Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
M/S. SUNIL INDUSTRIES
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAM CHANDER PRADHAN & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/11/2000
BENCH:
S. Rajendra Babu, & S.N. Variava,
JUDGMENT:
S. N. VARIAVA, J.
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This Appeal is against an Order dated 7th May, 1997 by
which the first appeal filed by the appellant has been
dismissed in limine.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows: The Petitioner
is a sole proprietory concern. It runs its workshop of
shaping steel sheets into various shapes and forms. The 1st
Respondent was, at the relevant time, working as a press
operator with the Appellant. On 27th January, 1993 while
working on a press, the 1st Respondent sustained injuries to
his right index finger and thumb. The Appellant rushed the
1st Respondent to the Civil Hospital at Gurgaon (Haryana).
The injuries necessitated amputation of 2.5 x 0.5 Cms. of
the index finger.
On 14th June, 1993, the 1st Respondent filed a claim
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 claiming
compensation in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with interest
thereon @ 16% per annum. The Appellant in his reply, inter
alia, claimed that the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act would not apply to his establishment.
On 15th October 1996 the Commissioner held that the
Workmen’s Compensation Act applied and that the Appellant
was liable to pay compensation in a sum of Rs.29,814/-
together with Rs.5,000/- as penalty and interest at 12% per
annum. The Appellant preferred an Appeal under Section 30
of the Worken’s Compensation Act before the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana. That Appeal came to be dismissed in
limine by the impugned order dated 7th May, 1997.
It is admitted that the 1st Respondent was working as a
press operator with the Appellant at the relevant time. It
is admitted that the accident did took place on 27th
January, 1993 and that it resulted in injuries to the right
index finger and thumb of the 1st Respondent and that this
necessitated amputation of 2.5 x 0.5 Cms. of the index
finger. Mr. Vasdev however, submitted that the Workmen’s
Compensation Act did not apply to the Appellant’s
establishment. He submitted that Section 2(n) (ii) of the
Wormen’s Compensation Act provides that a workman is a
person employed in a capacity specified in Schedule II. He
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then referred to Schedule II of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act and pointed out that under item 2 of Schedule II a
person would be a workman provided he is employed in any
premises where a manufacturing process as defined in clause
(k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act 1948 was being carried
on. He submitted that this showed that the provisions of
the Factories Act were being incorporated into the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. He submitted that this is also clear from
the fact that over the years there have been a number of
amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Act incorporating
therein provision of the Factories Act or provisions similar
thereto. He then referred to Section 2(k) and 2 (m) of the
Factories Act and submitted that under the Factories Act the
manufacturing process must be in a factory where ten or more
workers are working (if the manufacturing process is being
carried on with the aid of power) or twenty or more persons
are working (if the manufacturing process is being carried
on without the aid of power). He submitted that a joint
reading of all these provisions makes it clear that even for
the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act only those
persons who are employed in a factory within the meaning of
the Factories Act, 1948 would be entitled to make a claim
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
We are unable to accept the submissions of the learned
counsel. It is true that the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
1923 has been amended on a number of occasions. However
inspite of numerous amendments the Legislature has purposely
omitted to specifically provide that only a workman who is
employed in a factory, as defined in the Factories Act,
could make a claim. All that has been done is that in
Schedule II of the Workmen’s Compensation Act it is inter
alia clarified that persons employed, otherwise than in a
clerical capacity, in any premises wherein a manufacturing
process as defined in clause (k) of Section 2 of the
Factories Act, 1948, are workmen. Significantly the
definition of the term "Factory" as appearing in clause (m)
of Section 2 of the Factories Act 1948 has not been
incorporated in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Thus it is
clear that for the Workmen’s Compensation Act to apply it is
not necessary that the workman should be working in a
Factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. It has not
been denied that the workshop of the Appellant would fall
under clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act.
Therefore, the 1st Respondent would be a Workman within the
meaning of the term as defined in the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.
Under the circumstances, we see no merit in the Appeal.
The same stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order
as to costs.