Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7
PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/s. CHAKOBHAI GHELABHAI AND COMPANY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/09/1960
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
SHAH, J.C.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1961 AIR 284 1961 SCR (1) 719
CITATOR INFO :
R 1968 SC 565 (20)
ACT:
Sales Tax-Sales tax authorities-Whether courts-Levy of fees
on memorandum of appeal and application for revision-
Whether taxes-Legislative competence place where sale
effected-Question of law or fact-Issue of one notice
for several quarters-Legality-Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947
(Orissa 14 of 1947), ss. 2(g), 12(5), 29(2)(s)-Orissa Sales
Tax Rules, 1947, rr. 20, 59-Government of India Act, 1935
(25 & 26 Geo. 5, Ch. 42), Seventh Schedule, List II, Items
1, 48, 54.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent firm, which had its headquarters in Madhya
Pradesh and was, during the years 1948 to 1951, engaged in
collecting bidi leaves from certain forest areas in Orissa
and dispatching them to various destinations outside the
State of Orissa, did not get itself registered as a dealer
under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, and did not submit a
return in spite of the notice issued to it, It was asked to
show cause why a penalty should not be imposed under s.
12(5) of the Act. The assessing authority then proceeded to
assess the tax to the best of its judgment and determined
the taxable turnover for each of the twelve quarters, the
first quarter ending on June 30, 1948, and the last quarter
ending on March 31, 1951. A penalty of Rs. 500 for each
quarter was also imposed. The respondent’s appeal to the
Assistant Collector of Sales Tax against the orders of
assessment and penalty was dismissed, and the revision
petition was rejected by the Collector of Commercial Taxes
as having been filed out of time. One of the pleas taken
before the appellate authority was that the respondent was
not a dealer in Orissa inasmuch as the sales of bidi leaves
were not effected in Orissa, but at the hearing of the
appeal it was admitted by the respondent’s pleader that the
sales were completed in Orissa. The High Court, on a writ
petition filed by the respondent, set aside the orders of
assessment and penalty on the grounds, inter alia, (i) that
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
the assessment orders were bad because of the repeal of the
second proviso to S. 2(g) of the Act defining " sale ", by
the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, (2) that the levy of
fees on the memorandum of appeal and the application in
revision on a graded scale under r. 59 read with s. 29(2)(s)
of the Act amounted to the imposition of a tax which was
beyond the competence of the State, and (3) that the notice
issued under s. 12(5) of the Act was not in accordance with
law, inasmuch as separate notices were not issued for each
quarter.
92
720
Held, (i) that the question as to where a sale was completed
depended on facts and was not a pure question of law and,
therefore, the admission made by the respondent’s pleader
was binding on the respondent; and that as the admission
brought the sales within s. 2(g) of the Act, it was
unnecessary to consider the second proviso to s. 2(g) and
the sales,were liable to tax ;
(2) that the sales-tax authorities including the Assistant
Collector of Sales Tax and the Collector of Commercial
Taxes, though they exercised quasi-judicial functions under
the Act, were not courts in the strict sense of the term "
Court " ;
(3) that fees levied under r. 59 read with s. 29(2)(s) of
the Act were not taxes but were imposed for services
rendered by a governmental agency. Section 29(2)(s) was,
not invalid on the ground of legislative incompetence and r.
59 did not go beyond what was permitted under that section;
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954]
S.C.R. 1005, relied on.
(4) that the issue of one notice under s. 12(5) of the Act
for several quarters was not contrary to law as the section
makes reference to a period which might consist of more than
one quarter.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 710 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 5, 1955,
of the Orissa High Court in O. J. C. No. 92 of 1954.
N. C. Chatterjee, H. J. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the
appellants.
J. M. Thakar and J. B. Dadachanji for the respondents.
R. Gopalakrishnan and J. B. Dadachanji, for the
Intervener.
1960. September 20. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by
the High Court of Orissa. The appellants are the State of
Orissa and the Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa. The
respondent is a partnership firm called Messrs. Chakobhai
Ghelabhai and Company dealing in " bidi ’ leaves.
The short facts are these. The respondent firm’ has its
headquarters in Bagbehera in Madhya Pradesh.
721
During the years 1948 to 1951 it was engaged, in collecting
’ bidi’ leaves from certain forest areas in Orissa. The
leaves so collected were made up into bundles and stored in
the respondent’s godowns in Orissa. They were then sold and
dispatched to various destinations outside the State of
Orissa. The respondent did not get itself registered as a
dealer under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa Act XIV
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
of 1947), hereinafter called the Act. On July 21, 1950, a
notice was issued to the respondent by the Assistant Sales
Tax Officer, Patna Circle, requiring it to submit a return
in Form No. IV showing separately the particulars of its
turnover for each of the quarters commencing October, 1947,
and upto June 30, 1950. The respondent was also asked to
show cause why a penalty should not be imposed on it under
s. 12(5) of the Act. To this notice the respondent sent a
reply to the effect, substantially, that it carried on no
selling business in Orissa and was, therefore tinder no
liability to register itself as a dealer in Orissa or to pay
sales tax under the Act. Thereafter, the respondent took no
part in the assessment proceedings and made no appearance
before the assessing authority except on June 30, 1951, when
one of its partners Narvaram Popatbhai appeared and said
that the accounts were at Bagbehera and the dispatches of
’bidi’ leaves from Orissa were mixed up with other
dispatches and, therefore, he was not in a position to give
a correct account of the business in Orissa. It was
admitted, however, that the ’bidi ’ leaves were collected in
Orissa, were processed and manufactured for sale and then
stored in godowns in Orissa; they were then sold and
dispatched to different customers outside Orissa. The
assessing authority held on the materials before it that the
transfer of property in the ’bidi ’ leaves sold and
dispatched to customers as aforesaid was completed in Orissa
and the respondent wailfully. failed to get itself
registered and to submit a return of its turnover. The
assessing authority then proceeded to assess the tax to the
best of its judgment and determined the taxable turnover to
be Rs. 61,250 for each of the twelve quarters, the first
quarter ending
722
on June 30, 1948, and the last quarter ending on March 31,
1951. It also imposed a penalty of Es. 500 for each
quarter. The orders of assessment were made on two dates-on
July 4, 1951, for four quarters and on August 29, 1951, for
the remaining eight quarters. Against these orders of
assessment the respondent went up in appeal to the Assistant
Collector of Sales Tax, Sambalpur. One of the pleas taken
before the appellate authority was that the respondent was
not a dealer in Orissa inasmuch as the sales of ’ bidi ’
leaves were not effected in Orissa. In the course of the
hearing of the appeal this plea. was given up, and it was
admitted by the respondent’s pleader that "the sales were
completed in Orissa ". The appeal was then heard on the
contentions that (1) the turnover determined was excessive,
and (2) that no penalty should have been imposed. These
contentions were rejected by the appellate authority. The
respondent then moved in revision, but the revision petition
having been filed out of time was rejected by the Collector
of Commercial Taxes, Orissa.
The respondent then moved the High Court of Orissa by means
of a writ petition- in which it was contended that (1) the
respondent was not a dealer in Orissa; (2) that the sales of
the post-Constitution period were sales within the meaning
of the Explanation to Art. 286(1)(a) as it then stood and
Orissa could not tax them ; (3) that the notice under s.
12(5) of the Act was bad on various grounds; (4) that the
fees levied under rule 59 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules,
1947, on the respondent’s ’Memorandum of appeal and revision
application, were not justified in law; and (5) that the
assessment was illegally made and so also the penalty under
s. 12(5) of the Act. On these contentions the respondent
asked for a writ quashing the assessment proceedings and the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
notices of demand and for a direction for a refund of the
fees paid. The High Court allowed the petition by its
Judgment and order dated September 5, 1955. It set aside
the assessment orders, directed a refund of the fees paid
and further made an order that the respondent shall be
directed " to furnish a return of its transactions
723
under,s. 11 for the period for which it had been served with
a notice under s. 11(1) of the Act ". In support of its
orders the High Court came to the following findings: (1)
that the assessment orders were bad because of the repeal of
the second proviso-to s. 2(g) of the Act defining "Sale", by
the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950; (2) that the levy of
fees on a graded scale amounted to the imposition of a tax
which was unwarranted and beyond the rule making power of
the State Government; and (3) that the notice issued under
s. 12(5) was not in accordance with law.
On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that the
High Court was in error in respect of all the three findings
at which it had arrived. As to the finding of the High
Court that the assessment orders were bad because of the
repeal of the second proviso to s. 2(g) of the Act, we think
that the High Court was clearly in error. In view of the
admission made on behalf of the respondent, it was quite
unnecessary to deal with the second proviso s. 2(g) of the
Act or to consider the effect of its repeal by the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, or the effect of the saving
clause in paragraph 20 thereof. The admission on behalf of
the respondent, made in very clear terms as recorded by the
appellate authority, was that the sales were completed in
Orissa. Section 2(g) of the Act states:
"S. 2(g)-" sale " means, with all its grammatical variations
and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods
for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, including a transfer of property in goods
involved in the execution of contract but does not include a
mortgage, hypothecation, char or pledge."
The admission made in this case clearly brings the sales of
’bidi’ leaves within s. 2(g) of the Act; and as the sales
were completed in Orissa, they were liable to tax under the
Act. It was quite unnecessary to go to the second proviso
to s. 2(g) in view of the admission of the respondent.
Learned Counsel for the respondent suggested that the
admission made by the respondent’s pleader was an admission
on a question of law and, therefore, not
724
binding on the respondent. We do not agree. The question
where a sale is completed depends on facts and is not a pure
question of law. It is worthy of note, that at no stage
subsequent to the admission did the respondent repudiate it
or challenge its correctness. Even in the writ’ petition it
was not stated that a wrong admission had been made; on ’the
contrary the appellate authority’s order in which the
admission was set out was an annexure to the writ petition.
It is indeed true that is paragraph 13(a) of the writ
petition a contention was raised with regard to the sales of
the post-Constitution period and a reference was made to the
Explanation to Art. 286(1)(a) as it then stood. But the
necessary averments to attract the Explanation were not
made, and nowhere was it stated that the goods were
dispatched outside Orissa for the purpose of’ consumption in
the delivery State. In other words, no foundation was laid
for making a distinction between the pre-Constitution and
post-Constitution sales, and with regard to all of them it
was admitted that they were completed in Orissa-an admission
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
which was never repudiated or challenged. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the High Court, was clearly
in error in its first finding as to the unconstitutionality
of the assessment orders made.
We think that the High Court was also in error in its
finding as to the legality of the fees levied on the
memorandum of appeal and the application in revision.
Section 29 of the Act deals with the rule making power. It
states:
" S. 29(1)-The State Government may, subject to the
condition of previous publication, make rules for carrying
out the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing power, such rules may prescribe-
(s) the procedure for and other matters (including fees)
incidental to, the disposal of appeals and applications for
revision and review under s. 23."
Rule 59 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, so far as it is
relevant for our purpose says:-
725
R. 59. Fees-Subject to the provisions of rule
60 the following fees shall be payable:-
(i) ..................... .....................
(ii) On a memorandum of Five per cent of the amount
appeal against an order of amount in dispute calculated
assessment or penalty or both to the nearest rupee subject
or an application for revision to a minimum of one rupee
or review of such order. and maximum of one hundred
rupees.
(iii) ..................... ..........................
(iv) On an application for One rupee."
revision.
The first question is if s. 29(2)(s) in so far as it em-
powers the State Government to make a rule prescribing fees
for appeals and applications in revision was within the
legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature. The
Act was enacted in 1947 and the source of legislative power
must be found in the Government of India Act, 1935. Item 48
of List II (Provincial Legislative List) in the Seventh
Schedule of the said Act related to "Taxes on the sale of
goods " and item 54 read: " Fees in respect of any of the
matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any
court". Item "related inter alia to " constitution and
Organisation of all courts except the Federal Court, and
fees taken therein." The High Court held that the assessing
authorities including the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax
and the Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, were not
courts in the strict sense of the term " Court ", though
they exercised quasi judicial functions under the Act. We
think that is a correct view. But it does not necessarily
follow that the fees imposed under r. 59 read with s.
29(2)(s) are illegal. Under items 48 and 54 the then
Provincial Legislature had power to make a law for taxes on
the sale of goods and for fees in respect thereof. Even
with regard to Court-fees, the Provincial Legislature had
power to make a law under item 1. We do not think that s.
29(2) (s) can be held to be bad on the ground of legislative
incompetence. Nor do we think that r. 59 goes beyond what
is permitted under a. 29(2)(s). The fees imposed are not
taxes; they
726
come within the expression " other matters (including fees)
incidental to the disposal of appeals and applications for
revision etc.". We are unable to agree with the High Court
that the word "incidental’ has reference to a matter of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
casual nature only. The procedure for disposal of an appeal
includes as a necessary incidental matter the filing of an
appeal on a proper fee. The distinction between a tax and a
fee was considered by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(1) and it is unnecessary to
repeat what was said there. We consider that the fees
imposed by r. 59 are for services rendered by a Governmental
agency and though ordinarily fees are uniform, there may be
various kinds of fees and it is not possible to formulate a
definition that would be applicable to all cases.
Now, the last finding of the High Court is that the notice
under s. 12(5) was not in accordance with law. Here again
we think that the High Court was in error. The notice was
issued in Form no. VI, which is a combined form for the
purposes of ss. 11 and 12. A foot-note appended to the form
required the assessing authority to score out unnecessary
words. The High Court points out, that this was not done.
We are, however, unable to agree with the High Court that
the failure to score out unnecessary words made the notice
bad in law. The respondent sent a reply to the notice and
claimed that it was not a dealer in Orissa. Obviously, the
respondent had no difficulty in understanding that the
notice was one under s. 12(5) of the Act. The notice stated
in terms that the respondent should show cause why a penalty
should not be imposed under s. 12(5) of the Act. Section
12(5) as it stood at the relevant time was in these terms:
"S. 12(5). If upon information which has come into his
possession, the Collector is satisfied that any dealer has
been liable to pay tax under this Act in respect of any
period and has nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for
registration, the Collector shall, after giving the dealer a
reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess, to the best
of his judgment, the
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1005.
727
amount of tax, if any, due from the dealer in respect of
such period and all subsequent periods and the Collector may
direct that the dealer shall pay, by way of penalty, in
addition to the amount so assessed, a sum not exceeding one
and a half times that amount." It has been argued before us
that one notice was issued for several quarters and an
assessment was made for each quarter separately-four
quarters on July 4, 1951, and eight quarters on August 29,
1951. This, it is contended, was illegal. We are unable to
accept this contention as correct. Section 12(5) talks of a
period, and the period may consist of more than one quarter.
The return has, however, to be submitted in Form IV which
read with r. 20 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947,
requires the assessee to furnish details of his turnover for
each quarter. The assessment must,, therefore, be made on
the taxable turnover of each quarter.
Lastly, it has been argued that there was no notice under s.
12(5) for the last three quarters and, there. fore, for
those quarters the assessment orders must be held to be bad.
The appellate authority has pointed out that even for the
last three quarters the assessing officer, after he had made
his orders of assessment in the first five quarters, had
directed the respondent to produce his accounts, but DO
accounts were produced. Section 12(5) enables the assessing
authority to make a best judgment assessment for " all
subsequent periods " after giving the dealer a reasonable
opportunity of being heard. Such an opportunity was given
in the present case even in respect of the last three
quarters, and we are unable to hold that the assessment for
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
the last three quarters was bad.
For the reasons given above, we must allow this appeal, set
aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated
September 5, 1955, and dismiss the writ petition of the
respondent. The appellants will be entitled to their costs
of the proceedings in the High Court and in this Court.
Appeal allowed,
93
728