ST. MARYS EDUCATION SOCIETY vs. RAJENDRA PRASAD BHARGAVA

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5789 OF 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1118 of 2022) ST. MARY’S EDUCATION SOCIETY & ANR.  ……APPELLANTS  VERSUS RAJENDRA PRASAD BHARGAVA & ORS.    ......RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T J.B. PARDIWALA, J.   : 1. Leave granted. 2. This   appeal   is   at   the   instance   of   a   private   unaided minority educational institution and its disciplinary committee, (respondents before the High  Court) and is directed against the judgment and  order  dated  15.12.2021 passed  by  a  Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench Indore in Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Sanjay Kumar Date: 2022.08.24 13:43:01 IST Reason: the Writ Appeal No. 485 of 2017 by which the Division Bench set aside the judgment and order passed by a learned single 1 Judge of the High Court and held that a writ petition filed by an employee of a private unaided minority educational institution seeking   to   challenge   his   termination   from   service   is maintainable in law.  3. In   the   present   appeal,   two   pivotal   issues   fall   for consideration of this Court:­ (a) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private unaided minority institution? (b) Whether a service dispute in the private realm involving   a   private   educational   institution   and   its employee   can  be   adjudicated  in   a  writ  petition  filed under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution?   In other words, even if a body performing public duty is amenable   to   writ   jurisdiction,   are   all   its   decisions subject to judicial review or only those decisions which have public element therein can be judicially reviewed under the writ jurisdiction? 4.  The   aforesaid   two   questions,   though   not   vexed, nevertheless despite plethora of case laws, always give rise to a 2 debate. FACTUAL MATRIX 5. The   appellant   No.   1­Society   runs   a   private   unaided educational institution. The appellant No. 2 is the disciplinary committee constituted by the appellant No. 1­Society for the purpose   of   its   internal   management.   The   respondent   No.   1 herein (original writ applicant before the learned single Judge) was serving as an office employee of the appellant No. 1. It appears from the materials on record that a show cause notice­ cum­suspension   order   dated   08.09.2014   was   issued   by   the appellant No. 1 herein to the respondent No.1 for the various alleged misconduct in service. The respondent No. 1 herein was thereafter issued a departmental chargesheet dated 08.12.2014 essentially on six grounds.  6.  The statement of charges and allegations as contained in the chargesheet dated 08.12.2014 are as under:­ “Charge I­ That, you refused to receive and deposit the PTA fund th from the lady teachers of the school on 4  August, 2014 and misbehaved with them. You talked to them rudely, loudly and your language was improper. Your refusal to 3 receive   and   deposit   the   amount   during   the   working hours is a gross misconduct and dereliction of your duty and act subversive of discipline.    Charge­II­ That, you are in habit of writing unwarranted letters to different authorities against the Principal of the school using   very   disrespectful,   derogatory   and   offensive language, making false accusation which is spoiling the image and reputation of this school.   Charge­III­ That,   you   have   threatened   and   pressurized   the institution by closing your Bank Account in which your monthly   salary   was   being   deposited   for   the   last   so many years.   You also actually refused to accept and receive your monthly salary for the month of August, 2014, which was offered to you by cheque personally on st 01.09.2014. In the following month the salary from 1  to th th th 8  September and 9  to 30  September as Subsistence Allowance   was   also   offered   to   you   by   cheque   on 01.10.2014 which you refused to accept again, saying that­ “I will take the subsistence allowance but until and unless I get justice …” (Letter dated 10.10.2014).   Your refusal to accept the salary shows that you do not wish to continue the relationship of employer – employee   with   the   school   because   the   school   cannot take your service without paying your salary. Charge­IV­ That earlier also your rude behavior with the Principal of the school was noticed for which you were warned and 4 advised   to   improve   your   behavior   and   talk   politely. However, no improvement has been shown by you in your   behavior.     You   have   misbehaved   with   the   two earlier Principals also namely: (1) Sr. Lalita (Letter dated 17.04.2009) and (2) Sr. Flavia.   Charge­V­ That, you were threatening the institution by writing to the President of our country that if something happens to you physically or mentally on work due to such behavior at home the sole responsibility of it would be on the School   Management,   the   Principal   and   the   various authorities.  This behaviour has compelled the school to complain to the police regarding your threat. Charge­VI­ That, you are in the habit of taking leaves at will and insisting   on   taking   leave   at   your   sole   convenience, sometimes without any sanction also.”   After   conclusion   of   the   departmental   enquiry,   the services of the respondent No. 1 came to be terminated vide order dated 08.05.2015. 7. The   respondent   No.   1   herein   challenged   the   order   of termination   on   various   grounds   in   appeal   before   the Disciplinary Committee of the appellant No. 1. The appeal was filed by the respondent No. 1 herein under Rule 49 of the CBSE Affiliation Byelaws. The Disciplinary Committee consisted of (i) 5 Sr. M. Deepa, Chairman, (ii) Sr. M. Georgina, School Manager, (iii)   S.N.   Purwar,   Advisor   CBSE   Nominee,   and   (iv)   Sadhna Paranjape, School Managing Committee Member. The appeal was ordered to be dismissed by the Disciplinary Committee, the appellant No. 2 herein, vide order dated 23.09.2016. 8.  In view of the aforesaid, the respondent No. 1 invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  In the writ petition, the respondent No. 1 arrayed the following five respondents:­ 1. Union of India 2.    Central Board of Secondary Education 3.   St. Mary’s Education Society 4.   Disciplinary Committee of the School  5.   Mr.   T.R.   Lapalikar   (retired   Deputy   Labour Commissioner appointed as Enquiry Officer) 9.   It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   despite   the   above   five respondents being arrayed as aforestated, the principal relief sought in the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 herein was to set aside the  order dated 23.09.2016 passed by the 6 Disciplinary Committee of the school and to set aside the order of termination dated 08.05.2015 passed by the appellant No. 1 herein. In other words, the respondent No.1 herein sought writ in   the   nature   of   certiorari   to   be   issued   against   the   private unaided minority institution. It may not be out of place to state at this stage that no relief was sought against the Union of India,   respondent   No.   2   herein   and   the   Central   Board   of Secondary Education (CBSE), respondent No. 3 herein.  10.  The   appellants   herein   raised   a   preliminary   objection before   the   learned   single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   on   the maintainability of the writ petition filed by an employee of a private unaided minority institution.  11. The learned single Judge of the High Court upheld the preliminary   objection   raised   by   the   appellants   herein   and rejected the writ application as not being maintainable. While rejecting the writ application vide order dated 10.07.2017 on the ground of not being maintainable in law, the learned single Judge held as under:­ “So   far   as   the   judgment   in   the   matter   of   K. Krishnamacharyulu (supra) relied upon by the petitioner 7 is concerned, in that case in respect of teachers duly appointed to a post in the private institution, it has been held by the Supreme Court that when an element of public interest is created and institution is catering to that element, the teacher, the arm of the institution is also entitled to avail of remedy provided under Article 226. In the present case, petitioner is not a teacher but is a member of clerical staff being L.D.C., hence he is not entitled to the benefit of that judgment. So far as the judgment in the matter of Frank Anthony Public   School   Employees   Association(supra)   is concerned,  that  was  a   case  where  the  teachers  had approached   the   court   for   writ   of   mandamus   seeking equalisation of their pay scales and condition of service with those of their counterparts in government schools and   in   that   context   it   was   observed   that   'the management of a minority Educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed   by   Article   30(1)   of   the   Constitution,   to oppress   or   exploit   its   employees   any   more   than   any other private employee, therefore the said judgment is distinguishable on its own facts. Similarly the benefit of Single Bench judgment of this court in the matter of Mrs. Kirti Bugde (supra) cannot be granted to the petitioner because in that judgment the petitioner was a teacher and a member of the academic staff but that is not so in the present case.  Having regard to the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that writ petition filed by the petitioner for issuance of writ of certiorari against the action of respondent No.3 which is a private unaided institution is not maintainable under Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   which   is accordingly   dismissed,   however   with   a   liberty   to   the petitioner to avail such other remedies as are available 8 in the law.” 12.  Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and order passed   by   the   learned   single   Judge   of   the   High   Court,   the respondent No. 1 herein went in appeal under Section 2(1) of the   M.P.   Uchcha   Nyayalaya   (Khand   Nyayapeeth   Ko   Appeal) Adhiniyam,   2005.     The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court thought fit to set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge and allowed the appeal holding that the writ application filed by the respondent No.1 herein against the appellants   herein   challenging   the   order   of   termination   from service was maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. The  appeal   Court   remitted   the   matter   to   the   learned   single Judge   for   being   considered  on  its   own   merits.  The  Division Bench, while allowing the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 herein, held as under:­ “11. Since all the aforesaid previous judgments have been considered, the judgment of Marwari (supra) is a binding   precedent.   The   present   appellant   was terminated from a private institution. In Marwari (supra) and Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) also the termination of Teacher/Officer was called in question in a writ petition. As per this judgment, the writ petition is maintainable. A division bench of this Court in Yogendra Singh Dhakad 9 Vs. Delhi Public School Society & Ors. 2014 SCC OnLine MP 162 has also taken the same view. So far as the judgment of Supreme Court in Executive Committee of Vaish   Degree   College,   Shamli   &   Ors.   Vs.   Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 58 is concerned, it is not applicable to the present case as it did not arise out of a writ petition. 12. Considering the aforesaid, order of learned Single Judge dated 10.07.2017 passed in WP No.1052/2017 is set aside. The writ petition is restored to its original number. We have no doubt that writ court shall make every   endeavor   to   decide   the   petition   expeditiously preferably within two months. 13. The writ appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.” 13. It   appears   from   the   aforesaid   that   the   appeal   court heavily relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in the case of   Marwari Balika Vidhyalaya v. Asha Shrivastaga , reported in (2020) 14 SCC 449, which, in turn, has relied upon its decision  in the  case of   Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab , reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331.  14.  In view of the aforesaid, the appellants are before this Court with the present appeal. 10 LEGAL STATUS OF THE APPELLANT NO. 1 ­ SOCIETY 15.   The  appellant No.  1  is a Society  registered under  the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. The Society   runs   an   all­girls   school   in   Mhow,   Indore,   Madhya Pradesh,   by   the   name   St.   Mary’s   Higher   Secondary   School, which was founded by a group of  French Catholic  Nuns in 1893. The school is a private unaided minority educational in­ stitution, which enjoys the protection guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. There is absolutely no Governmental control over the functioning and administration of the school. The respondent No. 1 herein was employed in this school prior to his termination. The school is presently affiliated to the Cen­ tral Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and is thus governed by its Rules and  Byelaws. Further, the Society has its own Byelaws, namely, (1) the Service Conditions for the Employees of St. Mary’s School and (2) Service Rules for Teaching and Non­Teaching Staff. The appellant No. 1­Society and the school are absolutely private institutions, without any aid or control of the Government or any instrumentality of the Government, and 11 therefore, not a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.   16. CBSE­i AFFILIATION BYELAWS Chapter­ I 1. Short Title and Definitions: 1. These   Byelaws   shall   be   called   Central   Board   of Secondary Education – International Affiliation Byelaws. 2. They   are   effective   from   April,   1,   2010   with modifications / amendments from time to time. 3. In case of any dispute(s) regarding the withdrawal of not   granting   affiliation   or   any   other   matter   pertaining   to upgradation   and   /or   any   matter   arising   in   respect   of anything pertaining to affiliation with any school and / or any other person, society, company or organization  , the courts and tribunals at Delhi only shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain such disputes. 2. Definitions: (i) “Affiliation”   means   formal   enrolment   of   a   school among the list of approved schools of the Board following prescribed / approved courses of studies up to class VIII as well as  those   preparing  students   according  to  prescribed courses   for   the   Board’s   International   Curriculum examinations. x x x  x (xxxxii)  “School” means any recognized school imparting elementary / middle / secondary /senior secondary level 12 education and includes: (i) a school established, owned or controlled by the  appropriate Government or a local authority; (ii) an aided school receiving aid or grants to meet whole  or part of its expenses from the appropriate Government or  the local authority; (iii) a school belonging to specified category; and (iv) an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or  grants to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority. Chapter­6 23. Powers and functions of the School Managing  Committee: (xi) It   shall   exercise   powers   to   take   disciplinary   action against staff. 25. Head of the School – Duties, Powers and  Responsibilities: (xii) Supervise, guide and control the work of the teaching and non­ teaching staff of the school. Chapter ­7 Service Rules for Employees: 26. Short Title: (1) Each school affiliated/ to be affiliated with the Board shall frame Service Rules for its employees which will be as per Education Act of the State/ Union Territory, if the Act makes adoption of the same obligatory, otherwise as per Service Rules given in subsequent sections. (2) Service Contract will be entered with each employee as per the provision in the Education Act of the State / Union Territory or as given in Appendix III, if not obligatory as per 13 the State Education Act / Act applicable in the country in which the school is situated. 27. Appointments: (1) All appointments to all categories of employees except Group ‘D’ employees (multitasking staff/ housekeeping) as per relevant country /Government of India gradation shall be made by Managing Committee either by direct recruitment or by promotion through a Selection Committee constituted by the   School   Society   /   Trust   /   Company   Registered   under Section   25   of   the   Companies   Act,   1956   or   under   the appropriate Acts of relevant country and in accordance with and upon such conditions as the Managing committee may decide, which shall be consistent with norms of the Board / Government   if   statutory   provision   exists.   Appointment   of Group ‘D’ employees will be made by the Principal through constituted Selection Committee. (2) The Selection Committee shall include a) In the case of recruitment of the Head of the School: (i) the President of the Society; (ii) the Chairman of the Managing Committee; (iii) an   educationist,   nominated   by   the   managing committee; (iv) a   person   having   experience   of   administration   of schools, nominated by the Managing Committee; and (v) an academic officer or representative of the Board. b) In the case of recruitment of teachers and librarian: (i) the Chairman of the managing committee; (ii) Head of the School; (iii) an   educationist,   nominated   by   the   managing committee; and  (iv) a subject expert c) In the case of recruitment of clerical staff / Laboratory Assistant: 14 (i) The   Chairman   of   the   managing   committee   or   any member   of   the   managing   committee   nominated   by   the Chairman. (ii) Head of the school; (iii) Manager/ Correspondent of the School d) In case of recruitment of class IV staff / multitasking staff/ housekeeping staff: (i) Head of the school; (ii) A nominee of School Managing Committee. (3) The   Selection   Committee   shall   regulate   its   own procedure   and   in   the   case   of   any   difference   of   opinion amongst the members of the Selection Committee on any matter, it shall be decided by the trust / society running the school or Board. (4) The appointment letters of every employee of a school shall be issued by its managing committee. (5) Where any selection made by the Selection Committee is not acceptable to the managing committee of the school, the   managing   committee   shall  record   its   reason   for  such nonacceptance and refer the matter to Board and the trust or society   or   Company   registered   under   Section   25   of   the Companies   Act,   1956   or   under   the   appropriate   Acts   of relevant country running the school and the trust or society, as the case may be, shall decide the same. (6) Employees   shall   be   appointed   subject   to   the provisions of this agreement and they shall have to comply with all the requirements of the provisions contained herein. 44. Code of Conduct: Byelaw number 44 of the Chapter­7 prescribes that every employee   shall   be   covered   by   the   code   of   conduct.   It prescribes the acts that constitute breach of code of conduct, the acts which shall not be deemed as a breach is a code of conduct. 15 46. Disciplinary Procedure: Suspension 1. The   School   Managing   Committee   may   place   an employee under suspension where: a. The   disciplinary   proceedings   against   her   are contemplated or pending. Or b. A case against her in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial; Or c. She is charged with embezzlement; Or d. She is charged with cruelty / physical punishment or mental harassment towards any student or any employee of the school. Or e. She is charged with misbehavior towards any parent, guardian student or employee of the school; Or f. She is charged with a breach of any other Code of Conduct. 49. Procedure for Imposing Major Penalty: 1. No   order   imposing   on   any   employee   any   major penalty shall be made except after an inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner specified below: a) The disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on   the   basis   of   the   allegation   on   which   the   inquiry   is proposed to be held and a copy of the charges together with the statement of the allegations on which they are based shall be furnished to employee and she shall be required to submit   within   such   time   as   may   be   specified   by   the disciplinary   authority   but   not   later   than   two   weeks,   a written statement of her defence and also to state whether she desires to be heard in person; 16 b) On   receipt   of   the   written   statement   of   defence,   or where no such statement is received within the specified time, the disciplinary authority may itself make inquiry in to such of the charges as are not admitted or if it considers it necessary   to   do   so,   appoint   and   inquiry   officer   for   the purpose; c) At the conclusion of the enquiry the enquiry officer shall prepare a report of the enquiry recording her findings on each of the charges together with the reasons thereof; d) The disciplinary authority shall consider the report of the enquiry and record its findings on each charge and if the disciplinary authority is of opinion that any of the major penalties should be imposed it shall: (i)   furnish to the employee a copy of the report of the enquiry officer, where an enquiry has been made by such officers; (ii)  give her notice in writing stating the action proposed to be taken in regard to her and calling upon her to submit within the specified time, not exceeding two weeks, such representation   as   she   may   wish   to   make   against   the proposed action; (iii)  on receipt of the representation if any, made by the employee, the disciplinary authority shall determine what penalty, if   any  should   be   imposed  on  the  employee   and communicate its tentative decision to impose the penalty to the Committee for its prior approval; (iv)   after   considering   the   representation,   made   by   the employee   against   the   penalty,   the   disciplinary   authority shall record its findings as to the penalty, which it proposes to   impose   on   the   employee   and   send   its   findings   and decision to the Committee for its approval and while doing so the disciplinary authority shall furnish to the employee all relevant   records   of   the   case   including   the   statement   of allegations,   charges   framed   against   the   employee, representation made by the employee, a copy of the enquiry report, where such enquiry was made and the proceedings of the disciplinary authority. 17 2. No   order   with   regard   to   the   imposition   of   a major   penalty   shall   be   made   by   the   disciplinary authority except after the receipt of the approval of the Committee. 51. Disciplinary Committee: 1. In case the employee wishes to appeal against the order   of   the   Disciplinary   authority,   the   appeal   shall   be referred   to   a   Disciplinary   Committee.   The   Disciplinary Committee shall consist of the following: a) The Chairman of the School Managing committee or in her absence any member of the Committee, nominated by her. b) The Manager of the School, and where the disciplinary proceeding is against her any other person of the Committee nominated by the Chairman. c) A nominee of the Board appropriate authority, She shall act as an adviser. d) The Head of the School, except where the disciplinary proceedings is against her, the Head of any other school nominated by the CBSE or Director of Education in case the Act so provides. e) One teacher who is a member of School Managing Committee of the school nominated by the Chairman of the Committee. 2. The Disciplinary Committee shall  carefully examine the findings of the enquiry officer reasons for imposing penalty recorded   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   and   the representation by the employee and pass orders as it may deem fit. Appendix–IV   attached to the Byelaws is with respect to the minority   educational   institutions.   Clause   6   of   Appendix­IV 18 reads thus:­ “6.   Disciplinary   Control   over   Staff   in   Minority Educational   Institutions:   While   the   managements should   exercise   the   disciplinary   control   over   staff,   it must be ensured that they hold an inquiry and follow a fair procedure before punishment is given. With a view to   preventing   the   possible   misuse   of   power   by   the management of the Minority Educational Institutions, the State   has   the   regulatory   power   to   safeguard   the interests of their employees and their service conditions including procedure for punishment to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OT THE APPELLANTS 17. Mr.   Pai   Amit,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the appellants, vehemently submitted that the Division Bench of the   High   Court   committed   a   serious   error   in   passing   the impugned   judgment   and   order.     He   would   submit   that   the learned single Judge of the High Court rightly took the view that   the   writ   petition   filed   by   the   respondent   No.1   herein seeking to challenge the order of termination passed by the appellant No. 1 herein could not be said to be maintainable in law. He would submit that the Division Bench of the High Court in an intra­court appeal ought not to have taken the view that 19 the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at the instance   of   the   respondent   No.   1   herein   was   maintainable before the learned single Judge. 18. Mr. Pai would submit that the Division Bench of the High Court mis­directed itself by relying upon the two decisions of this Court rendered in the cases of  Ramesh Ahluwalia  (supra) and  (supra).  Marwari Balika Vidhyalaya  19. Mr. Pai laid much stress on the following three aspects of the matter:­ (a)   Indisputably, the appellant No. 1 is a private   unaided   minority   educational institution; (b)   The   dispute   between   the   appellants and the respondent No. 1 herein is purely contractual in nature and does not involve any public law element, and (c)   The   respondent   No.1   herein   has sought relief only against the two orders of termination and both of which have been passed   by   the   appellant   No.   1   in   its 20 capacity as a private body.  20.  In such circumstance referred to above, Mr. Pai prays that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the impugned order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court may be set aside. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 21.  The   respondent   No.   1   herein   appeared   virtually   in­ person. He relied upon the written submissions furnished by him   to   this   Court.   In   his   written   submissions   dated 10.08.2022, he has mainly stated as under:­ “That the respondent no. 1 (Rajendra Prasad Bhargava) is filing this Written Notes as per this Hon’ble Court’s Order Dated:08.08.2022 seeking that the judgment and final order dated: 15.12.2021 of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal No. 485/2017 kindly be upheld whereby the writ petition of Respondent No. 1 was maintainable. That the Respondent No. 1 was working in St. Mary’s Hr.   Sec.   School,   Mhow   (M.P.)   run   by   the   appellant namely St. Mary’s Education Society, serving as a LDC since   July   1,   1987.   That,   the   respondent   no.   1   has performed   his   duty   honestly,   diligently,   allegiance (loyalty) and  with hard  work during his  27  years  of service and there is no adverse remark in his Service Book and Annual Confidential Roll. That, as far as the respondent no. 1 has knowledge and information, on the 21 basis of that the respondent no. 1 humbly prays to this Court that: I) Mandamus is  a very wide  remedy which  must be available   to   reach   injustice   wherever   it   is   found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. “A word is said to be mandatory as well as defining in nature when the word MUST is used in meaning of that word.” As the word “MUST” is used in the aforesaid statement about   the   mandamus   by   this   Hon’ble   Court,   the mandamus becomes mandatory as well as defining in nature. Hence it is proved that mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. I   (Respondent   No.   1),   therefore,   humbly   pray   to   this Hon’ble Supreme Court that kindly reject the contention urged by the appellant on the maintainability of the writ petition and to kindly upheld the Impugned judgment and final order dated: 15.12.2021 rightly and legally held  by the  Hon’ble  High  Court  of Madhya  Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal No. 485 of 2017. 1. Kindly read page No. 2 and 3 of Reply to the SLP.   OR Kindly read page No. 76 and 77 of Reply to the SLP (Annexure   R­2   Ramesh   Ahluwalia   case   reported   in (2012) 12 SCC 331). 2. Kindly read Para 20 on page No. 89, Para 21 on page No. 89­90 and Para 22 on page No. 90 of Reply to the   SLP   (Annexure   R­3   Andi   Mukta   case   reported   in 22 1989 AIR 1607) (1989) 2 SCC 691 3. Kindly read page No. 6 and 7 of Reply to the SLP. OR Kindly read Para 15 on page No. 97, 98 and 99 of Reply to   the   SLP   (Annexure   R­4   Marwari   Balika   Vidhyalya Case reported in (2020) 14 SCC 449. 4. Kindly   read   page   No.   49   of   SLP   (Annexure   P­5 Yogendra Singh Dhakad versus Delhi Public School Society, 2014 SCC Online MP 162: AIR 2014 (NOC 580) 211.” 22.  In his written submissions, the respondent No. 1 has also   requested   this   Court   to   consider   the   following   social circumstances:­ “i) That, my youngest son Ashwin Bhargava is suffering from Cancer of Nasopharanx (Rare type of Head and Nose Cancer) and I’m facing severe financial difficulties in his medical treatment. ii)  That, my wife Smt. Sunita Bhargava, 53 years has been   operated   upon   for   Carnio   Vertebral   Junction Anamoly on 25.12.2021. She has been discharged on 02.01.2022 and still completely on bed. Her medication is   still   going   on   through   physiotherapy   and   regular follow   up   for   future   periodic   evaluation.   For   her operation I’ve taken a loan of Rupees 350000/­ from a friend which has put more financial burden on me. I’ve to attend her throughout the day and night as well. iii)  That, apart  from  this, I’m suffering  from Cataract Disease in left eye. iv) That, I’m also suffering from Knee Pain problem in the 23 right leg.” 23.  He has prayed for the following reliefs:­ “Humble Prayer to this Court in the interest of Justice: 1. That, I (Respondent No. 1), therefore, humbly pray to this Court that kindly reject the contention urged by the appellant on the maintainability of the writ petition and to kindly upheld the Impugned Judgment and final order dated:15.12.2021 rightly and legally held by the High Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh,   Bench   at   Indore   in   Writ Appeal No. 485 of 2017. 2. That, the impugned order dated 23.09.2016 passed by the appellant, being illegal, improper and inoperative, may kindly be set aside; 3. That, the termination order dated 08.05.2015 passed by the disciplinary authority may kindly be set aside; 4.  That,  necessary  orders   may  kindly   be  passed  for reinstating the Respondent no. 1 at his original post with all consequential benefits and back wages; 5.   Any   other   relief,   which   this   Court   may   consider necessary in the interest of justice, may also be granted in favor of the Respondent no. 1.” 24.  Later   in   point   of   time,   the   respondent   No.   1   filed additional written submissions dated 11.08.2022, wherein the following has been stated:­ “1. That, when Respondent no. 1 was appointed in the 24 said  institution (St. Mary’s  Hr. Sec. School), the said institution was affiliated to the M.P. Board (State Board). At that time the school was also in receipt of the Grant­ in­Aid from the State Government of M.P. 2. That, whilst the respondent no. 1 was appointed on 01.07.1987 but the Service Conditions and Guidelines for   the   Teachers   was   for   the   first   time   given   on 26.07.2013 by the school to the respondent no. 1.  3. That, at the time of appointment of respondent no. 1 the said school was governed by the M.P. Ashaskiya School Viniyam Adhiniyam, 1975 – Which received the th assent of the President on the 18  October, 1975 assetn first published in the Madhya Pradesh for their better organization  and  development   and   matters   connected therewith or incidental thereto. 4. Para 3 of Chapter II of the said Act reproduced below, “Power   of   State   Government   to   regulate   school education.­ On and from the commencement of this Act, the State Government may regulate education in all the schools in the State in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.” 25. He has relied upon few judgments of this Court as noted above to fortify his submissions that the writ application filed before the learned single Judge was maintainable and should have been entertained on its own merits. ANALYSIS 26. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the 25 appellants and the respondent No. 1 in­person and also having considered the materials on record, we now proceed to answer the two pivotal issues referred to above by us. 27. The respondent No. 1 herein has laid much emphasis on the fact that at the time of his appointment in the school, the same was affiliated to the Madhya Pradesh State Board. It is his case that at the relevant point of time the school used to receive the grant­in­aid from the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. Later in point of time, the school came to be affiliated to the CBSE. The argument of the respondent No. 1 seems to be that as the school is affiliated to the Central Board i.e. the CBSE, it falls   within   the   ambit   of   “State”   under   Article   12   of   the Constitution.     The   school   is   affiliated   to   the   CBSE   for   the purpose of imparting elementary education under the Right of Children   to   Free   and   Compulsory   Education   Act,   2009   (for short,   “Act   2009”).   As   the   appellant   No.   1   is   engaged   in imparting of education, it could be said to be performing public functions. To put it in other words, the appellant No. 1 could be said to be performing public duty.  Even if a body performing 26 public duty is amenable to the writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review. Only those decisions which have public element therein can be judicially reviewed under the writ jurisdiction. If the action challenged does not have the public element, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action could be said to be essentially of a private character. 28.  We   may   at  the   outset   state   that   the   CBSE   is   only   a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the school affiliated to it is not a creature of the statute and hence not a statutory body. The distinction between a body created by the statute and a body governed in accordance with a statute has been explained by this Court in the   Executive Committee   of   Vaish   Degree   College   v.   Lakshimi   Narain , (1976) 2 SCC 58, as follows:­ “It   is,   therefore,   clear   that   there   is   a   well   marked distinction   between   a   body   which   is   created   by   the statute   and   a   body   which   after   having   come   into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words, the position seems to be that   the   institution   concerned   must   owe   its   very existence to a statute which would be the fountain­head of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal 27 existence.   If   the   answer   is   in   the   negative,   then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has   a   separate   existence   of   its   own   without any reference   to   the   statute   concerned   but   is   merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body.” 29.   As stated above, the school is affiliated to the CBSE for the sake of convenience, namely, for the purpose of recognition and syllabus or the courses of study and the provisions of the Act 2009 and the rules framed thereunder.  30. The contention canvassed by the respondent No. 1 is that a   Writ   Petition   is   maintainable   against   the   Committee   of Management controlling the affairs of an institution (minority) run by it, if it violates any rules and byelaws laid down by the CBSE.   First,   as   discussed   above,   the   CBSE   itself   is   not   a statutory   body   nor   the   regulations   framed   by   it   has   any statutory force. Secondly, the mere fact that the Board grants recognition to the institutions on certain terms and conditions itself does not confer any enforceable right on any person as against the Committee of Management.  31.    In     Km.   Regina   v.   St.   Aloysins   High   Elementary 28 School and another ,(1972) 4 SCC 188 :  AIR 1971 SC 1920, this   Court   held   that   the   mere   fact   that   an   institution   is recognised by an authority, does not itself create an enforceable right   to   an   aggrieved   party   against   the   Management   by   a teacher on the ground of breach or non­compliance of any of the Rules which was part of terms of the recognition. It was observed as under :­ "The Rules thus govern the terms on which the Govern­ ment would grant recognition and aid and the Govern­ ment can enforce these rules upon the management. But the enforcement of such rules is a matter between the Government and the management, and a third party, such as teacher aggrieved by some order of the manage­ ment cannot derive from the rules any enforceable right against the management on the ground of breach or non­ compliance of any of the rules." 32.  In   Km. Anita Verma v. D.A.V. College Management Committee, Unchahar, Rai Bareilly , (1992) 1 UPLBEC 30:­ “….30 where the services of a teacher were terminated, the Court held that the writ petition under  Article 226  is not maintainable as the institution cannot be treated as the instrumentality of the State. The matter was consid­ ered  in detail in  M/s. Habans Kaur v. Committee  of Management, Guru Teghahadur Public School, Meerut 29 and Anr., 1992 Labour and Industrial Cases 2070 (All), wherein the services of the petitioner were terminated by the Managing Committee of the institution recognised by the C.B.S.E. It was held that the Affiliation Bye­laws framed by the C.B.S.E. has no statutory force. The Court under  Article 226  of the Constitution of India can enforce compliance of statutory provision against a Committee of Management as held in a Full Bench decision of this Court   in  Aley   Ahmad   Abdi   v.   District   Inspector   of Schools, Allahabad and Ors ., AIR 1977 All. 539. The Af­ filiation Bye­laws of C.B.S.E. having no statutory force, the only remedy against the aggrieved person is to ap­ proach C.B.S.E. putting his grievances in relation to the violation of the Affiliation Bye­laws by the institution.” 33.  Thus, where a teacher or non­teaching staff challenges action of Committee of Management that it has violated the terms of contract or the rules of the Affiliation Byelaws, the appropriate remedy of such teacher or employee is to approach the CBSE or to take such other legal remedy available under law. It is open to the CBSE to take appropriate action against the Committee of Management of the institution for withdrawal of   recognition   in   case   it   finds   that   the   Committee   of Management has not performed its duties in accordance with the Affiliation Byelaws. 34. It needs no elaboration to state that a school affiliated to 30 the CBSE which is unaided is not a State within Article 12 of the Constitution of India [See :  Satimbla Sharma v. St. Pauls    [(2011) 13 SCC 760]. Nevertheless Senior Secondary School the   school   discharges   a   public   duty   of   imparting   education which   is   a   fundamental   right   of   the   citizen   [See   :   K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateshwara Hindu College of Engineering , (1997) 3 SCC 571]. The school affiliated to the CBSE is therefore an “authority” amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India [See :  Binny Ltd. and another v. V. Sadasivan and others , (2005) 6 SCC 657]. However, a judicial review of the action challenged by a party can be had by resort to the writ jurisdiction only if there is a public law element and not to enforce a contract of personal service.    A contract of   personal service  includes  all  matters relating   to   the   service   of   the   employee   –   confirmation, suspension, transfer, termination, etc. [See :  Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. C.P. Sebastian,  (2009) 14 SCC 360]. 35. This Court in the case of  K.K. Saksena v. International 31 Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and others , (2015) 4 SCC 670, after an exhaustive review of its earlier decisions on the subject, held as follows:­ “43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is  a 'State' within  the meaning of  Article 12  of   the   Constitution,   admittedly   a   writ   petition under  Article  226  would   lie  against   such   a  person  or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are catena   of   judgments   on   this   aspect   and   it   is   not necessary to  refer to  those judgments as that  is  the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. Reason is obvious. Private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of Common Law   that   involves   relationships   between   individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition   would   be   maintainable   against   an   authority, which   is   'State'   under  Article   12  of   the   Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.  x x x x 52. It is trite that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. There are three exceptions to this rule, namely: (i) when the employee is a public servant working under the Union of India or State;  (ii)   when   such   an   employee   is   employed   by   an authority/ body which is a State within the meaning of  Article 12  of the Constitution of India; and  (ii)   when   such   an   employee   is   'workmen'   within   the meaning of  Section 2(s)  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and raises a dispute regarding his termination by 32 invoking the machinery under the said Act.  In the first two cases, the employment ceases to have private   law   character   and   'status'   to   such   an employment is attached. In the third category of cases, it is the  Industrial Disputes Act  which confers jurisdiction on   the   labour   court/industrial   tribunal   to   grant reinstatement in case termination is found to be illegal.” 36.  The following decisions have been adverted to in   K.K.  (supra):­ Saksena 1. Shri   Anadi   Mukta   Sadguru   Shree   Muktajee Vandasjiswami   Suvarna   Jayanti   Mahotsav .(1989) 2 Smarak Trust & Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors SCC 691 2. G.   Bassi   Reddy   v.   International   Crops   Research Institute & Anr .,  (2003) 4 SCC 225 3. Praga   Tools   Corporation   v.   Shri   C.A.   Imanual     , (1969) 1 SCC 585  4. , (2003) 10 SCC Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas 733

private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a 33 State, the aggrieved person has a remedy, not only under the

in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even against  a  private   authority.   However,   such  private   authority must be discharging a public function and that the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in the discharge of public function. 38.  Paragraph 11 of the judgment in     (supra) is Binny Ltd. reproduced below:­ "Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of abuse of   power   and   neglect   of   duty   by   public   authorities.   However, under our Constitution,      Article 226    is couched in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even against a private authority. However, such private authority must be discharging a public function and that the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in discharge   of   a   public   function.  The   role   of   the   State expanded enormously and attempts have been made to create   various   agencies   to   perform   the   governmental functions. Several corporations and companies have also been formed by the government to run industries and to carry on trading activities. These have come to be known as   Public   Sector   Undertakings.   However,   in   the 34 interpretation given to  Article 12  of the Constitution, this Court took the view that many of these companies and corporations could come within the sweep of  Article 12  of the   Constitution.  At   the   same   time,   there   are   private bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It is difficult to draw a line between the public functions and private functions when it is being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest….”                                (Emphasis supplied)   39. This Court considered various of its other decisions to examine the question of public law remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.  This Court observed in  Binny Ltd.  (supra) as under:­ “ 29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the remedy under  Article 226  is pre­eminently a public law   remedy   and   is   not   generally   available   as   a remedy   against   private   wrongs.   It   is   used   for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel the   public/statutory   authorities   to   discharge   their duties and to act within their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped   to   serve   as   a   judicial   control   over administrative actions. This writ could also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view 35 of the words used in  Article 226  of the Constitution. However,   the   scope   of   mandamus   is   limited   to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the   source   of   such   power   is   immaterial,   but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action.  Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between public law and private law remedies.”  (Emphasis supplied) 40. In the penultimate para, this Court ruled as under:­ “32. Applying these principles, it can very well be said that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private body which is not a State within the meaning of  Article   12  of   the   Constitution   and   such   body   is amenable to the jurisdiction under  Article 226  of the Constitution and the High Court under  Article 226  of the   Constitution   can   exercise   judicial   review   of   the action challenged by a party.  But there must be a public   law   element   and   it   cannot   be   exercised   to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties.”                                    (Emphasis supplied) 41. In the background of the above legal position, it can be safely concluded that power of judicial review under Article 226 36 of the Constitution of India can be exercised by the High Court even if the body against which an action is sought is not State or an Authority or an Instrumentality of the State but there must be a public element in the action complained of. 42. A reading of the above extract shows that the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in the discharge of a public   function.   No   doubt,   the   aims   and   objective   of   the appellant No. 1 herein is to impart education, which is a public function.   However,   the   issue   herein   is   with   regard   to   the termination   of   service   of   the   respondent   No.   1,   which   is basically a service contract. A body is said to be performing a public function when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. 43.  In the case of  Committee of Management, Delhi Public , reported in (2015) 17 SCC School & Anr. v. M.K. Gandhi 353, this Court held that no writ is maintainable against a private school as it is not a "State" within the meaning of  Article 12  of the Constitution of India.  37 44. In the case of  Trigun Chand Thakur v. State of Bihar , reported in (2019) 7 SCC 513, this Court upheld the & Ors. view of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court which held that   a   teacher   of   privately   managed   school,   even   though financially aided by the State Government or the Board, cannot maintain a writ petition against an order of termination from service passed by the Management. 45. In the case of  Satimbla Sharma  (supra), this Court held that   the   unaided   private   minority   schools   over   which   the Government   has   no   administrative   control   because   of   their autonomy under  Article 30(1)  of the Constitution are not “State” within   the   meaning   of  Article   12  of   the   Constitution.   As  the right to equality under  Article 14  of the Constitution is available against the State, it cannot be claimed against unaided private minority private schools.   46. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of  Roychan Abraham v. State of U.P. , AIR 2019 All 96, after taking into consideration various decisions of this Court, held as under:­ 38 “38.  Even   if   it   be   assumed   that   an   educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have direct nexus with the discharge of public duty.  It   is   undisputedly   a   public   law   action   which confers   a   right   upon   the   aggrieved   to   invoke extraordinary   writ   jurisdiction   under  Article   226  for   a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts   without   having   any   public   element   as   its integral   part   cannot   be   rectified   through   petition   under    Article 226.  Wherever Courts have intervened in exercise   of   jurisdiction   under  Article   226 ,   either   the service   conditions   were   regulated   by   statutory provisions   or   the   employer   had   the   status   of   'State' within the expansive definition under  Article 12  or it was found   that   the   action   complained   of   has   public   law element.” (Emphasis supplied) 47. We may refer to and rely upon one order passed by this Court in the case of  S.K. Varshney v. Principal, Our Lady of , in the Civil Appeal Nos. 8783­8784 of 2003 Fatima H.S.S. dated July 19, 2007, in which the dispute was one relating to the   retirement   age   of   a   teacher   working   in   an   unaided institution. This Court, while dismissing the appeal preferred by the employee, held as under:­   “Both   the   petitions   were   dismissed   by   the   learned single   Judge   on   the   ground   that   no   writ   would   lie against   unaided   private   institutions   and   the   writ petitions were not maintainable.  39   Aggrieved   thereby,   writ   appeals   have   been   filed before   the   Division   Bench   without   any   result.   The Division   Bench   held   that   the   writ   petitions   are   not maintainable   against   a   private   institute.   Aggrieved thereby, these appeals have been filed.    Counsel   for   the   appellant   relied   on   a   decision rendered by this Court in K. Krishnamacharyulu & Ors. Vs. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering & Anr., (1997) 3 SCC 571. He particularly relied on the observation made by this Court in paragraph 4 of the order that when an element of public interest is created and   the   institution   is   catering   to   that   element,   the teacher, being the arm of the institution, is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226.   This Court in Sushmita Basu & Ors. Vs. Ballygunge Siksha Samity & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 680 in which one of us (Sema, J.) is a party, after considering the aforesaid judgment has distinguished the ratio by holding that the writ   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   against   a private educational institute would be justified only if a public law element is involved and if it  is only a private law remedy no writ petition would lie.  In the present cases,   there   is   no   question   of   public   law   element involved inasmuch as the grievances of the appellants are of personal nature. We, accordingly, hold that writ petitions   are   not   maintainable   against   the   private institute. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned   single   Judge   and   affirmed   by   the   Division Bench.   These   appeals   are   devoid   of   merit   and   are, accordingly,   dismissed.   No   costs.” (Emphasis supplied) 48.  We may also refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court   in   the   case   of   Vidya   Ram   Misra   v.   The   Managing 40 Committee Shri Jai Narain College , ( 1972) 1 SCC 623  :  AIR 1972 SC 1450 . The appellant therein filed a writ petition before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Allahabad challenging the validity of a resolution passed by the Managing Committee of Shri Jai Narain College, Lucknow, an associated college of the Lucknow University, terminating his services and praying for   issue   of   an   appropriate   writ   or   order   quashing   the resolution. A learned single Judge of the High Court finding that in terminating the services, the Managing Committee acted in violation of the principles of natural justice, quashed the resolution   and   allowed   the   writ   petition.   The   Managing Committee appealed against the order. A Division Bench of the High Court found that the relationship between the college and the appellant therein was that of master and servant and that even  if  the   service  of  the  appellant  had   been  terminated in breach of the   audi alteram partem   rule of natural justice, the remedy of the appellant was to file a suit for damages and not to apply under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ or order in the nature of certiorari and that, in fact, no principle of 41 natural justice was violated by terminating the services of the appellant.   The   writ   petition   was   dismissed.   In   appeal,   this Court upheld the decision of the High Court holding that the Lecturer cannot have any cause of action on breach of the law but only on breach of the contract, hence he has a remedy only by way of suit for damages and not by way of writ under Article 226   of   the   Constitution.   In   Vidya   Ram  Misra   (supra),   this Court observed thus: “12. Whereas in the case of Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jody v. A.L. Pande (1965) 2 SCR 713, the terms and conditions of service embodies in Clause 8(vi)(a) of the ‘College   Code’   had   the   force   of   law   apart   from   the contract   and   conferred   rights   on   the   appellant   there, here the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 have   no   efficacy,   unless   they   are   incorporated   in   a contract. Therefore, appellant cannot found a cause of action on any breach of the law but only on the breach of the contract.  As already indicated, Statute 151 does not lay down any procedure for removal of a teacher to be   incorporated   in   the   contract.   So,   Clause   5   of   the contract can, in no event, have even statutory flavour and   for   its   breach,   the   appellant’s   remedy   lay elsewhere.  13.   Besides,   in   order   that   the   third   exception   to   the general   rule   that   no   writ   will   lie   to   quash   an   order terminating   a   contract   of   service,   albeit   illegally,   as stated in  S.R Tewari v. District Board, Agra, (1964) 3 SCR   55   :   AIR   1964   SC   1680,     might   apply,   it   is 42 necessary that the order must be the order of a statutory body acting in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. The college, or the Managing Committee in question, is not a statutory body and so the argument of Mr. Setalvad that the case in hand will fall under the third  exception  cannot  be  accepted. The  contention  of counsel that this Court has sub­silentio sanctioned the issue   of   a   writ   under   Article   226   to   quash   an   order terminating services of a teacher passed by a college similarly   situate   in Prabhakar   Ramakrishna   Jodh (supra), and, therefore, the fact that the college or the Managing Committee was not a statutory body was no hindrance to the High Court issuing the writ prayed for by the appellant has no merit as this Court expressly stated   in   the   judgment   that   no   such   contention   was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court.” 49. In the case on hand, the facts are similar. Rule 26(1) of the Affiliation Byelaws, framed by the CBSE, provides that each school affiliated with the Board shall frame Service Rules. Sub­ rule (2) of it provides that a service contract will be entered with each employee as per the provision in the Education Act of the State/U.T. or as given in the Appendix III, if not obligatory as per   the   State   Education   Act.   These   rules   also   provide procedures   for   appointments,   probation,   confirmation, recruitment, attendance representations, grant of leave, code of 43 conduct, disciplinary procedure, penalties, etc. The model form of contract of service, to be executed by an employee, given in Appendix III, lays down that the service, under this agreement, will be liable to disciplinary action in accordance with the Rules and Regulations framed by the school from time to time. Only in case where the post is abolished or an employee intends to resign, Rule 31 of Affiliation Byelaws of the Board will apply. It may be noted that the above byelaws do not provide for any particular procedure for dismissal or removal of a teacher for being incorporated in the contract. Nor does the model form of contract given  in the  Appendix III  lays down any  particular procedure for that purpose. On the contrary, the disciplinary action   is   to   be   taken   in   accordance   with   the   Rules   and Regulations framed by the school from time to time. 50. On a plain reading of these provisions, it becomes clear that   the   terms   and   conditions   mentioned   in   the   Affiliation Byelaws may be incorporated in the contract to be entered into between the school and the employee concerned. It does not say that the terms and conditions have any legal force, until and 44 unless they are embodied in an agreement. To put it in other words, the terms and conditions of service mentioned in the Chapter VII of the Affiliation Byelaws have no force of law. They become terms and conditions of service only by virtue of their being incorporated in the contract. Without the contract they have no vitality and can confer no legal rights. The terms and conditions   mentioned   in   the   Affiliation   Byelaws   have   no efficacy,   unless   they   are   incorporated   in   a   contract.   In   the absence of any statutory provisions governing the services of the employees of the school, the service of the respondent no. 1 was purely contractual. A contract of personal service cannot be enforced specifically. Therefore, the respondent no. 1 cannot find a cause of action on any breach of the law, but only on the breach of the contract. That being so, the appellant’s remedy lies elsewhere and in no case the writ is maintainable. 51. Thus, the aforesaid order passed by this Court makes it very   clear   that   in   a   case   of   retirement   and   in   case   of termination, no public law element is involved.  This Court has held that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against a 45 private educational institution shall be maintainable only if a public law element is involved and if there is no public law element is involved, no writ lies.  52. In   , T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   v.   State   of   Karnataka (2002)   8   SCC   481,   an   eleven­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court formulated   certain   points   in   fact   to   reconsider   its   earlier decision   in   the   case   of   Ahmedabad   St.   Xavier’s   College , (1974) 1 SCC 717, and also the Society v. State of Gujarat case of  Unnikrishnan P.J. v. State of A.P. , reported in (1993) 4   SCC   111,   regarding   the   “right   of   the   minority   institution including   administration   of   the   student   and   imparting education   vis­à­vis   the   right   of   administration   of   the   non­ minority student”.  In the said case, very important points arose as follows:­ “5. (c) Whether the statutory provisions which regulate the facets of administration like control over educational agencies,   control  over   governing   bodies,   conditions   of affiliation including recognition/withdrawal thereof, and appointment of staff, employees, teachers and principals including their service conditions and regulation of fees etc. would interfere with the right of administration of minorities? 46 A.   So   far   as   the   statutory   provisions   regulating   the facets of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as conditions of affiliation to a university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day­to­day management, like appointment of staff,   teaching   and   non­teaching   and   administrative control   over   them,   the   management   should   have   the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a rational procedure for selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself. For redressing the grievances   of   such   employees   who   are   subjected   to punishment or termination from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals   could   be   constituted,   and   till   then,   such tribunal could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge. The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualifications, salaries, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher of an educational institution. Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State without interfering with overall administrative control   of   management   over   the   staff,   government/ university   representative   can   be   associated   with   the Selection Committee and the guidelines for selection can be laid down. In regard to unaided minority educational institutions such regulations, which will ensure a check over unfair practices and general welfare of teachers could be framed.” 53. We now procced to look into the two decisions of this 47 Court in the cases of  Ramesh Ahluwalia  (supra) and  Marwari (supra) resply. Balika Vidhyalaya  54. In  Ramesh Ahluwalia  (supra), the appellant therein was working   as   an   administrative   officer   in   a   privately   run educational institution and by way of disciplinary proceedings, was removed from service by the managing committee of the said educational institution. A writ petition was filed before the learned single Judge of the High Court challenging the order of the disciplinary authority wherein he was removed from service. The writ petition was ordered to be dismissed  in limine  holding that the said educational institution being an unaided and a private school managed by the society cannot be said to be an instrument of the State. The appeal before the Division Bench also came to be dismissed. The matter travelled to this Court. The principal argument before this Court was in regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against a private educational institution. It was argued on the behalf of the appellant therein that   although   a   private   educational   institution   may   not   fall within   the   definition   of   “State”   or   “other   authorities/ 48 instrumentalities”   of   the   State   under   Article   12   of   the Constitution, yet a writ petition would be maintainable as the said  educational  institution  could   be  said   to   be   discharging public functions by imparting education. However, the learned counsel   for   the   educational   institution   therein   took   a   plea before this Court that while considering whether a body falling with the definition of “State”, it is necessary to consider whether such   body   is   financially,   functionally   and   administratively dominated by or under the control of the government. It was further argued that if the control is merely regulatory either under a statute or otherwise, it would not  make the ipso facto  body   “State”   within   Article   12   of   the   Constitution.   On   the conspectus   of   the   peculiar   facts   of   the   case   and   the submissions   advanced,   this   Court   held   that   a   writ   petition would   be   maintainable   if   a   private   educational     institution discharges   public   functions,   more   particularly   imparting education. Even by holding so, this Court declined to extend any   benefits   to   the   teacher   as   the   case   involved   disputed questions of fact. 49 55. We take notice of the fact that in   Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) the attention of the Hon’ble Judges was not drawn to the earlier decisions of this Court in   K. Krishnamacharyulu (supra),  Federal Bank  (supra),  Sushmita Basu v. Ballygunge , (2006)   7   SCC   680,   and   Siksha   Samity   Committee   of Management,    Delhi Public School v. M.K. Gandhi  (supra). 56. In     (supra),   this   Court Marwari   Balika   Vidhyalaya followed  Ramesh Ahluwalia  (supra) referred to above.  57. We may say without any hesitation that the respondent No. 1 herein cannot press into service the dictum as laid down by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Marwari   Balika   Vidhyalaya (supra) as the said case is distinguishable. The most important distinguishing   feature   of   the   case   of   Marwari   Balika Vidhyalaya  (supra) is that in the said case the removal of the teacher from service was subject to the approval of the State Government.   The   State   Government   took   a   specific   stance before this Court that its approval was required both for the appointment as well as removal of the teacher. In the case on 50 hand, indisputably the government or any other agency of the government   has   no   role   to   play   in   the   termination   of   the respondent No. 1 herein.  58. In context with   (supra), we Marwari Balika Vidhyalaya remind ourselves of the Byelaw 49(2) which provides that no order with regard to the imposition of major penalty shall be made by the disciplinary authority except after the receipt of the   approval   of   the   disciplinary   committee.   Thus   unlike   (supra)   where   approval   was Marwari   Balika   Vidhyalaya required of the State  Government, in the case on hand  the approval is to be obtained from the disciplinary committee of the institution. This distinguishing feature seems to have been overlooked   by   the   High   Court   while   passing   the   impugned order. 59. In   (supra), the school was Marwari Balika Vidhyalaya receiving grant­in­aid to the extent of dearness allowance. The appointment and the removal, as noted above, is required to be approved   by   the   District   Inspector   of   School   (Primary Education) and, if any action is taken dehors such mandatory 51 provisions, the same would not come within the realm of private element.  60.     In    Trigun Chand Thakur    (supra),  the appellant therein was appointed as a Sanskrit teacher and a show cause notice was issued upon him on the ground that he was absent on the eve   of   the   Independence   day   and   the   Teachers   day   which resulted   into   a   dismissal   order   passed   by   the   Managing Committee of the private school. The challenge was made by filing a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that the writ petition is not maintainable against an order terminating the service by the Managing Committee of the   private   school.   This   Court  held   that   even   if   the   private school was receiving a financial aid from the Government, it does not make the said Managing Committee of the school a “State” within the meaning of  Article 12  of the Constitution of India. 61. Merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the  private  individuals   discharging  the   public  duties  and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained  if the 52 enforcement   is   sought   to   be   secured   under   the   realm   of   a private law. It would not be safe to say that the moment the private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction then every dispute concerning the said private institution is amenable to writ   jurisdiction.   It   largely   depends   upon   the   nature   of   the dispute   and   the   enforcement   of   the   right   by   an   individual against such institution. The right which purely originates from a   private   law   cannot   be   enforced   taking   aid   of   the   writ jurisdiction   irrespective   of   the   fact   that   such   institution   is discharging   the   public   duties   and/or   public   functions.   The scope of the mandamus is basically limited to an enforcement of the public duty and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the court to find out whether the nature of the duty comes within the peripheral of the public duty. There must be a public law element in any action. 62. Our present judgment would remain incomplete if we fail to   refer   to   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of , (2019) 16 SCC 303. Ramakrishnan Mission v. Kago Kunya In the said case this Court considered all its earlier judgments 53 on  the   issue.   The   writ  petition  was  not  found   maintainable against the Mission merely for the reason that it was found running a hospital, thus discharging public functions/public duty.   This   Court   considered   the   issue   in   reference   to   the element of public function which should be akin to the work performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. This Court took the view that every public function/public duty would not make a writ petition to be maintainable against an “authority” or a “person” referred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India   unless   the   functions   are   such   which   are   akin   to   the functions of the State or are sovereign in nature. Few relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted as under for ready reference:­ “17. The basic issue before this Court is whether the functions performed by the hospital are public functions, on the basis of which a writ of mandamus can lie under Article 226 of the Constitution.  18. The hospital is a branch of the Ramakrishna Mission and   is   subject   to   its   control.   The   Mission   was established by Swami Vivekanand, the foremost disciple of Shri Ramakrishna Paramhansa. Service to humanity is for the organisation co­equal with service to God as is 54 reflected   in   the   motto   “Atmano   Mokshartham   Jagad Hitaya   Cha”.   The   main   object   of   the   Ramakrishna Mission   is   to   impart   knowledge   in   and   promote   the study of Vedanta and its principles propounded by Shri. Ramakrishna Paramahansa and practically illustrated by his own life and of comparative theology in its widest form. Its objects include, inter alia to establish, maintain, carry   on   and   assist   schools,   colleges,   universities, research   institutions,  libraries,  hospitals  and  take  up development   and   general   welfare   activities   for   the benefit of the underprivileged/backward/tribal people of society without any discrimination. These activities are voluntary, charitable and non­profit making in nature. The activities undertaken by the Mission, a non­profit entity are not closely related to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity nor do they partake of the nature of a public duty.  19. The Governing Body of the Mission is constituted by members of the Board of Trustees of Ramakrishna Math and is vested with the power and authority to manage the   organisation.   The   properties   and   funds   of   the Mission   and   its   management   vest   in   the   Governing Body. Any person can become a member of the Mission if elected by the Governing Body. Members on roll form the   quorum   of   the   annual   general   meetings.   The Managing Committee comprises of members appointed by the Governing Body for managing the affairs of the Mission.   Under   the   Memorandum   of   Association   and Rules   and   Regulations   of   the   Mission,   there   is   no governmental control in the functioning, administration and   day   to   day   management   of   the   Mission.   The conditions of service of the employees of the hospital are governed   by   service   rules   which   are   framed   by   the Mission  without  the  intervention  of  any governmental body. 55 20. In coming to the conclusion that the appellants fell within the description of an authority under Article 226, the High Court placed a considerable degree of reliance on the judgment of a two­Judge Bench of this Court in Andi   Mukta   [Andi   Mukta   Sadguru   Shree   Muktajee Vandas   Swami   Suvarna   Jayanti   Mahotsav   Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691]. Andi Mukta [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna   Jayanti   Mahotsav   Smarak   Trust   v.   V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691] was a case where a public trust   was   running   a   college   which   was   affiliated   to Gujarat   University,   a   body   governed   by   the   State legislation. The teachers of  the  University and all its affiliated colleges were governed, insofar as their pay scales were concerned, by the recommendations of the University   Grants   Commission.   A   dispute   over   pay scales   raised   by   the   association   representing   the teachers of the University had been the subject­matter of an award of the Chancellor, which was accepted by the government   as   well   as   by   the   University.   The management of the college, in question, decided to close it   down   without   prior   approval.   A   writ   petition   was instituted before the High Court for the enforcement of the right of the teachers to receive their salaries and terminal   benefits   in   accordance   with   the   governing provisions.   In   that   context,   this   Court   dealt   with   the issue as to whether the management of the college was amenable   to   the   writ   jurisdiction.   A   number   of circumstances weighed in the ultimate decision of this Court, including the following:   20.1.   The   trust   was   managing   an   affiliated college.  20.2. The college was in receipt of government aid.  20.3. The aid of the government played a major role in the control, management and work of the 56 educational institution.  20.4. Aided institutions, in a similar manner as government   institutions,   discharge   a   public function of imparting education to students. 20.5. All aided institutions are governed by the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. 20.6. Their activities are closely supervised by the University.  20.7. Employment in such institutions is hence, not devoid of a public character and is governed by the decisions taken by the University which are binding on the management.  21. It was in the above circumstances that this Court came to the conclusion that the service conditions of the   academic   staff   do   not   partake   of   a   private character,   but   are   governed   by   a   right­duty relationship between the staff and the management. A breach of the duty, it was held, would be amenable to the remedy of a writ of mandamus. While the Court recognised that “the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting rights of people cannot be put into watertight compartments”, it laid down two exceptions where the remedy of mandamus would not be available : (SCC p. 698, para 15) “15. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty   mandamus   will   not   lie.   These   are   two exceptions to mandamus.”  22. Following the decision in Andi Mukta [Andi Mukta Sadguru   Shree   Muktajee   Vandas   Swami   Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691], this Court has had the occasion to re­visit the underlying principles in successive decisions. This 57 has led to the evolution of principles to determine what constitutes  a  “public duty” and “public function”  and whether the writ of mandamus would be available to an individual who seeks to enforce her right.  25. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 456 : 4 SCEC 715], where a two­Judge Bench of this Court held that a private   body   can   be   held   to   be   amenable   to   the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when it performs public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State or its authorities.  26. In Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733], this Court analysed   the   earlier   judgments   of   this   Court   and provided a classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be maintainable : (SCC p. 748, para 18)  “18.   From   the   decisions   referred   to   above,   the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of   India   may   be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an   authority;   (iii)   a   statutory   body;   (iv)   an instrumentality   or   agency   of   the   State;   (v)   a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi)   a   private   body   run   substantially   on   State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.”   58 63. The aforesaid decision of this Court in   Ramakrishnan   (supra) came to be considered exhaustively by a Full Mission Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of   Uttam , reported in (2021) 6 All LJ 393 Chand Rawat v. State of U.P. (FB), wherein the Full Bench was called upon to answer the following question:­ "(i) Whether the element of public function and public duty   inherent   in   the   enterprise   that   an   educational institution undertakes, conditions of service of teachers, whose functions are a sine qua non to the discharge of that   public   function   or   duty,   can   be   regarded   as governed by the private law of contract and with no remedy available under  Article 226  of the Constitution?” 64.  The   Full   Bench   proceeded   to   answer   the   aforesaid question as under:­ “16. The substance of the discussion made above is that a   writ   petition   would   be   maintainable   against   the authority or the person which may be a private body, if it   discharges   public   function/public   duty,   which   is otherwise primary function of the State referred in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ramakrishnan Mission   (supra)   and   the   issue   under   public   law   is involved. The aforesaid twin test has to be satisfied for entertaining   writ   petition   under Article   226 of   the Constitution of India. 59 17. From the discussion aforesaid and in the light of the judgments referred above, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would be maintainable against (i) the Government; (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv)   an   instrumentality   or   agency   of   the   State;   (v)   a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private   body   discharging   public   duty   or   positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under   liability   to   discharge   any   function   under   any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function. 18.  There is thin line between "public functions" and "private functions" discharged by a person or a private body/authority. The writ petition would be maintainable only   after   determining   the   nature   of   the   duty   to   be enforced by the body or authority rather than identifying the authority against whom it is sought. 19. It is also that even if a person or authority is discharging   public   function   or   public   duty,   the   writ petition would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution,   if   Court   is   satisfied   that   action   under challenge   falls   in   the   domain   of   public   law,   as distinguished   from   private   law.   The   twin   tests   for maintainability of writ are as follows : 1.   The   person   or   authority   is   discharging   public duty/public functions. 2.  Their action under challenge falls in domain of public law and not under common law. 20. The   writ   petition   would   not   be   maintainable against an authority or a person merely for the reason that   it   has   been   created   under   the   statute   or   is   to governed by regulatory provisions. It would not even in a case where aid is received unless it is substantial in 60 nature. The control of the State is another issue to hold a writ petition to be maintainable against an authority or a person.”                  (Emphasis supplied) 65.  We owe a duty to consider one relevant aspect of the matter. Although this aspect which we want to take notice of has not been highlighted by the respondent No.1, yet we must look into the same. We have referred to the CBSE Affiliation Byelaws in the earlier part of our judgment. Appendix­IV of the Affiliation Byelaws is with respect to the minority institutions. Clause   6   of   Appendix­IV   is   with   respect   to   the   disciplinary control over the staff in a minority educational institution. We take   notice   of   the   fact  that   in  Clause   6,   the   State   has  the regulatory power to safeguard the interests of their employees and   their   service   conditions   including   the   procedure   for punishment to be imposed. For the sake of convenience and at the cost of repetition, we quote Clause 6 once again as under: “6.   Disciplinary   Control   over   Staff   in   Minority   While   the   managements Educational   Institutions: should   exercise   the   disciplinary   control   over   staff,   it must be ensured that they hold an inquiry and follow a fair procedure before punishment is given. With a view to   preventing   the   possible   misuse   of   power   by   the 61 management  of the  Minority Educational Institutions, the State has the regulatory power to safeguard the interests of their employees and their service conditions including procedure for punishment to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 66.  It could be argued that as the State has regulatory power to safeguard the interests of the employees serving with the minority   institutions,   any   action   or   decision   taken   by   such institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 67.  In the aforesaid context, we may only say that merely because the State Government has the regulatory power, the same, by itself, would not confer any such status upon the institution (school) nor put any such obligations upon it which may be enforced through issue of a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, we may refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court in the case of  Federal Bank  (supra). While deciding whether a private bank that is regulated by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 discharges any public function, this Court held thus:­ 62 "33.   ...   in   our   view,   a   private   company   carrying   on banking   business   as   a   scheduled   bank,   cannot   be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be   amenable   to   writ   jurisdiction   only   where   it   may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public   nature   casting   positive   obligation   upon   it.   We don't find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking.  Merely  regulatory  provisions  to  ensure   such activity   carried   on   by   private   bodies   work   within   a discipline,   do   not   confer   any   such   status   upon   the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may   be enforced through issue of a writ under   Article 226     of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The   respondent's   service   with   the   Bank   stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by   the   respondent   by   filing   a   writ   petition   under   Article   226   of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank." 34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, for instance, in K.K. Saksena [K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 654 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] this Court held that when   an   employee   is   a   workman   governed   by the Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947,   it   constitutes   an exception   to   the   general   principle   that   a   contract   of 63 personal   service   is   not   capable   of   being   specifically enforced or performed. 35. It is of relevance to note that the Act was enacted to provide   for  the   regulation   and  registration   of   clinical establishments   with   a   view   to   prescribe   minimum standards of facilities and services. The Act, inter alia, stipulates   conditions   to   be   satisfied   by   clinical establishments for registration. However, the Act does not   govern   contracts   of   service   entered   into   by   the hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved."    (Emphasis  supplied)   68. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:­ (a)   An   application   under   Article   226   of   the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging   public   duties   or   public   functions.   The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving   the   public   law   element.   Similarly,   for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to  achieve  the  same  for  the   collective  benefit  of   the 64 public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. (b) Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ   jurisdiction   under  Article   226  for   a   prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under  Article 226.  Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of   jurisdiction   under  Article   226 ,   either   the   service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under  Article 12  or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. (c) It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty   and   thus   its   actions   becoming   amenable   to 65 judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High   Court   conferred   by  Article   226  in   respect   of matter relating to service where they are not governed or   controlled   by   the   statutory   provisions.   An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere.   While   such of   those   functions  as   would   fall within   the   domain   of   a   "public   function"   or   "public duty" be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under  Article   226  of   the   Constitution,   the   actions   or decisions   taken   solely   within   the   confines   of   an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under  Article 226  of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed   by   statutory   provisions,   the   matter   would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. (d)  Even if it be perceived that imparting education 66 by private unaided the school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non­teaching   staff   engaged   by   the   school   for   the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In   any   case,   the   terms   of   employment   of   contract between a school and non­teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the   removal  of   an   employee   of   non­teaching   staff   is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered by   the   court.   But   such   interference   will   be   on   the ground   of   breach   of   law   and   not   on   the   basis   of interference in discharge of public duty. (e)  From the pleadings in the original writ petition, 67 it  is   apparent   that   no  element   of   any   public   law  is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus   cannot   be   issued   as   the   action   was essentially of a private character.  69. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   hold   that   the learned single Judge of the High Court was justified in taking the   view   that   the   original   writ   application   filed   by   the respondent No. 1 herein under Article 226 of the Constitution is not   maintainable.   The   Appeal   Court   could   be   said   to   have committed an error in taking a contrary view. 70. In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   this   appeal   succeeds   and   is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in the Writ Appeal No. 485   of   2017   is   set   aside.   The   writ   application   accordingly stands   rejected   on   the   ground   of   its   maintainability.   It   is needless to clarify that it shall be open to the respondent No. 1 herein to take up the issue with the CBSE itself or the State or may avail any other legal remedy available to him in accordance 68 with law. We clarify that we have otherwise not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 71. There shall be no order as to costs. 72. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. ………………………………………..J.     (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) ………………………………………..J.     (J.B. PARDIWALA) NEW DELHI; AUGUST 24, 2022 69