Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE & CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GEOFFREY MANNERS & CO. PVT. LTD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
08/09/1969
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 2062 1970 SCR (2) 213
1969 SCC (2) 716
ACT:
The Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958, ss. 12(1) and
9(1)--Vitamin preparations--’DROPOVIT" whether a trade mark
deceptively similar to ’PROTOVIT’ so as to offened s.
12(1)--’DROPOVIT’ whether a descriptive word or an
invented word for the purpose of s. 9(1)--Tests.
HEADNOTE:
In 1946 the trade mark ’PROTOVIT’ was registered for one of
the vitamin preparations manufactured by the appellant
company. In 1957 the respondent company applied for
registration of its mark ’DROPOVIT’ in respect of "medical
and pharmaceutical preparations and substances". The
application was granted. When the appellant came to know
about this trade mark it asked the respondent to alter it.
On the respondent’s refusal to do so, the appellant in 1959,
applied to the Registrar for rectification of the Register
of Trade Marks by removal thereform of the respondent’s
trade mark. Later the appellant amended its application by
adding the ground that DROPOVIT’ was not an invented word.
The Joint Registrar by letter dated August 5, 1961 rejected
the appellant’s application for rectification. The
appellant went in appeal to the Bombay High Court. During
the hearing of the appeal the respondent restricted the
designation of goods covered by the mark ’DROPOVIT’ to
"medical preparations and, substances containing principally
vitamins." The Single Judge as well as the Division Bench
decided in favour of the respondent. The appellant came to
this Court with certificate. The questions that fell for
consideration were: (i) whether the word ’DROPOVIT’ was
deceptively similar to the word ’PROTOVIT’ and thus
offended the provision of s. 12(1) of the Trade and
Merchandise Act, 1958; (ii) whether the word ’DROPOVIT’
was an invented or a descriptive word for the purpose of s.
9(1) of the Act.
HELD: The appeal must be dismissed.
(i) In order that a trade mark may be found deceptively
similar to another it is not necessary that it ’should be
intended to deceive or intended to cause confusion. It is
its probable effect o.n the ordinary kind of customers that
one has to consider. For this purpose it is necessary to
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apply both the visual and phonetic tests. It is also
important that the marks should be compared as wholes. It
is not right to take a portion of the word and say that
because that portion of the word differs from the
corresponding portion of the word in the other case there is
no sufficient similarity to cause confusion. The true test
is whether the totality of the trade mark is such that it is
likely to cause deception or confusion or mistake in the
minds of the persons accustomed to the existing trade mark.
[216 H; 217 G--H; 218 E]
Parker Knoll Ltd. v. Knoll International Ltd., [1962]
R.P.C. 265 at 274, Pianotist Co. Ltd.’s application 23
R.P.C. 774, 777, Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta Ltd., 62 R.P.C. 65
at 72 and Toklon Ltd. v. Davidson & Co., 32 R.P.C. 133 at
136, applied.
The terminal syllable ’VIT’ in the two marks
’DROPOVIT’ and ’PROTOVIT’ was both descriptive and, as the
evidence showed. common to the trade. If greater regard was
paid to the uncommon ejement in
Jp CI/70--2
214
the two words it was difficult to, hold that one would be
mistaken for or confused with the other. The letters ’D’
and ’P’ in DROPOVIT’ and. the corresponding letters ’P’ and
’T’ in ’PROTOVIT’ could not possibly be slurred over in
pronunciation and the words were so dissimilar that there
was no reasonable probability of confusion between the words
either from the visual or phonetic point of view. This was
all the more so because the preparations from their very
nature were likely to be purchased on the prescription of
doctors, and under r. 61(2) of Drug Rules, 1945 could be
sold only by licensed’ dealers SO that the possibility of
confusion would be reduced to a considerable extent. [219
A--C, E]
(ii) It could not be accepted that the Word ’DROPOVIT’
would strike an ordinary person knowing English as meaning
’DROP OF VITAMINS’. The appellant’s original application for
rectification did not contain the ground that the word
’DROPOVIT’ was descriptive. It was therefore reasonable to
presume that it did not strike even the legal advisers of
the appellant as descriptive. It was true that the word
’DROPOVIT’ was coined out of words commonly used by and
known to ordinary persons knowing English. But the
resulting combination produced a new word, a newly coined
word which did not remind an ordinary person knowing
English of the original words out of which it was coined
unless he was so told or unless at least he devoted some
thought to it. It followed that the word ’DROPOVIT’ being an
invented word was entitled to be registered as a trade mark
and was not liable ’to be removed from the Register on which
it already existed. [220 H-221 D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1330 Of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 4, 7,
1964 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 65 of 1962.
K.S. Shavaksha, R.A. Shah, J.B. Dadachanji and Bhuvanesh
Kumari, for the appellant.
M.C. Chagla, 1. M. Chagla,.Anoop Singh, M.N. Shroff, for
1. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate
from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 17,
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1964 in application no. 65 of 1962 upholding in part the
judgment of Mr. Justice Tarkunde dated December 7, 1962 in
Miscellaneous Petition No. 358 of 1961.
The appellant is a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of Switzerland and carries on
business in the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical and
chemical products. The respondent is a company incorporated
under the Companies Act in India and also carries on
business in the manufacture ’and sale of pharmaceutical
products.
On December 2, 1946 the ,appellant applied for
registration of its trade mark "PROTOVIT". The application
Was granted and the appellants mark was registered in Class
V in respect of
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"Pharmaceutical preparations for human use and for
veterinary use, infants’ and invalids’ foods". The
appellant thereafter used that mark on multi-vitamin
preparations in liquid tablet forms and its goods are being
sold under that mark at least since the year 1951.
On January 28, 1957 the respondent applied for
registration of its mark "DROPOVIT" in respect of "medicinal
and pharmaceutical preparations and substances". The
application was registered but the advertisement of the
respondent’s application escaped the notice of the
appellant who did not hence oppose the registration. By a
letter dated March 4, 1958 Messrs Voltas Ltd., the
appellant’s ’agents, drew the attention of the appellant to
the respondent’s mark "DROPOVIT". There was negotiation
between the parties but on March 19, 1958 the respondents
wrote to the appellant refusing to alter its trade mark.
On January 21, 1959 the appellant applied for rectification
of the Register by removal therefrom of the respondent’s
trade mark. The ground urged in support of the application
was that the respondent’s mark so nearly resembled the
appellant’s mark as to. be likely to deceive or cause
confusion. On March 9, 1960 the appellant applied for
amendment of the application and an additional ground was
taken that "DROPOVIT" was not an invented word. The
application for amendment was allowed by the Registrar.
The amended application was opposed by the respondent. . By
his judgment dated August 5, 1961 the Joint Registrar
rejected the application for rectification holding that
"DROPOVIT" was not deceptively similar to "PROTOVIT" and
that the word "DROPOVIT" considered as a whole was not
descriptive. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the
Bombay High Court. On December 7, 1962 Mr. Justice Tarkunde
dismissed the appeal. The appellant preferred an appeal
under Letters Patent but the appeal was dismissed by a
Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Chainani and
Mody, J. on August 17, 1964. During the hearing of. the
appeal the respondent restricted the designation of goods
to "’medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations and
substances containing principally vitamins.
The application for rectification’ was made on
January 21, 1959 be/ore the Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act. 1958 (Act no. 43 of 1958) came into operation. But it
is not disputed that under s. 136(3) of this Act the
decision of this case is governed by the provisions of Act
no. 43 of 1958 (hereinafter called the Act).
Section 11 of the Act states: "A ’mark--
(a) the use of which would be likely to
deceive or cause confusion; or
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(b)the use Of WhiCh would be contrary to
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any law for the time being in force; or
(c) which comprises or contains scandalous
or obscene matter; or
(d) which comprises or.contains any matter
likely to hurt the religious susceptibilities
of any class or section of the citizens of
India; or .
(e) which would.otherwise be disentitled to
protection in a court;
shall not be registered as a trade
mark".
Section 12( 1 ) provides
"Save as provided in sub-section (3 ), no
trade mark. shall be registered in respect. of
any goods or description of goods which is
identical with or deceptively similar to a
trade mark which is already registered in the
name of a different proprietor in respect of
the same goods. or descriptive of goods."
Section 56(1) reads:
"On application made in the prescribed
manner to ’a High Court or to the Registrar by
any person aggrieved, the tribunal may make
such order as it may think fit for cancelling
or varying the registration of a trade mark on
the ground of any contravention, or failure to
observe a condition entered on the register
in relation thereto."
Section 2(1)(d) defines the phrase
"deceptively similar" as follows:
"A mark shall be deemed to. be deceptively
similar ’to another mark if it so nearly
resembles that other mark as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion;"
The first question to be considered in this appeal is
whether the word "DROPOVIT" is deceptively similar to
the word "PROTOVIT" and offends the provision of s. 12 (1 )
of the Act. In other words the question is whether the
respondent’s mark so nearly resembles the registered m,ark
aS to be "likely to deceive or cause confusion." It is not
necessary that it should be intended to deceive or intended
to cause’ confusion. It is its probable effect on the
ordinary kind of customers that one has to consider.
217
In Parker-Knoll Ltd, v. Knoll International Ltd, (1)
Lord Denning explained the words "to deceive,’ and the
phrase "to cause confusion" as follows 1:
. "Secondly, ’to deceive’ is one thing.
To ’Cause confusion’ is another. The
difference is this: When you deceive a man,
you tell him a lie. You make a false
representation to him and thereby cause him to
believe a thing to be true. which is false.
You may not do it knowingly, or intentionally,
but still you do it, and so you deceive him.
But you may cause confusion without telling
him ’a lie at all, and without making any
false representation to him. You may indeed
tell him the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, but still you may cause
confusion in his mind, not by any ,fault of
yours, but because he has not the knowledge or
ability to. distinguish it from the other
pieces of truth known to him. or because he
may not even take the trouble to do so."
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The tests for comparison of the two word marks were
formulated by Lord Parker in Pionotist Co., Ltd.’s
application(2) as follows:
"You must take the two words. You must
judge of them, both by their look and by their
sound. You must consider the goods to which
they are to be applied. You must consider the
nature and kind of customer who would be
likely to buy those goods. In fact, you must’
consider all the surrounding circumstances;
and’ you must further consider what is likely
to happen if each of those trade marks is used
in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods
of the respective owners of the marks. If,
considering all those circumstances, you come
to the conclusion that there will be a
confusion--that is to say, not necessarily
that one man will be injured and the other
will gain illicit benefit, but that there will
be ’a confusion in the mind of the public
which will lead ’to confusion in the
goods--then you may refuse the registration,
or rather you must refuse the registration ’in
that case."
It is necessary to apply both the visual and phonetic
tests. In Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta Ltd.(a) the House of Lords
was considering the resemblance between the two words
"Aristoc" and "Rysta". The view taken was that considering
the way the words were pronounced in English, the one was
likely to be mistaken for the other.
(1) 1962 R.P.C. 265 at 274 (2) 23 R.P.C. 774 at 777
(3) 62 R.P.C. 65 at 72.
218
Viscount Maugham cited the following passage of. Lord
Justice Luxmoore in. the Court of Appeal, which passage, he
said, he completely accepted as the correct exposition of
the law :.
"The answer to the question whether the
sound of one word resembles too nearly the
sound of another so as to bring the former
within the limits of section 12 of the Trade
Marks Act, 1938, must nearly always depend on
first impression, for obviously a person who
is familiar with both words will neither be
deceived nor confused; It is the person who
only knows. the one word and has perhaps an
imperfect recollection of it who is likely to
be deceived or confused. .Little assistance,
therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous
comparison of the two words, letter by
letter .and syllable by syllable, pronounced
with the clarity to be expected from a teacher
of elocution. The Court must be careful to.
make’ allowance for imperfect
recollection .and the effect of careless
pronunciation and speech on the part not only
of the person seeking to. buy under the trade
description, but also of the shop. assistant
ministering to that person’s wants".
It is also important that the marks must be
compared as wholes. It is not right to take a
portion of the word and say that because that
portion of the word differs from the
corresponding portion of the word in the other
case there is no sufficient similarity to
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cause confusion. The true test is whether the
totality of the proposed trade mark is such
that it is likely to cause deception or
confusion or mistake in the minds of persons
accustomed to the existing trade mark. Thus
in Layroma case(1). Lord Johnston said’:
".’ ..... we are not bound to scan
the words as we would in a question of
comparatio literarum. It is not a matter for
microscopic inspection, but to be taken from
the general and even casual point of view of a
customer walking into a shop."
In order to decide whether the word "DIROPOVIT" is
deceptively similar to the word "PROTOVIT" each of the two
words must, therefore, be taken as a whole word. Each of
the two words consists of eight letters, the last three
letters are common, and in the uncommon part the first two
are consonants, the next is the same vowel ’0’, the next is
a consonant and the fifth is again a common vowel ’0’. The
combined effect is to produce an alliteration. The
affidavits of the .appellant indicate that the last three
letters "VIT" is a well known common abbreviation used
in the pharmaceutical trade to denote Vitamin preparations.
(1) Tokajon Ltd. v. Davidson & Co., 32 R.P.C. 133 at 136.
219
his affidavit dated January 11, 1961 Frank Murdoch, has
referred to the existence on the Register of about 57 trade
marks which have the common suffix "VIT" indicating that
the goods are vitamin preparationS. It is apparent that
the terminal syllable "VIT" in the two marks is both
descriptive and common to the trade. If greater regard is
paid to the ’uncommon element in these two words, it is
difficult to hold that one will be mistaken for or confused
with the other. The letters ’D’ and ’P’ in "DROPOVIT" and
the corresponding letters ’P’ and ’T’ in "PROTOVIT" cannot
possibly be slurred over in pronunciation and the words are
so dissimilar that there is no reasonable probability of
confusion between the words either from the visual or
phonetic point of view.
In the High Court, counsel for the respondent made a
statement that the respondent was willing that the Court
should direct in exercise of its powers under s. 56(2) that
the Registrar should limit the respondent’s trade mark
"DROPOVIT" to medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations and
substances containing principally vitamins and that the
appeal should be decided on this basis. The question o,f
deceptive similarity must therefore be decided o.n the basis
of the class of goods to which the two trade marks apply
subject to the limitation agreed to by the respondent. From
the nature
of the goods it is likely that most of the customers
would obtain a prescription. from a doctor and show it to
the chemist before the purchase. In such a case, except in
the event of the handwriting of the doctor being very bad or
illegible the chance of confusion is remote. As we have
already observed the evidence shows that there are as many
as 57 trade marks in the Register of Trade Marks with the
suffix "VIT". Therefore, even an average customer would
know that in respect of Vitamin preparations the word "VIT"
occurs in large number of trade marks and because of this he
would naturally be on his guard and’ take special care
against making a mistake. In this connection the provisions
of the Drug Rules, 1945 are also relevant. Under r, 61(2)
vitamin preparations would be covered by item 5 in Schedule
C-( 1 ) to the Rules and a licence would be required to
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stock such vitamin preparations and to sell them retail.
The question of confusion must hence be determined on the
basis that the goods with one of the two rival trade marks
would be sold only by such ’a licensed dealer and would not
be available in any other shop. The fact that the vendor
would be a licensed dealer also reduces the possibility of
confusion to a considerable extent.
Having taken into account all circumstances of the
present case we are of the opinion that the High Court and
the Joint Registrar of Trade Marks were right in holding
that there was no real tangible danger of confusion if
respondent’s trade mark
220
was allowed to continue to remain on the Register and the
application’ for rectification made by the appellant should
be dismissed.
The question was also. argued in the appeal whether the
word "DROPOVIT" was not an invented word and whether it was
a descriptive WOrd. . Section 9(1 ) of the Act states-
. "A trade mark shall not be registered
in Part A of the register unless it contains
or consists of at least one
the following essential particulars, namely--
(c) one or more invented words;
(d) one or more words having no direct
reference to the character or quality of the
goods and not being according to its ordinary
signification, a geographical name or a
surname or a personal name or any common
abbreviation thereof or the name of a sect,
caste or tribe in India;"
It is contended on behalf of the .appellant that
"DROPOVIT" meant only "DROP OF VITAMIN" with the word ’of’
being mis-spelled as ’O’ ’VIT’ being used to denote
"Vitamins", and the three separate words are joined together
to make "DROPOVIT" as one word.’ It was said that the word
"DROPOVIT" was simply a combination of three common words
in English language and cannot, therefore, be said to. be
an invented .word. In Diabolo case(1) Parker J., has
explained the meaning of "invented word" as follows:
"To be an invented word within the
meaning of the Act a word must not only be
newly coined, in the sense of not being
’already current in the English language, but
must be such as not to convey an, meaning,
or, at any rate, any obvious meaning to
ordinary Englishmen. It must be
a word
having no meaning or no obvious meaning
until one has been assigned to it."
In the case of De Cordova and others v. Vick Chemical
Co.(2) the Privy Council referred to that interpretation of
Parker J., as "the best standing interpretation". The
question arising in this case is whether the word "DROPOVIT"
would strike an ordinary person’ knowing English as meaning.
"DROP OF VITAMIN". In this connection the High Court has
pointed out that the original application for
rectification did not contain the ground that the word of
"DROPOVIT" was descriptive. It was, therefore, legitimate
to draw the inference that the word
(1) 25 R.P.C. 565
(2) 68. R.P.C. 103.
221
"DROPOVIT" did: not strike even Messrs Depenning and
DePenning the legal advisers of the appellant as being
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descriptive. It was also pointed out that in his judgment
Mr. Justice Tarkunde has remarked that when the case was
opened before, him he did not understand that the word
"DROPOVIT" meant "DROP OF VITAMIN" till the explanation of
that word was given to. him. We see no reason, therefore, to
differ from the reasoning of the High Court on this ’aspect
of the case. If the word "DROPOVIT" is not a descriptive
word it must be held to be an invented word. It is true that
the word "DROPOVIT" is coined out of words commonly used by
and known to ordinary persons knowing English. But the
resulting combination produces a new word, a newly coined
word which does not remind an ordinary person knowing
English of the original words out of which it is coined
unless he is so told or unless at least he devotes some
thought to it. It follows that the word "DROPOVIT" being
an invented word was entitled to be registered as ’a trade
mark and is not liable to be removed from the Register on
which it already exists.
For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal fails
and must be dismissed with costs.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.
222