Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HARINARAYAN JAISWAL AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/03/1972
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
CITATION:
1972 AIR 1816 1972 SCR (3) 784
1972 SCC (2) 36
CITATOR INFO :
E&R 1974 SC 651 (11)
R 1975 SC 380 (21,35)
R 1975 SC1121 (51,53)
RF 1975 SC2008 (25)
R 1977 SC 722 (17,24,28)
RF 1978 SC1457 (64)
RF 1979 SC1628 (35,36)
F 1980 SC 614 (15)
D 1985 SC1147 (11)
R 1987 SC 251 (29)
RF 1988 SC 771 (5)
RF 1990 SC1927 (5)
ACT:
Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 as amended upto October 6,
1970, Ss. 22 and 29--Scope of--Order made under s. 29 giving
power to Government to accept or reject bid without
assigning any reason--violative of Arts. 14 and
19(1)(g)--Power of Government to sell the privilege of
selling country liquor by private negotiation--Scope of.--
HEADNOTE:
The first respondent was carrying on business of selling
country liquor. In exercise of the powers conferred by s.
29(2) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, the
appellant issued an Order and in pursuance of that Order a
date was notified for selling by public auction the
exclusive privilege. of selling by retail, country liquor in
8 shops. The respondent was the highest bidder but his bid
was rejected because the Government was of the view that
inadequate prices had been offered as a result of collusion
between the bidders. Thereafter, tenders were called for
and the appellant accepted the tender in respect of one shop
and rejected the others as it was again of the opinion that
the price offered was inadequate. Thereafter, the remaining
7 shops were’ sold by private negotiation for substantially
higher prices.
A writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court
was allowed mainly on the ground that the power centered on
the Government by cl. (vi) of the Order, that no sale shall
be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State who
shall be at liberty to accept or reject without assigning
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any reason, was an unguided power violative of Arts. 14 and
19(1) (g).
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : (1) Section 22 of the Act confers power on the
Government to grant to any person on such conditions and for
such period as it may think fit the exclusive privilege of
selling in retail country liquor; and s. 29 empowers the
Government to accept payment in consideration of the grant
either by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as it
may by general order direct. The powers conferred on the
State Government by ss. 22 and 29 are absolute. The
Government cannot be said to have conferred on itself
arbitrary power under cl. (vi) of its Order, passed under s.
29(2), because, the power that the Government reserved for
itself under that clause is nothing more than what was
conferred on it by the Legislature under the sections.
Since the validity of the sections was not challenged the
validity of the Order could not also be challenged. [792 B-
F]
(2) Even otherwise, one of the important purposes of selling
the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is
to raise revenue; and excise ’revenue forms an important
part of every State’s revenue. The Government is a guardian
of the finances of the State and is expected to protect its
financial interests. The fact that the prices fetched by
the sale of the privilege to sell country liquor is an
excise revenue does not change the nature of the right in
the Government. Therefore, the
785
Legislature has empowered the Government to see that there
is no leakage in the revenue. It was for the Government to
decide whether the price offered in an auction is adequate
and the conclusion reached by the Government does not affect
anyone’s rights. [793 D-F; 794 F-G]
(3) Public auctions are held to get the best possible price
and there is no completed contract till the bid is accepted.
There is, therefore, no basis for, contending that the owner
of the privileges who had offered to sell them cannot
decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the
price offered is inadequate, and, it makes no difference
that the Government was the seller. [793 G-H; 794 A]
(4) If the Government is exclusive owner of the privileges,
the respondent could not rely on Art. 14 and 19(1)(g),
because, citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade
or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging
to Government, nor can there be any infringement of Art. 14
if Government tries to get the best available price for its
valuable, rights. Further there is no inherent right in a
citizen to sell intoxicating liquor by retail. [793 A; 794
A-B]
Coverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the
Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Ors., ’ [1954] S.C.R. 873 and
Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. Bhimsen Walait Ram, [1970]
2 S.C.R. 594, followed.
(5) Assuming that the question of arbitrary or unguided
power can be raised it should be remembered that the power
to accept or reject the highest bid is given to the highest
authority in the State, namely, the Government, which is
expected to safeguard the finances of the State and it is
not a case of delegated power but of power conferred by the
Legislature. While accepting or rejecting a bid Government
is performing an executive function and the correctness of
its conclusion is not open to Judicial review where the
power is not used for any collateral purpose. [793 F-, 794
C-E]
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(6) The real conclusion. of the Government was that the
price fixed was inadequate and hence High Court erred in
thinking that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court
that there was collusion between the bidders. [794 E-F]
Barrium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v. Company Law Board and
Ors. [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 311 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v.
S. T. Agarwal, [1969] 1 S.C.C. 325 referred to.
(7) The Government was not precluded, having had recourse to
the auction method once, from either calling for tender or
selling by negotiations. Once the Government declines to
accept the highest bid or the tender price offered, the
government was free to have recourse to other methods. The
pow(* given to the Government to sell in such other manner
as it thinks fit is a very wide and unrestricted power and
includes within it the power to; sell the privilege by
private negotiation. [795 A-B]
(8) The Government is not required by s. 29 (2) (a) to make
an order that the privilege will be sold by private
negotiation, since, it makes no sense to require Government
to first make an order that it is going to negotiate. The
section only says that the State Government ’may by general
or special order direct’ and the direction contemplated is
one to subordinate officials and not to itself. [795 D-F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2024 and
2025 of 1972.
786
C. K. Daphtary, R. C. Misra, Advocate-General for the State
of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the
appellants (in both the appeals).
M. C. Setalvad and Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. 1 (in
C.A. No. 2024 of 1971).
Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2025 of
1971).
The Judgment of the, Court was delivered by
Hegde, J. These appeals by certificate raise common
questions of law for decision. The questions of law arising
for decision can be more conveniently brought out if the
material facts are first set out. It is sufficient, if we
refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1971.
The 1st respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1971 is
carrying on the business of selling country liquor. ’In
pursuance of the order made by the State of Orissa, the
Excise Commissioner notified on January 8, 1971 that the
exclusive privilege of selling by retail the country liquor
in the eight specified shops in the Cuttack District for the
period from April 1, 1971 to March 31, 1972 will be sold by
public auction on February 15, 1971 and on the following
days. The auction was accordingly held on the notified day.
The 1st respondent was the highest bidder for those eight
shops. His bids were provisionally accepted by the
Collector subject to confirmation by the Government. The
Government rejected those bids being of the view that
inadequate price had been offered as a result of collusion
between the bidders. It ordered the Excise Commissioner to
call for tenders in respect of those shops. After the
tenders were duly received, the Government accepted the
tender in respect of one shop and rejected the other
tenders as it was again of the opinion that the price
offered was inadequate. Thereafter it sold the seven shops
by negotiating with some of the tenderers. The price
ultimately fetched was substantially more than that offered
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either at the auction or as per tenders.
Thereafter the 1st respondent moved the, High Court of
Orissa under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a direction to
the Government to confirm his bids and cause the necessary
licences to be issued to him. Various pleas were taken in
support of the relief asked for. Such of them that were
pressed before us will be referred to later. The Government
resisted that application. The High Court came to the
conclusion that the Government had no power to refuse to
confirm the bids of the highest bidders except on good
grounds and the ground that had commended itself to the
Government for refusing to confirm the bids were irrelevant.
It
787
also opined that the absolute power conferred on the
Government to confirm or refuse to confirm the highest bids
without giving any reason was an unguided power and
consequent by violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the
Constitution. The High Court was further of the opinion
that monetary considerations were irrelevant for ’deciding
the question whether the highest bid should be confirmed or
not. Aggrieved by that decision, the State of Orissa has
come up in appeal.
Before proceeding to pronounce on the contentions advanced
at the hearing, it is convenient to set out the relevant
provisions of law as well as the orders passed by the
Government under S. 29 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act,
1915 (as amended upto October 6, 1970) (to be hereinafter
referred to as the Act). The preamble to the Act reads
"Whereas it is expedient to amend and reenact
the law in the Province of Bihar and Orissa
relating to the import, export, transport,
manufacture, possession, and sale of certain
kinds of liquor and intoxicating drugs;
And whereas the previous sanction of the
Governor-General has been obtained,, under
section 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892, to
the passing of this Act;
It is hereby enacted as follows
Section 22 deals with the grant of exclusive privilege of
manufacture and sale of country liquor or intoxicating
drugs. To the extent it is material for our present
purpose, it reads :
"The State Government may grant to any person,
on such conditions and for such period as it
may think fit, the exclusive privilege-
(a).............................
(b).............................
(c).............................
(d).............................
(e) of manufacturing and supplying wholesale
and selling retail, any country liquor or
intoxicating drug within any specified local
area :
Provided that public notice shall be given of
the intention to grant any such exclusive
privilege, and that any objections made by any
person residing within the area affected shall
be considered before an exclusive
788
privilege is granted."
Sub-s. (2) says : "No grantee of any privilege
under sub-s. (1) shall exercise the same
unless or until he has received a license in
that behalf from the Collector or the Excise
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Commissioner."
Section 29 deals with payment for grant of exclusive
privilege. It reads :
"(1) Instead of or in addition to, any duty
leviable under this Act, the State Government
may accept payment of a sum in consideration
of the grant. of any exclusive privilege under
section 22.
(2) The sum payable under sub-s. (1) shall be
determined as follows :
(a) by calling tenders or by auction or
otherwise as the State Government may, by
general or special order direct;- and
(b) by such authority and subject to such
control as may be specified in such order."
Excise revenue is defined in s. 2(9) :
" "Excise-revenue" means revenue derived or
derivable from any duty, fee, tax, payment
other than a fine imposed by a Criminal Court
or confiscation imposed or ordered under this
Act or any other law for the time being in
force relating to liquor or intoxicating drugs
and includes any payment to be made to the
State Government under s. 29."
In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 29(2) of the Act,
the State Government issued an order on January 6, 1971
directing that any sum payable under the aforesaid section
for grant of the exclusive privilege of manufacturing and
selling by retail of country liquor shall, unless otherwise
directed by the State Government, in any particular case or
cases for any reason, ’be determined by auction to be held
in accordance with the procedure specified below:
"(i) the dates and centers for the auction
shall be fixed and notified by the Excise
Commissioner with the prior approval of
Government and the Collector shall then issue
notice for auction and give wide publicity to
the same in such manner as’ he considers
necessary, 15 days before the date fixed for
commencement of the auction;
(ii) the auction shall determine the amount
of monthly consideration money and shall
ordinarily
789
be conducted by the Collector and in his
absence by the Additional District Magistrate;
Provided that the State Government in by
depute an officer from head-quarters to aid
and advise the officer conducting such sales;
(iii) the officer conducting the auction may
satisfy himself as to the solvency of any
bidder and may not allow a person of doubtful
solvency or a person to whom grant of a
licence for retail sale of any intoxicant is
prohibited under Orissa Excise Rules, 1965 to
offer bids in the auction;
(iv) the officer conducting the auction shall
be at liberty to close the auction if he is
satisfied that, there has not been sufficient
or fair competition in which case he may
publicly adjourn the auction, to a specified
hour on the following day or on’ some other
convenient day to be notified by him in the
auction hall;
(v) the highest bid in an auction shall
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ordinarily be, accepted provisionally by the
Collector subject to confirmation by the State
Government and in case where the officer
conducting the auction, refuses to accept the
highest bid as offered, he shall record the
reasons for such non-acceptance and shall
report forthwith the same to the Excise
Commissioner for further action after receipt
of advances from the highest bidder;
(vi) when any bid in an auction for an
exclusive privilege or privileges is
provisionally accepted by the Collector, the
bidder shall deposit two months’ consideration
money as an advance deposit which will be
refunded in case the provisional acceptance is
not confirmed by the State Government. No
sale shall be deemed to be final unless
confirmed by the State Government who shall be
at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assig
ning any reason therefore;
(vii) no licence for any exclusive privilege
shall be granted until acceptance of the bid
is confirmed by the State Government;
(viii) when any bid in an auction for any
exclusive privilege is provisionally accepted
but the advance deposit is not paid, the
exclusive privilege shall
790
be put to reauction as soon as possible at the
risk and loss of the defaulter;
(ix) all bids in an Auction shall be offered
by the bidder in person or by his agent
legally authorised for the purpose."
As mentioned earlier in pursuance of the above order, the
Collector held an auction in respect of the shops mentioned
earlier. The highest bidder had made the necessary
deposits. But. the Government did not accept his bids.
On March 7, 1971, the Government issued the following order
"Whereas for determining the sums payable for
the grant of exclusive privilege of
manufacturing and selling by retail of country
liquor auction had been held in the district
of Cuttack in accordance with the procedure
laid down in the order of the Government of
Orissa in the Excise Department No. S.R.O.
12/71, dated the 6th January 1971;
Whereas due to collusive bids among the
bidders at the said auction it is not
possible to determine the said sums in the
aforesaid manner;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 29 of
the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Bihar
and Orissa Act 2 of 1915) read with the Order
No. S.R.O. 12/71, dated the 6th January, 1971,
the- State Government do hereby direct that
the procedure for determining the aforesaid
sum in respect of the grant of exclusive
privilege of manufacturing and selling by
retail of country liquor in the local areas
specified in the Schedules I for the year
1971-72 shall be as laid down in Schedule II
hereof-
SCHEDULE I
. . . . . . .
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SCHEDULE II
1. The sum payable under sub-section (1) of
Section 29 of the said Act for grant of
exclusive privilege of manufacturing and
selling by retail of country liquor in the
aforesaid local areas shall be determined by
the Excise Commissioner by calling tenders
which may be
791
for individual local area or for lots of such area as the
Excise Commissioner may consider proper;
2. Tender notice shall be issued by the Excise Com-
missioner and published in the Notice Board of his office the C
uttack Collectorate and the offices of Sub Divisional
Officers in that district and shall also be widely published
in such manner as the Excise Commissioner considers
necessary.
3. The tender notice shall, among other things,, mention
that it is open to the State Government not to accept any
tender or to order for calling fresh tenders or otherwise
for such reason as they deem proper in the public interest;
4 to 8...................................
9. The Excise Commissioner shall prepare a list of all the
tenders received and submit the list with his
recommendations of any particular tender with sufficient
reasons alongwith the tender papers to the State Government
for approval. The tenderers whose tenders have been
recommended for acceptance shall deposit two month’s
consideration money as an advance deposit which will be
refunded in case their tenders are not approved by
Government.
10......................................."
As mentioned earlier, the Government accepted the tender in
respect of only one shop and sold the exclusive privilege to
sell country liquor in other shops by negotiation.
Before us the writ petitioners did not challenge the
validity of any of the provisions in the Act; possibly in
their own interest. They are not interested in raising any
contention which might vitiate the auctions held. The
contentions urged on behalf of the writ petitioners have to
be examined, in the background that the provisions of the
Act are not contended to be invalid.
One of the contentions taken on behalf of the writ
petitioners was that the power retained by the Government
"to accept or to reject any bid without assigning any reason
therefore" in cl. (6) of the order made by the Government on
January 6, 1971 in exercise of its powers under s. 29(2) of
the Act was an arbitrary power and therefore it is violative
of Arts. 14 and 1 9 ( 1 (g). This contention has been
upheld by the High Court. It was urged on behalf of the
writ petitioners that they have a fundamental right to carry
on trade or business in country liquor. That right can
792
be regulated only by imposing reasonable restrictions in the
interest of the general public. Restrictions imposed by the
order in question cannot be considered as reasonable
restrictions in the interest of the general public. It was
further urged that the power retained by the Government to
accept or to reject the highest bid without assigning any
reason is an unguided power and hence it is violative of
Art. 14. These contentions were accepted by the High Court.
To us, none of these contentions appear to be well founded.
As seen earlier s. 22 of the Act confers power on the
Government to grant to any person on such conditions and for
such period as it may think fit the exclusive privilege of
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selling in retail any country liquor. Section 29 empowers
the Government to accept payment of a sum in consideration
for the grant of any exclusive privilege under s. 22 either
by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may by
general or special order direct. The, powers conferred on
the State Government by s. 22 and s. 29 are absolute powers.
As seen earlier, the validity of those provisions has not
been challenged before us. Under s. 29(2) the Government
had power to dispose of any of the exclusive privileges
mentioned in s. 22 either by calling for tenders or by
auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order
direct. That being the amplitude of the power of the
Government, we fail to see how the Government can be said to
have conferred on itself arbitrary power under clause (6) of
its order made on January 6, 1971, when it provided that :
" No sale shall be deemed to be final unless
confirmed by the State Government who shall be
at liberty to accept or reject any bid without
assigning any reason therefore."
The power that the government reserved for itself under
that clause is nothing more than what was conferred on it by
the legislature under s. 22 and s. 29 of the Act. It is not
possible to challenge the validity of the order made without
challenging the validity of s. 29 itself.
It is true that this Court has ruled that the right to trade
in intoxicating drugs is also a right to carry on any trade
or business within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (g) see
Krishna Kumar Narula v. Jammu Kashmir State and ors(1). At
the same time, it was held by this Court in Cooverjee B.
Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief
Commissioner, Ajmer and ors.(2) that for determining
reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art’ 19 (6) of
the Constitution on the right given under cl. 19 (1) (g)
regard must be had to the nature of the business and the
conditions prevailing in a particular trade; State has power
to prohibit trades which are illegal or immoral or injurious
to the health and
(1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 50.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 873.
793
welfare of the public and there is no inherent right in a
citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. In that
case the court held that the provisions in the Excise
Regulation 1 of 1915 purporting to regulate trade in liquor
in all its different spheres are not invalid. It was
further held in that case that the charge of licence fee by
public auction is more in the nature of a tax than a licence
fee though it is described as a licence fee. One of the
purposes of the Regulation is to raise revenue. Revenue is
collected by the grant of contracts to carry on trade in
liquor and these contracts are sold by auction. The grantee
is given a licence on payment of the auction price. The
Regulation specially authorises this. The decision in Lala
Harichand Sarda v. Mizo District Council and anr. (1) relied
on by the writ petitioner does not bear on the point under
consideration. it deals with power to grant or refuse to
grant licence to trade in some ordinary commodity under
Lushai Hill Distt. Regulation.
Even apart from the power conferred on the Government under
ss. 22 and 29, we fail to see how the power retained by the
Government under cl. (6) of its order dated January 6, 1971
can be considered as unconstitutional. As held by this
Court in Cooverjee Bharucha’s case (supra), one of the
important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell
liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. Excise
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revenue forms an important part of every State’s revenue.
The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State.
It is expected to protect the financial interest of the
State. Hence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered
the Government to see that there is no leakage in its
revenue. It is for the. Government to decide whether the
price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While
accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an
executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is
not open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of
contravention of Art. 19(1)(g) or Art. 14 can arise in these
cases. The Government’s power to sell the exclusive
privileges set out in s. 22 was not denied. It was also not
disputed that those privileges could be sold by public
auction. Public actions are held to get the best possible
price. ’Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to
be, no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges
in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to
accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered
is inadequate.- There is no concluded contract till the bid
is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was
open to the bidders to withdraw their bids-see Union of
India and ors. v. M/s. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram (2) . By merely
giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights.
The fact that the Government was the seller
(1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 1012.
(2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 594.
794
does not change legal position once its exclusive right to
deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government
is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Art.
19(1)(g) or Art. 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot
have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in
the properties or rights belonging to the Government, nor
can there be any infringement of Art. 14, if the Government
tries to get the best available price for its valuable
rights. The High Court was wholly wrong in thinking that
purpose of ss. 22 and 29 of the Act was not to raise
revenue. Raising revenue as held by this Court in Cooverjee
Bharucha’s case (supra) was one of the important purposes of
such provisions. The fact that the price fetched by the
sale of country liquor is an excise revenue does not change
the nature of the right. The sale in question is but a mode
of raising revenue. Assuming that the question of arbitrary
or unguided power can arise in a case of this nature, it
should not be forgotten that the power to accept or reject
the highest bid is given to the highest authority in the
State i.e. the Government which is expected to safeguard the
finances of the State. Such a power cannot be considered
as an arbitrary power. If that power is exercised for any
collateral purposes, the exercise of the power will be
struck down. It may also be remembered that herein we are
not dealing with a delegated power but with a power
conferred by the legislature.
The High Court erroneously thought that the Government was
bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between
the bidders. The High Court was not sitting on appeal
against the order made by the Government. The inference of
the Government that there was a collusion among the bidders
may be right or wrong. But that was not open to judicial
review so long as it is not proved that it was a make-
believe one. The real opinion formed by the Government was
that the price fetched was not adequate. That conclusion is
taken on the basis of Government expectations. The
conclusion reached by the. Government does not affect any
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one’s rights. Hence, in our opinion the High Court
misapplied the ratio of the decision of this Court in Barium
Chemicals Ltd. and anr. v. Company Law Board and ors.(1) and
Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. T. Agarwal (2) .
It was next urged that having had recourse to the auction
method once, the Government was precluded from either
calling for tenders or to sell by negotiation. The High
Court has accepted that contention. We are unable to agree
with the High Court in its conclusion. Neither the
provisions of the Act nor the order issued by the Government
lend any support to such a conclusion.
(1) [1969] S.C.R. 311
(2) [1969] 1 S.C.C. 325.
795
Once the Government declines to accept the highest bid, the
auction held became useless. Similar is the effect when the
Government refused to accept the highest tender. That left
the Government free to have recourse to other methods. The
power given to the Government by the Act to sell the
exclusive privilege in such other manner as it thinks fit is
a very wide power. That power is unrestricted. It
undoubtedly includes the power to sell the privileges in
question by private negotiation.
It was urged that before adopting the method of selling the
privileges by private negotiation. The Government is
required by S. 29 (2) (a) to make an order that the,
privileges in question will be sold by private negotiation.
The Government has failed to make such an order. Hence the
sales effected are invalid. We, are, unable to accept these
contentions. In the cases of public auctions or in the case
of calling for tenders, orders from the Government directing
its subordinates to notify or hold the auctions or call for
tenders is understandable. Public auctions as well as
calling for tenders are done by subordinate officials.
Further due publicity is necessary in adopting those
methods. TOP require the Government to make an order that
it is going to sell one or more of the privileges in
question by negotiating with some one is to make a mockery
of the law. If the Government can enter into negotiation
with any person, as we think it can, it makes no sense to
require it to first make an order that it is going to
negotiate with that person. We must understand a provision
of law reasonably. Section 29 (2) (a) does not speak of any
order. It says that "the State Government may by general or
special order direct". The direction contemplated by that
provision is a direction to subordinate officials. It is
meaningless to say that the Government should direct itself.
In the result these appeals are allowed and the writ
petitions dismissed. No costs.
V.P.S. Appeals allowed.
796