Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 959 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Siddarama and Ors.
RESPONDENT:
State of Karnataka
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1939 of 2006)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Appellants call in question legality of the judgment
rendered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court
holding appellant no.1 guilty of the offence punishable under
Section 326 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (in short the ’IPC’). Each of the accused appellants was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years and
to pay a fine of Rs.500/-. The appellants and 9 others faced
trial for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 341,
307 read with Section 149 IPC. The Trial Court convicted
accused numbers 1 to 6 and 8 to 13 and sentenced each to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of
offences punishable under Sections 143, 147 and 341 read
with Section 149 IPC, and in respect of offence punishable
under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC, each was
sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and to
pay a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation. It had been
reported to the Trial Court that accused no.7 died during the
pendency of the trial. The judgment was assailed before the
High Court both by the accused persons and State. While
accused persons questioned conviction and sentence, State on
the other hand prayed for enhancement of sentence. The
appeals were disposed of as aforenoted.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
T. Kumar (the injured/P.W.7) is a resident of
Annechakanahally. As his female child had been left by his
wife in his father-in-law’s place in Aramballi village of K.R.
Nagar Taluk, he went to his father-in-law’s place on 7.5.1990
to bring the child. On 8.5.1990 he stayed back there and on
9.5.1990 he was returning to his village Annechakanahally
along with his child. His brother-in-law - Puttaswamy (P.W.4)
accompanied him. When they came near Hosa Agrahara
Railway Station, Puttaswamy proceeded further to purchase
the tickets. By the time Kumara came near the signal cabin in
Hosa Agrahara Railway Station, he saw all the accused
standing near the signal cabin. They were armed with
choppers. When they saw Kumara with the child, they
suddenly came and surrounded him and before he boarded
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the train, the accused Nos.1 and 2 gave a blow on the right
hand of Kumara by means of a chopper on account of which,
Kumara sustained an injury and lost one of his fingers. He left
his child, who was snatched by the accused No.11
Ramakrishna. Then all the accused together caught hold of
Kumara and dragged him to a little distance and near the
hedges at a distance of about 50 to 60 feet from the railway
cabin, they began to assault him. His left leg was severely
crushed by the assault and Kumara sustained injuries due to
the assault on his right leg and other parts of the body a1so.
In the meantime, Puttaswamy (P.W.4), who had returned to
the place after purchasing tickets and Niruvanigouda (P.W.3)
and Jayabharathi (P.W.1), who had come in the said train,
which had arrived by that time at the railway station, saw the
incident. When Nirvanegouda (P.W.3) and Puttaswamy (P.W.4)
attempted to go near the accused to rescue Kumara, they were
threatened by the accused. In the meantime, the train had left
the railway station and the accused left the place and ran
away. Kumara was grievously injured. Leaving others to look
after Kumara, Puttaswamy took the child and went to his
village to inform Kumara’s father-in-law - Rajegowda (P.W.5).
Karthikeyan, Railway Station Master (P.W.17), who had by
then come to know of the assault, came to the spot. When
Rajegowda and Annegouda assured him that they would shift
the injured to the hospital and also inform the police, he
returned to the office. In a tempo, the injured was shifted to
Bherya Clinic. Since there was no sufficient facility to treat the
injured, he was shifted to K.R. Nagar hospital. There, they
were advised to take the injured to K.R. Hospital, Mysore and,
therefore, the injured was taken there. Dr. B. Suhasini,
Assistant Surgeon in K.R. Hospital (P.W.18) examined Kumara
at about 12 noon and gave treatment. In the meantime,
Kuchela Shetty who was the S.H.O. (P.W.13) of Saligrama
Police Station had come to the hospital. He could not take the
statement of Kumara, since Kumara was undergoing
emergency treatment. Immediately after the treatment, at
about 4.00 p.m. P.W.13 recorded the statement of Kumara. On
the basis of the same, D.V. Suresh (P.W.16), who was P.S.I. of
Saligrama Police Station (P.W.16) registered a case in Crime
No.14/1990 and forwarded the FIR to the jurisdictional
Magistrate. He went to the spot and conducted spot mahazar
as per Ex.P5. He also took steps to apprehend the accused
who were found absconding. The accused Nos.1 to 4 were
arrested on 19.7.1990 and on the voluntary information
furnished by them, choppers allegedly used by the accused for
assault were recovered. The accused Nos.5 and 6 were
arrested on 28.7.1990 and accused No.7 was arrested on
27.3.1991. Other accused were found absconding. Despite
treatment, Kumara’s left leg could not be saved and it had to
be amputated in view of the grangrene that had set in by that
time. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was
filed against all the accused showing the accused No.11
absconding. Later accused No.11 Ramakrishna was arrested
and a separate case registered against him was also tried
along with S.C.No. 109/1990.
Accused persons pleaded not guilty. In order to establish
the accusations, 20 witnesses were examined by the
prosecution. PWs 1 and 3 are the eye witnesses and PW7 was
the injured. PWs 2, 5, 9 and 17 went to the place of incidence
immediately after the occurrence. PW5 was examined to prove
the motive. PW 18 was the doctor who examined the injured.
The accused persons pleaded innocence and in their
examination in terms of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Cr.PC’), false accusations were
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pleaded. Accused no.11 examined himself as DW1 to establish
the plea of alibi.
On considering the evidence of the witnesses and the
injured, the trial Court found accused persons version credible
so far as accused numbers 1, 2, 6 and 9 are concerned but
found the evidence insufficient to fasten guilt of the rest of the
accused persons. The conviction and sentence as noted above
were accordingly recorded.
The convicted accused persons filed an appeal (Criminal
Appeal No.888/2000) while the State of Karnataka filed
Criminal Appeal No.12/2001 for enhancement of sentence and
to set aside the acquittal. By the impugned judgment the High
Court allowed both the appeals in part. While maintaining the
conviction and sentence imposed in respect of the offence
relatable to Section 143, 147 and 341 read with Section 149
IPC and the consequential sentence the conviction in terms of
Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC was altered to Section
326 read with Section 149 IPC and the sentence of 8 years
rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/- was thought to
be appropriate. But the High Court did not interfere with the
acquittal of the accused persons as done by the trial Court.
The present appeal is filed by accused persons 1, 2, 6
and 9. Though various points were urged in support of the
appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
sentence is highly disproportionate to the nature of the offence
committed. The prosecution version itself is to the effect that
the allegations had foundation on political differences.
Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand supported the judgment of the High Court and
submitted that this is a case to which Section 307 IPC read
with Section 149 IPC is clearly applicable. More than 5
accused persons were involved and in fact one of the major
players in the whole incident i.e. A-7 had died. The sentence
according to him is liberal.
Law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting
claims and demands. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural
conflict where living law must find answer to the new
challenges and the courts are required to mould the
sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of
lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins.
Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State
of criminal law continues to be \026 as it should be \026 a decisive
reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in
operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the
corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual
matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where
it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to
be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the
nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and
committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the
conduct of the accused, and all other attending circumstances
are relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration.
Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would
do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public
confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long
endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of
every court to award proper sentence having regard to the
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nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed
or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by
this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Naidu (AIR
1991 SC 1463).
The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the
culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily
allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a
sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that
reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised
by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that
punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice
sentences are determined largely by other considerations.
Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that
are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of
keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic
results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a
departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and
create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and
widespread.
Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal
respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it
remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences.
The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal
severity is now unknown in civilized societies, but such a
radical departure from the principle of proportionality has
disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a
single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed.
Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any
serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration
that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from
those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable
when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly
disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable
practical consequences.
After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate
sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has
been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of
really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the
Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has
been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v.
State of Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no
formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a
reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate
punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may
affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof
formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to
correctly assess various circumstances germane to the
consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in
the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment
may be equitably distinguished.
The object should be to protect the society and to deter
the criminal in achieving the avowed object to law by imposing
appropriate sentence. It is expected that the Courts would
operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence
which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing
process has to be stern where it should be.
Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on
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the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to
offences relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
which have great impact not only on the health fabric but also
on the social order and public interest, cannot be lost sight of
and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude
by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view
merely on account of lapse of time or personal inconveniences
in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter
productive in the long run and against societal interest which
needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence
inbuilt in the sentencing system.
In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. (1994 (2) SCC
220), this Court has observed that shockingly large number of
criminals go unpunished thereby increasingly, encouraging
the criminals and in the ultimate making justice suffer by
weakening the system’s creditability. The imposition of
appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Court
responds to the society’s cry for justice against the criminal.
Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment
befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence
of the crime. The Court must not only keep in view the rights
of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime
and the society at large while considering the imposition of
appropriate punishment. (See Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh
(2004 (2) SCC 590), Abu Ram v. Mukna and Ors. (2005 (10)
SCC 597) and Shailesh Jaswantbhai v. State of Gujarat and
Ors. (2006 (2) SCC 359).
The offence committed is certainly gruesome but the
State has not questioned alteration of conviction from Section
307 read with Section 149 IPC to Section 326 read with
Section 149 IPC.
Considering the background facts it would be appropriate
to reduce the custodial sentence to five years but enhance the
fine in respect of each appellant to Rs.20,000/-. In case the
fine amount is not deposited within two months, the default
custodial sentence would be two years. In case the amount is
deposited, 3/4th of the amount deposited shall be paid to the
victim PW-7 within one month of the deposit.
With the above modification of sentence, the appeal is
dismissed.