Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3322 of 2003
PETITIONER:
K.A. Abdul Jaleel
RESPONDENT:
T.A. Shahida
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/2003
BENCH:
CJI., S.B. Sinha & AR. Lakshmanan.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.8996 of 2001]
S.B. SINHA, J :
Leave granted.
Whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any
question relating to the properties of divorced parties arises for consideration
in this appeal. The said question arises out of a judgment and order dated
20.03.2001 passed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissing
an appeal from an order passed by the Family Court, Ernakulam, dated
22.07.1998 in O.P. No.343 of 1996.
The parties to this appeal were married on 03.01.1988. A female
child was born out their wedlock on 11.10.1988. Allegedly, after the birth of
the second child, owing to deterioration in the health of the respondent
herein, the relationship of the parties became strained. The respondent
contended that at the time of marriage, a large amount in cash as also gold
ornaments were given. From the cash amount the appellant herein
purchased a property described in Schedule ’A’ of the petition on
01.02.1988. The balance amount was kept by the appellant. He allegedly
further sold the gold ornaments of the respondent and out of the sale
proceeds he purchased the property described in Schedule ’B’ of the
petition.
In respect of properties an agreement marked Exhibit A1 was
executed by the parties, in terms whereof it was agreed that the properties
purchased from the aforesaid amount will be transferred in the name of the
respondent by the appellant. The appellant herein pronounced Talaq on
01.11.1995 after his relationship with the respondent became strained. In
terms of the said agreement dated 17.09.1994, the respondent filed a suit
marked O.S. No.85 of 1995 in the Family Court on 08.12.1995. The
appellant in his written statement alleged that the said agreement was signed
by him under threat and coercion and further contended that several
documents purported to have been executed by him in support thereof were
also obtained by applying force.
Both the parties examined themselves as also proved various
documents in the said suit before the Family Court.
The Family Court by a judgment and order dated 22.07.1998 decreed
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4
the suit in favour of the respondent herein upon arriving at a finding that she
was the absolute owner of the Schedule ’A’ property as also 23/100 shares in
the Schedule ’B’ property.
Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant preferred
an appeal before the High Court which was marked as MFA No.196 of
1999. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 20.03.2001, the said
appeal has been dismissed.
Mr. Haris Beeran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court had no
jurisdiction to decide a dispute as regards properties claimed by a divorced
wife. The learned counsel would urge that the jurisdiction exercisable by
any Family Court being between the parties to a marriage which would
mean parties to a subsisting marriage. In support of the said contention
strong reliance has been placed on a judgment of a Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Amjum Hasan Siddiqui vs. Smt.Salma B. [AIR
1992 (Allahabad) 322] and Ponnavolu Sasidar vs. Sub-Registrar, Hayatnagar
and Others [AIR 1992 (A.P.) 198].
Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, would contend that the matter is covered by
an inter-parties judgment passed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court which is since reported in [1997 (1) KLT 734]. As the appellant
herein did not question the correctness of the said judgment, he cannot be
permitted to turn round and now challenge the jurisdiction the Family Court.
The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the establishment
of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy
settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters
connected therewith. From a perusal of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, it appears that the said Act, inter alia, seeks to exclusively provide
within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts the matters relating to the
property of the spouses or either of them. Section 7 of the Act provides for
the jurisdiction of the Family Court in respect of suits and proceedings as
referred to in the Explanation appended thereto. Explanation (c) appended
to Section 7 refers to a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage
with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them.
The fact of the matter, as noticed hereinbefore, clearly shows that the
dispute between the parties to the marriage arose out of the properties
claimed by one spouse against the other. The respondent herein made a
categorical statement to the effect that the properties were purchased out the
amount paid in cash or by way of ornaments and the source of consideration
for purchasing the properties described in Schedules ’A’ and ’B’ of the suit
having been borne out of the same, the appellant herein was merely a trustee
in relation thereto and could not have claimed any independent interest
thereupon. It is also apparent that whereas the agreement marked as Exhibit
A1 was executed on 17.09.1994, the appellant pronounced Talaq on
01.11.1995. The wordings ’disputes relating to marriage and family affairs
and for matters connected therewith’ in the view of this Court must be given
a broad construction. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as referred to
hereinbefore, would clearly go to show that the jurisdiction of the Family
Court extends, inter alia, in relation to properties of spouses or of either of
them which would clearly mean that the properties claimed by the parties
thereto as a spouse of other; irrespective of the claim whether property is
claimed during the subsistence of a marriage or otherwise.
The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that this Court
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
should read the words "a suit or proceeding between the parties to a
marriage" as parties to a subsisting marriage, in our considered view would
lead to miscarriage of justice.
The Family Court was set up for settlement of family disputes. The
reason for enactment of the said Act was to set up a court which would deal
with disputes concerning the family by adopting an approach radically
different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings. The said Act was
enacted despite the fact that Order 32A of the Code of Civil Procedure was
inserted by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976,
which could not bring about any desired result.
It is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court
created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be
construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c)
appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object
wherefor the Family Courts were set up.
In Amjum Hasan Siddiqui’s case (supra) an application was filed in
terms of Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act, 1986. The question before the Allahabad High Court arose as to
whether a Family Court could deal with such a dispute. It was held that no
application could lie before the Family Court as the claim under Section 3 of
the 1986 Act would neither be a suit nor a proceeding within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act inasmuch as such an application could
only be moved before the First Class Magistrate having requisite jurisdiction
as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said decision, in our
opinion, cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant
case.
In Smt. P. Jayalakshmi and Another vs. V. Revichandran and Another
[AIR 1992 AP 190], the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with a case
under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held that
although the matrimonial proceeding was moved before the Family Court,
the same could not have provided for a legal bar for the wife and the minor
child for instituting a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Prcoedure at Tirupathi where they were residing; as both the rights are
separate.
As indicated hereinbefore, Balakrishnan, J. (as His Lordship then was)
speaking for a Division Bench in a matter arising out of a preliminary issue
on the question of jurisdiction held that the dispute over properties between
parties to a marriage cannot be confined to the parties to a subsisting
marriage. We agree with the said view. The said decision being inter-
parties and having attained finality would operate as res judicata.
The further contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant is that as the respondent had already filed an application under
Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,
1986, wherein an amount of Rs.1,33,200/- was awarded in her favour, the
impugned proceeding was not maintainable.
The two proceedings are absolutely separate and distinct. The
impugned judgment does not show that the said question was even argued
before the High Court. As indicated hereinbefore, the factual issue involved
in this appeal revolved round as to whether Exhibit A1 was obtained by
applying force or undue influence upon the appellant. The said contention
has been negatived by both the Family Court as also the High Court.
We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with
costs. Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only).
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4
+
5 3488 2003