Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1479
NON- REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15068 OF 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18702 of 2023)
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
PRANAB KUMAR NATH …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Leave Granted.
2. The Respondent- Pranab Kumar Nath was employed with
1
the Central Industrial Security Force and had been dismissed from
st
service in terms of order dated 1 July 2017 passed by the Senior
2
Commandant, CISF consequent to disciplinary proceedings
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2025.12.19
16:59:16 IST
Reason:
1 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CISF’
2 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Disciplinary Authority’
Page 1 of 14
drawn against him, for marrying once more in the subsistence of
3
his first marriage. Such dismissal was confirmed by the Appellate
4 5
and Revisional Authorities. The Learned Single Judge and the
6
Division Bench were of the view that dismissal from service is
much too harsh a penalty, and as such, for their own reasons, each
directed the Disciplinary Authority to pass orders imposing a lesser
penalty on him. The Appellant- the Union of India, is aggrieved
thereby.
3. The facts, as laid out by the Courts/Authorities below are
that the Respondent began serving as a member of the CISF as a
nd
Constable on 22 July 2006. Mrs. Chandana Nath- the wife of the
Respondent, by way of a written complaint, and subsequently,
upon examination, informed the authorities that he had, while on
rd
posting to the 3 NDRF Battalion, Mundali Odisha, married for a
th
second time to one Parthana Das on 14 March 2016.
Consequently, a Charge Memorandum was framed against the
th
Respondent on 7 July 2016. The relevant extract thereof is as
below:-
th
Deputy Inspector General, CISF vide Order dated 20 September 2017
3
th
Inspector General, CISF vide Order dated 26 July 2018
4
st
5 WP No. 8078 of 2019 vide Order dated 21 July 2022
th
6 Impugned judgment in WA No. 357 of 2022 by judgment dated 18 January 2023
Page 2 of 14
“ STATEMENT OF ARTICLES OF CHARGE
FRAMED AGAINST NO.Q6216(I(M5
CONSTABLE/GD PRANAB KUMAR .NATH OF
'HQRS.' COY, CISF UNIT ISP BURNPUR (W.B.)
Article of Charge
‘ “An act prejudicial to good order and discipline of the
Force in that CISF No.062f60045Constable/GD Pranab
Kumar Nath of 'FT Coy, CISF Unit ISP Bumpur, who,
having a spouse living has entered into a marriage with
another womah Mrs. Parthana Das daughter of Shri
Debasaran Das, village Barhanti Maniari, P.S.
Palasbari, District- Kamrurn (Assam) on 14.03.2016,
while he was serving at 3rJNDRF Battalion, Mundali
(Odisha) and Ums, violated the provisions of Rule-
18(b) of CISF Rules-2001. The above act on the part of
No.062160045 Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath
tantamount to grave misconduct and highly
unbecoming a good member of a disciplined CAPF i.e.
CISF". Hence, the charge.
Article of Charge-II
“An act prejudicial to good order and discipline of the
Force in that CISF No.062160045 Constable/GD
Pranab Kumar Nath of 'D' Coy, CISF Unit ISP Bumpur
is neglecting his wife (Smt. Chandna Nath) and minor
daughter though being a member of a disciplined CAPF
i.e. CISF, be is expected to maintain a responsible and
decent standard of conduct in his private life and not
bring discredit to his service by his misdemeanors. 'The
above act on the part of No. 062160045 Constable/GD
Pranab Kumar Nath tantamount to grave misconduct
serious indiscipline and highly unbecoming of a good
member of a disciplined CAPF i.e. CISF.". Hence, the
charge.
Sd/-
COMMANDANT
Page 3 of 14
CISF UNIT ISP BURNPUR
ANNEXURE-II
STATEMENT OF IMPUTATION OF MISCONDUCT
IN SUPPORT OF THE ARTICLES OF CHARGE
FRAMED ACAINST NO. 06216tuJ45
CONSTABLE/CD PRANAB KUMAR NATH OF
'HQRS.' COY, CISF UNIT ISP BURNPUR.
Article of Charge-I
A written complaint dated 18.03.2016 was received
from Smt. Chandana Nath wife of No.062160045
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath while he was serving at
3rd NDRF Battalion, Mundali (Odisha), wherein she
complained against her husband and informed about his
re-marriage. As per details of family given by
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath in his service records,
the name of his wife is Smt. Chandana Nath, 'The
complaint preferred by Smt. Chandana Nath wife of
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath was examined by the
Competent Authority and during the course of such
examination, it was ascertained that
No.062160045Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath, who,
having a spouse living, has entered into a marriage with
another woman Mrs. Parthana Das daughter of Shri
Debasaran Das, village Barhanti Maniari, P.S.
Palasbari, District- Kamaun (Assam) on 14.03.2016
and thus, violated the provisions of Rule-18(b) of CISF
Rules-2001. 'The above act on the part of
No.062160045 Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath
tantamount to grave misconduct and highly
unbecoming a good member of a disciplined CAP11’
i.e. CISF". Hence, the charge.
Article of Charge-II
Page 4 of 14
A written complaint dated 18.03.2016 was received
from Smt. Chandana Nath wile of No. 062160045
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath against her husband,
while he was serving at 3 NDRF Battalion, Mundali
(Odisha). Tn her complaint she stated that her husband
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath physically tortures her
alongwith his minor daughter and asked them to leave
his home. Being a member of a disciplined CAPB i.e.
CISF. he is expected to maintain a responsible and
decent standard of conduct in his private life also and
not bring discredit to his service by his misdemeanors.
The above act on the part of-No. 062160045
Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath tantamount to grave
misconduct, serious indiscipline and highly
unbecoming of a good member of' a disciplined CAP1'
i.e. CISF". Hence, the charge.
Sd/-
Commandant
CISF Unit ISP BURNPUR”
An Enquiry Officer was deputed to look into the case and upon
th
completion, report dated 19 May 2017 was submitted. The
following aspects can be noticed from a perusal thereof- ( a ) Mrs.
th
Chandana Nath and the Respondent were married on 13 March
2006, and it appears that the marriage has been sailing in rocky
waters ever since. ( b ) After some initial disputes, they started
residing separately from the family of the Respondent and were
th
also blessed with a daughter on 19 April 2008. (c) There are
allegations and counter-allegations about relationships outside of
marriage, and insofar as Ms. Das is concerned, the matter was
Page 5 of 14
taken forward by the Respondent only with the intention of
showing “his wife how it felt like when a spouse roamed or talked
with another person”. (d) In mid- 2016, after numerous back and
th
forth attempts, on 17 March 2016 Mrs. Chandana Nath finally left
her matrimonial home. (f) According to the Respondent, he sent
Mrs. Chandana Nath, money, first of his own volition and
subsequently upon orders of his superiors- the amount however,
was very little and spaced out. [See Pages 63 and 64 of the
paperbook]
4. Having taken note of the aforesaid facts, the Disciplinary,
Appellate and Revisional Authorities, all dismissed him from
service for having entered into a second marriage while still having
a living spouse.
5. The Learned Single Judge, taking cue from certain
authorities of the High Court as also this Court was of the view
that as opposed to dismissal from service, his removal from service
would be more appropriate and as such, remanded the matter to the
concerned authority. The appellant herein approached the Division
Bench against this order. It was held that dismissal from service is
the most extreme punishment that can be imposed, and while
entering into a second marriage can be termed as an act of
indiscipline, yet it is not such a serious act of misconduct to
warrant this punishment. The financial difficulty which would be
Page 6 of 14
imposed upon him as a result of this , as also upon his family,
would be disproportionate to the offence. The Division Bench too,
in the above terms remanded the matter to the concerned authority
for imposition of appropriate punishment.
6. We now take up the issue of the Respondent’s dismissal on
the Union’s appeal.
7. First and foremost, we must take note of the relevant rules.
7
The CISF Rules, 2001 have been framed under Section 22 of the
CISF Act, 1968. Chapter IV thereof provides for Recruitment to
the Force. Section 18 provides for the conditions which will lead to
the disqualification of a recruit as follows:
“ 18. Disqualification - No person, - (a) who has entered
into or contracted a marriage with a person having a
spouse living; or (b) who, having a spouse living, has
entered into or contracted a marriage with another
person, shall be eligible for appointment to the Force;
Provided that the Central Government may, if satisfied
that such marriage is permissible under the personal
law applicable to such person and the other party to the
marriage and there are other grounds for so doing,
exempt any person from the operation of this rule.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is important to observe that such Rules are premised on an
institutional requirement for all members of the force(s) to
maintain the highest standards of discipline, public confidence and
7 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Rules’
Page 7 of 14
integrity. It is generally understood that acts, whether in personal
or professional life, if they involve the possibility of domestic
discord, financial vulnerability or divided responsibilities, they
have the potential to adversely impact operational efficacy given
mental/psychological stability is key. It is also to be noted that
these rules are not a moral censure, but simply a service condition,
which, it need not be stated, an employer is perfectly within their
rights to prescribe, so long as such conditions are not arbitrary,
disproportionate or violative of constitutional protections, which in
any event stand taken before us. For instance, where the personal
law applicable to a service member permits either polygamy or
polyandry or the first marriage of such a service member was void,
voidable or the like, then, regulation by the employer without due
regard therefor would step into the undesirable realms of
overregulation, removed from the paramount interests of service
discipline.
8. None of the parties to this lis are alleging that the enquiry
and subsequent proceedings till the High Court have transgressed
the law or its duly laid down procedure. We need not, therefore,
look into that aspect. The crux of this appeal lies in appreciating
the contours of the power of the High Court vis-a-vis disciplinary
proceedings. It has long been held that under Article 226
jurisdiction, the court is not akin to an appellate Court, its powers
Page 8 of 14
are limited to the extent of judicial review. They cannot set aside
punishment or impose a different punishment unless they find that
there is substantial non-compliance of the rules. For instance, in
8
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , it was observed by a bench of
three learned judges of this Court that:
12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is
made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied
with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power
to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence
as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of
judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or
in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of
inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
8 (1995) 6 SCC 749
Page 9 of 14
the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may
interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould
the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority
has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or
the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the
strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be
canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of
India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC
364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be
issued.”
Similarly, in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant
9
S. Patil , it was observed:
“16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to
have approached the case as though it was an appeal
against the order of the administrative/disciplinary
authority of the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode
of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the
9 (2000) 1 SCC 416
Page 10 of 14
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or
capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived
at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the
above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental
authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of
the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence on which
the findings can be based, then adequacy or even
reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
10
Further, in Union of India v. K.G. Soni , it was held:
“ 14. The common thread running through in all these
decisions is that the court should not interfere with the
administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers
from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in
defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what
has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn.,
(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court
would not go into the correctness of the choice made by
the administrator open to him and the court should not
substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The
scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in
the decision-making process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed
by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no
scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it
10 (2006) 6 SCC 794
Page 11 of 14
may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
thereof. In the normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be
appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.”
(emphasis supplied)
11
We further notice that in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran , a
coordinate Bench of this Court had spelt out the scope of the High
Court’s function as follows:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can
only see whether:
( a ) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
( b ) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
( c ) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings;
( d ) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
11 (2015) 2 SCC 610
Page 12 of 14
( e ) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
( f ) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
( g ) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
( h ) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
( i ) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
( i ) reappreciate the evidence;
( ii ) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
( iii ) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
( iv ) go into the reliability of the evidence;
( v ) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
( vi ) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
( vii ) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.”
9. In view of the consistent position, as can be deduced from the
judgments referred to above, we are of the considered view that the
High Court, both the learned single Judge as also the division
bench erred in exercising its power as settled principles of law. We
say so for the reason that clause 18-B is a close prescribing penal
consequences for an action and it is trite in law that any provision
of law or rule framed under a statute prescribing penal
consequences, has to be strictly construed for the conditions that
can trigger such a clause must be flowing from the words
Page 13 of 14
employed therein. It is also settled that when such a rule presents
any ambiguity, the interpretation which favours the person sought
to be penalised, is to be preferred. In the instant case, it cannot be
said that there is any ambiguity. The words of the clause are clear.
There is no averment as to the proper procedure not been followed
in the disciplinary proceedings. The maxim “dura lex sed lex”
which means “the law is hard, but it is the law” is attracted in this
case. Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of
law cannot detract from the prescription of the law. Consequently,
we set aside the impugned judgment, and restore the findings of
the disciplinary authority, as confirmed by the Appellate and
Revisional authorities.
10. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of
this case, no order is required to be passed on cost.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………J.
( SANJAY KAROL )
…………………………………….J.
( VIPUL M. PANCHOLI )
New Delhi;
December 19, 2025.
Page 14 of 14
NON- REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15068 OF 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18702 of 2023)
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
PRANAB KUMAR NATH …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Leave Granted.
2. The Respondent- Pranab Kumar Nath was employed with
1
the Central Industrial Security Force and had been dismissed from
st
service in terms of order dated 1 July 2017 passed by the Senior
2
Commandant, CISF consequent to disciplinary proceedings
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2025.12.19
16:59:16 IST
Reason:
1 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CISF’
2 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Disciplinary Authority’
Page 1 of 14
drawn against him, for marrying once more in the subsistence of
3
his first marriage. Such dismissal was confirmed by the Appellate
4 5
and Revisional Authorities. The Learned Single Judge and the
6
Division Bench were of the view that dismissal from service is
much too harsh a penalty, and as such, for their own reasons, each
directed the Disciplinary Authority to pass orders imposing a lesser
penalty on him. The Appellant- the Union of India, is aggrieved
thereby.
3. The facts, as laid out by the Courts/Authorities below are
that the Respondent began serving as a member of the CISF as a
nd
Constable on 22 July 2006. Mrs. Chandana Nath- the wife of the
Respondent, by way of a written complaint, and subsequently,
upon examination, informed the authorities that he had, while on
rd
posting to the 3 NDRF Battalion, Mundali Odisha, married for a
th
second time to one Parthana Das on 14 March 2016.
Consequently, a Charge Memorandum was framed against the
th
Respondent on 7 July 2016. The relevant extract thereof is as
below:-
th
Deputy Inspector General, CISF vide Order dated 20 September 2017
3
th
Inspector General, CISF vide Order dated 26 July 2018
4
st
5 WP No. 8078 of 2019 vide Order dated 21 July 2022
th
6 Impugned judgment in WA No. 357 of 2022 by judgment dated 18 January 2023
Page 2 of 14
“ STATEMENT OF ARTICLES OF CHARGE
FRAMED AGAINST NO.Q6216(I(M5
CONSTABLE/GD PRANAB KUMAR .NATH OF
'HQRS.' COY, CISF UNIT ISP BURNPUR (W.B.)
Article of Charge
‘ “An act prejudicial to good order and discipline of the
Force in that CISF No.062f60045Constable/GD Pranab
Kumar Nath of 'FT Coy, CISF Unit ISP Bumpur, who,
having a spouse living has entered into a marriage with
another womah Mrs. Parthana Das daughter of Shri
Debasaran Das, village Barhanti Maniari, P.S.
Palasbari, District- Kamrurn (Assam) on 14.03.2016,
while he was serving at 3rJNDRF Battalion, Mundali
(Odisha) and Ums, violated the provisions of Rule-
18(b) of CISF Rules-2001. The above act on the part of
No.062160045 Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath
tantamount to grave misconduct and highly
unbecoming a good member of a disciplined CAPF i.e.
CISF". Hence, the charge.
Article of Charge-II
“An act prejudicial to good order and discipline of the
Force in that CISF No.062160045 Constable/GD
Pranab Kumar Nath of 'D' Coy, CISF Unit ISP Bumpur
is neglecting his wife (Smt. Chandna Nath) and minor
daughter though being a member of a disciplined CAPF
i.e. CISF, be is expected to maintain a responsible and
decent standard of conduct in his private life and not
bring discredit to his service by his misdemeanors. 'The
above act on the part of No. 062160045 Constable/GD
Pranab Kumar Nath tantamount to grave misconduct
serious indiscipline and highly unbecoming of a good
member of a disciplined CAPF i.e. CISF.". Hence, the
charge.
Sd/-
COMMANDANT
Page 3 of 14
CISF UNIT ISP BURNPUR
ANNEXURE-II
STATEMENT OF IMPUTATION OF MISCONDUCT
IN SUPPORT OF THE ARTICLES OF CHARGE
FRAMED ACAINST NO. 06216tuJ45
CONSTABLE/CD PRANAB KUMAR NATH OF
'HQRS.' COY, CISF UNIT ISP BURNPUR.
Article of Charge-I
A written complaint dated 18.03.2016 was received
from Smt. Chandana Nath wife of No.062160045
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath while he was serving at
3rd NDRF Battalion, Mundali (Odisha), wherein she
complained against her husband and informed about his
re-marriage. As per details of family given by
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath in his service records,
the name of his wife is Smt. Chandana Nath, 'The
complaint preferred by Smt. Chandana Nath wife of
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath was examined by the
Competent Authority and during the course of such
examination, it was ascertained that
No.062160045Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath, who,
having a spouse living, has entered into a marriage with
another woman Mrs. Parthana Das daughter of Shri
Debasaran Das, village Barhanti Maniari, P.S.
Palasbari, District- Kamaun (Assam) on 14.03.2016
and thus, violated the provisions of Rule-18(b) of CISF
Rules-2001. 'The above act on the part of
No.062160045 Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath
tantamount to grave misconduct and highly
unbecoming a good member of a disciplined CAP11’
i.e. CISF". Hence, the charge.
Article of Charge-II
Page 4 of 14
A written complaint dated 18.03.2016 was received
from Smt. Chandana Nath wile of No. 062160045
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath against her husband,
while he was serving at 3 NDRF Battalion, Mundali
(Odisha). Tn her complaint she stated that her husband
Const/GD Pranab Kumar Nath physically tortures her
alongwith his minor daughter and asked them to leave
his home. Being a member of a disciplined CAPB i.e.
CISF. he is expected to maintain a responsible and
decent standard of conduct in his private life also and
not bring discredit to his service by his misdemeanors.
The above act on the part of-No. 062160045
Constable/GD Pranab Kumar Nath tantamount to grave
misconduct, serious indiscipline and highly
unbecoming of a good member of' a disciplined CAP1'
i.e. CISF". Hence, the charge.
Sd/-
Commandant
CISF Unit ISP BURNPUR”
An Enquiry Officer was deputed to look into the case and upon
th
completion, report dated 19 May 2017 was submitted. The
following aspects can be noticed from a perusal thereof- ( a ) Mrs.
th
Chandana Nath and the Respondent were married on 13 March
2006, and it appears that the marriage has been sailing in rocky
waters ever since. ( b ) After some initial disputes, they started
residing separately from the family of the Respondent and were
th
also blessed with a daughter on 19 April 2008. (c) There are
allegations and counter-allegations about relationships outside of
marriage, and insofar as Ms. Das is concerned, the matter was
Page 5 of 14
taken forward by the Respondent only with the intention of
showing “his wife how it felt like when a spouse roamed or talked
with another person”. (d) In mid- 2016, after numerous back and
th
forth attempts, on 17 March 2016 Mrs. Chandana Nath finally left
her matrimonial home. (f) According to the Respondent, he sent
Mrs. Chandana Nath, money, first of his own volition and
subsequently upon orders of his superiors- the amount however,
was very little and spaced out. [See Pages 63 and 64 of the
paperbook]
4. Having taken note of the aforesaid facts, the Disciplinary,
Appellate and Revisional Authorities, all dismissed him from
service for having entered into a second marriage while still having
a living spouse.
5. The Learned Single Judge, taking cue from certain
authorities of the High Court as also this Court was of the view
that as opposed to dismissal from service, his removal from service
would be more appropriate and as such, remanded the matter to the
concerned authority. The appellant herein approached the Division
Bench against this order. It was held that dismissal from service is
the most extreme punishment that can be imposed, and while
entering into a second marriage can be termed as an act of
indiscipline, yet it is not such a serious act of misconduct to
warrant this punishment. The financial difficulty which would be
Page 6 of 14
imposed upon him as a result of this , as also upon his family,
would be disproportionate to the offence. The Division Bench too,
in the above terms remanded the matter to the concerned authority
for imposition of appropriate punishment.
6. We now take up the issue of the Respondent’s dismissal on
the Union’s appeal.
7. First and foremost, we must take note of the relevant rules.
7
The CISF Rules, 2001 have been framed under Section 22 of the
CISF Act, 1968. Chapter IV thereof provides for Recruitment to
the Force. Section 18 provides for the conditions which will lead to
the disqualification of a recruit as follows:
“ 18. Disqualification - No person, - (a) who has entered
into or contracted a marriage with a person having a
spouse living; or (b) who, having a spouse living, has
entered into or contracted a marriage with another
person, shall be eligible for appointment to the Force;
Provided that the Central Government may, if satisfied
that such marriage is permissible under the personal
law applicable to such person and the other party to the
marriage and there are other grounds for so doing,
exempt any person from the operation of this rule.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is important to observe that such Rules are premised on an
institutional requirement for all members of the force(s) to
maintain the highest standards of discipline, public confidence and
7 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Rules’
Page 7 of 14
integrity. It is generally understood that acts, whether in personal
or professional life, if they involve the possibility of domestic
discord, financial vulnerability or divided responsibilities, they
have the potential to adversely impact operational efficacy given
mental/psychological stability is key. It is also to be noted that
these rules are not a moral censure, but simply a service condition,
which, it need not be stated, an employer is perfectly within their
rights to prescribe, so long as such conditions are not arbitrary,
disproportionate or violative of constitutional protections, which in
any event stand taken before us. For instance, where the personal
law applicable to a service member permits either polygamy or
polyandry or the first marriage of such a service member was void,
voidable or the like, then, regulation by the employer without due
regard therefor would step into the undesirable realms of
overregulation, removed from the paramount interests of service
discipline.
8. None of the parties to this lis are alleging that the enquiry
and subsequent proceedings till the High Court have transgressed
the law or its duly laid down procedure. We need not, therefore,
look into that aspect. The crux of this appeal lies in appreciating
the contours of the power of the High Court vis-a-vis disciplinary
proceedings. It has long been held that under Article 226
jurisdiction, the court is not akin to an appellate Court, its powers
Page 8 of 14
are limited to the extent of judicial review. They cannot set aside
punishment or impose a different punishment unless they find that
there is substantial non-compliance of the rules. For instance, in
8
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , it was observed by a bench of
three learned judges of this Court that:
12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is
made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied
with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power
to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence
as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of
judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or
in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of
inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
8 (1995) 6 SCC 749
Page 9 of 14
the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may
interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould
the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority
has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or
the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the
strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be
canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of
India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC
364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be
issued.”
Similarly, in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant
9
S. Patil , it was observed:
“16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to
have approached the case as though it was an appeal
against the order of the administrative/disciplinary
authority of the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode
of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the
9 (2000) 1 SCC 416
Page 10 of 14
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or
capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived
at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the
above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental
authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of
the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence on which
the findings can be based, then adequacy or even
reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
10
Further, in Union of India v. K.G. Soni , it was held:
“ 14. The common thread running through in all these
decisions is that the court should not interfere with the
administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers
from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in
defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what
has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn.,
(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court
would not go into the correctness of the choice made by
the administrator open to him and the court should not
substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The
scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in
the decision-making process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed
by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no
scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it
10 (2006) 6 SCC 794
Page 11 of 14
may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
thereof. In the normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be
appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.”
(emphasis supplied)
11
We further notice that in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran , a
coordinate Bench of this Court had spelt out the scope of the High
Court’s function as follows:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can
only see whether:
( a ) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
( b ) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
( c ) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings;
( d ) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
11 (2015) 2 SCC 610
Page 12 of 14
( e ) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
( f ) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
( g ) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
( h ) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
( i ) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
( i ) reappreciate the evidence;
( ii ) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
( iii ) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
( iv ) go into the reliability of the evidence;
( v ) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
( vi ) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
( vii ) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.”
9. In view of the consistent position, as can be deduced from the
judgments referred to above, we are of the considered view that the
High Court, both the learned single Judge as also the division
bench erred in exercising its power as settled principles of law. We
say so for the reason that clause 18-B is a close prescribing penal
consequences for an action and it is trite in law that any provision
of law or rule framed under a statute prescribing penal
consequences, has to be strictly construed for the conditions that
can trigger such a clause must be flowing from the words
Page 13 of 14
employed therein. It is also settled that when such a rule presents
any ambiguity, the interpretation which favours the person sought
to be penalised, is to be preferred. In the instant case, it cannot be
said that there is any ambiguity. The words of the clause are clear.
There is no averment as to the proper procedure not been followed
in the disciplinary proceedings. The maxim “dura lex sed lex”
which means “the law is hard, but it is the law” is attracted in this
case. Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of
law cannot detract from the prescription of the law. Consequently,
we set aside the impugned judgment, and restore the findings of
the disciplinary authority, as confirmed by the Appellate and
Revisional authorities.
10. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of
this case, no order is required to be passed on cost.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………J.
( SANJAY KAROL )
…………………………………….J.
( VIPUL M. PANCHOLI )
New Delhi;
December 19, 2025.
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