Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HARI SHANKER TRIPATHI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHIV HARSH & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/02/1976
BENCH:
ACT:
Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), ss.
2(1)(h), 39(1)(a), 81(1), 87(1) and the Rules framed by the
Allahabad High Court under Act, rr. 3 and 4-Allahabad High
Court Rules, 1952, rr. 4 and l0-Period of limitation under
s. 81(1) for election petition expiring during summer
vacation-Filing of petition on re-opening day-If barred-
General Clauses Act (10 of 1897), s. l0-Applicability.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent was declared elected on April 30, 1974,
in the election to the State Legislative Council. The period
of limitation of 45 days, prescribed by s. 81(1) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, for filing an
election petition, expired on June 14, 1974, when the High
Court was closed for the summer vacation. The appellant,
therefore, filed the election petition on July 8, 1974, the
re-opening day, challenging the respondent’s election. The
High Court dismissed the petition as having been filed out
of time.
Allowing the appeal to this Court and remitting the
matter to the High Court for disposal on merits.
^
HELD . The High Court had issued a notification that
the entire period of the summer vacation from May 25, to
July 7, 1974 was a close holiday, As the period of
limitation expired during the summer vacation, which was a
closed holiday, the Registrar of the High Court was not
competent to entertain the election petition nor could the
appellant have presented the election petition legally to
the Registrar during such period. and so, it is a case to
which s. 10. General Clauses Act, 1897, applies and. the
appellant was justified in filing the petition on the re-
opening day. [312C-D; 313D-E, 318A-B]
(1) Under r. 3 of the Rules framed by the High Court
under the Representation of the People Act, every election
petition shall be presented to the Registrar. and r. 4 lays
down that after the office report is complete, the Registrar
shall place the petition forthwith before the Chief Justice
for reference to the concerned Bench. But, from these rules
it could not be held that there was no impediment in the way
of the appellant in filing the election petition before the
Registrar as the office of the High Court was open and the
Registrar was available. even though the Court was closed.
The presentation before the Registrar, required by r. 3,
must be a legal presentation and not a mere physical
presentation. If on a day the office is open and only Judges
do not sit, it would undoubtedly be a working day of the
Court and the election petition could be presented to the
Registrar or other officer. But, if the Court was observing
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a closed holiday, then the Court is not open even though the
office may remain open for conducting ministerial or
administrative work. Rules 3 and 4 refer to a situation
where the Court is open, because, the Registrar has to take
the legal steps of placing the petition immediately before
the Chief Justice for reference to the Bench concerned and
the assignment of a Judge. This could not be done when the
Court was observing a closed holiday
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, [1974] 3
S.C.R. 31, explained.
Krishna Dhan Mullick v. Umratul Zohra Begam, I.L.R.
[1949] All. 433, approved.
(2) (a) Further. r. 10 of the High Court Rules which is
the only provision which empowers vacation Judges to hear
matters, has a very limited scope and does not empower the
Registrar to entertain or to receive an election petition.
Under the rule normally. Only criminal work shall continue
to be dealt with during vacation, and it is only when other
matters require immediate attention
309
that the vacation Judges have jurisdiction to entertain
them. Election petitions A do not come under these two
categories, so as to be taken up when the Court is observing
a closed holiday. [315E, H-316B]
(b) The mere fact that a practice has grown up of the
Registrar or Deputy Registrars or other officers receiving a
number of applications, which was not strictly justified by
the Rules, would not have the effect of converting what is
legally a closed holiday into a working day. [316B-C]
(c) Rule 4 of the High Court Rules-which provides that
’there any particular number of days is prescribed by these
Rules, the same shall be reckoned exclusive of the first day
and inclusive of the last day, unless, the last day shall
happen to fall on a day on which the offices of the Court
are closed, in which case the time shall be reckoned
exclusive of that day also and of any succeeding day or days
on which the offices of the Court continue to be closed’-
cannot be relied upon by the respondent, because, it applies
only where the period of limitation is prescribed by the
Rules. [316G]
(3) For taking advantage of s. 10, General Clauses Act,
1897, it is necessary that.
(a) an act or proceeding is allowed to be done or
taken in any court or office on a particular
day or within a prescribed period; and
(b) if the Court or office is closed on that day
or the last day of the prescribed period then
the act or proceeding will be deemed to have
been taken in due time if it is done or taken
on the next day afterwards on which the Court
or office is open.
The proviso to the section makes the section
inapplicable to cases where the Limitation Act applies.
In Hukumdev Narain Yadav’s case [19741 3 S.C.R. 31,
this Court held that ss 4 and 5, Limitation Act, do not
apply to election petitions. Therefore, s. 10, General
Clauses Act applies in terms to the instant case. [313A-D]
H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, [1957]
S.C.R. 208, followed.
(4) ’Public holiday’ is defined in s. 2(1)(h) of the
Representation of the People Act to mean any day which is a
public holiday for the purposes of s. 25, Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. But the term ’public holiday’ refers
only to such contingencies as are mentioned in s. 39(1)(a)
of the Act, in the conduct of the actual elections. Section
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87(1) shows that so far as the disposal of election
petitions is Concerned once s. 80 confers power on the High
Court to try them, s. 2(1)(h) would have no application
whatsoever to their trial which will be governed either
according to the Rules framed by the High Court under the
Act, or the general Rules of the High Court, or in
accordance with the C.P.C. In the instant case, the High ‘
Court having framed Rules under the Representation of the
People Act, which provide for the presentation of the
petition to the Registrar, which could only be on a day
which is not a ’closed holiday’, the term ’closed holiday’
will have to be referred to and not ’public holiday’ defined
in s. 2(1)(h). [317B-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE- JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 699 of
1975.
From the Judgment and order dated 10-2-1975 of the
Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 45 of 1974.
J. P. Goyal, S. P. Singh and G. S. Chatterjee for the
appellant.
S. N. Misra, K. C. Agarwala, M. M. L Srivastava and E.
C. Agarwala, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment of
S. Malik, .J. Of the Allahabad High Court who was assigned
as an Election Judge to hear the election petition filed by
the appellant in the High
310
Court. The election petition was filed by the appellant who
was one of the ten candidates for the membership of the U.P.
Legislative Council from Basti-cum-Gorakhpur Local Authority
Constituency. The results of the aforesaid election were
declared on April 30, 1974 and the appellant filed the
election petition ill the High Court on July 8, 197,4
praying that the election of respondent No. 1 be declared
void and that the appellant be declared to be duly elected.
The election petition was placed for hearing before the
learned Judge after he was assigned as a Judge to hear the
election petition by the Chief Justice and the learned Judge
framed 20 issues in the case. Issue No. 8 related to the
question as to whether the election petition had been
properly presented and was within time. As Issue No. 8
related to the maintainability of the petition on the point
of limitation, the learned Judge took up this matter as a
preliminary issue, and after hearing the parties he held
that the petition having been filed beyond time merited
dismissal under s.86(1) read with s.81(1) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951. The election
petition of the appellant was accordingly dismissed by the
High Court by its order dated February 10, 1975 and it is
against this order that the present appeal has been
preferred in this Court.
The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass.
It is not disputed that the results of the election were
declared on April 30, 1974 and normally the election
petition should have been filed in the High Court within 45
days from this date. Accordingly the period of limitation
expired on June 14, 1974. The petition was, however,
presented before the Registrar on July 8, 1974. The
appellant relied on the fact that he was not in a position
to file the petition in the High Court on June 14, 1974
because the High Court was closed for the summer vacation
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and as the High Court was observing a closed holiday the
appellant was entitled to file the petition of the re-
opening which was July 8, 1974 and accordingly he filed the
petition on that day. The appellant, therefore, claimed that
his petition was not time-barred in view of the provisions
of s. 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which would apply
to this case.
The learned counsel for the appellant has reiterated
the same argument before us as in the Court below and has
submitted that for all intents and purposes the summer
vacation being a closed holiday according to the
notification issued by the High Court, the appellant was
legally entitled to file the petition only on July 8, 1974
when the High Court re-opened.
The learned Judge of the High Court rejected the
contention of the appellant on two grounds. In the first
place the learned Judge thought that the matter was clearly
covered by the decision of this Court in Hukumdev Narain
Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra.(l) Second by, the learned
Judge was of the opinion that although the High Court was
closed for the summer vacation, the office of the High Court
was open and the Registrar was available for entertaining
any petition of an urgent nature which was filed by any
petitioner and the Vacation
(1) [1974]3 S.C.R. 31.
311
Bench also functioned during the vacation. In these
circumstances he learned Judge thought that there was no
justification for the appellant to have waited till the re-
opening of the High Court in order to file the election
petition. Mr.. S. N. Misra appearing for the respondents
more or less supported the view taken by the learned Judge
and he also put forward certain additional arguments which
will be dealt with later.
After having heard the arguments of the parties and
going through the record, we find that the view taken by the
learned Judge is legally erroneous. The learned Judge
appears to have drawn an analogy from the facts in the case
of Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra) which appear to be clearly
distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the
case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav this Court was not called upon
to consider the legal significance of the Court having been
closed due to summer vacation, but was considering a case
where the Court was undoubtedly open but the petition was
filed on the Monday instead of the previous Saturday which
though a working day of the Court was not a day on which the
Judges were usually sitting. Secondly the learned Judge
appears to have completely overlooked the provisions of s.
l0 of the General Clauses Act, particularly in view of the
fact that this Court has held that ss. 4 or 5 of the
Limitation Act did not apply to election petitions.
To begin with we would first deal with the case of
Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra). What had happened in that
case was that the election petition was filed on March 20;
1972 instead of being filed on Saturday March 18, 1972 which
was the last day on which the limitation expired. The
election petitioner sought to cross the bar of limitation on
the ground that Saturday not being a working 1 day of the
Court, the petitioner was entitled to file the petition on
the next working day, namely, Monday. This Court on a
consideration of various factors negatived this contention
and held that even though the Judges of the High Court did
not usually sit on Saturdays it was undoubtedly a working
day of the Court and it could not be said that the Court was
observing a closed holiday on Saturday. After referring to a
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large number of decisions and traversing various provisions
of the Limitation Act, this Court observed as follows:-
".... for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in s. 4, ss. 9 to 18 and s. 22 shall apply
only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local
law.........
For all these reasons we have come to the
conclusion that the provisions of s. 5 of the
Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election
petitions or their trial, and in this view, it is
unnecessary to consider whether there are any merits in
the application for condonation of delay."
This Court accordingly held that s. 4 as also s. S of the
Limitation Act had no application to the election petitions
on the true interpretation of s. 29(2) of the Limitation
Act. The Court also held on a
312
reading of rr. 6 & 7 with r. 26 of the Patna High Court
Rules that even though the Judges were not sitting on
Saturdays the- election petition could be presented on a
Saturday to the Registrar or other officers as envisaged by
r. 26 of the Patna High Court Rules. In the instant case,
however, the period of limitation provided by s. 81(1) of
the Representation of the People Act appears to have expired
during the summer vacation which according to the
notification of the Allahabad High court was declared to be
a closed holiday. By virtue of the notification of the
Allahabad High Court dated September 22, 1973 when the High
Court Calendar for 1974 was approved by the Court after
inviting objections from the members of the public, a list
of days had been mentioned to be treated as closed holidays.
The last part of this notification runs thus:
"List of days to be observed as closed holidays in
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad during the
year 1974.
------------------------------------------------------------
Name of holidays Dates on which they fall Days of Number of
the week days
According to According to
Gregorian Indian Calen
Calendar dar saka era
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 4 5
------------------------------------------------------------
Summer Vacation May 25 to Jyaistha 4 to Saturday 44
July 7. Asadha 11, 1896 to Sunday ..
------------------------------------------------------------
In view of this notification, therefore, the legal position
would be that the sunder vacation, namely, the period
starting from May 25 and ending on July 7, 1974, would be
deemed to be close holidays in the High Court. Thus it
follows that June 14, 1974, which fell within this period
would also be a closed holiday. If, therefore, the period of
limitation under s. 81 of the Representation of the People
Act expired on June 14, 1974 which being a closed holiday
right upto July 7, 1974, then s. l0 of the General Clauses
Act would apply in terms and the appellant would be fully
justified in filing the petition on July 8, 1974 when the
Court re-opened after the summer vacation. The relevant
portion of s. l0 of the General Clauses Act runs thus:
"10. (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, any act or
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proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken
in any, Court or office on a certain day or within a
prescribed period, when, if the Court or office is
closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed
period, the act or proceeding shall be ’ considered as
done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the
next day afterwards on which the Court or office is
open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply
to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation
Act, 1877, applies."
313
Analysing the section it would appear that the following
conditions must be satisfied before a litigant may take
advantage of the protection of s 10 of the General Clauses
Act.
(1) that any act or proceeding is allowed to be
done or taken in any court or office on a
particular day or within a prescribed period;
(2) that if the court or office is closed on that
day or the last day of prescribed period then
the act or proceeding will be deemed to have
been taken in due time if-it is done or taken
on the next day afterwards on which the Court
or office is open.
The proviso to s. 10 makes these provisions inapplicable to
cases where the Limitation Act applies. In the instant case
which arises out of the election petition it is manifest
from the judgment of this Court on Hukumdev Narain Yadav
(supra) that the provisions of ss. 4 and S of the Limitation
Act do not apply. It is also clear from the notification of
the High Court referred to above that the entire period of
the summer vacation starting from May 25 to July 7, 1974,
was a closed holiday. Thirdly the period of limitation
prescribed by s. 8(1) of the Representation of the People
Act expired on June 14, 1974 during the summer vacation. In
these circumstances the inescapable conclusion would be that
s. 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply in terms and
the appellant would be entitled to file the election
petition on July 8, 1974 as he did.
In H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh(l)
while interpretating s. 10 of the General Clauses Act, this
Court pointed out the necessary conditions that are required
to invoke s. 10 and held that s. 10 clearly applied to
election petitions. In this connection this Court observed
as follows:
"Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the
per formance of an act in a court or office, and that
period expires on a holiday, then according to the
section’ the act should be considered to have been done
within that period, if it is done on the next day on
which the court or office is open. For that section to
apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there
should be a period prescribed, and that period should
expire on a holiday.. We entertain no doubt that the
legislature has used both the expressions as meaning
the same thing, and there are accordingly no grounds
for holding that s. l0 is not applicable to petitions
falling within Rule 119.
We are also unable to read in the proviso to s. 37
of the Act an intention generally to exclude the
operation of s. l0 of the General Clauses Act in the
construction of the Rules, as that will be against the
plain language of Rule 2 (6) .. .. .... .. .. .... ’..
.... ...... .. The
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(1) [1957] S.C.R. 208.
314
operation of such a beneficent enactment as s. 10 of
the General Clauses Act is not, in our opinion, to
be‘cut down on such unsubstantial grounds as have been
urged before us. We are accordingly of opinion that the
petition which the respondent filed on May 18, 1954, is
entitled to the protection afforded by that section and
is in time."
In these circumstances, therefore, s. 10 of the General
Clauses Act furnishes a complete answer to the reasons given
by the learned Judge in holding that the election petition
filed by the appellant in the High Court was barred by time.
Another reason given by the learned Judge was that even
though the High Court was closed its office was open and the
Registrar was available to receive any election petition.
This reasoning of the High Court fails to consider the
distinction between the opening of the Court and opening of
the office. While the Court may be closed, the office may
remain open for conducting ministerial business or
administrative work. So far as the election petitions are
concerned they are matters of moment and if the power to
receive these petitions was delegated to the Registrar by
the Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court under the
Representation of the People Act, the Registrar must be
deemed to exercise a judicial power which could not be
exercised when the Court was observing a closed holiday. It
would appear that under the rules framed by the High Court
of Allahabad regarding the trial of election petitions, r. 3
required that every election petition shall be presented to
the Registrar and r. 4 laid down that after the office
report etc. is complete the petition shall be laid forthwith
before the Chief Justice for reference to the Bench
concerned. The learned Judge seems to think that in view of
these rules there was no impediment in the way of the
appellant in filing the election petition before he
Registrar who was available luring the summer vacation even
though the Court was closed. We are, however, unable to
agree with this view. These rules clearly refer to a
situation where the Court is open, because the Registrar has
to take legal steps, namely, the placing of the petition
immediately before the Chief Justice for reference to the
Bench concerned and the assignment of a Judge. This could
not be done when the Court was observing a closed holiday.
The presentation before the Registrar as required by r. 3 of
the aforesaid rules must be a legal presentation and not a
physical presentation. For instance, if the Registrar
visited the High Court on a Sunday or on any public holiday,
could it be said that the election petition could be
presented to him and the Registrar may be asked to entertain
the same. The answer to this question must obviously be in
the negative. Therefore, the position would be the same if
the Court by virtue of the notification issued on September
22, 1973, was observing a closed holiday during the summer
vacation. A similar question appears to have arisen before
the Allahabad High Court in a case on appeal to the Federal
Court where six weeks time for depositing security money
expired during the High Court vacation and the Allahabad
High Court clearly pointed out that the mere fact that
certain ministerial officers of the
315
Court were available to conduct the routine matters would
not indicate that the Court was open. In this connection the
Allahabad High Court in Krishna Dhan Mullick v. Umratul
Zohra Begam(l) . observed as follows:
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"The six weeks within which security could be
deposited expired during the High Court vacation. If
the period expires on a closed holiday, it is not
disputed that the time would be excluded in computing
the period of six weeks. This is done under section 10
of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897)...............
The fact that the Court for its own convenience deputes
certain officers to receive the money does not give
them a separate existence and it cannot be urged that
while the Court is closed the office is open. There may
be days when the learned Judges are not sitting and yet
the Court may not be closed, but if the Court is closed
then it cannot be said that the ministerial officers
attached to the Court are an office within the meaning
of the term in section 10 of the General Clauses Act
and they have a separate existence from the Court."
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the
observations made by the Division Bench in the aforesaid
decision, and in fact this . clearly brings out the real
distinction between the functioning of the office of the
High Court and of the High Court itself.
Furthermore, it would appear from r. 10 of Ch. V of the
Allahabad High Court Rules, that this is the only provision
which em powers the Vacation Judge to hear certain types of
matters. The rule may be extracted thus: E
"10. (1) Criminal work shall continue to be dealt
with during the vacation by such Judges as may be
appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice.
They may also exercise the original and appellate
jurisdiction vested in the Court in any miscellaneous
matter or any civil matter connected with, relating to,
or arising out of, the execution of a decree, which may
in their opinion, require immediate attention.
Such jurisdiction may be exercised even in cases
which are under the Rules cognizable by two or more
Judges, unless the case is required by any other law to
be heard by more than one Judge. G
(2) Subject to any general of special order of the
Chief Justice, Vacation Judges shall, in the absence of
the Chief Justice. exercise jurisdiction at Allahabad
or Lucknow, as the case may be, in connection with the
arrangement of Benches, listing of cases and other like
matters."
A perusal of r. 10 would clearly indicate that only criminal
work shall continue to be dealt with during the vacation by
such judges as
(1) I.L.R.[1949] All. 433.
316
may be appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice. The
second part of r. 10 no doubt gives jurisdiction to the
Vacation Judges to entertain other matter, but the rider is
that those matters must require immediate attention. This
rule no where empowers the Registrar to entertain or to
receive an election petition. Rule 10 of Chapter V has a
very limited scope and does not include election petitions
which cannot be said to be cases of a criminal nature or
those requiring immediate attention so as to be taken up
even when the Court is observing a closed holiday. It is
true, as the learned Judge pointed out, that the office of
the High Court was open and the Registrar or the Deputy
Registrar etc. were receiving a number of applications, but
the mere fact that such a practice had grown which may not
have been strictly justified by the statutory Rules would
not have the effect of converting what is legally a closed
holiday into a working day. Similarly as indicated above,
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this Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav’s case (supra) was not
at all called upon to consider the significance of a closed
holiday but was deciding a case where on all accounts the
day on which the limitation expired was a working day of the
. Court and where the Court was factually and legally held
to be open. In these circumstances, therefore, the analogy
drawn by the learned Judge from that case does not hold good
in the facts of the present case.
Mr. S. N. Misra appearing for the respondents advanced
two contentions before us. In the first place he drew our
attention to r. 3 of Chapter I of the Allahabad High Court
Rules, the relevant part of which may be extracted thus:
" ’Registrar’ includes- -
(i) the Deputy Registrar at Lucknow, in matters
relating to the Lucknow Bench;
(ii) the Joint Registrar or any other officer,
with respect to such functions and duties of
the Registrar as may have been assigned to
the Joint Registrar or such officer by the
Chief Justice, and
(iii)in the absence of the Registrar, the Joint
Registrar or any other officer authorized to
act on his behalf;"
Rule 3 no doubt provides that the Registrar includes the
Deputy Registrar and other officers. Rule 4 of Chapter I
would have no application to the present case because this
rule applies only to such cases where the period of
limitation is prescribed by the Rules. In r the instant
case, be period of limitation is not prescribed by the Rules
made by the High Court of Allahabad but by s. 81(1) of the
Representation of the People Act itself, and therefore this
rule can- . not be of any assistance to the respondents. ’
It was then submitted that under s. 2(1)(h) of the
Representation of the People Act, "public holiday" was
defined as meaning any day which is a public holiday for the
purposes of section 25 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881. It was contended that as the notification issued by
the High Court declared the summer vacation
317
to be a closed holiday it could not be construed as a
holiday under s 25 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and it
would not be deemed to be a public holiday of which the
appellant could have taken any advantage. The argument is
undoubtedly attractive but on a deeper probe it does not
appear to be tenable. The term "public holiday" referred to
in s. 2(1) (h) of the Representation of the People Act has
nothing to do with any administrative functions exercised by
the High Court but refers only to such contingencies as are
mentioned in the conduct of the actual elections under the
provisions of the Representation of the People Act. For
instance s. 39(1)(a) provides thus;
39. (1) As soon as the notification calling upon
the elected members or the members of the Legislative
Assembly of a State or the members of the electoral
college of a Union territory to elect a member or
members is issued, the Election Commission shall, by
notification in the official Gazette, appoint-
(a) the last date for making nominations which
shall be the seventh day after the date of publication
of the first mentioned notification or, if that day is
a public holiday, the next succeeding day which is not
a public holiday."
The word "public holiday" used in s. 39(1) (a) would
undoubtedly refer to public holiday as defined in s. 2 (1)
(h) of the Representation of the People Act. So far as the
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disposal of the election petitions is concerned, once s. 80
confers the power on the High Court to try an election
petition, s. 2 (1) (h) would have no‘application what soever
to the trial of such election petition by the High Court
which will be governed either according to the Rules framed
by the High Court under the Representation of the People Act
or under the r general Rules of the High. Court or in
accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. This is borne
out by s. 87(1) of the Representation of the People Act
which may be extracted as follows:
"87. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and
of any rules made there under every election petition
shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be,
in accordance with the procedure applicable under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits:
Provided *"
In the instant case the High Court having framed the Rules
under the Representation of the People Act which provided
for the presentation of the election petitions to the
Registrar, which as we have held could r only be done on a
day which is not a closed holiday, the term "closed holiday"
would have to be referred to as defined by the High Court
Rules and not by s. 2(1) (h) of the Representation of the
People Act. In these circumstances, therefore, the
contention of the respondents on this score must be
overruled. \ H
For the reasons given above we are satisfied that as
the period of limitation expired during the summer vacation
which was a closed
6-5225CI/76
318
holiday by virtue of the notification issued by the High
Court, the . Registrar was not competent to entertain the
election petition nor could the appellant have presented the
election petition legally to the Registrar during such
period. We are further satisfied that this is a case in
which s. 10 of the General Clauses, Act applies in terms and
the appellant was fully justified in filing the election
petition on the re opening day of the High Court, namely,
July 8, 1974. In these B; circumstances the view taken by
the High Court that the election t, petition was barred by
time is wrong on a point of law, and the finding of the
learned Judge on issue No. 8 cannot, therefore, be
sustained.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the
High Court dated February 10, 1975, is set aside and the
matter is remitted to the learned Judge for trying the
election petition in-accordance with the law. In the special
circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs in
this Court.
V.P.S. Appeal allowed.
319