ownership   and   control   of   the   material resources of the community should be so distributed so as to best   subserve   the   common   good,   but   no   comprehensive legislation   has   been   enacted   to   generally   define   natural resources   and   a   framework   for   their   protection.   Of   course, environment laws enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures deal with specific natural resources i.e. forest, air, water, coastal zones, etc.” 38.   In   M.C. Mehta   v.   Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388 , this Court while considering the doctrine of public trust which extends to natural  resources observed  as  under:  (SCC  pp.  407­08 &  413, paras 24­25 & 34) “ 24 . The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known as the ‘Doctrine of the Public Trust’. It was founded on the ideas that certain common properties such as rivers, seashore, forests and the air were held by Government in trusteeship for the free 13 and unimpeded use of the general public. Our contemporary concern about ‘the environment’ bear a very close conceptual relationship to this legal doctrine. Under the Roman law these resources   were   either   owned   by   no   one   ( res   nullius )   or   by everyone   in   common   ( res   communious ).   Under   the   English common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not grant   these   properties   to   private   owners   if   the   effect   was   to interfere   with   the   public   interests   in   navigation   or   fishing. Resources that were suitable for these uses were deemed to be held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of the public. Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan—proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine—in an erudite article ‘ Public Trust   Doctrine   in   Natural   Resource   Law:   Effective   Judicial Intervention ’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1, p. 473, has given the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine as under: ‘The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that   received   much   attention   in   Roman  and   English   law—the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature and need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasised. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public;   accordingly,   property   used   for   those   purposes   was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could   routinely   grant   to  private   owners.   Second,   while   it   was understood   that   in   certain   common   properties—such   as   the seashore,   highways   and   running   water—“perpetual   use   was dedicated  to  the  public”,  it   has never  been  clear   whether  the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses, no   evidence   is   available   that   public   rights   could   be   legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.’ 25 . The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be   wholly   unjustified   to   make   them   a   subject   of   private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. According to Professor Sax the Public Trust Doctrine imposes the following restrictions on governmental authority: ‘Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust: first, the property 14 subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but   it   must   be   held   available   for   use   by   the   general   public; second,   the   property   may   not   be   sold,   even   for   a   fair   cash equivalent;   and   third   the   property   must   be   maintained   for particular types of uses.’ * 34 . Our legal system—based on English common law—includes the Public Trust Doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the seashore, running waters, air, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.” 39.   In   Intellectuals Forum   v.   State of A.P (2006) 3 SCC 549 , this Court while balancing the conservation of natural resources vis­à­ vis urban development observed as under: (SCC p. 572, para 67) “ 67 . The responsibility of the State to protect the environment is now a well­accepted notion in all countries. It is this notion that, in   international   law,   gave   rise   to   the   principle   of   ‘State responsibility’   for   pollution   emanating   within   one’s   own 14 territories ( Corfu Channel case ). This responsibility is clearly enunciated   in   the   United   Nations   Conference   on   the   Human Environment , Stockholm 1972 (Stockholm Convention), to which India was a party. The relevant clause of this declaration in the present context is para 2, which states: ‘The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural   ecosystems,   must   be   safeguarded   for   the   benefit   of present   and   future   generations   through   careful   planning   or management, as appropriate.’ Thus, there is no doubt about the fact that there is a responsibility bestowed upon the Government to protect and preserve the tanks, which are an important part of the environment of the area.” 7.2 This   Court   further   observed   in   paragraphs   60   &   69   as under: “60.  There cannot be any two opinions that natural resources are the assets of the nation and its citizens. It is the obligation of all concerned, including the Central and the State Governments, to conserve and not waste such valuable resources. Article 48­A of 15 the Constitution requires that the State shall endeavour to protect and   improve   the   environment   and   safeguard   the   forests   and wildlife of the country. Similarly, Article 51­A enjoins a duty upon every   citizen   to   protect   and   improve   the   natural   environment including   forests,   lakes,   rivers   and   wildlife,   and   to   have compassion for all the living creatures. In view of the constitutional provisions, the doctrine of public trust has become the law of the land. The said doctrine rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, water and forests are of such great importance to the people as a whole that it would be highly unjustifiable to make them a subject of private ownership.  Considering the principles of interpretation and the wordings 69. used in Section 22, in our considered opinion, the provision is not a complete and absolute bar for taking action by the police for illegal and dishonestly committing theft of minerals including sand from the riverbed. The Court shall take judicial notice of the fact that   over   the   years   rivers   in   India   have   been   affected   by   the alarming rate of unrestricted sand mining which is damaging the ecosystem   of   the   rivers   and   safety   of   bridges.   It   also   weakens riverbeds, fish breeding and destroys the natural habitat of many organisms. If these illegal activities are not stopped by the State and   the   police   authorities   of   the   State,   it   will   cause   serious repercussions as mentioned hereinabove. It will not only change the river hydrology but also will deplete the groundwater levels.” 7.3 That thereafter, after considering the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act, this Court opined that there is no complete and absolute bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where the   offences   committed   by   persons   are   penal   and   cognizable offence.  Ultimately, this Court concluded in paragraphs 72 and 73 as under: “72.  From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is manifest that the ingredients constituting the offence are different. The contravention of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing mining activity in violation of Section 4 of the Act is an offence punishable under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly removing sand, 16 gravel and other minerals from the river, which is the property of the   State,   out   of   the   State’s   possession   without   the   consent, constitute an offence of theft. Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from taking action against persons for committing theft of sand and minerals   in   the   manner   mentioned   above   by   exercising   power under the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report before the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such persons. In other words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the government land, the police can register a case, investigate the same and submit a final report under Section 173 CrPC before a Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in Section 190(1)( d ) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 73.  After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act vis­à­vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, we are of the definite opinion   that   the   ingredients   constituting   the   offence   under   the MMDR Act and the ingredients of dishonestly removing sand and gravel from the riverbeds without consent, which is the property of the   State,   is   a   distinct   offence   under   IPC.   Hence,   for   the commission of offence under Section 378 IPC, on receipt of the police   report,   the   Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   can   take cognizance   of   the   said   offence   without   awaiting   the   receipt   of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the MMDR Act. Consequently, the contrary view taken by the different High Courts cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, overruled. Consequently,   these   criminal   appeals   are   disposed   of   with   a direction to the Magistrates concerned to proceed accordingly.” 7.4 Thus, as held by this Court, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the MMDR Act against prosecution of a person except on a written complaint made by the authorised officer in this behalf would be attracted only when such person is sought to be prosecuted for contraventions of Section 4 of the MMDR Act 17 and not for any act or omission which constitutes an offence under the Penal Code.   8. However,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the   case   of this   Court   had   no   occasion   and/or   had   not Sanjay   (supra),   considered when and at what stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act would be attracted.  The further question which is required   to   be   considered   is,   when   and   at   what   stage   the Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance attracting the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act? 8.1 While   considering   the   aforesaid   issue,   Section   22   of   the MMDR Act is required to be referred to, which is as under: “   .—No court shall take cognizance of 22. Cognizance of offences any   offence   punishable   under   this   Act   or   any   Rules   made thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government.”   Reading the aforesaid provision would show that cognizance of any offence punishable under the MMDR Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be taken only upon a written complaint made   by   a   person   authorised   in   this   behalf   by   the   Central Government   or   the   State   Government.     Therefore,   on   a   fair 18 reading   of   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act,   the   bar   would   be attracted when the Magistrate takes cognizance. 9. Let us now consider the question in the light of judicial pronouncements on the point. 9.1. In the case of  Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 (Supp) , after considering a five Judge Bench judgment of this SCC 121 Court in the case of   A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC  500, it is observed in paragraph 4 as under: “4.   Taking   cognizance   has   assumed   a   special   meaning   in   our criminal jurisprudence. We may refer to the view taken by a five Judge bench of this Court in   A.R. Antulay   v.   Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak   (supra)   at   p.   530   (para   31)   of   the   reports   this   Court indicated: “When a private complaint is filed, the court has to examine the complainant on oath save in the cases set out in the proviso to Section 200 CrPC After examining the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would be open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made out   for   issuing   process.   When   it   is   said   that   court   issued process, it means the court has taken cognizance of the offence and   has   decided   to   initiate   the   proceedings   and   a   visible manifestation   of   taking   cognizance   process   is   issued   which means that the accused is called upon to appear  before the court.” The extract from the Constitution Bench judgment clearly indicates that filing of a complaint in court is not taking cognizance and what exactly constitutes taking cognizance is different from filing of a complaint…..” 9.2 In the case of  Manohar M. Galani v. Ashok N. Advani (1999) 8 SCC 737,  when the bar under Section 195 Cr. P.C. was pressed 19 into   service   and   the   High   Court   quashed   the   complaint   and enquiry on the basis of the FIR registered by the complainant, while   setting   aside   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   this Court accepted the submission on behalf of the State that the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. can be gone into at the stage when the court takes cognizance of the offence and investigation on the basis of the information received could not have been quashed and an investigating agency cannot be throttled at this stage from proceeding with the investigation particularly when the charges are serious and grave. 9.3 In   the   case   of   S.K.   Sinha,   Chief   Enforcement   Officer   v. Videocon International Limited, (2008) 2 SCC 492, in paragraphs 19 to 34 , it is observed and held as under: “19. The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means “become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. 20. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case 20 and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance. 21. Chapter XIV (Sections 190-199) of the Code deals with “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) thereof is material and may be quoted in extenso: “190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates —(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence— (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.” 22. Chapter XV (Sections 200-203) relates to “Complaints to Magistrates” and covers cases before actual commencement of proceedings in a court or before a Magistrate. Section 200 of the Code requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Section 202, however, enacts that a Magistrate is not bound to issue process against the accused as a matter of course. It enables him before the issue of process either to inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding further. The underlying object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused. It thus allows a Magistrate to form an opinion whether the process should or should not be issued. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 is, no doubt, extremely limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is called upon to see is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused. 23. Then comes Chapter XVI (Commencement of proceedings before Magistrates). This Chapter will apply only after cognizance of an offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Chapter XIV. Section 204, whereunder process can be issued, is another material provision which reads as under: “204. Issue of process.—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be— (a) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or 21 (b) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process- fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87.” 24. From the above scheme of the Code, in our judgment, it is clear that “Initiation of proceedings”, dealt with in Chapter XIV, is different from “Commencement of proceedings” covered by Chapter XVI. For commencement of proceedings, there must be initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of proceedings must precede commencement of proceedings. Without initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV, there cannot be commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate under Chapter XVI. The High Court, in our considered view, was not right in equating initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV with commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI. 25. Let us now consider the question in the light of judicial pronouncements on the point. 26. In Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437, the High Court of Calcutta had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking cognizance” under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which was in pari materia with Section 190 of the present Code of 1973. Referring to various decisions, Das Gupta, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated: (AIR p. 438, para 7) “7. … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the 22 subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” 27. R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207 was probably the first leading decision of this Court on the point. There, the police, having suspected the appellant-accused to be guilty of offences punishable under Sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code (IPC) as also under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, applied to the District Magistrate, Kanpur to issue warrant of arrest on 22- 10-1947. Warrant was issued on the next day and the accused was arrested on 27-10-1947. 28. On 25-3-1949, the accused was produced before the Magistrate to answer the charge-sheet submitted by the prosecution. According to the accused, on 22-10-1947, when warrant for his arrest was issued by the Magistrate, the Magistrate was said to have taken cognizance of offence and since no sanction of the Government had been obtained before that date, initiation of proceedings against him was unlawful. The question before the Court was as to when cognizance of the offence could be said to have been taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code. Considering the circumstances under which “cognizance of offence” under sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code can be taken by a Magistrate and referring to Abani Kumar Banerjee (supra), the Court, speaking through Kania, C.J. stated: (Chari case (supra), AIR p. 208, para 3) “3. It is clear from the wording of the section that the initiation of the proceedings against a person commences on the cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first contingency evidently is in respect of non-cognizable offences as defined in CrPC on the complaint of an aggrieved person. The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of a cognizable offence when the police have completed their investigation and come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process. The third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice of an offence and issues the process. It is important to remember that in respect of any cognizable offence, the police, at the initial stage when they are investigating the matter, can arrest a person without obtaining an order from the Magistrate. Under Section 167(b) CrPC the police have of course to put up the person so arrested before a Magistrate within 24 hours and obtain an order of remand to police custody for the purpose of further investigation, if they so desire. But they have the power to arrest a person for the purpose of investigation without approaching the Magistrate first. Therefore, in cases of cognizable offence before proceedings are initiated and while the matter is under investigation by the police the suspected 23 person is liable to be arrested by the police without an order by the Magistrate.” 29. Approving the observations of Das Gupta, J. in Abani Kumar Banerjee(supra), this Court held that it was on 25-3-1949 when the Magistrate issued a notice under Section 190 of the Code against the accused that he took “cognizance” of the offence. Since before that day, sanction had been granted by the Government, the proceedings could not be said to have been initiated without authority of law. 30. Again in Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B.AIR 1959 SC 1118, this Court observed that when cognizance is taken of an offence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuance of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or a warrant of arrest of the accused cannot by itself be regarded as an act of taking cognizance of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and thereby had taken cognizance of an offence (see also Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B. AIR 1963 SC 765 and Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala, (1978) 4 SCC 58). 31. In Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986, referring to earlier judgments, this Court said: (AIR p. 989, para 7) “7. … We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word ‘may’ in Section 190 to mean ‘must’. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code.” 32. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753, the Court stated that it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code, he must have not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him, but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the provisions following that section. Where, however, he 24 applies his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) or issues a warrant for arrest of the accused, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 33. In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra (1971) 2 SCC 654, speaking for the Court, Shelat, J. stated that under Section 190 of the Code, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence either (a) upon receiving a complaint, or (b) upon a police report, or (c) upon information received from a person other than a police officer or even upon his own information or suspicion that such an offence has been committed. As has often been said, taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, thus, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. 34. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252, this Court said: (SCC p. 257, paras 13-14) “13. It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words ‘may take cognizance’ which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with ‘must take cognizance’. The word ‘may’ gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. 14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by ‘taking cognizance of an offence’ by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV 25 of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence.” (see also M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1967 SC 528). 9.4 In the case of   Fakhruddin Ahmad v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 17 SCC 157, in paragraphs 9 to 17,  it is observed and held as under: “9.  Before examining the rival contentions, we may briefly refer to some of the relevant provisions in the Code. Chapter XIV of the Code,   containing   Sections   190   to   199   deals   with   the   statutory conditions requisite for initiation of criminal proceedings and as to the powers of cognizance of a Magistrate. Sub­section (1) of Section 190 of the Code empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in the manner laid therein. It provides that a Magistrate may   take   cognizance   of   an   offence   either   ( a )   upon   receiving   a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; or ( b ) upon a police report of such facts; or ( c ) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 10.   Chapter   XV   containing   Sections   200   to   203   deals   with “Complaints to Magistrates” and lays down the procedure which is required to be followed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence   on   complaint.   Similarly,   Chapter   XVI   deals   with “Commencement   of   Proceedings   before   Magistrates”.   Since admittedly,   in   the   present   case,   the   Magistrate   has   taken cognizance of the complaint in terms of Section 190 of the Code, we shall confine our discussion only to the said provision. We may, however, note that on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate has more than one course open to him to determine the procedure and the manner to be adopted for taking cognizance of the offence. 11.   One of the courses open to the Magistrate is that instead of exercising   his   discretion   and   taking   cognizance   of   a   cognizable offence and following the procedure laid down under Section 200 or Section 202 of the Code, he may order an investigation to be made by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code, which the learned Magistrate did in the instant case. When such an order is 26 made, the police is obliged to investigate the case and submit a report under Section 173(2) of the Code. On receiving the police report, if the Magistrate is satisfied that on the facts discovered or unearthed by the police there is sufficient material for him to take cognizance of the offence, he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)( b ) of the Code and issue process straightaway to the accused. However, Section 190(1)( b ) of the Code does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the   investigating   officer   gives   an   opinion   that   the   investigation makes   out   a   case   against   the   accused.   Undoubtedly,   the Magistrate   can   ignore   the   conclusion(s)   arrived   at   by   the investigating officer. 12.  Thus, it is trite that the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of the investigating  officer  and he is  competent  to exercise his discretion in this behalf, irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report and decide whether an offence has been made out or not. This is because the purpose of the police report under Section 173(2) of the Code, which will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police as well as the conclusion drawn by the police therefrom is primarily to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether on the basis of the report and the material referred therein, a case for cognizance is made out or not. 13.   The next incidental question is as to what is meant by the expression “taking cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 of the Code? 14.  The expression “cognizance” is not defined in the Code but is a word of indefinite import. As observed by this Court in  Ajit Kumar Palit  v.  State of W.B., AIR 1963 SC 765  (AIR p. 770, para 19) “ 19 .   …   The   word   ‘cognizance’   has   no   esoteric   or   mystic significance   in   criminal   law  or   procedure.   It   merely   means— become aware of and when used with reference to a court or Judge, to take notice of judicially.” Approving the observations of the Calcutta High Court in  Emperor v.  Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1910) 37 Cal. 412  (at ILR p. 416), the Court said that “taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind  to the suspected commission of an offence.” (emphasis supplied) 15.   Recently, this Court in   Chief Enforcement Officer   v.   Videocon 4 International   Ltd.   speaking   through   C.K.   Thakker,   J.,   while considering the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking cognizance” under   Section   190   of   the   Code,   has   highlighted   some   of   the observations of the Calcutta High Court in  Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs  v.  Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437  which 27 were approved by this Court in  R.R. Chari  v.  State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207.   The observations are: ( Abani Kumar Banerjee case(supra), AIR p. 438, para 7) “ 7 . … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)( a ) CrPC, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under Section 200,   and   thereafter   sending   it   for   enquiry   and   report   under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding  under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” 16.  From the aforenoted judicial pronouncements, it is clear that being an expression of indefinite import, it is neither practicable nor desirable to precisely define as to what is meant by “taking cognizance”.   Whether   the   Magistrate   has   or   has   not   taken cognizance of the offence will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action. 17.  Nevertheless, it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he must have taken notice of the accusations and  applied his mind  to the allegations made in the complaint or in the police report or the information received from a source other than a police report, as the case may be, and the material filed therewith. It needs little emphasis that it is only when the Magistrate  applies his mind  and is   satisfied   that   the   allegations,   if   proved,   would   constitute   an offence   and   decides   to   initiate   proceedings   against   the   alleged offender,   that   it   can   be   positively   stated   that   he   has   taken cognizance of the offence. Cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender.” 9.5 In the case of   Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 , it is observed in paragraphs 34 to 37 as under: “34.   The   argument   of   the   learned   Attorney   General   that   the question of granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises only at the stage 28 of taking cognizance and not before that is neither supported by the plain language of the section nor the judicial precedents relied upon by him. Though, the term “cognizance” has not been defined either in the 1988 Act or CrPC, the same has acquired a definite meaning and connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal parlance cognizance is “taking judicial notice by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter judicially”. 35.  In  R.R. Chari  v.  State of U.P AIR 1951 SC 207 , the three­Judge Bench approved the following observations made by the Calcutta High Court in   Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs   v.   Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR 1950 Cal. 437, : (AIR p. 438, para 7) “ . … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the 7 Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)( a ), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done   so   for   the   purpose   of   proceeding   in   a   particular   way   as indicated   in   the   subsequent   provisions   of   this   Chapter,— proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind   not   for   the   purpose   of   proceeding   under   the   subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind e.g.   ordering   investigation   under   Section   156(3),   or   issuing   a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” 36.  In State of W.B. v.  Mohd. Khalid (1995) 1 SCC 684 , the Court referred to Section 190 CrPC and observed: (SCC p. 696, para 43) “ 43 . … In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps   to   see   whether   there   is   any   basis   for   initiating   judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word ‘cognizance’ indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an   offence.   It   is   entirely   a   different   thing   from   initiation   of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons.”  In State of Karnataka v.  Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728 , this 37. Court referred to the provisions of Chapter XIV and Sections 190 and 196(1­A) CrPC and observed: (SCC p. 732, para 8) “ 8 . … There is no bar against registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the 29 police on completion of investigation, as contemplated by Section 173   CrPC.   If   a   criminal  case   is   registered,   investigation   of   the offence is done and the police submits a report as a result of such investigation before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of the   Central   Government   or   of   the   State   Government   or   of   the District Magistrate, there will be no violation of Section 196(1­A) CrPC and no illegality of any kind would be committed.” 9.6 In the case of   Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC it is observed and held in paragraphs 12 to 15 as under: 705,  “12.   We will now examine whether the order directing investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC would amount to taking cognizance of the offence, since a contention was raised   that   the   expression   “cognizance”   appearing   in Section 19(1) of the PC Act will have to be construed as post­cognizance   stage,   not   pre­cognizance   stage   and, therefore,   the   requirement   of   sanction   does   not   arise prior   to   taking   cognizance   of   the   offences   punishable under the provisions of the PC Act. 13.   The   expression   “cognizance”   which   appears   in Section   197   CrPC   came   up   for   consideration  before   a three­Judge Bench of this Court in  State of U.P.  v.  Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372,  and this Court expressed the following view: (SCC pp. 375, para 6) “ 6 . … ‘ 10 . … And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any   person   other   than   a  police   officer,   or   upon   his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the   Code   unless   sanction   is   obtained   from   the appropriate   authority,  if   the  offence,  alleged  to  have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection   is   afforded   but   it   also   specifies   the 30 conditions   and   circumstances   in   which   it   shall   be available   and   the   effect  in   law  if   the   conditions   are satisfied.   The   mandatory   character   of   the   protection afforded   to   a   public   servant   is   brought   out   by   the expression,   ‘no   court   shall   take   cognizance   of   such offence except with the previous sanction’. Use of the words ‘no’ and ‘shall’ makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very   cognizance   is   barred.   That   is,   the   complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to   Black’s Law Dictionary  the word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the   exercise   of   jurisdiction’   or   ‘power   to   try   and determine   causes’.   In   common   parlance,   it   means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining   a   complaint   or   taking   notice   of   it   or exercising   jurisdiction   if   it   is   in   respect   of   a   public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty.” 14.   In   State of W.B.   v.   Mohd. Khalid (1995) 1 SCC 684 , this Court has observed as follows: “ 13 .   It   is   necessary   to   mention   here   that   taking cognizance   of   an   offence   is   not   the   same   thing   as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process   is   at   a   subsequent   stage   when   after considering   the   material   placed   before   it   the   court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out. The meaning of the said expression was also considered by this Court in  Subramanian Swamy case (2012) 3 SCC 64 . 15.   The   judgments   referred   to   hereinabove   clearly indicate   that   the   word   “cognizance”   has   a   wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. When a Special Judge refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) 31 CrPC,   obviously,   he   has   not   taken   cognizance   of   the offence and, therefore, it is a pre­cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post­cognizance stage. When a Special   Judge   takes   cognizance   of   the   offence   on   a complaint  presented   under   Section   200   CrPC  and   the next step to be taken is to follow up under Section 202 CrPC. Consequently, a Special Judge referring the case for   investigation   under   Section   156(3)   is   at   pre­ cognizance stage.” 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the relevant provisions of the law as also the judicial pronouncements, we are of the view that the High Court has not committed any error in not quashing the order passed by the learned Magistrate and not quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 379 and 414.   It is required to be noted that the learned Magistrate in exercise of the suo motu powers   conferred   under   Section   156(3),   Cr.P.C.   directed   the concerned In­charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register the crime case/FIR and directed initiation of investigation and directed the concerned In­charge/SHO of the police station to submit a report after due investigation. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   cases referred to hereinabove, it cannot be said that at this stage the learned   Magistrate   had   taken   any   cognizance   of   the   alleged 32 offences attracting bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act.  On considering the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, it cannot be said that there is a bar against registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police   agency   or   submission   of   a   report   by   the   police   on completion   of   investigation,   as   contemplated   by   Section   173, Cr.P.C.   10.1 At this stage, it is required to be noted that as per Section 21 of the   MMDR  Act,   the   offences   under   the   MMDR  Act  are cognizable.  10.2 As specifically observed by this Court in the case   of   ,   ‘when   a   Special   Judge   refers   a Anil   Kumar   (supra) complaint   for   investigation   under   Section   156(3)   Cr.P.C., obviously,   he   has   not   taken   cognizance   of   the   offence   and, therefore, it is a pre­cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post­cognizance stage’. 10.3 Even as observed by this Court in the case of   R.R. Chari (supra) ,   even   the   order   passed   by   the   Magistrate   ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.  As observed by the Constitution 33 Bench of this Court in the case of  A.R. Antulay(supra) , filing of a complaint in court is not taking cognizance and what exactly constitutes   taking   cognizance   is   different   from   filing   of   a complaint.  Therefore, when an order is passed by the Magistrate for investigation to be made by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code, which the learned Magistrate did in the instant case, when such an order is made the police is obliged to investigate the case and submit a report under Section 173(2) of the Code. That thereafter the investigating officer is required to send report to   the   authorised   officer   and   thereafter   as   envisaged   under Section 22 of the MMDR Act the authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act may file the complaint before the learned   Magistrate   along   with   the   report   submitted   by   the investigating officer and at that stage the question with respect to taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate would arise. 11. Now   so   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   private appellants­violators that in view of the fact that violators were permitted to compound the violation in exercise of powers under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules or Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules and the violators   accepted   the   decision   and   deposited   the   amount   of 34 penalty   determined   by   the   appropriate   authority   for compounding   the   offences/violations,   there   cannot   be   any further criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 379 and   414   IPC   and   Sections   4/21   of   the   MMDR   Act     and   the reliance placed on Section 23A of the MMDR Act is concerned, it is   true   that   in   the   present   case   the   appropriate   authority determined the penalty under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules/Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules, which the private appellants­violators paid and therefore the bar contained in sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act will be attracted.   Section 23A as it stands today has been brought on the Statute in the year 1972 on the recommendations of the Mineral Advisory Board which provides that a ny offence punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder may, either before or after the institution of the prosecution,   be   compounded   by   the   person   authorised   under section 22 to make a complaint to the court with respect to that offence, on payment to that person, for credit to the Government, of   such   sum   as   that   person   may   specify.     Sub­section   2   of Section   23A   further   provides   that   where   an   offence   is compounded   under   sub­section   (1),   no   proceeding   or   further proceeding,   as   the   case   may   be,   shall   be   taken   against   the 35 offender   in   respect   of   the   offence   so   compounded,   and   the

under   sub­section   2   of   Section   23A   shall   be   applicable   with respect   to   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   or   any   rule   made thereunder.     However,   the   bar   contained   in   sub­section   2   of Section 23A shall not be applicable for the offences under the IPC, such as, Section 379 and 414 IPC.  In the present case, as observed and held hereinabove, the offences under the MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder and the offences under the IPC are different and distinct offences.  Therefore, as in the present case, the mining inspectors prepared the cases under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules and submitted them before the mining officers with the  proposals of  compounding  the  same for the amount calculated according to the concerned rules and the Collector approved the said proposal and thereafter the private appellants­ violators   accepted   the   decision   and   deposited   the   amount   of penalty determined by the Collector for compounding the cases in view of sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act and the 1996 rules and even the 2006 rules are framed in exercise of the powers   under   Section   15   of   the   MMDR   Act,   criminal complaints/proceedings for the offences under Sections 4/21 of 36 the MMDR Act are not permissible and are not required to be proceeded further in view of the bar contained in sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act.   At the same time, as observed hereinabove,   the   criminal   complaints/proceedings   for   the offences under the IPC – Sections 379/414 IPC which are held to be distinct and different can be proceeded further, subject to the observations made hereinabove. However,   our   above   conclusions   are   considering   the provisions of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, as it stands today.  It might be true that by permitting the violators to compound the offences under the MMDR Act or the rules made thereunder, the State may get the revenue and the same shall be on the principle of person who causes the damage shall have to compensate the damage and shall have to pay the penalty like the principle of polluters to pay in case of damage to the environment.  However, in view of the large scale damages being caused to the nature and

the policy and object of MMDR Act and Rules are the result of an increasing   awareness   of   the   compelling   need   to   restore   the serious   ecological   imbalance   and   to   stop   the   damages   being 37 caused to the nature and considering the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision, reproduced hereinabove, and when   the   violations   like   this   are   increasing   and   the   serious damage is caused to the nature and the earth and it also affects the  ground   water   levels   etc.   and   it  causes   severe   damage   as

hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the violators cannot be permitted to go scot free on payment of penalty only.  There must be some stringent provisions which may have deterrent effect so that   the   violators   may   think   twice   before   committing   such offences and before causing damage to the earth and the nature.  It is the duty cast upon the State to restore the ecological imbalance and to stop damages being caused to the nature.  As observed by this Court in the case of  Sanjay (supra) , excessive in­ stream sand­and­gravel mining from river beds and like resources causes the degradation of rivers.  It is further observed that apart from threatening bridges, sand mining transforms the riverbeds into large and deep pits, as a result, the groundwater table drops leaving the drinking water wells on the embankments of these rivers dry.  Even otherwise, sand/mines is a public property and 38 the   State   is   the   custodian   of   the   said   public   property   and therefore   the   State   should   be   more   sensitive     to   protect   the environment   and   ecological   balance   and   to   protect   the   public property the State should always be in favour of taking very stern action against the violators who are creating serious ecological imbalance and causing damages to the nature in any form.    As the provisions of Section 23A are not under challenge and Section 23A of the MMDR Act so long as it stands, we leave the matter there   and   leave   it   to   the   wisdom   of   the   legislatures   and   the concerned States. 12. Now   so   far   as   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   State   on   the premise   that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate, confirmed by the High Court, affects the powers of the authorised person to compound the offence, in exercise of powers under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules and Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules is concerned, the same is absolutely misconceived.  By the order passed by the learned Magistrate, confirmed by the High Court, by no stretch of imagination,   it   can   be   said   that   directing   to   file   the   first information report/crime case for the offences under the IPC and even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the rules made 39 thereunder, it affects any of the powers of the authorised person to compound the offence.  In fact, in view of the decision of this Court in the  case of   Sanjay (supra) , in which this  Court has specifically observed and held that so far as the offence under the IPC is concerned, there shall not be any bar under Section 22 of the   MMDR   Act   and   when   before   the   High   Court   the   State supported the order passed by the learned Magistrate and rightly so and when the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is in favour of the State, as such, the State ought not to have filed the special leave petition/appeal.   13. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder vis­à­vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, and the law laid down by this Court in the cases   referred   to   hereinabove   and   for   the   reasons   stated hereinabove, our conclusions are as under: i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section   156(3)   of   the   Code   order/direct   the   concerned   In­ charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made 40 thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted; ii) the   bar   under   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act   shall   be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of the   police   report,   the   Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   can   take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and iv) that   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In­charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the   crime   case/FIR   in   respect   of   the   violation   of   various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after   investigation   the   concerned   In­charge   of   the   police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be 41 sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and   thereafter   the   concerned   authorised   officer   may   file   the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate. v) in a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub­section1 of Section 23A, considering sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the   offender   in   respect   of   the   offences   punishable   under   the MMDR   Act   or   any   rule   made   thereunder   so   compounded. However, the bar under sub­section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further. 42 14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the appeals   filed   by   the   violators/private   appellants   are   partly allowed, to the extent quashing the proceedings for the offences under the MMDR Act – Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act only. The appeal   preferred   by   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   stands dismissed. …………………………………..J. [ASHOK BHUSHAN] NEW DELHI; …………………………………..J. DECEMBER 03, 2020 [M.R. SHAH] 43