Himakshi vs. Rahul Verma

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 391
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5942 OF 2023
HIMAKSHI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAHUL VERMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5943 OF 2023
RAHUL VERMA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS

HIMACHAL PRADESH BOARD OF
SCHOOL EDUCATION & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
1. The present appeals relate to recruitment to the post of
Computer Hardware Engineer by respondent no. 2 – Himachal
Pradesh Board of School Education (hereinafter “ the Board ”). The
Signature Not Verified
controversy centres around the prescribed qualifications for
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2026.04.20
17:49:38 IST
Reason:
appointment to the said post, particularly the requirement of prior
1

work experience and the preference, if any, to a higher
qualification, such as a Master’s degree.
2. These appeals emanate from the common impugned
judgement dated 23.04.2021 (hereinafter “ Impugned
Judgement ”) passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh at Shimla (hereinafter “ High Court ”), whereby
the judgement of the Single Judge of the High Court was set aside.
The Division Bench held that neither the appellant Himakshi
(hereinafter “ selected candidate ”) nor the respondent no. 1 –
Rahul (hereinafter “ unsuccessful candidate ”) satisfied the
essential qualifications at the time of recruitment and
appointment.
3. At its core, the question involved is whether a candidate who
did not possess the required work experience at the time of
recruitment could still be selected and appointed, either on the
basis of having a preferred higher qualification or by exercising
supposed relaxation of the eligibility conditions.
4. Civil Appeal No. 5942 of 2023 has been preferred by the
selected candidate Himakshi, assailing the impugned judgement
to the extent it sets aside her appointment, challenge to which was
rejected by the Single Judge of the High Court. Civil Appeal No.
2

5943 of 2023 has been preferred by the unsuccessful candidate,
Rahul, challenging the same judgement insofar as it rejects his
prayer for appointment and consequential relief, despite
invalidating the selection process to the post in question. Since
there is a commonality of facts and legal issues, both appeals are
being dealt with by this common judgement. For the sake of
convenience, the parties are being referred to as per their status in
Civil Appeal No. 5942 of 2023.
Factual Matrix
5. The Board initiated a recruitment process vide Advertisement
No. 3001-3010 dated 21.07.2016 inviting applications for various
categories of posts on contract basis, including one unreserved
post of Computer Hardware Engineer on contract basis. The
qualification for selection was prescribed as follows: –
“Essential Qualification
(1) Should have passed 10+2 examination or its equivalent
from a recognised Board/University.
(2) B.E/B.Tech in Electronic telecommunication/I.T. from a
recognised University with at least 5 years’ experience in
computer manufacturing/ maintenance from a company of
repute.
(3) Preference will be given to candidate with M.Tech in
Electronic Degree.
Desirable Qualification
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(4) Knowledge of customs, manner and dialects of Himachal
Pradesh and suitability for appointment in the peculiar
conditions prevailing in the Pradesh.”
6. Pursuant to the advertisement, various candidates, including
the parties herein, applied for the said post. The written test was
conducted on 28.08.2016, followed by a personal interview on
03.10.2016. Insofar as the qualifications of the candidates are
concerned, it is not in dispute that all three candidates – appellant
Himakshi, respondent no. 1 Rahul and respondent no. 3 Gaurav –
possessed a B.Tech degree from a recognised University in the
relevant field. Himakshi also held an M.Tech degree; however, at
the time of participating in the recruitment process, she had work
experience of only about one year. Gaurav possessed a Diploma in
Computer Engineering and had accumulated a combined work
experience of approximately two and a half years across different
organizations. Rahul possessed a Post Graduate Diploma in
Computer Applications and had work experience of approximately
six years across multiple organizations.
7. As per the result, respondent no. 1 – Rahul, having Roll No.
40032, obtained 118 marks in the written test and 25 marks in
the personal interview; being a total of 143 marks. Respondent no.
3 – Gaurav, having Roll No. 40013, obtained 123 marks in the
written test and 28 marks in the personal interview; being a total
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of 151 marks. The appellant Himakshi, having Roll No. 40016,
scored 124 marks in the written test and 28 marks in the personal
interview; obtaining a total of 152 marks; thus being the highest-
scoring candidate. For better clarity, the position of each candidate
is referred in the table below: –

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8. After completion of the selection process, vide notification
dated 03.10.2016, the appellant Himakshi was declared as
selected candidate for the post of Computer Hardware Engineer.
Respondent no. 3 – Gaurav, having the second-highest marks, was
placed in the wait list (hereinafter “ waitlisted candidate ”) for the
post. It is not in dispute that at the time of selection, Himakshi
had been serving as a VT (Vocational Trainer) Telecom in
Government Senior Secondary School, Kapahi, Sundernagar since
August 2015. She obtained No Objection Certificate from her
earlier employer to join service as a Computer Hardware Engineer
with the Board.
9. This selection and appointment of the appellant was
challenged by the unsuccessful candidate Rahul by way of Original
Application No. 1561 of 2017 before the erstwhile Himachal
Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal at Shimla (hereinafter
“ Tribunal ”). In the said application, he prayed for setting aside of
the appellant’s selection as well as putting respondent no. 3 in the
wait-list, along with direction for his own appointment on the post
in question, and for grant of all consequential benefits since he
possessed the prescribed essential qualifications.
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10. During pendency of the proceedings, the Tribunal came to be
abolished and the matter was transferred to the High Court, where
it was renumbered as CWPOA No. 136 of 2019. The learned Single
Judge vide judgement dated 24.08.2020, allowed the writ petition
ex-parte qua appellant Himakshi and set-aside her selection and
appointment. It was held that in absence of the essential
qualification of 5 years’ experience, no preference could have been
extended to her only on account of possessing an M.Tech degree.
It was further directed that the Board shall offer appointment to
Rahul, having regard to his claim of possessing the requisite
experience as on the relevant date. Pertinently, this order was
passed without any representation on behalf of the appellant, and
as such, she preferred Review Petition No. 33 of 2020 before the
High Court. The Single Judge allowed the said review petition,
thereby recalling the previous order dated 24.08.2020 and
restored the writ petition to its original number.
11. In her reply before the High Court, the appellant claimed that
she was more meritorious in the selection process and that the
Board had the power to relax the criteria if a candidate was found
to be otherwise well-qualified. It was further contended that none
of the candidates who were called for interview fulfilled the
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requisite experience. It was also not clear whether the experience
of the unsuccessful candidate Rahul was in a ‘company of repute’
dealing with ‘manufacturing/maintenance of computers’, as
stipulated in the advertisement.
12. It may be noted that during pendency of the writ petition
before the High Court, the selected candidate Himakshi continued
to render her services on the post in question and was ultimately
regularised on 07.11.2019 in terms of the regularisation policy
framed by the State of Himachal Pradesh.
13. Upon rehearing the matter, learned Single Judge of the High
Court, by order dated 23.09.2020, dismissed the writ petition filed
by respondent no. 1 Rahul, and upheld the selection and
appointment of the appellant Himakshi. The Court took note of the
applicable service rules for the post, being the Recruitment and
Promotion Rules for the Post of Computer Hardware Engineer in
the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education, Dharamshala
(hereinafter “ R&P Rules ”), particularly Rule 18 which conferred a
discretion to relax the conditions relating to eligibility, including
the requirement of age and work experience, in appropriate cases.
In this context, it was considered that the appellant Himakshi
possessed a higher qualification in the form of M.Tech degree,
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which could be taken into account for evaluating her suitability for
the post. Her selection, having been conducted by a duly
competent Selection Committee (hereinafter “ Committee ”) and in
absence of any mala fides or procedural irregularity in the
selection process, the outcome of the process was not required to
be interfered with. In such backdrop, learned Single Judge was of
the view that mere absence of the prescribed length of experience
would, by itself, not vitiate the selection, particularly when the
selected candidate secured the highest marks, possessed a higher
academic qualification and the R&P Rules provided the power of
relaxation.
14. Aggrieved by the said decision, the unsuccessful candidate
Rahul preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 49 of 2020 before the
High Court. The Division Bench, by way of the impugned
judgement, set aside the selection and appointment of Himakshi
on the ground that the essential qualification relating to work
experience had not been satisfied on the relevant date and there
was no material on record to show that her selection was by
exercising the power of relaxation and using the discretion
available under the R&P Rules. However, at the same time, no
direction was issued for appointment in favour of the unsuccessful
9

candidate Rahul, or any other candidate, on the consideration that
none of them fulfilled the requirement of the requisite experience
as prescribed in the R&P Rules read with the advertisement. It is
in this backdrop, the present appeals came to be preferred. This
Court, vide order dated 06.05.2021, granted a stay on the
operation of the impugned judgement of the High Court. The said
interim relief was further extended by order dated 06.05.2021. As
a consequence of such relief, the appellant has been continuing to
work on the post.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the parties
15. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, appearing on
behalf of the selected candidate submitted that the challenge to
her selection is misconceived inasmuch as the respondent Rahul
does not stand in the zone of consideration for appointment. It was
urged that the merit position of the candidates would show that
even if the appellant were to be excluded, Rahul would not
automatically be entitled to appointment. It was further contended
that the R&P Rules, confer a power of relaxation upon the
competent authority, when a candidate is otherwise found
suitable. In this context, reliance was placed on Rule 18 to submit
that the requirement of experience is flexible and could be relaxed
10

in an appropriate case. It was further his case that the appellant,
having secured the highest marks in the selection process, was
found meritorious by the Board. Based on the overall evaluation
process, including the written test and the personal interview, the
appellant was rightly selected on account of securing the highest
marks. The power of relaxation, being discretionary, was not
necessary to be recorded giving detailed reasons for the selection
of a particular candidate. Once the recommendation of the
Committee had been accepted by the Board and appointment was
also directed, the same ought not to be interfered with.
16. Per contra , Mr. M.C. Dhingra, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent Rahul submitted that the very
foundation of the appellant’s selection was flawed as she did not
possess the relevant essential qualification at the time of selection.
The requirement of five years’ work experience was a mandatory
condition, and in absence of the same, any preference on account
of having a Masters’ degree could not have been exercised in favour
of the appellant. It was further submitted that even if the R&P
Rules contemplate the power of relaxation, no material was placed
to indicate that the same was mentioned in the advertisement
pursuant to which selection was made, or that the Board had
11

exercised the same in favour of the appellant; hence the appellant’s
selection couldn’t be sustained. It was further his case that once
the appellant had herself contended before the High Court that
none of the candidates fulfilled the required essential
qualifications, the selection was effectively done without strict
adherence to the eligibility conditions, which was impermissible in
law.
17. In response, Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent Board submitted that the selection
process had been carried out through a duly constituted
Committee and that the appellant was selected on the basis of
securing the highest marks in the written test as well as the
personal interview. However, when queried as to whether the issue
of eligibility, particularly the requirement of work experience as
envisaged under the R&P Rules had been specifically examined or
if any relaxation was formally granted; after taking instructions, it
was fairly informed that there was no express decision to such
effect.
18. At this point in time, it was reiterated by Mr. P.S. Patwalia,
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that even assuming
certain deficiencies in eligibility, no candidate, including the
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unsuccessful and waitlisted candidates herein, could claim an
indefeasible right of appointment. Additionally, pursuant to her
selection and appointment, the appellant has been serving on the
post for a considerable period of time and was also regularised in
service in the year 2019. In view of her long continuance in service,
the Court may take into account considerations of equity and
decline to interfere with her appointment at this stage. In this
regard, reliance was placed on the judgement in If at all any
interference was warranted, on account of it being an admitted
position that no candidate had the required essential qualification,
the proper course would not be to grant appointment to any
particular candidate but to uphold the selection process or direct
a fresh exercise, as the case may be.
19. In the said factual backdrop, the following issues arise for our
consideration:– (i) Whether a candidate not possessing the
essential qualification of five years’ work experience as on the
relevant date could nonetheless be considered for selection on the
strength of having a higher academic qualification, on account of the
same being indicated as a preference under the R&P Rules; (ii)
Whether the power of relaxation could be exercised in favour of a
candidate not possessing the essential qualification as prescribed
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in the R&P Rules, and if so, whether such relaxation was in fact
exercised in favour of the appellant in accordance with law; and (iii)
Whether the selection and appointment of the appellant can be
sustained in law, and if not, whether any direction for appointment
of any other candidate is warranted.
Appreciation of the issues in seriatim
20. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length
on the conspectus of this case and perused the material on record.
In that context, the issues are being appreciated in the succeeding
paragraphs.
Re: Issue (i) and (ii)
21. At the outset, it must be noted that the advertisement dated
21.07.2016 issued by the respondent Board clearly stipulates that
a candidate must possess, apart from the academic requirement
of passing the 10+2 examination from a recognised Board or its
equivalent and a B.E/B.Tech in Electronic telecommunication/I.T.
from a recognised University, inter alia , a minimum of five years’
work experience in a reputed organization engaged in computer
manufacturing or maintenance. This requirement was not
couched as being discretionary or flexible, but in fact, was
prescribed as part of the minimum eligibility criteria for
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appointment. The said stipulation finds its source in Rule 7 of the
R&P Rules governing the post in question, which also prescribe
experience as a component of eligibility for direct recruitment. The
said Rule is relevant and reproduced below for ready reference: –
“ 7. Minimum educational and other qualification
required for direct recruit(s)
(a) Essential
(i) B.E./B/Tech. Degree in Electronics &
Telecommunication/IT from a recognised University with
at least 5 years experience in computer manufacturing /
maintenance company of repute.
(ii) Preference will be given to candidates with M.Tech. in
Electronic Degree.
(b) DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION
Knowledge of customs, manners and dialects of Himachal
Pradesh and suitability for appointment in the peculiar
conditions prevailing in the Pradesh.”

22. Clause 2 preceding the said Rule 7 provides the manner in
which relaxation may be exercised by the Recruitment Agency and
is reproduced below: –
“ 2. Age and experience in case of direct recruitment, relaxable
at the discretion of the Recruitment Agency as the case may
be, in case the candidate is otherwise well qualified.”


23. The use of the expression “minimum” in the R&P Rules
assumes significance. It indicates that the requirement of
experience is a threshold condition which must be fulfilled by all
15

candidates seeking consideration. Such a condition cannot be
diluted or substituted merely on the basis of comparative merit or
superior academic qualifications. A close perusal of the governing
service rules, i.e., the R&P Rules reveals that there is a clear
distinction in the essential and desirable qualifications. While a
higher educational qualification may confer an additional
advantage of preference in the matter of selection, it does not
supplant or override the primary requirement of essential
eligibility. To hold otherwise would amount to rewriting the terms
of the selection and altering the criteria after the process had
commenced.
24. The indication in Rule 7 of the R&P Rules that preference
shall be given to candidates possessing an ‘M.Tech in Electronics’
degree must be understood in its proper context. A preference
operates only within the zone of eligible and merit candidates; it
does not enlarge or modify the field of eligibility itself. In other
words, the stage of applying preference arises only after a
candidate is found to fulfil the essential qualifications prescribed
for the post. Where a candidate does not meet the threshold
requirement of eligibility, the question of extending preference,
being in merit, on account of higher qualification does not arise.
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Preference may, at best, be exercised in a situation where two or
more candidates, otherwise eligible and similarly placed in terms
of merit, stand at par. In such event, the candidate possessing
M.Tech degree may be accorded preference. However, the same
cannot be extended to a candidate who is otherwise ineligible for
selection merely on account of possessing desirable qualification
prescribed for preference.
25. To accept the contention of the appellant that possession of
a higher degree can compensate for the absence of an essential
qualification would be to invert the scheme of the R&P Rules. It
would effectively permit the preferred qualification to override the
minimum essential qualification, thereby rendering the latter
nugatory. Such an interpretation would not only defeat the plain
language of the R&P Rules, but would also introduce uncertainty
and subjectivity into the selection process, which is impermissible
in matters of public employment.
26. The legal position regarding the impermissibility of
substituting prescribed qualifications with higher degrees, in the
absence of an express enabling provision, stands fortified in the
judgement of this Court in Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v.
17

1
Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors. , where it was held that in
absence of a specific statutory rule or a provision in the
advertisement, the recruiting agency cannot broaden the eligibility
criteria by treating a higher qualification as a replacement for the
mandatory ‘essential' qualification’. The relevant portion of the
judgement is reproduced for ready reference: –
“ 26. …it would not be permissible to draw an inference that a
higher qualification necessarily presupposes the acquisition of
another, albeit lower, qualification. The prescription of
qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The
State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications
as a condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of
judicial review to expand upon the ambit of the prescribed
qualifications. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a
matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of
judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or
should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State,
as the recruiting authority, to determine.”


27. It is trite law that the terms of the recruitment rules and the
advertisement form the basis of the selection process and are
binding on both, the candidates as well as the recruiting agencies.
Any departure therefrom, unless expressly permitted and properly
exercised, would be arbitrary and violative of the principles of
selection.

1
(2019) 2 SCC 404.
18

28. The contention of the appellant that the R&P Rules confer a
power of relaxation also requires consideration. In this regard,
Rule 18 of the said rules states as thus: –
“ 18. Power to Relax
Where the Board is of the opinion that it is necessary or
expedient to do so, it may be order for reasons to be recorded in
writing relax any of the provisions of these rules with respect to
any class of category of persons of posts(s).”
29. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to examine the scope
and effect of the power of relaxation under the R&P Rules. Clause
2 preceding Rule 7 permits relaxation of two kinds when a
candidate is otherwise well qualified; one, in case of age, and
second, in case of experience. Rule 18, on the other hand, confers
a much broader power upon the Board to relax any of the
provisions of the R&P Rules, where it is of the opinion that is
necessary or expedient to do so, for reasons to be recorded in
writing.
30. The width of the power under Rule 18, however, cannot be
construed as dispensing with the requirement of a structured and
conscious exercise of such discretion. Even if it were to be assumed
that the said power extends to relaxing the essential qualification,
including the requirement of a minimum of five years’ experience;
the same can be effected only upon due consideration of the nature
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of the requirement and the suitability of the candidate,
accompanied by reasons recorded in writing. The mere existence
of the power of relaxation does not obviate the manner of its
exercise.
31. This position is further borne out from the material placed on
record. This Court vide order dated 27.11.2025 called for records
of the Board to ascertain whether any relaxation was extended by
the recruiting agency. The said order is important, and as such,
the relevant portion is quoted below: –
“ 3) It is contended that under the Rules, age and experience in
case of direct recruits is relaxable at the discretion of the
Recruiting Agency/Board. It also gives power of relaxation if it is
necessary and expedient.
4) During arguments, Mr. P. S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel
representing petitioner-Himakshi submits that relaxation in
experience has been granted by the Recruiting Agency while Mr.
M. C. Dhingra, learned senior counsel representing petitioner-
Rahul Verma, submits that as per the result declared, it is not
clear that the relaxation in experience has been granted by
recruiting agency. It is also contended that as per the chart, his
client possesses the requisite experience. The said argument of
having requisite qualification and experience has been
controverted by Mr. P. S. Patwalia, inter alia, contending that
experience which is required in computer
manufacturing/maintenance company of repute. In absence of
such experience, the reference of experience as indicated in the
selection chart have no relevance.
5) Having considered the submissions as made, we deem it
appropriate to call for the records of selection from the Board. The
Board shall produce the relevant documents extending relaxation
if any by the recruiting agency or in exercise of the power if any
exercised by the Board along with the relevant record…”
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32. In response thereto, the material placed on record by the
respondent Board does not disclose any specific instance or
decision evidencing the exercise of the power of relaxation in favour
of any candidate, much less the appellant herein. In the Proforma
for the Interviews to be held for the post, the relevant details of the
concerned candidates were mentioned as thus: –
“HIMACHAL PRADESH BOARD OF SCHOOL EDUCATION
DHARAMSHALA (KANGRA-176213)
PROFORMA FOR COMPUTER H/W ENGINEER INTERVIEW TO
BE HELD ON 03/10/2016

33. A conjoint reading of the above material leaves no iota of
doubt that the requirement of experience was a substantive
qualification intended to ensure that the candidate possessed
adequate practical exposure in the relevant field. In such a
21

backdrop, the selection of the appellant, who admittedly possessed
only about one year of such experience, without any recorded
decision to relax the qualification, clearly indicates that the
essential eligibility criteria was neither adhered to nor consciously
dispensed with.
34. It is thus clear that no material has been placed on record to
indicate that any relaxation of experience was in fact exercised in
favour of the appellant, by way of recording in writing or otherwise.
The record of the Committee is silent to that effect, except to state
that the appellant secured the highest combined marks in the
written test and personal interview. However, there is nothing to
show that the recruitment agency applied its mind to the deficiency
in eligibility, particularly regarding the essential qualification, or
by recording any reason to relax the qualification of experience in
order to treat the appellant as eligible. The absence of any
deliberation or reasoning in this regard, when viewed in the light
of the above material, reinforces the position that the selection was
effected without due application of mind or after granting
relaxation.
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35. In Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan
2
and Ors. , this Court had the occasion to look into the power of
relaxation and the manner in which the same shall be exercised
by the recruiting agency, especially in case of public employment.
While the selections of persons in whose favour the relaxation was
exercised, albeit without recording any reasons, was sustained on
account of their period of service and lapse of time due to the
litigation, this Court laid down certain guidelines which may be
referred at this point: –
“ 11. … We, however, feel it necessary to emphasise and bring
to the notice of the University that the illegal practices in the
selection of candidates which have come to light and which
seem to be followed usually at its end must stop forthwith. It is
for this purpose that we lay down the following guidelines for
the future selection process:
A. The University must note that the qualifications it
advertises for the posts should not be at variance with
those prescribed by its Ordinance/Statutes.
B. The candidates selected must be qualified as on the last
date for making applications for the posts in question or
on the date to be specifically mentioned in the
advertisement/notification for the purpose. The
qualifications acquired by the candidates after the said
date should not be taken into consideration, as that
would be arbitrary and result in discrimination. It must
be remembered that when the advertisement/notification
represents that the candidates must have the
qualifications in question, with reference to the last date
for making the applications or with reference to the
specific date mentioned for the purpose, those who do not
have such qualifications do not apply for the posts even

2
1993 Supp (3) SCC 168.
23

though they are likely to acquire such qualifications and
do acquire them after the said date. In the circumstances,
many who would otherwise be entitled to be considered
and may even be better than those who apply, can have
a legitimate grievance since they are left out of
consideration.
C. When the University or its Selection Committee
relaxes the minimum required qualifications,
unless it is specifically stated in the
advertisement/notification both that the
qualifications will be relaxed and also the
conditions on which they will be relaxed, the
relaxation will be illegal.
D. The University/Selection Committee must mention
in its proceedings of selection the reasons for
making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the
candidates in whose favour relaxation is made.
E. The minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee
should be preserved for a sufficiently long time, and if the
selection process is challenged until the challenge is
finally disposed of. An adverse inference is liable to be
drawn if the minutes are destroyed or a plea is taken that
they are not available.”
36. In light of the above, absence of any decision exercising power
of relaxation in favour of the selected candidate, i.e., the appellant
herein assumes greater significance, especially in the context of a
public selection process, where transparency and adherence to
declared criteria are of paramount importance. If such relaxation
were to be granted, it ought to have been reflected in the record in
clear terms, indicating that the recruitment agency was conscious
of the lack of essential qualification of five years’ experience and
had, for valid reasons, chosen to relax the same.
24

37. The argument that the Committee is not required to record
reasons for its selection does not advance the case of the appellant.
While it may be correct that detailed reasons are not required for
awarding marks or selecting a candidate, the same principle
cannot be extended to the exercise of a statutory power of
relaxation. The latter involves a departure from the prescribed
eligibility conditions and, therefore, necessarily requires a
conscious, reasoned and demonstrable exercise of discretion. In
the absence of any material evidencing such exercise of, it cannot
be presumed that the requirement of minimum five years’
experience stood waived. Acceptance of such a contention would
effectively render the eligibility criteria nugatory and confer an
unguided discretion upon the recruiting agency, which is
impermissible in law.
38. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that
the requirement of “at least five years’ experience in computer
manufacturing/ maintenance company of repute”, being an
essential qualification, was required to be fulfilled as on the
relevant date. A candidate not fulfilling such requirement could
not have been treated as eligible merely on the basis of possessing
a higher degree or securing a higher rank in merit. The record
25

clearly indicates that the selected candidate, at the time of
submission of her application for the purpose of selection,
possessed work experience of only about one year, as is evident
from the application status and supporting documents furnished
by her during the selection process. In such circumstances, the
possession of ‘M.Tech degree in Electronics and Communication’,
which is a preferential qualification under the R&P Rules, could
not have been relied upon to either confer eligibility or to justify
any relaxation of the essential requirement. The mere possession
of such a higher academic degree does not, by itself, render a
candidate “otherwise eligible or well qualified” without meeting the
requirement of experience within the meaning of the R&P Rules,
particularly when the basic eligibility criteria itself remains
unfulfilled. Any such approach would amount to substituting the
minimum qualification with a preferential one, which is
impermissible. The selection of the appellant on such basis,
therefore, reflects a clear non-application of mind to the distinction
between essential and preferential qualifications and renders any
purported relaxation fundamentally flawed.
39. Further, although the R&P Rules do contemplate the power
of relaxation, such power is not capable of being presumed. It is
26

required to be exercised consciously by the recruiting agency, for
reasons to be recorded in writing such that it is in accordance with
the R&P Rules. In the case at hand, despite an order asking the
material granting relaxation in the eligibility criteria by applying
the mind by the recruiting agency, nothing has been brought on
record. In absence, guidance can be taken from the judgment of
Rekha Chaturvedi (Supra) , whereby it is clear that the selection
committee were required to mention in its proceedings and to
assign reasons to grant relaxation, if any.
40. Issue nos. (i) and (ii) are answered in the above terms.
Re: Issue (iii)

41. Having answered issue nos. (i) and (ii) against the appellant,
the question that now arises is whether, notwithstanding the
absence of eligibility and lawful exercise of relaxation, the selection
and appointment of the appellant can be sustained in law.
42. The position as it exists today is that on appointment and on
dismissal of the writ petition of the unsuccessful candidate Rahul
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the selected
candidate i.e., Himakshi has continued to serve on the post. When
her selection and appointment was set aside by the Division Bench
27

of the High Court in the impugned judgement, on being challenged,
stay was granted by this Court vide order dated 06.05.2021 which
is still in operation and the appellant has been in service. There is
no doubt that she was also regularised on the post in the year
2019.
43. In light of the same, it was strenuously urged on behalf of the
appellant that these factors, coupled with the absence of any
allegation of mala fides in appointment or any deficiency in
performance, ought to weigh with this Court in order to exercise
equity. In this regard, reference was made to the decision of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup v. State of
3
Haryana and Ors. , wherein the initial appointment was treated
to be deemed as regular, on account of the experience acquired
from the date of appointment to the post. The relevant portion of
the judgement reads as thus: –
“ 2. …The appellant was undoubtedly a graduate of a
recognised university in Economics and he also held diploma
in Social Welfare of a recognised university but admittedly he
did not have five years' experience in the field of Labour Laws
as Labour Inspector or Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops or
Wage Inspector. He was a Statistical Officer for about six
years and thereafter for a period of about ten months he held
the post of Chief Inspector of Shops. His experience of the
working of Labour Laws as Chief Inspector of Shops which is
a post higher than the Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops was,

3
(1979) 1 SCC 168.
28

therefore, limited only to a period of about ten months and he
did not satisfy the requirement of five years' experience. He
was, in the circumstances, ineligible to be appointed as
Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer under Rule 4, clause (1).
…
The appellant could not, therefore, be legitimately appointed
to the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer unless,
amongst other things he possessed five years’ experience in
the working of Labour Laws as Labour Inspector, Deputy
Chief Inspector for Shops or Wage Inspector, which he
admittedly did not…
3. The question then arises as to what was the effect of
breach of clause (1) of Rule 4 of the Rules. Did it have the
effect of rendering the appointment wholly void so as to be
completely ineffective or merely irregular, so that it could be
regularised as and when the appellant acquired the
necessary qualifications to hold the post of Labour-cum-
Conciliation Officer. We are of the view that the
appointment of the appellant was irregular since he
did not possess one of the three requisite qualifications
but as soon as he acquired the necessary qualification
of five years' experience of the working of Labour Laws
in any one of the three capacities mentioned in clause
(1) of Rule 4 or in any higher capacity, his appointment
must be regarded as having been regularised …”
44. Reliance was further placed on the decision of this Court in
4
Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors.
where the selection, and subsequent appointment, of candidates
as Motor Vehicle Inspector in the State of Bihar was under
challenge on account of not possessing the experience in an
appropriate automobile institution registered under the Factories
Act, 1948 or not possessing a driving license. It was held that by

4
(2001) 3 SCC 328.
29

virtue of having served on the post for a long time, by extending
equitable consideration, the appointments made pursuant to a
selection were not liable to be disturbed. The relevant portion is
reproduced below for ready reference: –
“ 6. The selected candidates, who have been appointed, are
now in employment as Motor Vehicle Inspectors for over a
decade. Now that they have worked in such posts for a
long time, necessarily they would have acquired the
requisite experience. Lack of experience, if any, at the
time of recruitment is made good now. Therefore, the
new exercise ordered by the High Court will only lead
to anomalous results. Since we are disposing of these
matters on equitable consideration, the learned counsel for
the contesting respondents submitted that their cases for
appointment should also be considered. It is not clear
whether there is any vacancy for the post of Motor Vehicle
Inspectors. If that is so, unless any one or more of the
selected candidates are displaced, the cases of the
contesting respondents cannot be considered. We think that
such adjustment is not feasible for practical reasons. We
have extended equitable considerations to such
selected candidates who have worked in the post for a
long period , but the contesting respondents do not come in
that class. The effect of our conclusion is that
appointments made long back pursuant to a selection
need not be disturbed. Such a view can be derived from
several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Ram
Sarup v. State of Haryana; District Collector Chairman,
Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M.
Tripura Sundari Devi and H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief
Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore. Therefore, we
must let the matters lie where they are.”

45. It was further urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant that such equitable consideration was extended by this
Court in a catena of cases, being Bholanath Mukherjee and Ors.
v. Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Centenary College and
30

5 6
Ors. , Rajesh Kumar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. and
Vikas Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and
7
Ors. to contend that where a candidate has continued in service
for a considerable period, this Court may, in appropriate cases,
mould the relief on equitable considerations so as to avoid
unsettling appointments.
46. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decisions is that
this Court may, in appropriate cases, having regard to the long
period of service, in absence of any fault on the part of the
incumbent, and on equities that may have crystallised over time;
mould the relief so as to do complete justice. However, such
exercise of discretion is necessarily conditioned by the facts of each
case and cannot be invoked to dilute or override the essential
eligibility requirements forming the basis of the selection process.
47. At this point, we must emphasise that the grant of relief on
equitable considerations is not a matter of right. The exercise of
such jurisdiction is discretionary and is invoked only in
exceptional circumstances when the facts so warrant. Where the
basic eligibility criteria itself remains unfulfilled, no claim of equity

5
(2011) 5 SCC 464.
6
(2013) 4 SCC 690.
7
(2013) 14 SCC 494.
31

can arise in favour of one candidate, in particular, when some
other candidate allegedly possessing the qualification and also
claiming appointment to the said post succeeded in the writ
Appellate Court. To extend such consideration in the face of a clear
breach of essential qualifications would amount to placing equity
above the R&P Rules, which is impermissible. The decisions relied
upon by the appellant, wherein this Court extended equitable
consideration to protect appointments, were rendered in distinct
factual contexts. In those cases, the deficiency in qualification was
either marginal or was capable of being cured by the incumbents
upon their continuation in service, inasmuch as the experience or
requirement in question could be acquired in the course of
discharging duties on the post itself. It was in such circumstances
that this Court, having regard to long years of service, declined to
unsettle the appointments.
48. In the present case, the defect is not merely procedural or
incidental, but goes to the root of eligibility itself. The selected
candidate, i.e., the appellant did not fulfil the essential
qualification of “at least five years’ work experience in computer
manufacturing/maintenance” as on the relevant date. Such
experience is of a specialised nature and external to the post in
32

question, which couldn’t have been acquired by a candidate after
serving as a Computer Hardware Engineer. At the same time, the
plea taken by the unsuccessful candidate has been accepted in the
Letters Patent Appeal, though consideration for his appointment
was not allowed. Thus, we can presume from the chart referred
above in paragraph 32 of this judgment, wherein the Committee
has not specified the nature of experience possessed by the
candidates even though it was deficient. Therefore, in such a
scenario, the qualification of five years’ experience which is within
the minimum qualification, must be understood in its true sense
to mean that the candidates ought to possess prior hands-on
exposure in the field of computer manufacturing/maintenance in
a company of repute. The experience in service on the said post
could not be substituted by the experience required at the
threshold.
49. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, it is further
observed that the recruiting agency or the Board had not exercised
their power under Clause 2 preceding Rule 7 or as per Rule 18 of
the R&P Rules by application of mind and assigning any reason in
writing. Therefore, the selection made, if any, in contravention to
the R&P Rules prevalent on the date, would cause inherent
33

illegality which cannot be dispensed with by way of equitable
consideration or by exercising discretion of the Court.
50. The next aspect which arises for consideration is whether, on
the selection of the appellant being held unsustainable, any
direction for selection/appointment of the unsuccessful candidate,
i.e., respondent no. 1 – Rahul or any other candidate is warranted.

51. It was contended on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel for
the unsuccessful candidate that he, having possessed the requisite
experience as on the relevant date, and the selection of the selected
candidate having been set aside, ought to be considered for
appointment to the post in question. This submission, however,
cannot be accepted in a mechanical manner. It is well settled that
mere participation in a selection process or even fulfilment of
eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to
appointment. The right, if any, is only to be considered in
accordance with the applicable rules and the outcome of a valid
selection process.
52. The material on record indicates that the selection process
itself was not conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed
eligibility criteria. As noticed hereinabove, candidates who did not
fulfil the essential qualification of experience were permitted to
34

participate, and there is nothing to show that the eligibility of
candidates was scrutinised with due rigour at the threshold. In
such circumstances, the recruitment process stands vitiated to
that extent, as also observed in the impugned judgement. A
perusal of the supporting documents submitted by the candidates
during the selection process, which are on record, indicates that
none of the parties herein appear to have possessed the requisite
experience in a “computer manufacturing/maintenance company
of repute” as specifically prescribed under the R&P Rules. The
selected candidate’s experience was in the capacity of a Vocational
Trainer (Telecom) in a Government school, whereas the
unsuccessful candidate had experience as a Senior Technical
Assistant, Project Associate and Additional Programme Officer in
various autonomous public institutions. The waitlisted candidate
was working as a System Administrator in a private company.
Such engagements, on the face of the record, do not satisfy the
specific nature of experience contemplated under the R&P Rules.
This further reinforces the observation that the essential eligibility
criteria was neither scrutinised nor adhered to at the stage of
selection, thereby vitiating the selection process.
35

53. Further, even on perusal of the facts and material on record,
it is not the case that respondent no. 1 – Rahul stood next in merit,
in a valid and properly conducted selection, upon exclusion of the
appellant Himakshi. The record does not support any such
automatic or consequential right of appointment. To direct
appointment in his favour would amount to substituting one
illegality with another without the benefit of a fair and rule-
compliant selection process.
54. In matters of public employment, the Court must be
circumspect in issuing positive directions for appointment unless
the entitlement is clear, unambiguous, and flows directly from the
applicable rules. Where the selection process itself is found to be
flawed, the appropriate course would ordinarily be to set aside the
selection rather than to direct appointment of a particular
candidate.

55. Before concluding, it may be noted that the controversy in
the present appeals has, at its core, arisen from the selection of a
candidate who did not fulfil the essential eligibility criteria as on
the relevant date, and the subsequent continuance of such
appointment over a period of time. The issues that have engaged
the attention of this Court, therefore, lie at the intersection of
36

adherence to the R&P Rules and the equities sought to be invoked
on account of subsequent developments. As discussed
hereinabove, the former must prevail.

56. In view of the above, the selection and appointment of the
appellant cannot be sustained in law. At the same time, no
direction for appointment of the unsuccessful candidate or any
other candidate is warranted, in the facts and circumstances of
the case.
57. Issue no. (iii) is answered accordingly.

58. Having regard to the above discussion, this Court finds no
infirmity in the impugned judgement of the Division Bench of the
High Court, and accordingly, the same is upheld. On considering
the nature of the defect in eligibility, the passage of time, and the
fact that the appellant has continued in service for a considerable
period, no useful purpose would be served in directing a fresh
process of selection at this stage with the same candidate.
However, the respondent no. 2 – Board is at liberty to issue a fresh
advertisement for selection to the post in question and do the
needful strictly in accordance with the R&P Rules. As such, for
the reasons recorded hereinabove, no direction for appointment in
37

favour of respondent no. 1 – Rahul or any other candidate can be
issued. Accordingly, these appeals stand dismissed.
59. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

.….………………………… J.
[J.K. MAHESHWARI]
..…………………………… J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
New Delhi;
April 20, 2026.

38