IN RE ARTICLE 370 OF THE CONSTITUTION vs. NaN

REPORTABLE I N   THE  S UPREME  C OURT   OF  I NDIA C IVIL  O RIGINAL  J URISDICTION RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1099   2019     D R . S HAH  F AESAL  A ND  O RS .                    …P ETITIONER ( S ) V ERSUS U NION   OF  I NDIA   AND  A NR .                            …R ESPONDENT ( S ) And RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1013   2019     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 722  OF  2014     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 871  OF  2015     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 396  OF  2017     SLP (C IVIL ) N O . 19618  OF  2017   RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 756   2017   RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 398   2018   RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 924   2018     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1092  OF  2018     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1162  OF  2018     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1082  OF  2019   Signature Not Verified   W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1048  OF  2019   Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2020.07.04 11:23:15 IST Reason: RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1068   2019   1 RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1037   2019     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1062  OF  2019     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1070  OF  2019     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1104  OF  2019     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1165  OF  2019   RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1210   2019   RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1222   2019   RIT ETITION IVIL O OF   W  P  (C ) N . 1268   2019     W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1368  OF  2019     ORDER   1. These cases pertain to the constitutional challenge before this Court as regards to two Constitution Orders issued by the President of India in exercise of his powers under Article 370 of the Constitution of India.  2. At the outset, learned senior counsel appearing for one of the Petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 1013/19 and Petitioner in W.P. (C)   1368/19   raised   the   contention   that   the   present   matter needs to be referred to a larger Bench as there were contrary opinions   by   two   different   Constitution   Benches   on   the interpretation of Article 370 of the Constitution. This order is confined to the limited preliminary issue of whether the matter 2 should be referred to a larger Bench. We have  not  considered any issue on the merits of the dispute. 3. A brief introduction to the issue to set the context for this order is that after the late Maharaja of Kashmir had entered into a treaty of accession with the Indian State, Article 370 was incorporated   into   the   Indian   Constitution,   which   states   as follows: 370.  Temporary provisions with respect  to the State of Jammu and Kashmir  Notwithstanding   anything   in   this (1) Constitution,— (a)   the   provisions   of   article   238   shall   not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;  (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to— (i)   those   matters   in   the Union   List and the Concurrent   List which,   in   consultation with   the Government   of   the   State,   are declared   by   the President to   correspond   to matters   specified   in   the Instrument   of Accession governing   the   accession   of   the State   to   the Dominion   of   India as   the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the   State,   the   President   may   by   order specify. 3 Explanation  [1950   wording]:   For   the purposes of this article, the Government of the   State   means   the   person   for   the   time being   recognised   by   the   President   as   the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time   being   in   office   under   the   Maharaja's Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;  [1952   wording]:   For   the Explanation purposes of this article, the Government of the   State   means   the   person   for   the   time being   recognized   by   the   President   on   the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of   the   State   as   the Sadar­i­Riyasat (now Governor) of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office.  (c)   The   provisions   of   article   1   and   of   this article shall apply in relation to that State; (d)   Such   of   the   other   provisions   of   this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State   subject   to   such   exceptions   and modifications as the President may by order specify: Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession   of   the   State   referred   to   in paragraph   (i)   of   sub­clause   (b)   shall   be issued   except   in   consultation   with   the Government of the State: Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to   in   the   last   preceding   proviso   shall   be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2)  If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub­ clause   (b)   of   clause   (1)   or   in   the   second 4 provision to sub­clause (d) of that clause be given   before   the   Constituent   Assembly   for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the   State   is   convened,   it   shall   be   placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3)  Notwithstanding   anything   in   the foregoing   provisions   of   this   article,   the President   may,   by   public   notification, declare   that   this   article   shall   cease   to   be operative   or   shall   be   operative   only   with such exceptions and modifications and from such   date   as   he   may   specify: Provided   that   the   recommendation   of   the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.  Since India’s independence, this Article has remained in the Constitution and has been invoked as and when required.  4. On 20.12.2018, President’s Rule was imposed in exercise of powers under Article 356 of the Constitution of India in the State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir,   which   was   subsequently extended on 03.7.2019.  5. On August 5, 2019, two Constitution Orders were issued by the President in exercise of his power under Article 370, being C.O. Nos. 272 and 273, which are extracted below: C.O. 272 of 2019 5 MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Legislative Department) NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 5th August, 2019 G.S.R   .551(E).—  the   following   Order  made by   the   President   is   published   for   general information:­  THE CONSTITUTION (APPLICATION TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR) ORDER, 2019 C.O. 272 In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1)   of   article   370   of   the   Constitution,   the President,   with   the   concurrence   of   the Government   of   State   of   Jammu   and Kashmir, is pleased to make the following Order:— 1.   (1)   This   Order   may   be   called   the Constitution   (Application   to   Jammu   and Kashmir) Order, 2019.  (2) It shall come into force at once, and shall thereupon   supersede   the   Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 as amended from time to time.  2. All the provisions of the Constitution, as amended from time to time, shall apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and   the   exceptions   and   modifications subject to which they shall so apply shall be as follows:— To   article   367,   there   shall   be   added   the following clause, namely:—  “(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir—  (a) references to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references   to   the   Constitution   or   the 6 provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;   (b)   references   to   the   person   for   the time being recognized by the President on the   recommendation   of   the   Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar­i­Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office, shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir;  (c) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers;  and  (d) in proviso to clause (3) of article 370 of   this   Constitution,   the   expression “Constituent Assembly of the State referred to   in   clause   (2)”   shall   read   “Legislative Assembly of the State”.”  C.O. 273 of 2019 MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Legislative Department) NOTIFICATION  New Delhi, the 6th August, 2019 G.S.R.   562(E).—   The   following   Declaration made by the President is notified for general information:—  DECLARATION UNDER ARTICLE 370(3) OF  THE CONSTITUTION  C.O. 273 In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3)   of   article   370   read   with   clause   (1)   of 7 article 370 of the Constitution of India, the President,   on   the   recommendation   of Parliament,   is   pleased   to   declare   that,   as from the 6th August, 2019, all clauses of the said article 370 shall cease to be operative except   the   following   which   shall   read   as under, namely:—  "370. All provisions of this Constitution, as amended   from   time   to   time,   without   any modifications   or  exceptions,  shall  apply   to the   State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir notwithstanding   anything   contrary contained in article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgment, ordinance,   order,   by­law,   rule,   regulation, notification,   custom   or   usage   having   the force of law in the territory of India, or any other   instrument,   treaty   or   agreement   as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise."  6. These   Constitution   Orders   made   the   Constitution   of   India applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety, like other States in India.  7. Challenging the constitutionality of the aforesaid orders, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel, has argued on the validity of the same. However, as mentioned above, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi and Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned senior counsel, sought a reference to a larger Bench. Therefore, this Court is 8 required   to   hear   the   issue   of   reference   as   a   preliminary question.  Contentions 8. Learned   senior   advocate   Mr.   Dinesh   Dwivedi,   after   placing reliance   upon   the   Constituent   Assembly   debates   and interpreting the language of Article 370, submitted that Article 370 was a transitory provision, which provided for an interim arrangement between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union of India. It was the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and   Kashmir   which   took   a   final   decision   on   the   form   of Government the State of Jammu and Kashmir should adopt. The counsel argued that this Court, in the case of  Prem Nath ,   AIR 1959 SC 749, Kaul v. State of Jammu and Kashmir after considering the various issues, held that Article 370 was   temporary in nature, but the subsequent judgment of  Sampat , AIR 1970 SC Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir   1118 reversed the aforesaid position, recognizing Article 370 as   a permanent provision giving perennial power to the President to regulate the relationship between the Union and the State. Learned   senior   counsel   contended   that   this   conflict   needs 9 reconsideration by a larger Bench. 9. Learned   senior   advocate   Mr.   Sanjay   Parikh   submitted   that after the framing of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the first judgment rendered by this Court was by a Bench of five­judges in  (supra).   This Court, after widely Prem Nath Kaul  discussing the historical background and objective behind the introduction   of   Article   370,   held   that   the   constitutional relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union of India should be finally decided by the Constituent Assembly   of   the   State   and,   therefore,   the   same   has   to   be treated as a temporary provision. 10. The   learned   senior   counsel   further   submitted   that,   the subsequent   cases   of   (supra)  and   Sampat   Prakash   Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir ,   (1972) 1 SCC 536, have not considered the earlier judgment of   Prem Nath Kaul   (supra) .   On the contrary, this Court in   Sampat   (supra) held that neither the Constituent Assembly Prakash   nor the President ever made any declaration that Article 370 has   ceased   to   be   operative.   Moreover,   this   Court   in   the aforesaid case further held that in the light of the proviso to 10 Article   368,   the   President   under   Article   370   is   required   to exercise his powers from time to time in order to bring into effect constitutional amendments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,   under   Article   368.   Therefore,   by   virtue   of   the aforesaid mechanism, it cannot be said that Article 370 was temporary. 11. Furthermore, in the case of   (supra), Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo this   Court,   while   interpreting   Article   370,   ignored   the interpretation   rendered   in   Prem   Nath   Kaul   (supra) .   The aforesaid case also did not decide as to whether Article 370 can continue after the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was enacted.   The   learned   senior   counsel   finally   submitted   that concurrence under Article 370(1)(d) was subject to ratification by   the   Constituent   Assembly   and   therefore,   upon   the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, this power cannot be exercised. 12. Learned   senior   advocate,   Mr.   Zafar   Shah,   representing   the Jammu   and   Kashmir   High   Court   Bar   Association   on   the necessity of reference submitted that while there is no direct conflict between the aforesaid two five­judge Bench decisions of Prem   Nath   Kaul   (supra)  and   Sampat   Prakash   (supra) 11 however if it is held that  Prem Nath Kaul  (supra)   declared that Article 370 as temporary, then there exists a conflict with the subsequent holding of  Sampat Prakash  (supra) . 13. The learned Attorney General submitted that the challenge on the ground of an inconsistency between the decisions in  Prem (supra) and   (supra) is   not Nath   Kaul     Sampat   Prakash     sustainable. The judgments must be read in their context. The earlier   decision   of   Prem   Nath   Kaul   (supra)  was   regarding legislative capacity of the Yuvaraj and the Court never intended on deciding upon the nature of Article 370. However, this Court for the first time in the case of  Sampat Prakash  (supra) dealt with the issue of continuance of powers under Article 370 after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State. In order   to   substantiate   his   contentions,   he   relied   upon   the subsequent   decision   of   State   Bank   of   India   v.   Santosh Gupta ,   (2017) 2 SCC 538   wherein this Court, after placing reliance   upon   the   earlier   decisions,   concluded   that   the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is subordinate to that of the Constitution of India. 12 14. The   learned   Solicitor   General   supported   the   arguments rendered by the learned Attorney General and submitted that a co­ordinate Bench cannot refer the matter to a larger Bench on minor inconsistencies. Rather, the decisions rendered by an earlier   co­ordinate   Bench   are   always   binding   on   the subsequent   Benches   of   equal   strength.   However,   if   the subsequent Bench expresses doubt on the correctness of the earlier decision rendered by a Bench of equal strength, the same has to be referred to a larger Bench. 15. Learned senior advocate, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, appearing for the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1165 of 2019, while opposing the reference, submitted that it is not legally tenable to argue that (supra)  is   per   incuriam   as   it   has   not Sampat   Prakash   considered the earlier decision of  Prem Nath Kaul  (supra) as the decisions should be studied in their context and hence have limited application. Moreover, the present case deals with various other issues which have not been considered by the previous Bench. The submissions made by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned   senior   counsel   were   supported   by   learned   senior advocates   C.U.   Singh,   Shekhar   Naphade   and   Gopal 13 Sankaranarayanan, who submitted that the alleged conflict in the aforesaid judgments do not mandate reference. 16. Based on the submissions of the learned senior counsel, the following questions of law which can be formulated herein are as follows. i. When can a matter be referred to a larger Bench? ii. Whether there is a requirement to refer the present matter   to   a   larger   Bench   in   view   of   the   alleged contradictory   views   of   this   Court   in   Prem   Nath case( supra )   and   case Kaul   Sampat   Prakash   ( )? supra iii. Whether   case   ( supra )   is   per Sampat   Prakash   for   not   taking   into   consideration   the incuriam   decision   of   the   Court   in   case Prem   Nath   Kaul   ( )? supra 17. This Court’s jurisprudence has shown that usually the Courts do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a development. The numbers themselves speak of restraint and the value this Court attaches to the doctrine of precedent .  This Court regards the use of precedent as indispensable bedrock upon   which   this   Court   renders   justice.   The   use   of   such precedents,   to   some   extent,   creates   certainty   upon   which individuals can rely and conduct their affairs. It also creates a basis   for   the   development   of   the   rule   of   law.   As   the   Chief Justice   of   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   United   States,   John 14 Roberts observed during his Senate confirmation hearing, “ It is a   jolt   to   the   legal   system   when   you   overrule   a   precedent. Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and 1 even­handedness .” 18. Doctrine of precedents and  stare decisis  are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty,   stability   and   continuity   in   our   legal   system. Arguably, judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law, therefore they often justify their holdings by relying upon the established tenets of law. 19. When   a   decision   is   rendered   by   this   Court,   it   acquires   a reliance interest and the society organizes itself based on the present   legal   order.   When   substantial   judicial   time   and resources  are spent on references,  the same should  not be made   in   a   casual   or   cavalier   manner.   It   is   only   when   a proposition  is   contradicted  by  a subsequent  judgment  by   a Bench of same strength, or it is shown that the proposition laid down has become unworkable or contrary to a well­established principle, that a reference will be made to a larger Bench. In this   context,   a   five­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Chandra 1  Congressional Record—Senate, Vol. 156, Pt. 7, 10018 (June 7, 2010) 15 Prakash v. State of U.P.,   (2002) 4 SCC 234 , after considering series of earlier ruling reiterated that:  “ 22 . … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of   our   judicial   system.   It   promotes certainty   and   consistency   in   judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is   this   need   for   consistency   in   the enunciation   of   legal   principles   in   the decisions of this Court. ”

20. At the extreme end of this doctrine, we have the example of the House   of   Lords,   wherein   until   1966   it   never   overruled   its decisions   but  only   distinguished   them.   It  was   said   that   an erroneous decision of the House of Lords could be set right only   by   an   Act   of   Parliament   ( refer   Street   Tramways   v. [1898] A.C. 375 and   London County Council,   Radcliffe v. Ribbel Motor Service Ltd. , [1939] A.C. 215). 21. It is only after 1966, due to pressure and the prevailing socio­ economic structure that the House of Lords finally decided to exercise the power of overruling. From then on, there has been a continuous evolution of guidelines which have modified the 16 basis as to when the House of Lords could overrule its earlier decisions. 22. It   may   be   necessary   to   quote   the   opinion   of   Chief   Justice Griffith   of   the   High   Court   of   Australia   in   the   Ex   Parte

In the same case, Barton, J. observed as follows: "  ....I would say that I never thought that it was   not   open   to   this   Court   to   review   its previous   decisions   upon   good   cause.   The question is not whether the Court can do so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need   for   continuity   and   consistency   in   the judicial decision. Changes in the number of appointed   Justices   can,   I   take   it,   never   of themselves furnish a reason for review... But 17 the Court can always listen to argument as to whether   it   ought   to   review   a   particular decision,   and   the   strongest   reason   for   an overruling   is   that   a   decision   is   manifestly wrong and its continuance is injurious to the public interest ". 23. This brings us to the question, as to whether a ruling of a co­ordinate Bench binds subsequent co­ordinate Benches. It is now a settled principle of law that the decisions rendered by a coordinate  Bench  is  binding  on the  subsequent  Benches   of equal or lesser strength. The aforesaid view is reinforced in the National   Insurance   Company   Limited   v.   Pranay   Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680 wherein this Court held that:

18 24. The impact of non­consideration of an earlier precedent 2 by a coordinate Bench is succinctly delineated by  in Salmond   his book in the following manner: …A   refusal   to   follow   a   precedent,   on   the other hand, is an act of co­ordinate, not of superior,   jurisdiction.   Two   courts   of   equal authority   have   no   power   to   overrule   each other’s   decisions.     Where   a   precedent   is merely not followed, the result is not that the later authority is substituted for the earlier,   but   that   the   two   stand   side   by side   conflicting   with   each   other.     The legal   antinomy   thus   produced   must   be solved by the act of a higher authority, which will in due time decide between the competing   precedents,   formally overruling one of them, and sanctioning the other as good law.   In the meantime the matter   remains   at   large,   and   the   law uncertain.

25. In this line, further enquiry requires us to examine, to what   extent   does   a   ruling   of   co­ordinate   Bench   bind   the subsequent   Bench.   A   judgment   of   this   Court   can   be distinguished   into   two   parts:   ratio   decidendi   and   the   obiter dictum.  The ratio is the basic essence of the judgment, and the 2 Salmond on Jurisprudence  (P.J. Fitzgerald ed., 12th edn., 1966), p. 147. 19 same must be understood in the context of the relevant facts of the case. The principle difference between the ratio of a case, and the obiter, has been elucidated by a three­Judge Bench decision of this Court in  Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi , (1996) 6 SCC 44 wherein this Court held that:    …It   is   not   everything   said   by   a   Judge 9. while   giving   judgment   that   constitutes   a precedent.   The   only   thing   in   a   Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision   and   isolate   from   it   the  ratio decidendi .   …   A   decision   is   only   an authority   for   what   it   actually   decides. ….The   concrete   decision   alone   is   binding between   the   parties   to   it,   but   it   is   the abstract  ratio   decidendi ,   ascertained   on   a consideration of the judgment in relation to the   subject­matter   of   the   decision,   which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding . It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution .

26. The   aforesaid   principle   has   been   concisely   stated   by   Lord Halsbury   in  Quinn  v.  Leathem ,   1901   AC   495   (HL)   in   the aforesaid terms: 20 …   that   every   judgment   must   be   read   as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are   not   intended   to   be   expositions   of   the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions   are   to   be   found.   The   other   is that  a case is only an authority for what it actually decides …

27. Having discussed the aspect of the doctrine of precedent, we need to consider another ground on which the reference is sought,   i.e. , the relevance of non­consideration of the earlier decision of a co­ordinate Bench. In the case at hand, one of the main submissions adopted by those who are seeking reference is that, the case of  Sampat Prakash  (supra)   did not consider the earlier ruling in the case of  Prem Nath Kaul  (supra) . 28. The rule of  per incuriam  has been developed as an exception to the   doctrine   of   judicial   precedent.   Literally,   it   means   a judgment passed in ignorance of a relevant statute or any other binding authority [see   Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd ., 1944 KB 718 (CA)]. The aforesaid rule is well elucidated in 3 Halsbury's Laws of England  in the following manner : 3 3rd edn., Vol. 22, para 1687, pp. 799­800. 21 1687 . … the court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam.   A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision   of   its   own   or   of   a   court   of   a coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case   before   it,   or   when   it   has   acted   in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords.   In   the   former   case   it   must   decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is   bound   by   the   decision   of   the   House   of Lords.

29. In this context of the precedential value of a judgment rendered per  incuriam ,   the   opinion   of   Justice   Venkatachaliah,   in   the

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30. The counsel arguing against the reference have asserted that the rule of   per   incuriam   is limited in its application and is contextual in nature. They further contend that there needs to be   specific   contrary   observations   which   were   laid   without considering the relevant decisions on the point, in which case alone the principle of  per incuriam  applies. 31. Therefore, the pertinent question before us is regarding the application   of   the   rule   of   .   This   Court   while per   incuriam deciding the  Pranay Sethi  case (supra), referred to an earlier decision rendered by a two­judge Bench in   Sundeep Kumar 23 Bafna  v.  State of Maharashtra , (2014) 16 SCC 623, wherein this Court emphasized upon the relevance and the applicability of the aforesaid rule:

32. The view that the subsequent decision shall be declared   per incuriam  only if there exists a conflict in the  ratio decidendi  of the pertinent judgments was also taken by a five­Judge Bench decision   of   this   Court   in   Punjab   Land   Development   and 24 Reclamation   Corpn.   Ltd.   v.   Presiding   Officer,   Labour , (1990) 3 SCC 682: Court, Chandigarh

33. In order to analyze the contention of the Petitioners that the judgments   in   question   were   per   incuriam ,   we   need   to understand the context, ratios of the concerned cases and the interpretation of Article 370. Once we have noted the evolution of Article 370, we would be able to appreciate the context of the cases which are sought to be portrayed as being contradictory. 25 34. Under the draft Constitution, Article 370 of the Constitution was   draft   Article   306A,   which   was   introduced   in   the Constituent   Assembly   on   17.10.1947,   by   N.   Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who stated as under:

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27 35. In line with the above observations, Constitution Order 44 was promulgated   under   Article   370(3)   of   the   Constitution, modifying   Article   370   of   the   Constitution   by   amending   the Explanation in Clause 1 of Article 370 in the following terms: “Explanation.—For   the   purposes   of   this Article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative   Assembly   of   the   State   as   the Sadar­I­Riyasat   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir, acting   on   the   advice   of   the   Council   of Ministers of the State for the time being on office”  36. Further, the President in exercise of the power conferred upon him by clause (1) of Article 370 of the Constitution, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, issued the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir)   Second   Amendment   Order,   1965,   which   further brought about change through amendment to Article 367 as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The aforesaid amendment can be observed as under: “( aa ) references to the person for the time being   recognised   by   the   President   on   the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar­i­Riyasat of Jammu and   Kashmir,   acting   on   the   advice   of   the Council of Ministers of the State for the time 28 being   in   office,   shall   be   construed   as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir; ( b ) references to the Government of the said State   shall   be   construed   as   including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers: Provided that in respect of any period prior to   the   10th   day   of   April,   1965,   such references shall be construed as including references to the Sadar­i­Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers.” The aforesaid amendment Order of 1965 was upheld in the Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo  case (supra). 37. After   alluding   to   the   Constituent   Assembly   Debates   and developments subsequent to the coming of the Constitution, we need   to   look   at   the   cases   indicated   by   the   counsel,   which according to them have interpreted the aforesaid provision in a contradictory manner.  38. The first case which needs to be looked at is the   Prem Nath Kaul  case  (supra)  which dealt with the validity of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estate (Abolition) Act, 2007 (17 of 2007   smvt.).   The   main   contention   on   which   the   Act   was impugned was that the Yuvaraj did not have the constitutional authority to promulgate the said Act. One of the arguments 29 canvassed by the Petitioner in that case related to the effect of Article 370 of the Constitution of India on the powers of the Yuvaraj. The Constitution Bench, in deciding that it would be unreasonable to hold that Article 370 could have affected, or was intended to affect, the plenary powers of the Maharaja, made   certain   observations   relating   to   Article   370   of   the Constitution,   which   the   counsel   before   us   arguing   for   a reference   have   relied   upon.   The   observations   of   the Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   (supra) Prem   Nath   Kaul   regarding   Article   370   therefore   merit   reproduction   in   their entirety: 32.  Since Mr Chatterjee has strongly relied on   the   application   of   Article   370   of   the Constitution to the State in support of his argument   that   the   Yuvaraj   had   ceased   to hold   the   plenary   legislative   powers,   it   is necessary to examine the provisions of this article   and   their   effect.   This   article   was intended to make temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It reads thus: xxx Clause (1)( b ) of this Article deals with the legislative power of Parliament to make laws for the State; and it prescribes limitation in 30

31

32 39. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi and Mr. Sanjay Parikh, have given much importance to the above observations of the Court, and have submitted that the implication of the above Statements, in line with the observations made in the Constituent Assembly Debates, is that the exercise of power under Article 370 of the Constitution of India was contingent on the existence of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as the Constituent Assembly had the “final   decision”   on   the   matters   pertaining   to   Article   370. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, when the Constituent Assembly of the State was dissolved subsequent to the drafting and adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the application of Article 370 automatically came to an end, with no further recourse to the same being possible, even without any declaration to that effect being made under Article 370(3) of the Constitution. 40. On this interpretation of the decision in the  Prem Nath Kaul case   (supra),   the   learned   senior   counsel   submit   that   there exists a conflict with the dicta of another Constitution Bench of this   Court   in   the     case   (supra) .   In   the Sampat   Prakash 33 Sampat   Prakash   case   (supra),   this   Court   was   seized   of   a matter pertaining to the detention of the petitioner in that case under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act 13 of 1964. The main point canvassed before the Constitution Bench was   whether   the   continuation   of   Article   35(c)   of   the Constitution   (as   applicable   to   the   State   of   Jammu   and Kashmir),   which   gave   protection   to   any   law   relating   to preventive   detention   in   Jammu   and   Kashmir,   through successive   Constitution   Orders   passed   in   exercise   of   the powers of the President under Article 370 of the Constitution, in   1959   and   1964,   was   valid.   The   Court   held   that   the Constitution   Orders   were   validly   passed   in   exercise   of   the power under Article 370 of the Constitution, which continued beyond the date of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. In this regard, this Court held as follows:

34

35

41. The learned senior counsel urge that these two judgments by Constitution Benches of this Court are in direct conflict with one another, and as such, the present petitions require to be 36 referred to a larger Bench. However, we are not in agreement with this submission of the learned senior counsel. 42. First ,   it   is   worth   highlighting   that   judgments   cannot   be interpreted in a vacuum, separate from their facts and context. Observations made in a judgment cannot be selectively picked in order to give them a particular meaning. The Court in the case (supra) had to determine the legislative Prem Nath Kaul  competence of the Yuvaraj, in passing a particular enactment. The   enactment   was   passed   during   the   interregnum   period, before the formulation of the Constitution of State of Jammu and Kashmir, but after coming into force of the Constitution of India. The observations made by the Constitution Bench in this case, regarding  the  importance  given to the  decision of  the Constituent   Assembly   of   the   State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir needs to be read in the light of these facts.  43. Second ,   the   framework   of   Article   370(2)   of   the   Indian Constitution was such that any decision taken by the State Government, which was not an elected body but the Maharaja of the State acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers which was in office by virtue of the Maharaja’s proclamation dated March 5, 1948, prior to the sitting of the Constituent 37 Assembly   of   the   State,   would   have   to   be   placed   before   the Constituent   Assembly,   for   its   decision   as   provided   under Article 370(2) of the Constitution. The rationale for the same is clear, as the task of the Constituent Assembly was to further clarify the scope and ambit of the constitutional relationship between   the   Union   of   India   and   the   State   of   Jammu   and Kashmir, on which the  State  Government as  defined  under Article 370 might have already taken some decisions, before the   convening   of   the   Constituent   Assembly,   which   the Constituent Assembly in its wisdom, might ultimately not agree with. Hence, the Court in the case of  Prem Nath Kaul  (supra) indicated   that   the   Constituent   Assembly’s   decision   under Article 370(2) was final. This finality has to be read as being limited   to   those   decisions   taken   by   the   State   Government under Article 370 prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly   of   the   State,   in   line   with   the   language   of   Article 370(2). 44. Third , the Constitution Bench in the   case Prem Nath Kaul   ( supra ) did not discuss the continuation or cessation of the operation of Article 370 of the Constitution after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State. This was not an issue 38 in question before the Court, unlike in the  Sampat Prakash case (supra) where the contention was specifically made before, and refuted by, the Court. This Court sees no reason to read into the  Prem Nath Kaul  case (supra) an interpretation which results in it being in conflict with the subsequent judgments of this   Court,   particularly   when   an   ordinary   reading   of   the judgment does not result in such an interpretation. 45. Thus, this  Court is of the opinion that there is no conflict between the judgments in the   case (supra) Prem Nath Kaul   and the  Sampat Prakash  case (supra). The plea of the counsel to refer the present matter to a larger Bench on this ground is therefore rejected. 46. An additional ground canvassed by the learned senior counsel is that the judgment of the Court in the  Prem Nath Kaul  case (supra)  was   not   considered   by   the   Court  in  its   subsequent decision in  Sampat Prakash  case (supra), which is therefore per incuriam . At the cost of repetition, we note that the rule of per incuriam  being an exception to the doctrine of precedents is only applicable to the ratio of the judgment. The same having an  impact  on   the   stability   of   the   legal  precedents   must  be applied   sparingly,   when   there   is   an   irreconcilable   conflict 39 between the opinions of two co­ordinate Benches. However, as indicated above there are no contrary observations made in the   case  (supra) to that of   Sampat Prakash Prem Nath Kaul (supra), accordingly, the case of   Sampat Prakash   (supra) is not  . per incuriam 47. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we do not see any reason to refer   these   petitions   to   a   larger   Bench   on   the   questions considered. ..............................................J.                                                     (N.V. RAMANA)                         ..............................................J.                                                     (SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)        .............................................J.              (R. SUBHASH REDDY)   ..............................................J.               (B. R. GAVAI) ..............................................J.               (SURYA KANT) NEW DELHI; MARCH 02, 2020 40 41 42