Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 916
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3298 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5247 of 2025)
MANCHU MOHAN BABU APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
& ANOTHER RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3299 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8623 of 2025)
MANCHU VISHNU VARDHAN BABU APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
& ANOTHER RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Signature Not Verified
Leave granted.
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.07.31
16:13:57 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 16
2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgement dated
02.01.2025 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Amaravati whereby the High Court dismissed the application filed
by the appellants herein in Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short, “CrPC”) and refused to quash C.C. No.1015 of 2021 on the
file of the Court of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati for
the offences punishable under Sections 290, 341 and 171F read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”)
and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861, the appellants are before
this Court.
3. The appellant Manchu Mohan Babu in Criminal Appeal
arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5247 of 2025 is the Chairman of Sri
Vidyaniketan Educational Institutions and the appellant Manchu
Vishnu Vardhan Babu in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)
No.8623 of 2025 is the son of Manchu Mohan Babu (hereinafter,
“the appellants”).
Page 2 of 16
3.1 Briefly stated the facts of this case are that the General
Elections for the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly in Andhra
Pradesh were scheduled on 11.04.2019 and as a consequence, the
Model Code of Conduct came into force on 10.03.2019 restricting
public meetings, dharnas, rallies and road shows without prior
permission from the Competent Authority until the end of the
electoral process. On 13.03.2019, the Sub Divisional Police Officer,
Tirupati West issued Prohibitory orders under Section 30 of the
Police Act, 1861 restricting such public gatherings.
4. It is the case of the respondent-State that on 22.03.2019 at
about 8:30 AM, the appellants and some others comprising of staff
and students congregated together to conduct a rally along the
Tirupati-Madanapalli Road, by raising slogans against the-then
Government of Andhra Pradesh for not granting student fee
reimbursements. They further are described to have raised slogans
and conducted a dharna on the same day from 8:30 AM to 12:30
PM.
Page 3 of 16
5. The above acts are alleged to have caused obstruction to the
free flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to
passengers.
6. On receipt of the said information about the rally and dharna,
the Mandal Parishad Development Officer and In-charge of the
Model Code of Conduct Team-IV, Chandragiri Assembly
Constituency arrived at the spot, videographed the rally and
dharna and registered a written complaint with the police.
Consequently, an FIR bearing No. 102 of 2019 came to be
registered on 22.03.2019 against the aforesaid appellants and
other participants in the rally and dharna at the Chandragiri Police
Station, District – Tirupati Urban.
7. Statements of certain witnesses having been recorded, a
chargesheet came to be filed on 03.06.2020 against the appellants
in C.C. No. 1015/2021.
8. Being aggrieved by the said criminal proceedings, the
appellants approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Page 4 of 16
Amaravati by filing Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022 seeking
quashing of the criminal proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021. Vide
impugned order dated 02.01.2025, the High Court dismissed the
said petition. The High Court noted that there are specific
allegations leveled against the appellants in the commission of the
alleged offences and observed that there were no tenable grounds
to quash the proceedings. Hence the instant appeal.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the
learned counsel for the respondent-State.
10. Sri Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, learned senior counsel for the
appellants submitted that the appellants were merely exercising
their fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression and
that the rally and dharna in question did not cause any form of
obstruction to the general public. That the rally and dharna were
both conducted peaceably and without arms. It was further
contended that the Model Code of Conduct would not govern the
appellants as they are private citizens. That the criminal
Page 5 of 16
proceedings initiated are nothing but an abuse of the process of
law to scuttle the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights
of the appellants. That the High Court has not appropriately
applied the ‘ Bhajan Lal test’ to determine if the criminal
proceedings are to be quashed. That no ingredients of the alleged
offences have been made out. Therefore, it was argued that this
Court may set-aside the impugned order dated 02.01.2025 and
quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants
herein in C.C. No. 1015 of 2021.
10.1 Per contra , Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel for the
respondent-state contended that the dharna and rally were
conducted without prior permission of the concerned authorities,
blocked the traffic for several hours and caused public nuisance
and inconvenience. That reasonable restrictions may be applied to
the fundamental right to congregate peaceably.
11. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the bar and in light of the material on record.
Page 6 of 16
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question
that falls for our consideration is, whether, the criminal
proceedings in C.C. No. 1015 of 2021 against the appellants herein
ought to be quashed.
13. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 (“Bhajan Lal”) , this Court formulated the parameters in
terms of which the powers under Section 482 of CrPC may be
exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all those parameters,
a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The
Court held that quashing may be appropriate in the following
circumstances:
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
Page 7 of 16
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2).
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.”
14. Further, this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial
Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , while affirming Bhajan Lal has
held that:
“22. It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of
judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana
and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., this Court examined the
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution
and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down
certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction
under these provisions, it was also stated that these
guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae
to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but
with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One
of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of
superintendence by the High Court is not only of
Page 8 of 16
administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This
article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent
the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and
to see that the stream of administration of justice remains
clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under
Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power
more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking
these powers. …”
(Underlining by us)
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs.
15. This Court, in
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , reasoned
that the criminal process cannot be utilized for any oblique
purpose and held that while entertaining an application for
quashing an FIR at the initial stage, the test to be applied is
whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the
offence. This Court also concluded that the court should quash
those criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction
are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by
continuation of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid observations
squarely apply to this case.
Page 9 of 16
16. On perusal of the FIR of the instant case, it is noted that
respondent No.2-complainant has filed the FIR invoking Sections
290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 34 of
the Police Act. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are
extracted as under:
IPC:
“290. Punishment for public nuisance in cases not
otherwise provided for.— Whoever commits a public
nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this
Code, shall be punished with fine which may extend to two
hundred rupees.”
xxx
341.Punishment for wrongful restraint .—Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both”
xxx
171F. Punishment for undue influence and
personation at an election: Whoever commits the offence
of undue influence or personation at an election shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with
both.
xxx
Page 10 of 16
34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention: When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of common intention of all,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone.”
xxx
Police Act, 1861
34. Punishment for certain offences on roads, etc:-
Powers of police officers -
Any person who, on any road or in any open place or street
or thoroughfare within the limits of any town to which this
section shall be specially extended by the State
Government, commits any of the following offences, to the
obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger of
damage of the residents or passengers shall, on conviction
before a Magistrate, be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty
rupees, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour
not exceeding eight days; and it shall be lawful for any
police officer to take into custody; without a warrant, any
person who, within his view, commits any of such offences
namely:-
First - Slaughtering cattle, Curious riding, etc .- Any
person who slaughters any cattle or cleans any carcass;
any person who rides or drives any cattle recklessly or
furiously, or trains or breaks any horse or other cattle;
Second - Cruelty to animal - Any person who wantonly
or cruelly beats, abuses or tortures any animal;
Page 11 of 16
Third - Obstructing passengers - Any person who keeps
any cattle or conveyance of any kind standing longer, than
is required, for loading or unloading or for taking up or
setting down passengers, or who leaves any conveyance in
such a manner as to cause inconvenience or danger to the
public;
Fourth - Exposing goods for sale - Any person who
exposes any goods for sale;
Fifth - Throwing dirt into street - Any person who throws
or lays down any dirt, filth, rubbish or any stones or
building materials, or who constructs any cowshed, stable
or the like or who causes any offensive matter to run from
any house, factory, dung-heap or the like;
Sixth - Being found drunk or riotous - Any person who
is found drunk or riotous or who is incapable of taking care
of himself;
Seventh - Indecent exposure of person - Any person who
wilfully and indecently exposes his person, or any offensive
deformity or disease, or commits nuisance by easing
himself, or by bathing or washing in any tank or reservoir,
not being a place set apart for the purpose;
Eighth - Neglect to protect dangerous places - Any
person who neglects to fence in or duly to protect any well,
tank or other dangerous place or structure.”
17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the
High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR
and chargesheet are correct as they stand, offences punishable
under the aforesaid sections were made out.
Page 12 of 16
18. On a combined reading of the FIR and the charge-sheet, we
fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants
herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid
provisions. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet
as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offences under
Sections 290, 341, 171F read with 34 IPC and Section 34 of the
Police Act, 1861 are entirely absent. A reading of the FIR and the
charge-sheet neither discloses any act committed or illegal
commission that caused common injury, danger, annoyance to the
public or any section of the public or interference with their public
rights, nor do they disclose any voluntary obstruction to a person
that prevents them from proceeding in any direction that they have
a right to proceed in. Further they do not disclose any material to
suggest that there was any undue influence at elections,
impersonation at elections or any act committed with the intention
to interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights. Further they
do not suggest that any act was committed on a road or in an open
place within the limits of a town that caused inconvenience,
Page 13 of 16
annoyance or posed a risk of danger or inquiry or damage to the
public, and do not disclose any of the eight specified actions under
Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861. Therefore, even if the case of the
respondent-State is accepted at its face value, it cannot be
concluded that the appellants, while conducting the rally and
dharna, engaged in any form of obstruction of the road in a manner
that led to the offences alleged. The appellants were exercising their
right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble
peacefully. Therefore, no purpose will be served by continuing the
prosecution.
19. As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they
stand, which are not in dispute, indicate that the ingredients of the
offence under Sections 290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the
IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 are not established. The
High Court erred in concluding that there were specific allegations
against the appellants and that there were no tenable grounds to
quash the proceedings, and therefore, proceeded to dismiss the
application under Section 482 CrPC on a completely misconceived
Page 14 of 16
basis. It would have been appropriate for the High Court to have
exercised the power available under Section 482 CrPC to prevent
abuse of the court’s process.
20. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned facts and
judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the
appellants herein is made out, therefore, the judgments of this
Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs
(1), (2) and (3) of paragraph 102, extracted above and Pepsico ,
squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient
nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to
continue.
21. In the result, we allow these appeals and set-aside the
impugned judgment. The application under Section 482 of CrPC
on the file of the High Court shall accordingly stand allowed. The
FIR No.102 of 2019 dated 22.03.2019 registered at Police Station
Chandragiri, District Tirupati under Sections 290, 341, 171F read
with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861
Page 15 of 16
and the proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021 shall accordingly
stand quashed.
…….……………………………..J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
.…………………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 31, 2025
Page 16 of 16
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3298 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5247 of 2025)
MANCHU MOHAN BABU APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
& ANOTHER RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3299 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8623 of 2025)
MANCHU VISHNU VARDHAN BABU APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
& ANOTHER RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Signature Not Verified
Leave granted.
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.07.31
16:13:57 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 16
2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgement dated
02.01.2025 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Amaravati whereby the High Court dismissed the application filed
by the appellants herein in Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short, “CrPC”) and refused to quash C.C. No.1015 of 2021 on the
file of the Court of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati for
the offences punishable under Sections 290, 341 and 171F read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”)
and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861, the appellants are before
this Court.
3. The appellant Manchu Mohan Babu in Criminal Appeal
arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5247 of 2025 is the Chairman of Sri
Vidyaniketan Educational Institutions and the appellant Manchu
Vishnu Vardhan Babu in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)
No.8623 of 2025 is the son of Manchu Mohan Babu (hereinafter,
“the appellants”).
Page 2 of 16
3.1 Briefly stated the facts of this case are that the General
Elections for the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly in Andhra
Pradesh were scheduled on 11.04.2019 and as a consequence, the
Model Code of Conduct came into force on 10.03.2019 restricting
public meetings, dharnas, rallies and road shows without prior
permission from the Competent Authority until the end of the
electoral process. On 13.03.2019, the Sub Divisional Police Officer,
Tirupati West issued Prohibitory orders under Section 30 of the
Police Act, 1861 restricting such public gatherings.
4. It is the case of the respondent-State that on 22.03.2019 at
about 8:30 AM, the appellants and some others comprising of staff
and students congregated together to conduct a rally along the
Tirupati-Madanapalli Road, by raising slogans against the-then
Government of Andhra Pradesh for not granting student fee
reimbursements. They further are described to have raised slogans
and conducted a dharna on the same day from 8:30 AM to 12:30
PM.
Page 3 of 16
5. The above acts are alleged to have caused obstruction to the
free flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to
passengers.
6. On receipt of the said information about the rally and dharna,
the Mandal Parishad Development Officer and In-charge of the
Model Code of Conduct Team-IV, Chandragiri Assembly
Constituency arrived at the spot, videographed the rally and
dharna and registered a written complaint with the police.
Consequently, an FIR bearing No. 102 of 2019 came to be
registered on 22.03.2019 against the aforesaid appellants and
other participants in the rally and dharna at the Chandragiri Police
Station, District – Tirupati Urban.
7. Statements of certain witnesses having been recorded, a
chargesheet came to be filed on 03.06.2020 against the appellants
in C.C. No. 1015/2021.
8. Being aggrieved by the said criminal proceedings, the
appellants approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Page 4 of 16
Amaravati by filing Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022 seeking
quashing of the criminal proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021. Vide
impugned order dated 02.01.2025, the High Court dismissed the
said petition. The High Court noted that there are specific
allegations leveled against the appellants in the commission of the
alleged offences and observed that there were no tenable grounds
to quash the proceedings. Hence the instant appeal.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the
learned counsel for the respondent-State.
10. Sri Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, learned senior counsel for the
appellants submitted that the appellants were merely exercising
their fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression and
that the rally and dharna in question did not cause any form of
obstruction to the general public. That the rally and dharna were
both conducted peaceably and without arms. It was further
contended that the Model Code of Conduct would not govern the
appellants as they are private citizens. That the criminal
Page 5 of 16
proceedings initiated are nothing but an abuse of the process of
law to scuttle the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights
of the appellants. That the High Court has not appropriately
applied the ‘ Bhajan Lal test’ to determine if the criminal
proceedings are to be quashed. That no ingredients of the alleged
offences have been made out. Therefore, it was argued that this
Court may set-aside the impugned order dated 02.01.2025 and
quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants
herein in C.C. No. 1015 of 2021.
10.1 Per contra , Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel for the
respondent-state contended that the dharna and rally were
conducted without prior permission of the concerned authorities,
blocked the traffic for several hours and caused public nuisance
and inconvenience. That reasonable restrictions may be applied to
the fundamental right to congregate peaceably.
11. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the bar and in light of the material on record.
Page 6 of 16
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question
that falls for our consideration is, whether, the criminal
proceedings in C.C. No. 1015 of 2021 against the appellants herein
ought to be quashed.
13. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 (“Bhajan Lal”) , this Court formulated the parameters in
terms of which the powers under Section 482 of CrPC may be
exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all those parameters,
a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The
Court held that quashing may be appropriate in the following
circumstances:
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
Page 7 of 16
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2).
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.”
14. Further, this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial
Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , while affirming Bhajan Lal has
held that:
“22. It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of
judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana
and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., this Court examined the
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution
and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down
certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction
under these provisions, it was also stated that these
guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae
to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but
with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One
of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of
superintendence by the High Court is not only of
Page 8 of 16
administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This
article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent
the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and
to see that the stream of administration of justice remains
clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under
Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power
more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking
these powers. …”
(Underlining by us)
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs.
15. This Court, in
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , reasoned
that the criminal process cannot be utilized for any oblique
purpose and held that while entertaining an application for
quashing an FIR at the initial stage, the test to be applied is
whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the
offence. This Court also concluded that the court should quash
those criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction
are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by
continuation of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid observations
squarely apply to this case.
Page 9 of 16
16. On perusal of the FIR of the instant case, it is noted that
respondent No.2-complainant has filed the FIR invoking Sections
290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 34 of
the Police Act. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are
extracted as under:
IPC:
“290. Punishment for public nuisance in cases not
otherwise provided for.— Whoever commits a public
nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this
Code, shall be punished with fine which may extend to two
hundred rupees.”
xxx
341.Punishment for wrongful restraint .—Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both”
xxx
171F. Punishment for undue influence and
personation at an election: Whoever commits the offence
of undue influence or personation at an election shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with
both.
xxx
Page 10 of 16
34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention: When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of common intention of all,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone.”
xxx
Police Act, 1861
34. Punishment for certain offences on roads, etc:-
Powers of police officers -
Any person who, on any road or in any open place or street
or thoroughfare within the limits of any town to which this
section shall be specially extended by the State
Government, commits any of the following offences, to the
obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger of
damage of the residents or passengers shall, on conviction
before a Magistrate, be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty
rupees, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour
not exceeding eight days; and it shall be lawful for any
police officer to take into custody; without a warrant, any
person who, within his view, commits any of such offences
namely:-
First - Slaughtering cattle, Curious riding, etc .- Any
person who slaughters any cattle or cleans any carcass;
any person who rides or drives any cattle recklessly or
furiously, or trains or breaks any horse or other cattle;
Second - Cruelty to animal - Any person who wantonly
or cruelly beats, abuses or tortures any animal;
Page 11 of 16
Third - Obstructing passengers - Any person who keeps
any cattle or conveyance of any kind standing longer, than
is required, for loading or unloading or for taking up or
setting down passengers, or who leaves any conveyance in
such a manner as to cause inconvenience or danger to the
public;
Fourth - Exposing goods for sale - Any person who
exposes any goods for sale;
Fifth - Throwing dirt into street - Any person who throws
or lays down any dirt, filth, rubbish or any stones or
building materials, or who constructs any cowshed, stable
or the like or who causes any offensive matter to run from
any house, factory, dung-heap or the like;
Sixth - Being found drunk or riotous - Any person who
is found drunk or riotous or who is incapable of taking care
of himself;
Seventh - Indecent exposure of person - Any person who
wilfully and indecently exposes his person, or any offensive
deformity or disease, or commits nuisance by easing
himself, or by bathing or washing in any tank or reservoir,
not being a place set apart for the purpose;
Eighth - Neglect to protect dangerous places - Any
person who neglects to fence in or duly to protect any well,
tank or other dangerous place or structure.”
17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the
High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR
and chargesheet are correct as they stand, offences punishable
under the aforesaid sections were made out.
Page 12 of 16
18. On a combined reading of the FIR and the charge-sheet, we
fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants
herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid
provisions. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet
as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offences under
Sections 290, 341, 171F read with 34 IPC and Section 34 of the
Police Act, 1861 are entirely absent. A reading of the FIR and the
charge-sheet neither discloses any act committed or illegal
commission that caused common injury, danger, annoyance to the
public or any section of the public or interference with their public
rights, nor do they disclose any voluntary obstruction to a person
that prevents them from proceeding in any direction that they have
a right to proceed in. Further they do not disclose any material to
suggest that there was any undue influence at elections,
impersonation at elections or any act committed with the intention
to interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights. Further they
do not suggest that any act was committed on a road or in an open
place within the limits of a town that caused inconvenience,
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annoyance or posed a risk of danger or inquiry or damage to the
public, and do not disclose any of the eight specified actions under
Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861. Therefore, even if the case of the
respondent-State is accepted at its face value, it cannot be
concluded that the appellants, while conducting the rally and
dharna, engaged in any form of obstruction of the road in a manner
that led to the offences alleged. The appellants were exercising their
right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble
peacefully. Therefore, no purpose will be served by continuing the
prosecution.
19. As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they
stand, which are not in dispute, indicate that the ingredients of the
offence under Sections 290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the
IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 are not established. The
High Court erred in concluding that there were specific allegations
against the appellants and that there were no tenable grounds to
quash the proceedings, and therefore, proceeded to dismiss the
application under Section 482 CrPC on a completely misconceived
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basis. It would have been appropriate for the High Court to have
exercised the power available under Section 482 CrPC to prevent
abuse of the court’s process.
20. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned facts and
judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the
appellants herein is made out, therefore, the judgments of this
Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs
(1), (2) and (3) of paragraph 102, extracted above and Pepsico ,
squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient
nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to
continue.
21. In the result, we allow these appeals and set-aside the
impugned judgment. The application under Section 482 of CrPC
on the file of the High Court shall accordingly stand allowed. The
FIR No.102 of 2019 dated 22.03.2019 registered at Police Station
Chandragiri, District Tirupati under Sections 290, 341, 171F read
with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861
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and the proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021 shall accordingly
stand quashed.
…….……………………………..J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
.…………………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 31, 2025
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