Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SAKHARAM SHRIPATI JADHAV, DECEASED THROUGHHIS LEGAL REPRESEN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
CHANDRAKANT ALIAS MADHAV LAXMAN AGNIHOTRIAND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT08/01/1987
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 637 1987 SCR (1) 913
1987 SCC (1) 486 JT 1987 (1) 85
1987 SCALE (1)5
ACT:
Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, S.43A-
Composite purpose lease and single purpose lease--Distinc-
tion between--Lease for composite purpose--Area where only
sugarcane cultivated--Exempted--Area where along with sugar-
cane other crops cultivated--Not exempted.
HEADNOTE:
The Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, by
s.32(1) provides that every tenant should, subject to the
other provisions contained in the Act, be deemed to have
purchased from the landlord, free of all encumbrances the
land held by him as tenant, if such tenant was a permanent
tenant and cultivated the land personally; or such tenant
was not a permanent tenant but cultivated the land leased
personally; and the landlord has not given notice of termi-
nation of his tenancy under section 31; or notice had been
given under section 31, but the landlord had not applied to
the Mamlatdar on or before 31st day of March, 1956 under
section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or for
certain other contingencies mentioned in section 32 of the
Act. Section 43A provides that the aforesaid provisions for
the benefit of tillers or tenants would not apply to land
granted to any bodies or persons for the cultivation of
sugarcane or the growing of fruits or flowers or for the
breeding of livestock.
The appellant-tenant had taken the suit land on lease
from the respondent. The lease deed was alleged to have been
executed for the purpose of cultivation of chillies, tobac-
co, sugarcane and groundnuts etc. Suo moto proceedings for
fixing the price under s.32(g) were taken on the assumption
that the appellant-tenant had become statutory purchaser by
virtue of s.32 of the Act. While the proceedings were pend-
ing, the respondents made an application under the Act for
determination of reasonable rent on the basis that the lands
were leased for growing sugarcane.
The trial court rejected the application holding that the
lands had
914
been leased not for growing sugarcane alone, but for differ-
ent types of crops. However, the Special Land Acquisition
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Officer held that the purpose of the lease was one for
cultivating sugarcane and, as such, the lands were governed
by the provisions of s.43A of the Act and directed the
determination of the rent accordingly. The Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal as well as the High Court confirmed the
aforesaid order. The High Court held that though initially
there was some mention of other crops, the Kabulayat (Lease
Deed) in terms intended that the land would be used for
cultivation of sugarcane, and when sugarcane was not being
cultivated, the other crops could be cultivated till the
land was again available for sugarcane cultivation, and if
that be not the intention, the entire document could not be
correctly and reasonably reconciled and that the predominate
purpose being sugarcane cultivation, the tenant was not
entitled to the right asserted by him.
In appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended on
behalf of the appellant-tenant: (i) that the whole of the
land is not for the cultivation of sugarcane; (ii) that in
an area of 11 acres, only 1 acre was subjected to the culti-
vation of sugarcane, and that the Kabulayat or the lease
clearly indicated that there were other purposes; and (iii)
that the land could not be exempted because the lease was
not for the cultivation of the sugarcane alone.
Disposing of the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1.1 The Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act,
1948 was enacted with a high purpose of transferring the
land tilled to the tillers of the soil with the exception of
the lands which were leased out for growing sugarcane be-
cause of the need for protection of the industry of sugar-
cane and development of the economy. [924G-H]
1.2 Having regard to the preamble to the Act and the
primary purpose of the Act, it would be necessary to remand
the matter back to the High Court for further remand to the
appropriate officer to determine whether there was any area
which was leased exclusively for sugarcane crop. If it is
held on such enquiry that the entire area was for sugarcane
crop, then the order of the Tribunal cannot be interfered
with. If, on the other hand, there are areas which were
leased out separately and independently of the leasing out
for sugarcane and demarcated separately, then in respect of
the same no exemption can be given in derogation of the’
rights of the Agricultural tenants in those leased areas and
the appellant would be entitled to succeed. [924D-F]
915
2.1 In a lease for composite purposes, if there was any
area where sugarcane was only cultivated, that area would be
exempt from the ambit of the provisions of the Act and would
be exempted. If, however, along with cultivation of sugar-
cane, other crops were cultivated in the area, such an area
would not be entitled to exemption. [924F-G]
2.2 It is not necessary that the purpose of the lease
must be specifically mentioned either in the instrument of
the lease or that the lease must be for cultivation of
sugarcane etc. in the entire field. It would be for the
courts to reach a conclusion on the evidence whether the
lease was for cultivation of any particular crop or not.
Nothing would turn on whether the agreement was to grow that
crop in the entire field or not. [922G-H; 923A-B]
In the instant case, the area which is in dispute com-
prised of areas leased for raising sugarcane crop as also
for other crops. The area was covered by lease for multiple
purposes. Some areas were leased out for sugarcane where
along with sugarcane other crops were grown. These however,
should be included as areas leased for sugarcane as ancil-
lary crops or for better utilisation of the land in ques-
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tion. The leases covered areas other than the areas contem-
plated by sugarcane which could be demarcated in terms of
the Kabulayat. [924B-D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.11.1983 of the
Bombay High Court in w.P. No. 271 of 1979.
S.S. JavaIi and P.R. Ramashesh for the Appellants.
A.M. Khanwilkar and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted. Heard
counsel for the parties on the appeal.
This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment
of the High Court of Bombay dated 9th November, 1983. It
raises a short and an interesting point. Shripati Balla
Jadhav, father of the appellants had executed a lease deed
with regard to the suit land in favour of the landlord and
taken the said land on lease. The said lease was for the
purpose of cultivation of chillies, tobacco, sugarcane,
groundnuts etc.
916
That is the version of the petitioners/appellants,
The question is, whether the lease was taken for the
aforesaid purposes or was only for the cultivation of sugar-
cane alone. In deciding that question the terms of the lease
will have to be borne in mind. Suo moto proceedings for
fixing the price under section 32(G) of the Bombay Tenancy
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948--being Act No. LXVII of 1948
(hereinafter called the ’Act’) was taken on the assumption
that the tenant had become statutory purchaser by virtue of
section 32 of the said Act. The proceedings were dropped as
some of the respondents were then minors. An order as made
by Deputy Collector in appeal from the order of the trial
court in proceedings under section 3"(G) of the said Act
remanding the case to the trial Court on 31st March. 1973.
Thereafter on 17th July, 1975, the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal confirmed the order of remand made by Dy. Collec-
tor, in revision filed by the respondents herein. The High
Court thereafter rejected the writ petition of the landlord
against the order of the Tribunal. and as such the proceed-
ings under section 32(G), according to the appellants here-
in, are still pending.
On 15th June, 1974, the respondents made an application
under the Act for determination of reasonable rent on the
basis that the lands were leased for growing sugarcane. The
trial court on 11th February, 1975 rejected the application
in respect of the tenancy of Aval Kankoon on the ground that
the lands had been leased not for growing sugarcane alone.
but for different types of crops. On or about 31st May.
1977. the Spedal Land Acquisition Officer. Kolahpur in
Tenancy Appeal No. 302 of 1975 allowed the tenancy of Aval
Kankoon and directed the determination of the rent on the
basis that the lands were leased for growing sugarcane. The
said order was confirmed on 30th November, 1978 by the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolahpur, in appeal filed by
the appellants. There was a writ petition thereafter on 9th
November, 1983 by the appellants under article 227 of the
Constitution and the High Court of Bombay rejected the said
writ application. The petitioners have come up in special
leave to this Court.
It may be mentioned before we deal with the judgment
under appeal that the said Act was an Act to amend the law
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relating to tenancy of the agricultural land and to make
certain other provisions with regard to those lands. It may
be mentioned that the purpose was to make the tillers owners
of the land and in respect of mortgages of certain lands
giving the tenant the right of re-purchase of the land. It
is
917
a social agrarian reform measure to ameliorate the condi-
tions of the tenants. See in this connection the statement
of Objects and Reasons of the said Act.
In the Preamble it is stated that it was necessary to
amend the law which governed the relations of landlords and
tenants of agricultural lands; and further whereas on ac-
count of the neglect of a landholder or disputes between
landlord and tenants, the cultivation of an estate has
seriously suffered, or for the purpose of improving the
economic and social conditions of peasants or ensuring the
full and efficient use of land for agriculture, it was
expedient to assume management of estates held by landhold-
ers and to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer
of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands
appurtenant thereto or occupied by agriculturists, agricul-
tural labourers and artisans in the Province of Bombay, and
to make provisions for certain other purposes therein the
said Act was being passed. The Act was intended to benefit
tenants in respect of the said evils. But Chapter IlIA which
was inserted by Bombay Act 13 of 1956 provided special
provisions for land held on lease by industrial or commer-
cial undertakings and by certain persons for the cultivation
of sugarcane and other notified agricultural produce. Under
the scheme of the Act under sections 4B, 8, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C,
10, 10A, 14, 16, 17A, 17B, 18, 27, 31 to 31D (both inclu-
sive), 32 to 32R (both inclusive), 33A, 33B, 33C, 43, 63,
63A, 64 and 65 dealt with the various kinds of rights of the
tenants in land, including the right of repurchase as con-
templated in sections 32 to 32R. Section 32(1) provided that
on first day of April, 1957 which was called "the tillers’
day’7 in the Act every tenant should subject to the other
provisions of the Act and the succeeding sections be deemed
to have purchased from the landlord, free of all encum-
brances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by
him as tenant, if such tenant was a permanent tenant thereof
and cultivated land personally; or such tenant was not a
permanent tenant but cultivated the land leased personally;
and the landlord had not given notice of termination of his
tenancy under section 31; or notice had been given under
section 31, but the landlord had not applied to the Mamlat-
dar on or before 31st day of March, 1957 under section 29
for obtaining possession of the land; or for certain other
contingencies mentioned in clause (ii) and other clauses of
section 32 of the Act.
Section 43A which is in Chapter III-A, provides, inter
alia, by clause (b) of Section 43A(1) that leases of land
granted to any bodies or persons other than those mentioned
in clause (a) for the cultivation of sugarcane or the grow-
ing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of
918
livestock, that the aforesaid provisions for the benefit of
tillers or tenants would not apply to those.
In this appeal we are concerned with a very short ques-
tion namely, whether the lease of land granted in this case
is covered by clause (b) for the lease for the cultivation
of sugarcane or the growing of fruits or flowers or for the
breeding of livestock. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
section 43A deals with land leased to or held by any indus-
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trial or commercial undertaking which in the opinion of the
State Government bona fide carries on by any industrial or
commercial operations and which is approved by the State
Government.
By the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, the
tenant had been denied that right as against the landlord.
The Revision Petition was filed by the respondents-tenants
in proceedings under section 43B of the said Act to question
the order made by the Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal,
Kolahpur, refusing to interfere with the order made by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer (II) Tulsi Project, Kolha-
pur, holding that the purpose of the lease as far as suit
lands were concerned was one for cultivating sugarcane and
as such the lands were governed by the provisions of section
43A of the Act. The question is, is that finding correct?
Both the courts had interpreted the original Kabulayat,
herein dated 24th February, 1947 to come to the conclusion
that this land was leased for raising sugarcane. Our atten-
tion was also drawn to the official translation of the said
documents which will be presently noted. It may be mentioned
that initially proceedings under section 88C of the Act were
filed on the basis that the lands were Jiravat lands but the
said proceedings were ’withdrawn, and further that proceed-
ings under section 32(G) of the Act were also initiated in
1972, which were still pending. In those proceedings too,
the character of the lands was stated to be Jiravat lands.
According to the learned’ counsel, this characterisation of
the lands as Jiravat lands was contrary to the findings
recorded by the revenue authorities and there was an error
apparent on the face of the record, and so was contended
before the High Court. Secondly, the learned counsel had
submitted before the’ High Court that on correct reading of
the Kabulayat there was an express mention that apart from
sugarcane no other crops could be cultivated and if that was
so, the revenue Courts were in error in holding otherwise.
The High Court noted that the proceedings before it were not
proceedings in appeal. The High Court rightly rejected the
application under article 227 of the Constitution on the
view that if a
919
reasonable view of the evidence was taken by the authorities
competent to decide the controversy, no interference was
called for. Furthermore that was a fact which had to be
determined on the basis of the evidence. However, it was
contended before the High Court with reference to the Kabu-
layat that it could be seen that this Kabulayat of 1947
conferred a right of cultivation for five years. The Kabu-
layat specifically mentioned that possession of the lands as
well as the well was given under the document. It provided
that the executant could take the crop in due-consultation
with the landholders and there the mention or the crops
indicated all sorts of crops, like Jawar, Tur, Bhuimug,
Mirchi, Kapus, Oos, Tambakhoo etc. It further recited that
1/2 of the crop would be retained by he owners and the other
1/2 would be retained by the tillers. After these primary
recitals, reference was made primarily to the sugarcane
crop. With regard to that aspect, it was undertaken by the
executant that everyday till jaggery was prepared, 20 sugar-
canes and one pot of sugarcane juice would have to be
reached to the owners. Similarly, it was provided how the
fruits of the mango trees would be shared. It was further
provided with regard to the manure as well as the seeds for
raising sugarcane the parties were to share 1/2 and 1/2
expenditure. Similarly with regard to the maintenance of the
irrigational facilities and also the expenditure for the
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preparation of jaggery the parties were to share 1/2 and
1/2. It was further provided that the land which Was not
available for sugarcane could be subjected to cultivation of
jute or chilli and no other till the land was available for
sugarcane cultivation.
It may be instructive to refer to the material portion
of the deed which states as follows:
"These two lands I have taken from you agreeing to pay. half
crop share for a period of five years from shake 1869 to
1874 and have taken possession today alongwith well and
trees. I will raise crops therein in consultation with you.
In these lands, I will raise chillies, Cotton, Sugarcane,
Tobacco, etc. but I will cut and-harvest them with your
approval. I will give you a half share in all the crops
raised as also in the fodder. I will take the remaining
share as a tenant. You are to take the green grass growing
on the western hedge in R.S. No. 493. I am to take the green
grass from other hedges. In the dry fodder you are to get
half the number of shieves."
The next clause dealt with the price and it has also an
important beating and stated as follows:
920
"The price of your share of crops and fodder is fixed at Rs.
1400. However I will give you the grain & fodder and will
not ask you to take its price. Similarly I will pay you half
the assessment and local fund in the month of January every
year.
Every year as long as sugar-cane crushing goes on I
will give you every day 20 good sugar-canes, and a pitcher
of sugar-cane juice. The price of the sugarcane and juice is
fixed at Rs. 15.
These are mango trees in the lands. if they bear
fruits I will protect the same and will not pluck any nor
will allow anyone also to do so. For protecting the fruits I
will take 1/4th and will give you 3/4th. The price of your
share in the mangoes is fixed at Rs.50."
Then in the second clause the executant states as follows:
"In the land where sugar-cane is grown I will raise either
chillies or jute as an alternate crop. I will not grow any
other crop in that plot."
Thereafter the Kabulayat dealt with the obligation of
the executant to supply half the manure of the land and half
the cost of fertilizer and asserted that he would supply.
half the seed for sugarcane and carry the fertilizer and
seed of sugarcane of his share at his cost. Free service as
per usual practice was also ensured. The last clause on
which reliance was placed provides as follows:
"I will cultivate the lands on these terms for five years. I
will hand back the land in which sugarcane is raised in the
month of Magarshirsha of shake 1873. The remaining land I
will deliver to you between Margarshirsha and Falgun of
shake 1876 as and when the standing crops are removed. Thus
the lands are to remain with me till the amount of Rs.3000
deposited by me is paid off."
According to the High Court, though initially there was
sortie mention of other crops, the Kabulayat in terms in-
tended that the land would be used for cultivation of sugar-
cane, and when the sugarcane was not being cultivated, the
other crops could be cultivated in those pieces of lands
till the land was again available for sugarcane cultiva-
921
tion. If that be not the intention, according to the High
Court, the entire document could not be correctly and rea-
sonably reconciled. It could not be forgotten that this was
a document reserving right of the amount of Rs.3000 and
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Rs.600 to be adjusted every year by giving the cultivated
return and taking a receipt therefor. The receipt so intend-
ed to be taken only concerns itself with the sugarcane,
sugarcanejuice and sugarcane-waste. Thus, the document taken
as a whole could reasonably be read as providing for the
purpose as it was found by the revenue authorities. Further-
more, the oral evidence, according to the High Court, of the
parties clearly went on to show that the initial purpose
must have been the lease for growing sugarcane. The High
Court referred to the evidence of P.W. 1 who attested the
document. As against this evidence, there was evidence of
D.W. 1 which was an evidence only of denial and even he was
unable to say whether in the document sugarcane, cotton and
tobacco as crops were mentioned or not. He was unable to say
in how many years actually the sugarcane had been cultivated
and he submitted that by rotation the land could be used for
cultivating sugarcane. It was further admitted, the High
Court noted, that in cross-examination that jaggerywise
taken to shops for sale.
The High Court was of the view that. once the Kabulayat
was read in this manner, it did not appear even from the
7/12 extract that in some portion. sugarcane crop was culti-
vated. The High Court found that being the position of the
record it was difficult to interfere with the finding of the
lower court. In other words the High Court was of the view
that the predominate purpose being sugarcane cultivation,
the tenant was riot entitled to the right asserted by him.
The High Court also noted that the fact that the lands to be
characterised as Jiravat lands would not be decisive for
determining the purpose of the lease when that could be
found from a document like the Kabulayat. In the premises
the High Court refused to interfere. It is the correctness
or otherwise of that decision which is under challenge
before us.
It was submitted before us that the whole of the land is
not for the cultivation of sugarcane. It was urged that in
an area of 11 acres, only 1 acre was subjected to the culti-
vation of sugarcane. The Kabulayat or the lease clearly
indicated that there were other purposes.
The question in this case is whether the lease was for
sugarcane or also for other purposes? Was it composite
purpose lease or single purpose lease? The object of the
legislation has to be borne in mind.
922
The entirety of the lease has to be kept in view. Then
and then only can the question be viewed properly.
Our attention was drawn to a bench decision of the
Bombay High Court in Shri Usaf Usman Majawar v. Shrimant
Yeshwantrao Appasaheb Ghatage, [1963] Bombay Law Reporter
Vol. LXV 831. There the Division Bench observed that indi-
vidual leases were not excluded from the operation of sec-
tion 43A(1)(b) of the Act. According to the bench decision
of the Bombay High Court, the determining factor in consid-
ering whether clause (b) of section 43A(1) of the Act was
applicable or not, was the purpose of the lease. If the
purpose of the lease was for cultivation of sugarcane or
growing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of live-
stock, then it was excluded from the operation of sections
32 to 32R of the Act whether the lessee is a body of person
or persons. The High Court further reiterated that what was
required to be established on material evidence under sec-
tion 43A(1)(b) of the Act was whether there was a lease; and
whether the lease was for cultivation of sugarcane or grow-
ing of fruits or flowers. It is not necessary that the
purpose of the lease must be specifically mentioned either
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in the instrument of the lease or that lease must be for
cultivation of sugarcane etc. in the entire field. It would
be for the courts to reach a conclusion on the evidence
available to it whether the lease was for cultivation of any
particular crop or not. Nothing would, turn on whether the
agreement was to grow that crop in the entire field or not.
Our attention was drawn to the observations of the Court
at page 835 of the report. It was contended before the
Bombay High Court that for attracting the provisions of
section 43A of the Act, it must be proved by the landlord
that the agreement specifically provided that the lease was
for cultivation of the sugarcane or for the growing of
fruits or flowers or for breeding of livestock, and further
it must also be established that the agreement was to grow
sugarcane in the entire land leased out ’and not in any part
thereof. The High Court was of the view that it was true in
the language of clause (b) that it had to be established
that the lease was granted for the cultivation of sugarcane
or for growing. fruits and flowers etc., but it nowhere
specifically mentioned that the purpose of the lease must be
specifically mentioned either in the instrument of the lease
or that the/ease must be for cultivation of sugarcane etc,
in the entire field. (Emphasis supplied). On the other hand,
according to the view of the Bombay High Court, what was
required was to be established on material evidence whether
there was a lease and whether the lease was for cultivation
of
923
sugarcane or for growing of fruits or flowers. In each case
it would depend on the evidence whether the lease had been
for cultivation of sugarcane or growing of fruits or flowers
and that would depend on the nature of the cultivation. The
Bombay High Court noted that they were informed that the
cultivation of sugarcane could never be on the entire field
but the cultivation of sugarcane was always carried on by
rotation in parts of the field. It would, therefore, depend
on the facts of each case and if that be so, it is for the
courts of fact to reach a conclusion on the evidence avail-
able to it whether the lease had been for cultivation of a
particular crop or not. On behalf of the petitionersappel-
lants, learned counsel, Shri Javali contended that the lease
contained in the Kabulayat had to be examined because it was
not for cultivation of sugarcane only. Shri JavaIi for the
appellants contended that the land could not be exempted
because the lease was not for the cultivation of the sugar-
cane alone. He drew our attention to the findings at page 13
of the Paper Book of the appellate court where apart from
the record it appeared that the crop of sugarcane actually
raised in the suit lands was to the extent of 1 acre or
more. This was continued since 1947 till 1972 and it was
clearly stated by the tenants that they had stopped raising
sugarcane after 1972 because of scarcity of water. The
entries in the record of Rights also substantiated the
position that sugarcane was actually raised in the suit
lands. The appellate court noted that there was a well in
one of the suit lands having sufficient water to raise
sugarcane. The statement of the tenants corroborated this
fact when they stated that on the day of deposition there
was 5 to 6 cubic feet water in the said well. That the court
below had actually gone for site inspection and found that
Baggayat crops like wheat was cultivated by the tenants on
the water course available from the well in the suit land.
But it is clear that the entire land was not used for culti-
vation of sugarcane.
The question is if lease for multiple cultivation is
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permissible in the scheme of section 43A then only leases of
the areas for cultivation of sugarcane or growing of fruits
or flowers or for breeding of livestock could claim the
benefit of protection from the tenants’ claim. This has to
be borne in mind. With respect, we cannot accept the ratio
of the decision of the Bombay High Court in its entirety. We
are aware that ’sugarcane could not be cultivated in the
entire field for the whole year. It has to be kept follow
and crops had to be grown in the meantime to increase the
fertility. But what was primary and what was secondary and
what was to be done in such a case as we found it as a fact,
has to be considered.
924
As mentioned hereinbefore, this petition is concerned
with the proceeding under section 43B of the said Act which
questioned before the High Court the order made by the
Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, refusing to interfere
with the order made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer
(II) Tulsi Project, Kolhapur holding that the purpose of the
lease so far as the suit land was concerned was one for
cultivating sugarcane and as such the lands were governed by
the provisions of section 43A of the Act. Having regard to
the facts and circumstances enumerated before, we are of the
opinion that the area which is in dispute in this case
comprised of areas leased for raising sugarcane crop as also
for other crops. In view of the provisions of law discussed
above, in so far as the High Court upheld the finding that
the entirety of the area in question was covered by lease
for sugarcane, it is difficult to sustain the same. The area
was covered by lease for multiple purposes. Some areas were
leased out for sugarcane where along with sugarcane other
flops were grown. These, however, should be included as
areas leased for sugarcane as ancillary flops or for better
utilisation of the land in question. But here the leases
covered areas other than the areas contemplated by sugarcane
which could be demarcated in terms of the Kabulayat which we
have discussed before. In our opinion, having regard to the
preamble to the Act and the primary purpose of the Act, it
would be necessary to remand the matter back to the High
Court for remanding it back to the appropriate officer to
determine whether there was any area which was leased exclu-
sively for sugarcane crop. If it is held on such enquiry
that the entirety of the area was for sugarcane crop, then
the order of the Tribunal made in this case cannot be inter-
fered with. If, on the other hand, there are areas which
were leased out separately and independently of the leasing
out for sugarcane and demarcated separately, then in respect
of the same, no exemption can be given in derogation of the
rights of the agricultural tenants in those leased areas and
the appellant would be entitled to succeed. In a lease for
composite purposes, if there was any area where sugarcane
was only cultivated, that area would be exempt from the
ambit of the provisions of the Act and would be exempted.
If, however, along with cultivation of sugarcane, other
crops were cultivated in the area, such an area would not be
entitled to exemption. We therefore remand the case with
directions that the authorities below should find the posi-
tion in light of the aforesaid. It may be observed that the
Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was enacted with
a high purpose of transferring the land tilled to the till-
ers of the soil with the exception of the lands which were
leased out for growing sugarcane because of the need for
protection of the industry of sugarcane and development of
the economy.
925
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This appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid direc-
tions. In that view of the matter, parties will pay and bear
their own costs.
M.L.A Appeal disposed
of.
926